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 This dissertation is a product of the intellectual inspiration one Japanese person has obtained 
at Yale. Soon after starting my graduate study at Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan, I became 
interested in American constitutional law in general and free speech in particular. Vigorous 
discussions over the meaning of freedom of speech in a liberal democracy fascinated me so much 
that I wished to study in the United States. Luckily enough, I am privileged to have had such a 
precious opportunity at Yale Law School. Through attending classes as an LL.M. student, I have 
learned that legal study is not just scholastic discussion but also a positive commitment to make 
society a better place. The LL.M. experience has thus spurred me into reconsidering Japanese 
constitutional law, which in my view has long been surrounded with serious problems over freedom, 
governmental organization, and social justice. My main concern has come to lie in the question of 
how to fulfill the liberal democratic promises declared in the Constitution of Japan of 1946. As I 
understand, postwar politics in Japan has betrayed these promises. The Japanese people have not 
fully secured “the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty 
throughout this land”.1 It is true that the liberal democratization of politics is very difficult to achieve 
because majoritarian claims to govern always have to face minority challenges to their legitimacy. I 
believe, however, that the goal deserves pursuing with all the Japanese people’s energies because due 
respect for human dignity as individuals, popular sovereignty, and thorough pacifism---the three 
fundamental principles of the postwar Japanese constitution---are idealistic principles of government 
that have attracted a large number of people.  I hope that my work will make some positive 
contribution in promoting not only the liberal democratization of Japanese politics but also an 
understanding of Japanese constitutionalism on the part of the American people. 
                                                 
1 The Constitution of Japan, preamble, par. 1. 
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Toward a New Understanding of  the Constitution of  Japan 
 
Japan’s fanatical ultra-nationalistic movement of  the pre-war years vandalized the Meiji 
constitutional regime that had once experienced the liberal democratic political process to a 
considerable degree. The movement finally ended when Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers in 
World War II. Then, a crucial question emerged as to how to respond to the reality of  the defeat. 
There were two options available for the Japanese people: to restore the “good old regime” or to 
create a completely new political order. However, the actual outcome was something between the 
two options.1 The Constitution of  Japan, which was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and became 
effective on May 3, 1947, was established by following the amendment process the Constitution of  
the Empire of  Japan (the Meiji Constitution) provided for but introducing new principles of  
government fundamentally different from its predecessor.2  
In a comparison, we find a numbers of  similarities and differences in these two 
constitutions. Organization of  the two constitutions looks almost identical.3 The chapter dealing 
                                                 
1 For the process of  making the Constitution of  Japan, see Sato Tatsuo, Nihonkoku kenpo seiritsushi 4 vols. 
(Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1962, 1964, 1994) (hereinafter cited as Sato, Seiritsushi); Takayanagi Kenzo, Ohtomo Ichiro, 
and Tanaka Hideo, eds., Nihonkoku kenpo seitei no katei 2 vols. (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1972) (hereinafter cited as 
Takayanagi, Seitei Katei); Irie Toshio, Kenpo seiritsu no keii to kenpojyo no shomondai (Tokyo: Daiichi Hoki 
Shuppan, 1976) (hereinafter cited as Irie, Keii); Tanaka Hideo, Kenpo seitei katei oboegaki (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 
1979) (hereinafter cited as Tanaka, Oboegaki);  Koseki Shoichi, Shin kenpo no tanjyo (Tokyo: Chuko Bunko, 1989, 
1995) (hereinafter cited as Koseki, Tanjyo); Takahashi Hikohiro, Niohnkoku kenpo taisei no keisei (Tokyo: Aoki 
Shoten, 1997) (hereinafter cited as Takahashi, Keisei). Kyoko Inoue, MacArthur’s Japanese Constitution: A 
Linguistic and Cultural Study of  Its Making (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1991); Koseki, The Birth of  
Japan’s Postwar Constitution, translated by Ray A. Moore (Boulder: Westview, 1998); Ray A. Moore & Donald 
L. Robinson, eds., The Constitution of  Japan: A Documentary History of  Its Framing and Adoption, 1945-1947, CD-
ROM ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) (hereinafter cited as RM); John W. Dower, Embracing 
Defeat: Japan in the Wake of  World War II (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999); Theodore McNelly, The Origins of  
Japan’s Democratic Constitution (Lanham, MD: University Press of  America, 2000); Dale M. Hellegers, We, the 
Japanese People: World War II and Origins of  the Japanese Constitution 2 vols. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2001); Ray A. Moore & Donald L. Robinson, Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under 
MacArthur (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
2 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 73. 
3 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, which was promulgated on February 11, 1889, and became 
effective on November 29, 1890, has seven chapters and seventy-six articles in total. Its organization was as 
follows: Chapter I The Emperor; Chapter II Rights and Duties of  Subjects; Chapter III The Imperial Diet; 
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with the tenno (emperor) comes first in both constitutions. When we look more closely, we find that 
the status and powers of  the tenno have changed completely. Although the tenno still remains as an 
institution in the postwar constitution,4 there no longer exists a tenno as the head of  state with a 
divine right to govern. The tenno has become merely “the symbol of  the State and of  the unity of  the 
people, deriving his position from the will of  the people with whom resides sovereign power.”5 
Therefore we recognize a fundamental change in the holder of  sovereign power. 
The transition from the Meiji Constitution to the Constitution of  Japan is procedurally 
dependent upon a pre-existing rule but substantially something fundamentally new. However 
different their constitutional theories might be, both conservative Hozumi Yatsuka 6  and liberal 
Minobe Tatsukichi7 understood that a change of  the kokutai, national polity or national character, 
led to a revolutionary transformation of  the state.8 While the central idea of  the Meiji constitutional 
system lay in the particularistic concept of  the kokutai that the tenno in a line unbroken for ages 
eternal should govern Japan forever by following the will of  the imperial founder and ancestors, the 
postwar constitution was based upon a universalistic principle of  government as popular trust: 
“Government is a sacred trust of  the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the 
powers of  which are exercised by the representatives of  the people, and the benefits of  which are 
enjoyed by the people.”9 The basic structure of  the postwar constitution is to adopt the principle of  
popular sovereignty and thorough pacifism in order to secure due respect for human dignity as 
                                                                                                                                                             
Chapter IV The Ministers of  State and the Privy Council; Chapter V The Judicature; Chapter VI Finance; 
Chapter VII Supplementary Rules. Meanwhile, the Constitution of  Japan has eleven chapters and one hundred 
three articles in total. Its structure is as follows: Chapter I The Emperor; Chapter II Renunciation of  War; 
Chapter III Rights and Duties of  the People; Chapter IV The Diet; Chapter V The Cabinet; Chapter VI 
Judiciary; Chapter VII Finance; Chapter VIII Local Self-Government; Chapter IX Amendments; Chapter X 
Supreme Law; Chapter XI Supplementary Provisions.  
4 Even under the Constitution of Japan, the word “tenno” is usually translated into “emperor.” However, 
Japan ceased to be an empire after the Constitution became effective. Thus, I use “tenno” rather than 
“emperor” under the postwar regime except when the word “emperor” is used in an official English translation.   
5 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 1. 
6 See Hozumi Yatsuka, “Kenpo no seishin,” in Nagao Ryuichi, ed., Hozumi Yatsuka shu (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 
2001), 23. 
7 See Minobe Tatsukichi, Nihon kenpo no kihon shugi (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1934), 7-8; Minobe Tatsukichi, 
Shin kenpo no kihon genri (Fundamental principles of  the New Constitution) (Tokyo: Kunitachi Shoin, 1947), 69-73. 
8 For the details of  constitutional interpretations in the Meiji system, see Chapter 1 section 7. 
9 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble, par. 1. 
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individuals. The values the two constitutions try to defend differ completely from each other.  
In this dissertation, I will try to clarify the meaning of  this continuity in procedure and 
discontinuity in substance. Through examining the reason why the Japanese people have had both a 
continuous and discontinuous constitutional experience, I will argue that making the Constitution of  
Japan should be best understood as an unfinished constitutional revolution. If  revolution can be 
understood as simultaneous coexistence of  both a notion of  freedom and an experience of  a new 
beginning,10 the process of  making the Constitution of  Japan can be regarded as a type of  revolution. 
Since then, this constitution has constituted Japanese politics unprecedentedly in three aspects: 
process, style, and substance. My argument refuses to follow two conventional views of  the postwar 
constitution: theories of  external imposition and of  internal continuity. 
First, the external imposition theory attaches great importance to the fact that the postwar 
constitution was exogenous in essence and imposed upon the reluctant Japanese government as a 
consequence of  harsh occupational policy. For instance, Robert Ward once severely criticized the 
fashion that GHQ intervened in the most fundamental domestic issue. 11  The Allied Powers, 
specifically General Douglas MacArthur and his GHQ staff, imposed the postwar constitution on 
the Japanese government, which had been extremely reluctant to revise the Meiji Constitution 
substantially because the ruling elites were preoccupied by management to maintain their cherished 
kokutai. Ward singled out the meeting on February 13, 1946, as evidence of  threatening the Japanese 
government to adopt the new constitution.12 That meeting was held between Brigadier General 
Courtney Whitney, Chief  of  the Government Section of  GHQ, and Foreign Minister Yoshida 
Shigeru and Minister of  State in charge of  constitutional problems Matsumoto Joji, who had 
                                                 
10 See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 1963, 1965). 
11 See Robert E. Ward, “The Origins of  the Present Japanese Constitution,” 50 American Political Science Review 
980-1010 (1956). However, Ward later has revised his imposition theory because more materials became 
available afterwards. Compare Robert E. Ward, “Presurrender Planning: Treatment of  the Emperor and 
Constitutional Change,” Robert E. Ward and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, eds., Democratizing Japan: The Allied 
Occupation (Honolulu: University of  Hawaii Press, 1987), 1-41. Ward himself  told Takayanagi Kenzo, the 
former chairman of the Commission on the Constitution, that because other evidence was available now, he 
would write the incident differently. See Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 2: 59-60. 
12 See Ward, “The Origins of  the Present Japanese Constitution,” 995-999. 
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assumed that the GS would respond to the governmental proposed draft of  revision of  the Meiji 
Constitution.13 Instead, Whitney handed an American draft to them like a bolt from the blue. During 
the meeting, Whitney explained the background to repudiating the Japanese plan and preparing 
their own draft of  a constitution and necessity for the Japanese government to accept a basic idea of  
the American draft and revise the Meiji Constitution in that direction. The words of  Whitney might 
be understood as intimidation. Among other things, Whitney mentioned the possibility that the tenno 
might be prosecuted as a war criminal. Ward relied upon Sato Tatsuo’s account of  1955, which 
basically derived from notes of  Matsumoto because Sato did not attend the meeting, when Ward 
pointed out as evidence of  the threat the following: “General MacArthur had for some time been 
considering most seriously the maintenance of  the Emperor, but that it was essential to the 
accomplishment of  this aim that the Japanese Government proclaim a revised constitution similar to 
the draft here being presented. If  this was not done, the person of  the emperor could not be 
guaranteed.”14 And Ward wrote that “The most decisive pressure said to have been brought against 
[the Japanese] is […] the threat to ‘the person of  the Emperor.’ If  such a threat was made, one can 
understand far better the docility of  the Japanese in the remaining negotiations on constitutional 
revision.”15 This criticism was resonant with the attempts of  conservatives to revise the Constitution 
of  Japan in the 1950s.16 However, “Most serious of  all”, Ward continued to write, “is the damage 
this constitution may have done to the very cause it was intended to serve---the democratization of  
Japan.” Because “an idealized version of  Anglo-American political institutions” did not fit well with 
“the social, economic and political realities of  Japanese society”, in Ward’s view, “the older and 
more traditional political views and practices” that “not only survived but grew stronger and bolder” 
                                                 
13 For a description of  the meeting from the Japanese side, see Sato Tatsuo, Seiritsushi, 3: 47-57. From the 
American side, see Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 320-336.  
14 Sato Tatsuo, Jurisuto No. 82 (1955), 13, reprinted in his Seiritsushi, 3: 47  
15 Ward, “The Origins of  the Present Japanese Constitution,” 999 (footnote omitted). 
16 For arguments for revising the postwar constitution, see Watanabe Osamu, Nihonkoku kenpo “kaisei” shi (A 
History of  Attempts to Revise the Constitution of  Japan) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1987), 233-331.  
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would undermine the liberal democratic promise of  the constitution.17   
In 1980, Eto Jun, a literary critic, expressed his criticism of  a made-in-America constitution. 
Eto argued that the current constitution had constrained the psychology of  the Japanese as a taboo 
that had rejected all criticisms.18 His central target was Article 9 of  the postwar constitution that 
provides for denunciation of  war and of  armed forces and the right of  belligerency.19 His argument 
had a dual structure: Article 9 excluded all criticisms as a taboo and the fact that GHQ was its real 
producer was forbidden ground as well. There is nothing new in criticisms that the constitution was 
imposed by GHQ and that Article 9 deprived Japan of  sovereignty as an independent state. 
Immediately after the end of  the occupation, conservatives began to campaign against the imposed 
constitution to create a more traditional tenno system and the military. Eto’s argument held only a 
part of  the traditional attacks on the postwar constitution. What was new in Eto’s criticism was that 
he connected to the imposition theory the fact that the Civilian Censorship Department of  GHQ 
rigorously censored the Japanese press not to criticize their authority and not to inform the people of  
the bizarre origins of  the postwar constitution.20 In his view, GHQ not only limited the sovereign 
right of  an independent state to fight war but also constrained a way of  thinking of  the Japanese 
people. Eto contended that the effects still remained. 
However, the external imposition theory is not entirely persuasive. The alleged threat in the 
                                                 
17 Ward, “The Origins of  the Present Japanese Constitution,” 1010. 
18 See Eto Jun, 1946 nen kenpo: Sono kosoku (The Constitution of  1946: Its Constraint) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjyu, 
1980). See also, Eto Jun, Tozasareta gengo kukan: Senryogun no kennetsu to sengo nihon (The Sealed Linguistic Space: 
The Censorship of the Occupation Forces and Postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjyu, 1989, 1994). 
19 Article 9 of  the Constitution of  Japan reads “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of  the nation and the threat or use of  
force as a means of  settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of  the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of  
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” 
20 For the censorship by CCD, see Dower, Embracing Defeat, 405-440; Yamamoto Taketoshi, Senryoki media 
bunseki (An Analysis of  Media during the Occupation) (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1996); Ariyama 
Teruo, Senryoki media shi kenkyu: Jiyu to kisei 1945 (A Study of  History of  Media during the Occupation: Freedom and 
Regulation 1945) (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 1996). As Yamamoto has pointed out, Eto failed to understand 
GHQ’s censorship in relation to the pre and mid-war Japanese censorship system. See Yamamoto, Senryoki 
media bunseki, 554-562. Further, Eto did not raise the critical issue that Article 9 was established to save the 
tenno himself  and its institution. See Theodore H. McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’: The Policy and Process of  
Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan,” Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 76-106, 102. 
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February 13 meeting is dubious.21 At the meeting, which was clearly a turning point of  history, no 
American and Japanese participants other than Matsumoto Joji remembered that Whitney said that 
if  the Japanese government did not proclaim a revised constitution similar to the GHQ draft, the 
person of  the tenno could not be guaranteed.22 At that time, MacArthur had already decided to 
exclude the tenno from war criminal investigation and told the Joint Chiefs of  Staff  that he strongly 
opposed a plan to render the tenno subject to a war criminal trial. 23  However, the Japanese 
government did not know this fact but did feel the international opinions were extremely harsh on 
him.24 In such a situation, the Japanese participants might misunderstand Whitney’s utterance as a 
threat. It is reasonable, however, to interpret what Whitney said in that meeting as an objective 
warning of  “what might happen if  the Japanese Government failed to effect a constitutional reform 
in accordance with the terms of  the Potsdam Declaration.”25 Charles Kades, one of  the American 
participants, explains Whitney’s intention on the analogy of  lawyer’s counsel of  a danger if  a client 
refuses to follow his or her advice in the lawyer-and-client relationship.26 
More fundamentally, the imposition theory is in a sense self-contradictory. In fact, the 
conservatives have gained maximum benefit from GHQ’s intervention because they can maintain 
                                                 
21 For the details, see Chapter 3 section 3. 
22 See Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 2: 58; Sato Tatsuo, Seiritsushi 3: 53-56 (Sato Isao adds this portion in 1994). 
According to the note of  American participants, Whitney said the following: “As you may or may not know, 
the Supreme Commander has been unyielding in his defence of  your Emperor against increasing pressure 
from the outside to render him subject to war criminal investigation. He has thus defended the Emperor 
because he considered that that was the cause of  right and justice, and will continue along that course to the 
extent of  his ability. But, gentlemen, the Supreme Commander is not omnipotent. He feels, however, that 
acceptance of  the provisions of  this new Constitution would render the Emperor practically unassailable. He 
feels that it would bring much closer the day of your freedom from control by the Allied Powers, and that it 
would provide your people with the essential freedoms which the Allied Powers demand in their behalf.” 
Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 326-328.   
23 On November 29, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of  Staff  sent General MacArthur the terms of  SWNCC-55/6 and 
instructed him to collect evidence concerning the tenno’s possible war criminality. MacArthur replied 
negatively on January 25, 1946. General of  the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief  of  Staff, United States 
Army (Eisenhower), FRUS, 8(1971): 395-397 in RM054. See also, Robert E. Ward, “Presurrender Planning,” 
Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 1-41.  
24 For the international opinions on the tenno during the period of before and after 1945, see Takeda Kiyoko, 
Tenno kan no sokoku (The Conflicting Views on the Emperor) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001, 1978).  
25 Tanaka Hideo, “Introduction,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: xxii. See also, Tanaka Hideo, Oboegaki, 189-
204; McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution,’” Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 82.  
26 See Charles L. Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan’s Imperial Constitution,” 104 Political Science 
Quarterly 215-247 (1989).  
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their cherished tenno institution anyway. In light of  the extremely antagonistic atmosphere among 
the Allied countries other than the United States,27 it is fair to say the American “imposition” saved 
the tenno himself  and its institution from the danger of  its abolition for the conservative cause. 
Meanwhile, secondly, the internal continuity theory, which my thesis also challenges, tends 
to ignore the revolutionary novelty of  the postwar constitution. While the external imposition theory 
more or less recognizes an intentional discrepancy between the prewar and postwar constitutions, 
the internal continuity theory places emphasis upon traditional continuity expressed in the postwar 
constitution.  
           The internal continuity theory argues that the symbolic tenno system is nothing fundamentally 
innovative but the most suitable to the traditional image of  the tenno.28 Its argument is basically 
founded upon a contention that the tenno did not directly govern the state during most periods of  
Japanese history.29 Thus, the theorists argue that the tenno has been a symbol of  unification of  the 
nation for most of  the time. During such a period, the tenno has had no real political power but only 
moral or spiritual authority. That is, the tenno has reigned but not governed. Ancient times and the 
Meiji constitutional era were exceptionally deviant. During these periods, the tenno was at once a 
ruler and a symbol. The internal continuity theory contends that the separation between power and 
authority has been a normal condition in Japanese history. According to the theory, the Constitution 
of  Japan presents only a traditionally authentic model of  the tenno system. Thus, the symbolic tenno 
system the postwar constitution realizes is essentially consistent with a traditional principle of  
indirect government and the postwar constitution has not been the most drastic reform since the 
                                                 
27 See Takeda, Tennokan no sokoku. 
28 See e.g., Tsuda Sokichi, “Kenkoku no jijyo to bansei ikkei no shiso (Conditions of  the Nation Building and 
the Idea of  a Line Unbroken for Ages Eternal), Sekai April 1946 in Hidaka Rokuro ed., Sengo shiso no shuppatsu 
(The Beginnings of  Postwar Thoughts) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1968), 114-142; Odaka Tomoo, Kokumin shuken to 
tennosei (Popular Sovereignty and the Emperor System) (Tokyo: Kunitachi Shoin, 1947). 
29 See Ishii Ryosuke, Tenno: Tenno tochi no shiteki kaimei (The Emperor: Historical Elucidation of  the Government by 
the Emperor) (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1950); Ishii Ryosuke, Tenno: Tenno no seisei oyobi fushinsei no dento (The Emperor: 
Origins of  the Emperor and the Tradition of  Indirect Government by the Emperor) (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppannsha, 
1982). 
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founding of  the state.30 This school of  thought attempts to minimize the impact of  the defeat in war 
on the traditional authority in Japan. 
For instance, Tsuda Sokichi, who was an eminent professor of  Japanese history at Waseda 
University and a victim of  the fanatic right-wing assault against his positivistic approach to ancient 
Japan, argued in his famous and controversial 1946 essay how the idea of  a line unbroken for ages 
eternal was born and had developed. 31  Tsuda’s reasoning reached a point similar to what the 
Constitution of  Japan declared several months later.32 “The significance of  the existence of  the 
imperial house consists in the center of  the unity of  the people and the living symbol of  the national 
spirit.”33 
What Tsuda as a victim of  ultra-nationalism said about the tenno and Japanese history 
received close public attention after the wartime defeat. In the new era, he presented an unchanged 
image of  the tenno as “the living symbol of  the national spirit.” In his position, the postwar 
constitution is nothing revolutionary, but it expresses merely the core of  the Japanese tradition of  a 
line unbroken for ages eternal. The new constitution guarantees a return to normalcy. 
Odaka Tomoo, professor of  jurisprudence at the University of  Tokyo, is regarded as one of  
the most prominent advocates of  the internal continuity theory.34 He argued that the kokutai had 
never changed, because both popular sovereignty and the tenno sovereignty were parts of  the idea of  
“nomos sovereignty.”35 To him, the most urgent problem of  the day was to reconsider the concept of  
sovereignty that had been understood as absolute and to recast it under the ideal of  law. In his view, 
any political power had to be subject to law as justice. If  so, it was nomos that should be sovereign 
                                                 
30 See Ishii, Tenno:Tenno no seisei oyobi fushinsei no dento, 334-336. 
31 Tsuda, “Kenkoku no jijyo to bansei ikkei no shiso.” For the details of  Tsuda’s argument, see Chapter 5 
section 6.  
32  Tsuda wrote this essay in January 1946. It was at least one month before the government officially 
announced its constitutional draft including the symbolic emperor system.  
33 Tsuda, “Kenkoku no jijyo to bansei ikkei no shiso,” 140.  
34 For the details of  Odaka’s argument, see Chapter 5 section 7. 
35 Odaka, Kokuminshuken to tennnosei. 
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because it meant the fundamental principle of  law.36  
In Japanese history, in Odaka’s view, rule of  nomos had been consistent. In fact, he argued, 
the tenno reigned but did not govern under the Meiji Constitution. The Japanese tradition showed 
that the tenno had constantly embodied the invariably right ideal of  politics. “Purification of  the 
tenno’s status as such from its superfluous mixture in real politics leads to the symbolic tenno 
system.” The tenno as symbol represented the invisible people as a whole in a visible way when he 
carried out matters of  state such as appointment of  the prime minister and the chief  justice of  the 
Supreme Court. “The acts by the tenno as symbol are the most important state affairs that are 
representative of  the ideal and meaning of  popular sovereignty. This is a true reconciliation of  
popular sovereignty and the tenno institution in the new constitution. This is what a new tenno 
institution should be like in a new era, without extinguishing the tradition of  history and with 
purifying long-standing abuses associated with the tradition of  history.” 37  
In this way, Odaka claimed that nomos as the expression of  the legal ideal of  justice had 
remained unchanged. In the Japanese tradition, government by the tenno did not mean a form of  
executing actual state affairs on the part of  the tenno but presented the righteous ideal of  government. 
The tenno as the symbol of  the unity of  the people showed this Japanese tradition in the most 
purified way. Thus, to Odaka, the kokutai had never ceased to exist.    
However, the internal continuity theory trivializes the postwar constitutional experience of  
the Japanese people. It is true that the postwar constitution retains the tenno institution as the symbol 
of  the unity of  the people. But it is only a part of  the entire constitutional scheme. If  there were no 
serious change in the constitutional system, the principle of  popular sovereignty the postwar 
constitution has declared would not be something fundamentally new. Before the defeat, however, if  
someone had publicly said that the Japan was a democratic state, he or she would have been accused 
                                                 
36 Odaka, Kokuminshuken to tennosei, 63.  
37 Odaka, Komuminshuken to tennosei, 205-206. 
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and imprisoned due to a violation of  the Chian Iji Ho (the Peace Preservation Law). 38  Open 
discussion about the current political system, which inevitably led to questioning the legitimacy of  
the kokutai, always faced grave obstacles of  criminalization. That situation was contrary to the 
principle of  popular sovereignty, which requires all kinds of  information about governmental 
officials and their policies to flow freely so that the sovereign people themselves can evaluate them 
from their own perspective. Thus the idea of  popular sovereignty is without doubt unprecedented in 
Japan.39  Due respect for human dignity as individuals, a core substantial value of  the postwar 
constitution, is also a novel concept for the Japanese governmental process. The postwar constitution 
has indeed brought Japan to a fundamentally innovative stage of  its history.    
Therefore, both the external imposition theory and the internal continuity theory do not fit 
well with what really happened in the process of  creating the postwar constitution. They also fail to 
present the eminent features of  the postwar constitution. Thus, we have to move beyond thinking in 
terms of  external imposition or internal continuity. Before embarking upon a search for a third way, 
however, we have to confirm our starting point. How different is the Constitution of  Japan from the 
Meiji Constitution? Here we briefly examine the novelty of  the postwar constitution in three 
respects: process, style, and substance.  
1) Process: 40  As a matter of  process, the postwar constitution is a product of  public 
deliberation on creating political order that the Japanese people as a whole never have had before. 
The former Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, which is the first modern written constitution in 
Japan, was established as a gift of  the benevolent tenno to his subjects. A few governmental leaders 
secretly prepared a draft. When the Meiji Constitution was in the making, there were no public 
discussions on what was the goal of  the government, which type of  governmental systems would 
properly work to attain the goal, or what the public welfare meant. Japanese people failed to 
                                                 
38 For the contents and administration of the Chian Iji Ho, see Okudaira Yasuhiro, Chian Iji Ho shoshi (Tokyo: 
Chikuma Shobo, 1977). 
39 See Maruyama Masao, “Sengo minshu shugi no ‘genten’ (‘The Starting Point’ of  Postwar Democracy),” in 
Maruyama Masao shu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 15: 57-70, 67. 
40 For the details of  the process of  making the postwar constitution, see Chapters 2 & 3. 
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constitute a state structure because they were not entitled to participate in state affairs as active 
citizens. They as subjects could play only a subordinate role in a field the tenno had delineated. The 
very framework was a fait accompli and far beyond their control. If  a person discussed a derisible 
governmental system openly, he or she would be accused of  a violation of  the Chian Iji Ho. Although 
the Meiji Constitution had an article on its amendment, the Imperial Diet was excluded from the 
amending process. 41  Open discussions about its amendability had never occurred because the 
constitution was believed to be the great immortal code.42 The Meiji Constitution was, from the 
beginning to the end, a benefit granted by the charitable tenno. There was no room whatsoever for 
self-determination by the people and thus no public deliberation was necessary. 
           In sharp contrast, the Constitution of  Japan is an outcome of  unprecedented public 
deliberation, whatever limits it might have involved. On the official front, the postwar Imperial Diet 
can be regarded as a virtual constitutional convention for the Constitution of  Japan. Socialists and 
communists were allowed to participate, along with a majority of  conservative parties, in debates in 
the Imperial Diet. Furthermore, a few women had their first ever seats in the Diet as a result of  a 
general election based upon a newly established rule of  universal suffrage.43 In the Diet, women as 
well as an overwhelming majority of  men one way or another argued for and against a structure of  
government that is appropriate in a new era.44 Private groups and political parties also made a 
significant contribution to deliberating on a new constitution by proposing their drafts,45 although 
the Japanese government failed to appreciate the importance of  public deliberation when the 
                                                 
41 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 73. 
42 Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of the Constitution described the Meiji  
Constitution as “the present immutable fundamental law”.   
43 The Law of  Election of  the Members of  the House of  Representatives was revised in December 1945. See 
Soma Masao, Nihon senkyo seido shi (Fukuoka: Kyushu Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), 202-222.   
44 The first postwar general election of  the House of  Representatives was held on April 10th 1946. There were 
79 female candidates of  a total of  2770 and 39 female representatives of  a total of  464. The percentages were 
2.85 and 8.41, respectively. Incidentally, 39 female seats has been the largest number in the postwar history of  
Japan. The second largest is 35, in the last general election of 2000. See Uchida Mitsuru, ed., Gendai nihon seiji 
shojiten (Dictionary of  Contemporary Japanese Government and Politics), saishinhan, (Tokyo: Buren Shuppan, 2001), 
190; Ishikawa Masumi, Deta sengo seiji shi (Data History of  Postwar Politics) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1984), 115.  
45 For various drafts of  a new constitution, see Sato, Seiritsushi, Chap. 11 “Seito sonohoka no minkan kenpo 
kaiseian (Proposals of  Constitutional Revision by Political Parties and Other Private Groups),” 2: 733-883. 
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fundamental law of  a state is at stake.  
           In the process of  such public deliberation, the Japanese people for the first time heard 
alternative conceptions of  the state and a fundamentally different idea of  politics. They heard even a 
plan of  a new governmental system without the tenno. A tiny group of  communists denied the tenno 
system in favor of  a republican form of  government. However, a republican form of  government was 
not a monopoly of  the communists. Takano Iwasaburo, a former professor of  statistics at the Tokyo 
Imperial University, published a constitutional plan for the republic of  Japan. He was a leading 
liberal who was very interested in social problems in general and enthusiastically supported the labor 
movement in particular. After defeat in the war, he organized the Kenpo Kenkyukai (the 
Constitutional Research Group) with no relationship with orthodox constitutional scholarship to 
publish a private plan and aim to influence the ongoing public discussion on constitutional reform.46 
It proposed a new government system of  popular sovereignty and a ritualistic tenno system.47 In 
short, the proposal of  the research group was a kind of  symbolic tenno system, which the Japanese 
people currently have. This was a well democratized view by the standard of  the time.48 However, 
Takano himself  felt dissatisfied with a compromising attitude of  the members of  the research group. 
He thus published his own draft of  a new constitution in which he proposed a presidential system 
instead of  the tenno system. 49  He emphasized that it was high time for common citizens to 
disenchant themselves of  the obsolete kokutai ideology in an era of  liberation and democracy.50 
                                                 
46  Suzuki Yasuzo, another important figure in the group, might be regarded as a constitutional scholar. 
However, he had no orthodox background of  constitutional scholarship of  the day. He had no legal education 
at a university and studied constitutional history without a professorship in any university. After the war, 
Suzuki argued in the media about the necessity of  establishing a new constitution. See Koseki, Tanjyo, 46-50; 
Birth, 27-29. 
47  For the text of  the draft of  the Constitutional Research Group, see Sato, Seiritsushi, 2:784. 
48 In fact, the Government Section of  the General Headquarters of  the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers paid close attention to and highly evaluated this draft from a liberal democratic point of  view. On 
January 11, 1946, Milo Rowell pointed out the popular sovereignty provision of the draft by the research group 
as outstandingly liberal and that the proposed constitution as a whole was democratic and acceptable despite 
omission of several essential provisions. See Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 26-40.  
49 Takano placed a republican government system as the fundamental principle in his Kaisei kenpo shian youko 
(Outline of  a Personal Proposal for a Revised Constitution).    
50 Takano Iwasaburo, “Torawaretaru minshu (The Captured Masses),” Shinsei, February 1946 in his Kappa no 
he (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1961), 38-53.    
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Takano argued for a new political science needed in a new era.  
           However small and weak such new voices might have been, the people on the periphery of  the 
established power structure certainly raised them and the Japanese people as a whole had chances to 
hear them. This phenomenon had not emerged until the postwar period of  Japan. The new manner 
of  making a constitution has opened a possibility that publicly deliberated opinions can prevail over 
the elitist secretiveness. 
           2) Style:51 The second aspect of  novelty of  the postwar constitution is related to its style of  
wording. This constitution is written in a much more colloquial way than the Meiji Constitution. At 
the beginning of  the modernization of  Japan, new words were coined to express introduced Western 
legal concepts in Japanese. Newly coined terms were difficult for common citizens to understand 
their meanings. It was partly because there are two steps to understand what a new word means: 
original Western legal concepts are translated into traditionally used Chinese characters that carry 
not only sounds but also meanings. It was also partly because the elite attempted to keep common 
citizens away from the governmental and legal processes and thus purposefully adopted difficult 
words. In the result, the prewar legal documents were written in a strictly literary manner with 
Chinese characters and katakana and without punctuation marks.  
           In vivid contrast, the Constitution of  Japan is written in a colloquial style with Chinese 
characters and hiragana and with punctuation marks. Writing statutes and legal documents in 
colloquial Japanese has since been a common practice. Thus, legal materials have become more 
easily accessible to ordinary people than ever before. This is decisively important in terms of  a 
democratic foundation of  the governmental process. Reading and trying to understand the 
fundamental law of  the state are, obviously, the most rudimentary way of  participating in politics.  
           Furthermore, this reform in a wording style came totally from the leadership of  a group of  
Japanese private citizens.52 Among them, Yamamoto Yuzo, a famous novelist, most enthusiastically 
                                                 
51 For the details of  the writing style of  the postwar constitution, see Chapter 4 section 2. 
52 See Irie, Keii, 269-273, 289-291; Sato, Seiritsushi, 3:274-285;  Koseki, Tanjyo, 210-217; Birth, 133-137; Dower, 
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devoted himself  to lobbying to make legal documents easier to understand. To Yamamoto, usage of  
plain words and simple characters did not necessarily lead to worthless writings, but to prosperity 
and expansion of  a culture.53 The lobbying movement eventually persuaded governmental officials 
into making a constitutional draft in colloquial Japanese. Here we can recognize a more democratic 
feature of  the Constitution of  Japan in its form than ever before. 
           3) Substance: 54  The final aspect of  revolutionary features of  the postwar constitution is 
concerning its substance. I will point out three substantial issues: popular sovereignty, individual 
freedoms, and citizenship without arms. 
           First, the principle of  popular sovereignty has marked a new and discontinued stage of  
political life of  the Japanese people. The people have become the sole source of  political power. This 
is crucially different from the tenno-centered system in prewar Japan. As a matter of  constitutional 
logic, the people were merely objects of  rule by the governing elites. The Meiji Constitution was 
established as kintei kenpo, a constitution bestowed upon the subjects as a gracious tenno’s gift. The 
idea of  the tenno as the ultimate value creator was well presented in the imperial speech on the 
promulgation of  the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan. “Whereas We make it the joy and glory 
of  Our heart to behold the prosperity of  Our country, and the welfare of  Our subjects, We do hereby, 
in virtue of  the supreme power We inherit from Our Imperial Ancestors, promulgate the present 
immutable fundamental law, for the sake of  Our present subjects and their descendants.”55 After all, 
the people were his subjects. 
           The Constitution of  Japan, on the other hand, appeals to a universal value. The postwar 
governmental system is based upon an idea that “Government is a sacred trust of  the people, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Embracing Defeat, 392-393.  
53 Yamamoto Yuzo, “Moji to kokumin (Letters and the Nation),” Sekai April 1946, in Yamamoto Yuzo zenshu 
vol. 11 (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1977).  
54 For the details of  the new principles of  the postwar constitution, see Chapter 4. 
55  “Imperial Speech on the Promulgation of the Constitution,” in Ito Hirobumi, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, trans. by Ito Miyoji (Tokyo: Chuo Daigaku, 1906), 2nd ed., 169. “We” here 
refers to the emperor, not the people. The Japanese original text reads “chin,” which means I used by the tenno. 
Ito Miyoji did not translate the text literally.   
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authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of  which are exercised by the 
representatives of  the people, and the benefits of  which are enjoyed by the people.”56 And the 
constitution solemnly declares that this idea is “a universal principle of  mankind”.57 Indeed, the very 
constitution was established as a result of  the exertion of  sovereign power on the part of  the people. 
Popular sovereignty is understood as one of  the most conspicuous characteristics of  the postwar 
constitution.  
            Secondly, a conception of  individual rights that cannot be restricted by statutes has been 
introduced in the postwar constitution. Due respect for human dignity as individuals is its most 
fundamental principle.58 To secure human dignity, the constitution has a detailed list of  rights.59 
Positive rights as well as negative rights are enumerated in the list along with judicial review.60 It is 
true that the Meiji Constitution also declared some rights of  the subjects such as personal freedom, 
property right, freedom of  religious belief, freedom of  speech, and right to petition.61 However, these 
rights were protected only against invasion by the administrative branch. That is, they accompanied 
reservation of  law. On the other hand, the Constitution of  Japan protects rights against the legislative 
branch as well as the administrative branch.  
           Above all, the guarantee of  both freedom of  religion 62  and freedom of  expression 63  is 
decisively important to the postwar governmental system. As Carl Schmitt has pointed out, 64 
freedom of  religion reflects the belief  that whereas individuals are bearers of  absolute values, the 
state is only a means and thus relative, derivative, and restrictive in all its powers. Freedom of  
religion gives individuals a private space to which they can confine themselves. If  religious freedom 
constitutes a foundation of  liberal democracy, the postwar constitution shows considerable promise. 
                                                 
56 The Constitution of  Japan, Preamble, par. 1.   
57 The Constitution of  Japan, Preamble, par. 1.   
58 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 13. 
59 See the Constitution of  Japan, chap. 3, arts. 11-40.  
60 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 81.   
61 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, chap. 2, arts. 19, 22-30.  
62 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 20.  
63 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 21.   
64 See Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (1928), chap. 14.  
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Unlike the Meiji Constitution, its text provides for no reservation of  law.65 Furthermore, separation 
of  state and religion has been formulated for the first time in the postwar constitution. This is pivotal 
because the Meiji constitutional system was essentially built upon the premise that the sovereign 
tenno occupied the both secularly and religiously highest rank in the state (martially as well). In the 
immediate aftermath of  the defeat, Maruyama Masao, a distinguished political philosopher, pointed 
out in his famous essay that ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan derived from the lack of  protection of  
individual internal freedom.66 “Whereas in the West national power after Reformation was based on 
formal, external sovereignty,” Maruyama argues, “the Japanese State never came to the point of  
drawing a distinction between the external and internal spheres and of  recognizing that its authority 
was valid only for the former.”67  The Meiji Constitution and the Kyoiku Chokugo (the Imperial 
Rescript on Education)68 were understood as the official documents to declare that the state, more 
precisely the kokutai, monopolized internal values such as truth, morality, and beauty. Because it was 
founded upon the unification of  spiritual authority and political power, the prewar Japanese state 
held in herself  the standard of  judgment on governmental activities. Thus the state never confronted 
serious challenges to its legitimacy. In such a situation, the standard of  values came down to relative 
distance from the tenno, the embodiment of  ultimate values in both the state and society. 
Furthermore, even the tenno himself  could not enjoy subjective freedom. At the establishment of  the 
Meiji Constitution, the Tenno Meiji swore to the imperial founder and other imperial ancestors that 
                                                 
65 Compare the Constitution of  Japan, art. 20 with the Constitution of the Empire of  Japan, art. 28. The 
former reads that “Freedom of  religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any 
privileges from the State nor exercise any political authority. (2) No person shall be compelled to take part in 
any religious acts, celebration, rite or practice. (3) The State and its organs shall refrain from religious 
education or any other religious activity.” The latter reads “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not 
prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of  religious 
belief.”    
66 Maruyama Masao, “Chokokkashugi no ronri to shinri,” Sekai, May 1946 in Maruyama Masao shu (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1995), vol. 3, 1946-1948, 17-36. “Theory and Psychology of  Ultra-Nationalism,” trans. by 
Ivan Morris, in Masao Maruyama, Ivan Morris ed., Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 1969), 1-24.   
67 Maruyama, “Theory and Psychology of  Ultra-Nationalism,” 5.   
68 For the text of  the Imperial Rescript on Education, see Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myth, 121.   
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he would “maintain and secure from decline the ancient form of  government”, 69  because he 
inherited his right to sovereignty of  the state from his ancestors in “a lineal succession unbroken for 
ages eternal”.70 As a matter of  constitutional logic, the tenno himself  was restricted by the intents and 
practices of  the founder and his ancestors. In fact, this logic was declared in the Tsugebumi (Imperial 
Oath Sworn at the Sanctuary of  the Imperial Palace). The Meiji Constitution was considered a mere 
expression in the form of  fundamental law of  “the instructions bequeathed by” the imperial founder 
and by other ancestors.71 
           In a different vein altogether, the postwar constitution on the one hand guarantees individual 
internal freedoms and on the other declares separation of  state and religion. The latter is especially 
important because thanks to this institution, the Japanese state has separated herself  from Shintoism 
for the first time. Shintoism has lost its established status and become a private religion of  koshitsu 
(the tenno house). 72  The postwar constitution has finished the state’s monopoly of  values and 
transformed Japanese society into one in the nature of  secular diversification and pluralism.73 It has 
sowed the seeds of  liberal democracy.   
           Another important right that the postwar constitution guarantees is freedom of  expression.74 
Under the Meiji constitutional scheme, surely, free expression was somewhat protected. But such 
protection was not as solid as that in the postwar constitution. Freedom of  expression was with 
reservation of  law as other freedoms guaranteed in the Meiji Constitution. The most serious threat 
                                                 
69 Tsugebumi (Imperial Oath Sworn at the Sanctuary of  the Imperial Palace) in Ito, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, 167.  
70 Joyu (Preamble).   
71 Tsugebumi.  
72  Minobe Tatsukichi, one of  the most liberal interpreters of  the Meiji Constitution, admitted that the 
establishment of  Shinto was based upon Japanese tradition from ancient times. Minobe Tatsukichi, Kenpo 
satsuyo (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1932), kaiteidaigohan (5th ed.), 174-175.   
73 Maruyama concludes his famous essay as follows. “August 15, 1945, the day that out a period to Japanese 
imperialism, was also the day when the ‘national polity’, which had been the foundation of  the entire ultra-
nationalist structure, lost its absolute quality. Now for the first time the Japanese people, who until then had 
been mere objects, became free subjects and the destiny of  this ‘national polity’ was committed to their own 
hands.” Maruyama, “Theory and Psychology of  Ultra-Nationalism,” 21.  
74 The Constitution of Japan, art. 21 reads “Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and 
all other forms of expression are guaranteed. (2) No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of  
any means of  communication be violated.”  
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to free expression was once again the idea of  the kokutai. For instance, the Chian Iji Ho (the Peace 
Preservation Law) was enacted in exchange for universal male suffrage in 1925. The conspicuous 
feature of  the law was that it prohibited and severely penalized associations and organizations the 
purpose of  which was to subvert the kokutai and to deny the system of  private property.75 The 
concept of  the kokutai was highly ambiguous because it might be interpreted as either a legal term or 
a moral and ethical concept. As a legal term, the kokutai means the location of  sovereignty and is 
generally distinguished between monarchical sovereignty and popular sovereignty.76 In this sense, the 
meaning of  the kokutai was clearly defined in the provision of  the Meiji Constitution which stated 
that “the Emperor is the head of  the Empire, combining in Himself  the rights of  sovereignty”.77 If  
the term was interpreted as moral, however, its extension became inevitably vague. In the Meiji 
constitutional system, as argued above, the state monopolized all values and thus there was no 
challenge to the definition on the part of  the government. That was, in fact, exactly what the Kyoiku 
Cokugo (the Imperial Rescript on Education) presented to the people.78 As Okudaira Yasuhiro has 
clarified, the judicial bureaucrats held the moral conception of  the kokutai when they prepared the 
bill and later that conception became more and more powerful.79 Moralization of  the concept was 
vividly expressed in its punishment. The punishment for the subversion of  the kokutai was 
imprisonment with or without labor for up to ten years. In Japanese criminal law, there is a general 
distinction between imprisonment with labor and that without labor. While the former is a penalty 
for infamous crime, political crime is sanctioned with the latter.80  Moreover, the Daishinin, the 
                                                 
75 See Okudaira, Chian Iji Ho shoshi.  
76 For the concept of  kokutai, see Nagao Ryuichi, “‘Kokutai’ to ‘kensei’ (National Polity and Constitutional 
Government),” Nihon kenpo shiso shi (A History of  Japanese Constitutional Thought) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1996), 10-
35.  
77 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 4.  
78 “Our Imperial Ancestors (waga koso koso) have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and 
have deeply and firmly planted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty (chu) and filial piety (ko) have from 
generation and generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of  the fundamental character of  Our 
Empire (kokutai no seika), and herein also lies the source of  Our education (kyoiku no engen).” Kyoiku Chokugo 
in Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myth, 121.   
79 Okudaira, Chian Iji Ho shoshi, 50-59.  
80  For instance, the current penal code punishes a criminal concerning an insurrection by imprisonment 
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highest court in the prewar judicial system, provided for lower courts guidance to choose 
imprisonment with labor over that without labor in the Chian Iji Ho cases.81 This showed that there 
was a common understanding among the legal elites that the subversion of  the kokutai was immoral 
and shameful. In the situation that a feeling of  being close to the tenno determined the morality of  
the governing elites, as Maruyama has sharply pointed out, “[i]t was therefore only natural that these 
people should come to identify their own interests with those of  the Emperor, and that they should 
automatically regard their enemies as violators of  the Emperor’s powers.”82 In this political and 
intellectual climate, there were few, if  any, chances that people effectively exercised freedom of  
expression. 
           However, the core value of  free expression lies in an unlimited free exchange of  ideas and 
opinions. Particularly in liberal democracy, the central meaning of  freedom of  expression should 
consist in criticizing openly governmental officials and their policies. When he attacked the Sedition 
Act of  1798, James Madison formulated a universal and perpetual principle of  freedom of  
expression in liberal democracy.83 There is a deep connection between popular sovereignty and 
freedom of  expression. Where the people enjoy sovereignty, legislative as well as executive abuses of  
delegated powers should be carefully watched to keep sovereign power in the people’s hand. The 
guarantee of  free expression from prior restraint is not powerful enough to discharge sovereign 
functions on the part of  the people. The idea of  free expression should expand from mere exemption 
from prior restraint to immunity from subsequent punishments. If  the people’s choices prevail over 
hereditary elements in liberal democracy, the people must be entitled to examine and discuss freely 
the merits and demerits of  candidates for public offices and their policies. At all events, statutes as 
the Chian Iji Ho fundamentally conflict with “the right of  freely examining public characters and 
                                                                                                                                                             
without labor (or death penalty). Penal Code, art. 77.  
81 See Okudaira, Chian Iji Ho shoshi, 60.  
82 Maruyama, “Theory and Psychology of  Ultra-Nationalism,” 13.  
83 The Virginia Resolutions in Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several States Conventions on the Adoption of  
the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 (2nd ed. reprint. New 
York: Burt Franklin), vol. 4; James Madison, “Report of  1800,” in David B. Matteren et al., eds., The Papers of  
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measures, and of  free communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed 
the only effectual guardian of  every other right.” 84  Protection of  freedom of  expression under 
popular sovereignty is required to commit to “the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” 85  In this respect, the postwar 
constitution is much more promising. 
           The third point of  new substances of  the Constitution of  Japan is separation of  citizenship 
from soldiership. In the ancient Greek polis, only citizens who defended their homeland with arms 
could participate in politics. Since then to be a citizen had meant more or less to be a soldier. That 
was partly why women had been excluded from the political sphere. However, because modern war 
has become total war and the home front has come to gain a real sense, the connection between 
citizenship and soldiership has loosened.86 
           In the Meiji constitutional system, the tenno was also the supreme commander of  the Army 
and Navy.87 The tenno also held the prerogative to declare war and make peace, which he could exert 
without the consent of  the Imperial Diet.88 Furthermore, the tosui-ken, the power concerning military 
strategies and tactics, was interpreted as independent of  the government, although there was no 
explicit provision on its independence in the Meiji Constitution. It was situated outside the reach of  
the civilian government as a product of  pre-constitutional practices in the early Meiji period. When 
the ministers of  the War and of  the Navy were appointed from ranking officers in active service,89 
the matters related to the tosui were expansively understood because a cabinet could not maintain 
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itself  without the assistance of  the Army and Navy. The system lacked civilian control, which is 
considered one of  the most rudimentary institutions for liberal democracy.90 The independence of  
the tosui-ken was widely regarded as “an effective springboard for the rise of  extreme militarism.”91 
   In clear contrast, the postwar constitution renounces war, denies land, sea, and air forces, 
and repudiates the right of  belligerency of  the state.92 An ideal that has inspired postwar Japan is that 
“all peoples of  the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.” 93  In “an 
international society striving for the preservation of  peace, and the banishment of  tyranny and 
slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth,” “the justice and faith of  the peace-
loving peoples of  the world” constitutes “universal” “laws of  political morality”.94 The newly reborn 
Japan commits herself  to such political morality. The concept of  peace non-dependent upon arms in 
fact has released citizenship from its close connection to solidership. 
 With the new style, process, and substance, the postwar constitution has brought the 
Japanese people to a fundamentally new political life. The tenno-topped vertical relationship no 
longer was the essential characteristic of  the Japanese political community. In the Meiji 
constitutional system, the tenno who succeeded the throne in “a line of  Emperors unbroken for ages 
eternal” and “sacred and inviolable” conferred “titles of  nobility, rank, orders and other marks of  
honor.”95 However, even the symbolic tenno system of  the postwar constitution is based upon a 
horizontal relationship among the sovereign people.96 The people have become the ultimate source 
of  values in general and political legitimacy in particular. The Constitution of  Japan marks a 
revolutionary change in political structure. 
 How can we theorize the new constitution with these distinctive features independently of  
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foreign imposition and domestic continuity? Weaknesses of  the conventional views help to identify a 
third way. What is wrong with them?   
Both the external imposition theory and internal continuity theory suffer from an 
oversimplification of  history. The Allied Powers and the United States itself  could not be regarded as 
monolithic. The conflict between the Department of  State and the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers is a well-known fact.97 Even within GHQ, there was serious antagonism between the 
Government Section that sought the thorough democratization of  Japan and the G2 that favored a 
compromise with the Japanese conservatives to adopt a hard anti-communism policy.98  
           Moreover, the Japanese government did not necessarily share common interests with the 
Japanese people. Creation and reception of  the postwar constitution was more complicated and 
sophisticated than both the imposition and continuity theorists suppose. We have to examine more 
precisely how different categories of  people responded to the reality the defeat in the war had 
brought to Japan. Participants were classified at least into the government elite, liberals in the old era, 
the tenno family members, justices of  the Supreme Court, the media, intellectuals on the periphery of  
the established regime, and common citizens.  
Apparently, the Japanese government could not understand the meaning of  the defeat in 
the war and the ensuing occupation. The Japanese government as well as intellectual elite tried to 
keep the tenno system intact. The old kokutai ideology profoundly captivated them. Thus, many of  
them had to emphasize the continuity in the Japanese tradition of  the tenno as unifying symbol after 
the government published its official draft providing for popular sovereignty with the symbolic tenno 
system. Typically, Kanamori Tokujiro, the minister of  state in charge of  constitutional revision in the 
first Yoshida cabinet, stated again and again in the deliberation in the Imperial Diet that the new 
constitution would not change the kokutai as understood in a moral sense. In his view, the tenno was 
                                                 
97 See, e.g., Koseki, Tanjyo, 218-254. 
98 See Takemae Eiji, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of  Japan and Its Legacy (New York: Continuum, 2002); 
Herbert Passin, “The Occupation---Some Reflections,” Carol Gluck & Stephen R. Graubard, eds., Showa: The 
Japan of  Hirohito (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 107-129. 
 23 
a moral, not a political or legal figure, and akogare no mato (the center of  national adoration).99 At the 
end of  the defeat, however, to the governmental leaders and established intellectuals, the kokutai 
meant the tenno in one line unbroken for ages eternal governing the state as sovereign. Kanamori’s 
explanation distorted the legal and political reality and obscured the revolutionary innovation of  the 
idea of  popular sovereignty. In open discussion, however, he had to admit that the new constitution 
would have the kokutai in a political sense.  
Minobe Tatsukichi, a liberal academic giant in the Meiji constitutional system, tried to cope 
with reconstruction of  a political order through his liberal tenno organ theory.100 However, Minobe 
could not respond well to the new situation. That has vividly indicated that the postwar constitution 
was discontinuous with the Meiji Constitution. While the Tenno Showa himself  never seemed to 
realize what the symbolic tenno should look like, his younger brother Prince Mikasa openly argued 
for democratization of  the tenno family, which clearly marked the arrival of  a new era. Fifteen 
justices of  the Supreme Court expressed diversified opinions on lese majesty under the new 
constitution in the Placard Case, which also indicated a beginning of  a new era because the decision 
showed that legal elites were no longer monolithic.  
On the other hand, the media conveyed public discussions on the constitutional revision to 
the people. It was true that they were under censorship by GHQ for carrying out the occupational 
policy smoothly. But in the early occupation era, GHQ censored nationalist and militarist speeches 
and encouraged liberal democratization of  the media. In public discussion, liberal democratization 
of  politics was a central topic for newspapers and journals. Along with reports of  what was 
happening domestically and internationally, they offered space to opinion leaders for discussing the 
necessity of  constitutional revision, the tenno institution, popular constitutional convention, 
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governmental systems, protection of  human rights, and so on.101 Further, the scoop of  the Mainichi 
Shinbun, one of  the major newspapers, was influential enough to change the course of  constitution-
making in postwar Japan forever.102 Whatever the limits might have been, a wide exchange of  new 
constitutional conceptions actually was carried out in the media. Further, intellectuals on the 
periphery of  the established regime actively participated in public discussions on how to create a 
constitutional order in postwar Japan. For example, the Kenpo Kenkyukai (the Constitutional 
Research Group) proposed a political system of  the principle of  popular sovereignty and the 
ceremonial tenno institution and a model of  the welfare state. Its leader Takano Iwasaburo even 
presented a republican form of  government by himself. The Kokumin No Kokugo Undo (the People’s 
National Language Movement League) successfully lobbied with much enthusiasm writing the 
constitution in colloquial and plain Japanese. The movement surely deserved the credit for the 
popularization of  the new fundamental law.  
Meanwhile, many common Japanese citizens demonstrated frank preferences for a more 
moderate tenno system over the kokutai expressed in the Meiji Constitution, though how to obtain 
food for the following days was unfortunately a much more serious problem for them than how to 
organize a new nation.103 In the first general election in the postwar era, the people with universal 
suffrage elected thirty-nine women, ninety-three Socialists, and five Communists as their 
representatives.104 In the first general election under the postwar constitution, furthermore, the people 
gave the Socialists the status of  the leading party. Katayama Tetsu, the chairman of  the Socialist 
Party, formed a left-center coalition cabinet. In fact, the Constitution of  Japan brought 
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unprecedented incidents to postwar politics. 
We thus have to have a theory reflecting such complicated factors of  constitution-making in 
postwar Japan. We should explore a new perspective for making the Constitution of  Japan,105 from 
which we can measure the wider constitutional experiences of  the Japanese people as a whole in the 
aftermath of  defeat. 
           Another weakness is that both imposition and continuity theories do not take seriously the 
reason why the Japanese people now have the Constitution of  Japan. Prewar Japan to some extent 
succeeded in developing liberal democratic politics with the Meiji Constitution. However, the 
success turned out to be essentially limited because the ultra-nationalistic movement in the 1930s 
replaced a quasi-parliamentary government system based upon political party politics with a 
totalitarian regime. Thus there was something seriously wrong with the Meiji constitutional regime. 
However, the governmental leaders and liberal intellectuals who were extremely reluctant to amend 
the Meiji Constitution failed to see a possibility that it would be interpreted in a direction exactly 
opposite to Minobe’s liberal democratic interpretation. For them, in essence, the prewar constitution 
was nothing but an instrument of  rule over the ruled. If  the Potsdam Declaration had required Japan 
to realize a liberal democratic political system, and indeed did, a new conceptualization of  a 
constitution was necessary and, unfortunately, it did not come to be presented from the orthodox 
school of  thought. Outsiders in the constitutional scholarship and governmental elite circle, such as 
Takano Iwasaburo, Suzuki Yasuzo, Mortito Tatsuo, and Yamamoto Yuzo expressed new ideas on 
constituting political order. 
           It was true that when the Constitution of  Japan was established, there is no evidence that the 
Japanese people as a whole mobilized for freedom and a new government.106 It was also true that the 
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Japanese government did not have a wide range of  options. Indeed, Japan had lost its sovereignty as 
an independent state. The Allied occupation was surely crucial. However, the situation at that time 
was more complicated than simply stating that the constitution was imposed upon the Japanese 
government or that the true tradition of  Japan was condensed in the postwar constitution.  
         As discussed above, the imposition theory based upon the threat in the February 13 meeting 
has no convincing evidence. An important question comes down to an interpretation of  the terms of  
the Potsdam Declaration that set the conditions of  the occupation. The main provisions of  the 
Potsdam Declaration107 claimed the following:108 
Article 10: The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and 
strengthening of  democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of  
speech, of  religion, and of  thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human 
rights shall be established. 
Article 12: The occupying forces of  the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as 
soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in 
accordance with the freely expressed will of  the Japanese people a peacefully 
inclined and responsible government. 
 
On August 10, 1945, the Japanese government was ready to accept the Potsdam Declaration “with 
the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the 
prerogatives of  His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.”109 The Allied Powers did not answer directly to 
the Japanese request but issued the following statement on their position (the so-called Byrnes 
reply).110 
“From the moment of  surrender the authority of  the Emperor and the Japanese 
government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of  the 
Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the 
surrender terms.” 
“The ultimate form of  government of  Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam 
Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of  the Japanese people.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
164-165. 
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Then the Japanese government officially accepted the Potsdam Declaration on August 14. In the 
Imperial Rescript of  August 14, 1945, the tenno told his subjects that he accepted the Potsdam 
Declaration in “Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of  the Imperial State”.111 
The Japanese government elite believed that they could retain the kokutai, the governmental system 
in which the tenno in one line unbroken for ages eternal holds the prerogative to govern Japan as 
sovereign.112  However, a serious problem is whether their belief  had a reasonable basis. A few 
Japanese leaders suspected that Article 12 of  the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes reply would 
be inconsistent with the idea of  the kokutai.113  
At any rate, the Allied requirement could be interpreted in a way that the Japanese 
government had to establish popular sovereignty or a popularly approved tenno system. Thus, the 
acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration opened the possibility of  a drastic change in political 
structure in postwar Japan. But the government optimistically relied upon their self-seeking 
interpretation. 
 Given the fact that some fanatic military men argued for continuing the war and dying an 
honorable death rather than surrendering, it was somewhat understandable that the government had 
to pretend to end the war with maintenance of  the kokutai. However, most Japanese elites were so 
deeply instilled with the kokutai ideology that they could not look at the international environment 
with great composure. The interpretation of  the government leaders on the surrender was that the 
Japanese government, not the Allied powers could decide a form of  government. The phrases such 
as “the revival and strengthening of  democratic tendencies among the Japanese people” and “the 
freely expressed will of  the Japanese people” were understood in favor of  maintaining the kokutai. 
The governmental elite intentionally or unintentionally ignored the possibility that the terms of  
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surrender might require that popular sovereignty be realized or at least that a new government be 
based upon a radical transformation of  the political structure.  
           In following this self-seeking interpretation, few governmental and intellectual elites believed 
that a fundamental change of  the Meiji Constitution was necessary for reconstructing the political 
order. The government reluctantly established a committee that was in charge of  constitutional 
problems after MacArthur offered a suggestion. The name and discussion of  the Kenpo Mondai Chosa 
Iinkai (the Committee for the Investigation of  Constitutional Problems), widely known as the 
Matsumoto Committee, well expressed the general atmosphere at that moment. The first obligation 
of  this committee consisting of  truly distinguished constitutional scholars and legal bureaucrats was 
not to make a draft of  a new constitution, but only to investigate constitutional issues, if  any, in the 
aftermath of  the lost war. In addition, the committee decided to examine the Meiji Constitution 
article by article, rather than to explore its problems from different angles by adopting comparative 
constitutional approaches.114 
           The Matsumoto committee’s draft of  constitutional revision changed only several phrases of  
the Meiji Constitution.115 Articles 1 through 4 were substantially untouched and there were no 
institutions for executing the requirement that “Freedom of  speech, of  religion, and of  thought, as 
well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.”116 On February 1, 1946, the 
Mainichi Shinbun published a draft that was very close to the final draft of  the Matsumoto 
Committee.117 This scoop made the secret preparation of  the Matsumoto Committee known to the 
public. GHQ observed that “This is extremely conservative in character and leaves substantially 
unchanged the status of  the Emperor with all rights of  sovereignty vested in him. For this reason 
(along with others), the draft was poorly received by the press and the public.”118 In light of  the 
                                                 
114 For activities of  the Matsumoto committee, see Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 245-374; 2: 485-645  
115 For a few drafts of  the Matsumoto Committee, see Koseki, Tanjyo, 91-96; Birth, 57-60.  
116 The Potsdam Declaration, art. 10.  
117 For the translation of and comments on the Matsumoto Committee’s draft in Mainichi Shinbun by the 
Government Section of GHQ, see Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 40-75.  
118 Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 40-42.  
 29 
international opinions that were more or less severe to the tenno and the fact of  the forthcoming 
inauguration of  the Far Eastern Commission, GHQ could not approve such a conservative plan 
because the official publication of  the Matsumoto Committee’s draft would show that the early 
occupation had failed and lead complaining parts of  the Allied powers to require GHQ to take a 
harder line to the Japanese government in general and the tenno in particular. As a political and 
practical matter, on the other hand, it was not desirable for GHQ to directly command the Japanese 
government to make a more democratic constitutional draft. That was why GHQ counseled the 
Shidehara cabinet to adopt a constitutional plan similar to its draft for the interests of  the Japanese 
government as well as its own.119 
           My concerns reside in the Japanese government’s failure to propose a more liberal and 
democratic draft of  constitutional revision. Undoubtedly, Matsumoto’s leadership was questionable 
because of  his stubbornness, arrogance, and tunnel-vision. However, the committee as a whole had 
serious shortcomings. The members of  the Matsumoto Committee had been convinced by legal 
formalism and technicality because of  their kokutai obsession and thus missed an opportunity to 
correct their attitude by themselves to avoid “the imposition.” More generally, the course of  making 
the current constitution would have been totally different if  the Japanese government had had a 
better understanding of  the international environment of  the day and of  the United States. 
American people created their constitution, when they believed that they could establish good 
government “from reflection and choice,” not by “accident and force”.120 American constitutional 
law has always been full of  innovative experiments such as popular sovereignty, a right to revolution, 
constitutional conventions, a written constitution, the separation of  powers based upon checks and 
balances, a presidential system, judicial review, and federalism. Unfortunately, only extremely poor 
understandings of  American constitutional law were accumulated in the prewar Japanese 
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constitutional academic circle.121 That was partly because the prewar Japanese legal system was 
mostly introduced from German law, and partly because the constitutional scholarship in prewar 
Japan paid much more attention to the instrument of  government than to the bill of  rights.122 
Establishment of  a parliamentary government system was the most pressing task liberals took care 
of  in prewar Japan. Liberals regarded judicial review as an obstacle to strengthening the weak Diet, 
while conservatives proposed it for enhancing the tenno’s prerogatives. At any rate, various American 
constitutional experiences were more or less foreign to most Japanese governmental and intellectual 
leaders.  
In this way, the conventional theories have not recognized causes on the Japanese side to 
“impose” an American drafted constitution. Matsumoto triumphantly lectured the GHQ staff  on the 
significance of  bicameralism, when Whitney presented to the Japanese members GHQ’s draft of  a 
constitution at the critical meeting of  February 13, 1946.123 When most fundamental ideas were at 
stake, Matsumoto’s behavior seemed not only out of  place but also quite embarrassing. However, 
that was a cool reality for the Japanese people in 1946. As Koseki Shoichi has pointed out, 
Matsumoto and the Japanese government had no “meaningful constitutional debate pitting ideas 
one against another”, “[a]side from their discussion about protecting the emperor and ‘preserving 
the national polity’”.124 If  there was an “imposition” of  a constitution, that meant the defeat of  the 
political ideology and constitutional conception of  the Japanese governmental and intellectual elite. 
Thus, a third way should search spheres outside the power elite for a new constitutional 
meaning. The government’s failure to adapt generated “the imposition.” A clue for a new theory 
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should be found in people free from the kokutai ideology, which was not appropriate in a new era for 
liberal democratization. 
           This reflection leads to recognition of  a different weakness of  the conventional views, that is, 
both the external imposition theory and internal continuity theory have never appreciated Japanese 
initiatives such as the Kenpo Kenkyukai (the Constitutional Research Group) and the Kokumin No 
Kokugo Undo (the People’s National Language Movement League). In addition, the Japanese 
government did not accept the American draft literally but attempted to “japanize” it. Among other 
things, the japanized draft deliberately omitted protection of  rights of  foreigners.125 In the Imperial 
Diet, moreover, the Socialist Party successfully argued for the right to maintain the minimum 
standards of  wholesome and cultured living, which has become Article 25 of  the current 
constitution. No welfare right was found in either the GHQ or Japanese government drafts.126  
           People did discuss a relationship between popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno system 
in public. A crucial issue was whether the kokutai had changed. As a part of  japanization, the 
government draft purposefully used an extremely ambiguous phrase on the relationship: whereas the 
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English text of  Article 1 provided that the tenno derives “his position from the sovereign will of  the 
People,” the Japanese version used “nihon kokumin shiko no soi” (the supreme general will of  the 
People).127 After complications such as the Socialist interpellations and GHQ’s intervention, popular 
sovereignty has been finally declared straightforwardly in the postwar constitution. With the 
provision of  popular sovereignty, it has become crystal-clear that the Japanese people, not the tenno, 
have final power to decide political matters, at least on paper. As a political and social matter, 
however, there has been ambiguity in a relationship between the principle of  popular sovereignty and 
the symbolic tenno institution. In fact, some conservatives have attempted to restore the tenno’s 
authority as expansively as possible. At the time of  establishing the postwar constitution, as we saw, 
the government pretended that the new constitution had not changed the kokutai in an ethical sense. 
Retrospectively, the compromise was to some extent inevitable because the ruling elite were so 
preoccupied by the mission to maintain the kokutai one way or another that frank recognition of  the 
change of  the kokutai might lead to repudiating the postwar constitution itself. 
My argument of  the postwar constitution as an unfinished constitutional revolution refuses 
to regard both imposition and continuity as its distinctive feature. A third way lies in reconsideration 
of  the constitutional text itself  and the deliberation process. The government does not necessarily 
monopolize public visions of  constituting political order. Rather, the Japanese people as a whole for 
the first time have struggled for self-consciously constituting a new political order even within the 
limits of  the international and national political situation. The third way discovers positive 
participation and substantial discontinuity based upon the idea of  novelty in the process of  making 
the postwar constitution. In the process, the tradition of  the tenno institution became an object of  
consideration, deliberation, and choice. Thus, the Japanese people even with help from the outsider 
were successful in taking the tenno into a constitutional framework. Despite serious limits under the 
occupation, in short, the Japanese people as a whole have experienced a republican moment by 
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making the tradition in government relative. As a result, political legitimacy is no longer found in the 
tradition but in mutual deliberation among the people. Once popular sovereignty is declared, 
furthermore, the search for political legitimacy is never ending because the absolute value-giver such 
as the prewar tenno no longer exists outside the people. The establishment of  the Constitution of  
Japan is only a beginning of  beginnings. 
           It is true that if  the Constitution of  Japan had been established by popular vote, the Japanese 
people could have had a precious opportunity to express their own commitment to liberal 
democratic values. Thus the constitutional revolution thesis would be much more easily justifiable. 
However, it is also true that after the defeat, a significant number of  the Japanese people were forced 
to be self-consciously confronted with the difficult task of  constituting political order and struggled 
to initiate a new politics that is based upon a fundamentally innovative idea of  popular sovereignty 
to come to terms with the tenno institution. We cannot underrate their first experience of  public 
discussion on the constitution of  political legitimacy and public good for the nation as the internal 
continuity theory does. If  popular sovereignty means something positive, it must be a wide range of  
robust public discussions between the government elite and the common citizens. From this 
perspective, we cannot emphasize such an experience too much.  
           Popular sovereignty is a more dynamic fiction than the tenno sovereignty it has replaced. 
Government by the people is essentially paradoxical because the people are plural and thus it is 
inevitable in the real world of  politics to split the people between the governing minority and the 
governed majority.128 However, popular sovereignty always challenges the governing minority to 
reform political and social facts to adjust to ideals its concept inspires.129 The ambiguity between the 
principle of  popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno system should be clarified in the later 
                                                 
128 As Maruyama Masao has observed, democracy based upon popular sovereignty needs a trinity of  idea, 
movement, and institution and its idea and movement are endlessly challenging because the paradoxical rule 
of  the people consists in only process, or movement. Maruyama Masao, “Sengo minshushugi no ‘genten’ 
(‘The Starting Point’ of  Postwar Democracy),” Tokuhon Kenpo no hyakunen vol. 3 Kenpo no saisei (Tokyo: 
Sakuhinsha, 1989) in Maruyama Masao shu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996) 15: 57-70. 
129 See Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of  Popular Sovereignty in England and America (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 306. 
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political process by the exercises of  the new principle of  popular sovereignty on the part of  the 
people themselves.  
           If  the postwar constitution, as I have sketched here and will lengthily argue later, is regarded 
as an unfinished constitutional revolution, making it has meant merely a starting point. The 
internalization of  liberal democratic values has been the most important task for the Japanese people. 
The Constitution of  Japan itself  established at least a basis upon which public discourse could work 
well. On this basis, common citizens and the government elite, for the first time, can share a 
common language with which dialogue is practiced. The whole process has been a constitutional 
revolution in progress in Japan130 
 
           Chapter 1 “The Meiji Constitution: Between Absolutism and Constitutionalism” will discuss 
the Meiji constitutional system from the viewpoint of  liberal democracy. After briefly reviewing the 
process of  establishing the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan of  1889 and its prominent features, I 
will examine conflicts between democratic elements and undemocratic factors in the system. The 
constitutional text and its original intention were clearly antagonistic to political parties and did not 
permit parliamentary government system to operate. However, thanks to the Taisho Democracy 
Movement, a parliamentary cabinet system based upon political party politics was established as a 
constitutional practice in the 1920s. Minobe Tatsukichi made a remarkable contribution to 
establishing a cabinet government system through his excellent interpretation. Examination of  the 
controversy between his liberal theory and Hozumi Yatsuka and Uesugi Sinkichi’s conservative 
interpretations based upon the idea of  divine right (the Tenno Kikansetsu Ronso, the Controversy over 
the Tenno Organ Theory) will show the considerable interpretive leeway the Meiji Constitution 
allowed. Minobe’s non-originalist interpretation provoked a fanatic right-wing movement in the 
                                                 
130 In the dissertation, I will place emphasis on public discourse, not secret histories, of  political events in 
postwar Japan because I believe that from the perspective of  public discourse and popular commitment, it is 
more important to theorize how the people understand ongoing political events and respond to them than to 
discover hidden truths afterwards. 
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1930s. The Tenno Kikansetsu Jiken (the Incident of  the Tenno Organ Theory) forced Minobe to retire 
from public life. The government declared that his Organ Theory was against the kokutai ideology 
and banned his three main books. This incident finally led to the collapse of  the Meiji constitutional 
system. In tracing the incident, I will consider the limits of  the Meiji Constitution. The Meiji 
constitutional regime was based upon the monopolization of  values by the tenno, which ultimately 
rejected the liberal democratization of  politics. This chapter will clarify problems of  the Meiji 
constitutional system, from which constitutional writing in the postwar period will be evaluated.      
           Chapter 2 “The Failure of  the Japanese Government to Take a Chance of  Constitutional 
Revolution” will examine how the Japanese government responded to the reality the defeat in war 
had brought. The governing elite did not pay much attention to the difficult situation common 
citizens faced. It was the most important task immediately after the defeat for them to retain the 
kokutai, the government system in which the tenno in one line unbroken for ages eternal held and 
exercised sovereign power. They did not believe by themselves that the Potsdam Declaration 
required the Japanese government to revise the Meiji Constitution to achieve the goal of  liberal 
democratization of  politics the Declaration had set forth. However, they believed hat the Meiji 
Constitution was simple and flexible enough to achieve the goal with its minor repair and revision 
and repeal of  implementing statutes and orders.  
Nonetheless, the Japanese government had to come to prepare constitutional revision 
anyway. The starting point of  constitutional reform in postwar Japan was the suggestion of  General 
Douglas MacArthur to Prince Konoe Fumimaro, the deputy prime minister of  the Higashikuni 
cabinet. Even after the Shidehara cabinet was formed, Konoe and the Office of  the Privy Seal 
continued to assume responsibility for constitutional revision. Their activities incurred repulsion of  
the government. The Shidehara cabinet established the Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinkai (the Committee 
for the Investigation of  Constitutional Problems), over which Matsumoto Joji presided. The name of  
the committee well indicates the atmosphere of  the governing elite. The rivalry of  Konoe and the 
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Office of  the Privy Seal stimulated formation of  the Matsumoto Committee. Although this 
committee consisted of  outstanding constitutional scholars of  the day and top legal bureaucrats, its 
work failed to present a grand design for the new postwar era. The members had been so infatuated 
with the idea of  the kokutai that they could not determinedly face up to the problems the Meiji 
constitutional regime inhered. After all, they were so close to the center of  power in the established 
regime that they could easily identify themselves with the power structure. Because Minobe 
Tatsukichi, the liberal giant in the old era, represented the good governing elite, his constitutional 
thought in the postwar period is worth exploring. His theory reveals the limits of  the Meiji 
constitutional system. Without ideals and passions, the Japanese government experienced a second 
defeat.  
In Chapter 3 “Making of  the Postwar Constitution: The First Public Deliberation on 
Constituting Freedom,” I will reexamine the process of  making the Constitution of  Japan from the 
perspective of  its revolutionary characteristics. The failure of  the government does not necessarily 
mean that the Japanese people were unable to present innovative ideas of  liberal democratization of  
politics. In fact, Takano Iwasaburo and the members of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai (the Constitutional 
Research Group) framed a draft of  popular sovereignty with the ritualistic tenno institution. They 
were on the periphery of  the established regime. In fact, some of  them suffered persecution in the 
old era. Thus they were able to conceive freely a constitutional order for postwar Japan. More 
importantly, they were intellectuals in various disciplines without any orthodox constitutional 
scholarship and thus could come up with a grand design of  constitutionalism appropriate for the 
new era through deliberation among them. This plan had an influence upon the GHQ’s work on 
constitutional revision. 
Another important element of  the process of  making the postwar constitution was that the 
constitution was framed as the result of  public deliberation among the Japanese people for the first 
time in their history. Because of  GHQ’s directive on liberal democratization, election law was 
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revised to vest women with suffrage in December 1945. The general election of  April 1946 was held 
under universal suffrage for the first time. Its return of  39 women and 98 leftist representatives well 
indicated that a new era had come. In the ninetieth Imperial Diet, the newcomers along with 
traditional conservatives participated in deliberating on the new constitution. In comparison with the 
Meiji Constitution, which was secretly prepared by an extremely limited number of  leaders and 
granted to the subjects as a benefit by the merciful tenno, the postwar constitution can be regarded as 
an outcome of  public deliberation among the Japanese people. Through deliberation, politics in 
postwar Japan started to transform its nature. The government had to explain and defend a 
foundation of  the tenno system. Such a thing had never occurred in Japanese history. The will of  the 
imperial founder and ancestors was firmly believed to control the current will of  the tenno, that is, the 
state. In this fiction the government had no need to justify its political power when it resorted to the 
will of  the tenno. But now even the traditional authority could not be justified by itself. The creation 
of  the postwar constitution began to transform political power from a vertical relation based upon 
order and subject to a horizontal relation based upon mutual persuasion by speech. 
Chapter 4 “New Constitutional Principles: Popular Sovereignty and the Liberal 
Democratization of  Politics” will consider the basic principles of  the postwar constitutional system. 
My concern lies in how the postwar constitution guarantees liberal democracy to function well. 
Close attention must be paid to the writing style of  the postwar constitution. Its colloquial Japanese 
with hiragana and Chinese characters and punctuation marks has made the postwar constitution easy 
for common citizens to read. Reading the fundamental law of  the land is the most rudimentary form 
of  participation in politics. Moreover, this change in the writing style came completely from the 
Japanese initiative. The enthusiastic petition of  the Kokumin No Kokugo Undo (the People’s National 
Language Movement League) moved flexible legal bureaucrats to write the constitution in a 
colloquial and simple way. In the Meiji constitutional system, the constitution was after all nothing 
other than a tool of  the governing elite for ruling the common citizens. In sharp contrast, the 
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colloquialism has made the postwar constitution a baseline shared by both the common citizens and 
the governing elite. If  constitutionalism means something, it should be when common citizens who 
are more or less subjects of  rule can understand what the fundamental law provides for.  
The main purpose of  the postwar constitution is to guarantee due respect for human dignity 
as individuals. To achieve the purpose, according to its basic structure, the new constitution has 
adopted the principle of  popular sovereignty and thorough pacifism. The Meiji constitutional system 
failed to protect individual autonomy because of  the kokutai ideology that monopolized all values. 
One line unbroken for ages eternal with unification of  the state and Shinto denied even inner 
freedoms in principle. The postwar constitutional regime has successfully taken the tenno into its 
inside and thus abolished the kokutai ideology. To reinforce protection of  fundamental human rights, 
the postwar constitutional system has introduced judicial review, which is regarded as one of  the 
most important institutions for realizing liberal democracy. This had also sparked transformation of  
politics to rationalization of  one governmental organ’s action based upon reasons that can convince 
other organs. 
Furthermore, popular sovereignty is without any doubt the most eminent feature of  the 
postwar constitution. Nothing expresses the principle of  popular sovereignty better than the 
amendment process. If  sovereignty means the decisive power over fundamental matters in a political 
community, the very power to create a constitution well shows its attribute. Once a constitution is 
established, sovereign power changes its appearance to the power to amend the constitution. The 
postwar constitution displays profound commitment to popular sovereignty when it adopts a 
mandatory popular vote system in the amendment process. 
A constitutional regime does not stand by a constitution alone. It needs various 
implementing statutes and constitutional practices to support and reinforce the fundamental 
constitutional values it has chosen. The aspect of  consolidation should be carefully examined. In the 
case of  the postwar constitution, it is all the more important to pay attention to efforts to consolidate 
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the constitutional system because the government was quite reluctant to frame the new constitution. 
Unlike conventional explanations on the making of  the postwar constitution, therefore, my analysis 
will advance as far as the Katayama cabinet. The Socialist Party became the leading party in the 
House of  Representatives as the result of  the first general election under the new constitution on 
April 25, 1947. Even a plurality of  the left in the Diet was regarded as revolutionary and this fully 
announced that a new era had come. Generally this left-center coalition cabinet developed a poor 
reputation but because the Socialist Party occupied only about one third of  the seats of  the House of  
Representatives, compromises with conservative coalition partners were necessary. Even so, legal 
reforms such as change in the feudalistic family law system, abolition of  crimes against the imperial 
family in general, lese majesty in particular, liquidation of  the Ministry of  the Interior and police 
reform, and establishment of  the Supreme Court are very important achievements in the early 
reborn nation, which all consolidated the constitutional revolution in ideas. Finally, I will consider 
missing opportunities for the Japanese people to express themselves in popular referendum. The 
Japanese government and MacArthur’s GHQ shared common interests in evading popular selection 
of  the fundamental law. Potentials of  popular sovereignty will be focused on.                   
In Chapter 5 “Transformation of  Politics: The Symbolic Tenno System and Rise of  
Reason,” I will explore how the Japanese people conceptualized the new governmental principles 
immediately after the establishment of  the postwar constitution. First, by reviewing high school 
textbooks, I will discuss perceptions of  democracy in the postwar era. Democracy was indeed 
understood as in relation to a bright future and prosperity. This optimistic view on democracy leads 
us to ask a serious question. My main concern here lies in a relationship between the principle of  
popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno institution. Democracy might be distorted by the 
retention of  the tenno institution, which once had absolute influence upon people’s way of  thinking. 
When the constitution was framed, indeed, the government in a sense had to pretend that the kokutai 
was still the same as in the Meiji Constitution because the governing elite were profoundly captive of  
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the kokutai ideology. Without pretense, creation of  the postwar constitution might have been 
extremely difficult. Thus the government repeatedly stated that the tenno in the new constitution had 
still been unchangeably as akogare no mato (the center of  adoration), although the symbolic tenno 
institution with no real political powers is in fact totally different from the tenno system in which he 
as sovereign held and exercised the power to govern the state deriving from the divine will of  the 
imperial founder. Thus public discourse on the postwar constitution was formed along dichotomous 
ideas of  continuity and discontinuity.  
I will examine how people responded to this ambiguity in a relationship between popular 
sovereignty and the symbolic tenno institution in the early postwar period. How did the tenno and his 
family act in the new constitutional system? While it seemed that the tenno never understood the 
status of  the symbol, his brother openly challenged the traditional manner and advocated equality of  
men and women. We will see that some intellectuals who were regarded as liberals in the old era 
prepared the ground for accepting a symbolic tenno institution. The arguments of  historian Tsuda 
Sokichi and philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro deserve special attention. Especially, reexamination of  the 
controversy between Watsuji and Sasaki Soichi over the change in the kokutai will clarify features of  
public discourse on the new constitution in the postwar period and limits of  traditional 
constitutional thinking. Further, an important debate was carried out between the thesis of  August 
Revolution by Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, a constitutional law scholar, and the theory of  Nomos 
Sovereignty by Odaka Tomoo, a legal philosopher. Through this debate it became clear that the 
discourse of  discontinuity prevailed over that of  continuity. By developing the August Revolution 
thesis, moreover, I will argue that the whole process of  making the postwar constitution should be 
regarded as an unfinished constitutional revolution. On these premises, understanding of  the tenno 
institution and the symbol itself  in the new constitution will be explored in detail. Finally, 
examination of  the Placard case over lese majesty will indicate a new beginning of  constitutional 
discourse in the postwar era. Politics has transformed its nature to one based upon mutual 
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persuasion by speech. 
While many people argued heatedly for continuity between the two constitutions and most 
really wanted to see it, there were a few frank and solid discussions that recognized discontinuity and 
advocated the newness of  the postwar constitution. Through the public discussions in the early 
postwar period, the perception of  discontinuity gradually became a common foundation for the 
postwar constitution. Whatever might have been argued for the symbolic tenno system, it clearly is 
different from the old tenno institution based upon the idea of  one line of  tennos unbroken for ages 
eternal. The substance of  the symbolic tenno institution all depends upon the political will of  the 
sovereign people. In fact, the postwar constitution has anyway taken the tenno into its constitutional 
frame, which was the most urgent problem for the Meiji constitutional regime. 
 
Liberal democracy based upon popular sovereignty needs constant reforms to fulfill its 
promise. The postwar constitution has provided the people with a framework in which they have a 
final voice on critical matters of  the state. Claude Lefort’s argument is suggestive: “modern 
democracy invites us to replace the notion of  a regime governed by laws, of  a legitimate power, by 
the notion of  a regime founded upon the legitimacy of  a debate as to what is legitimate and what is 
illegitimate----a debate which is necessarily without any guarantor and without any end.”131 A liberal 
democratic system has to simultaneously guarantee promotion of  a majority will and protection of  a 
minority, which is an extremely challenging task. This task has to be carried out by the sovereign 
people through endless public discussions. With the postwar Constitution, Japan has reached this 
stage of  modern democracy, and it is time for constitutional theory to acknowledge fully this crucial 
turning point. 
 
                                                 
131 Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. David Macey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 39. 
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Chapter 1   
The Meiji Constitution: Between Absolutism and Constitutionalism  
 
1. Introduction 
2. Path to the Meiji Constitution 
3. Prominent Characteristics of  the Meiji Constitutional System 
4. Relationship between the Imperial Diet and the Government 
5. Pluralism in Advisory Institutions  
6. Protection of  the Rights of  Subjects and the Judiciary 
7. The Meiji Constitution in Operation 
8. Two Schools of  Constitutional Interpretation: The Organ Theory Controversy 





 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, or the Meiji Constitution, was promulgated on 
February 11, 1889, and put into effect on November 29, 1890. After World War II, it was replaced 
by the Constitution of  Japan, which is currently effective. It governed Japan for about fifty-six and a 
half  years. This Meiji Constitution was the first written constitution in a modern sense in Japanese 
history. 
 Soon after opening the country to the world in 1854, the Tokugawa Shogunate was 
overthrown and a tenno (emperor)-centered regime was restored in 1868. The Meiji Restoration was 
one way of  responding to the impact from the Western civilization. The leaders of  the time chose 
the tenno as their partner for carrying out modernization of  the state. By appealing to traditional 
authority, on the one hand, they placed the tenno on the apex of  power structure to integrate the 
people as a modern state. On the other hand, however, they had to emphasize that they were acting 
for the public good, not private interests to expand the foundation of  political power in a nation 
state.1 Thus, the Charter Oath in March 1868 adopted the principle of  respecting public discussion 
                                                 
1 See Matsumoto Sannosuke, Meiji Shisoshi: Kindai koka no sosetsu kara ko no kakusei made (A History of  Meiji 
Japanese Thought: From the Creation of  a Modern State to the Awakening of  the Individual) (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1996), 
28-44. 
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by old feudal units.2 Nonetheless, it is different from the Western idea of  public discussion based 
upon a distinction between the private and the public.3   
In modernization, the leaders decided to transform Japan from the Ritsuryo state (the state 
based upon legal codes introduced from ancient China) to a constitutional state in a more or less 
Western sense. We have to ask how modern constitutionalism, the core of  which lies in the 
limitation of  state power to enhance individual rights and liberties, was introduced to Japan. The 
idea of  modern constitutionalism was in essence foreign to the traditional way of  government in 
Japan: let the people lean upon the government but not inform them of  truth. The leaders who 
wanted more or less the powerful state to cope with the Western advanced powers tended to pursue 
the traditional governing style. Upon the influence of  Western political thought, however, some 
people enthusiastically advocated participation in the political process, protection of  fundamental 
human rights, and a parliamentary government system. The movement for advocacy of  liberal 
democracy was intense and wide-spread enough for the governing leaders to realize what they would 
not choose and make some compromise to its claims. As a result, the Meiji constitutional regime 
was constitutional in some parts and despotic in others.     
This chapter will explore how the Meiji Constitution was created, operated, and destroyed 
to clarify the conditions around the postwar constitutional making and particularly its problems that 
have to be solved in framing a new constitution. Because both the external imposition theory and the 
                                                 
2 The Charter Oath of March 14, 1868 in Ray A. Moore & Donald L. Robinson, eds., The Japanese Constitution: 
A Documentary History of  its Framing and Adoption, 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 
document 002 (hereinafter cited as RM002). 
(1) Deliberative assemblies shall be established and all measures of  government decided in 
accordance with public opinion. 
(2) All classes high and low shall unite in vigorously carrying on the affairs of  State. 
(3) All common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall be allowed to fulfill 
their just desires so that there may not be any discontent among them. 
(4) All the absurd usages of  old shall be broken through and equity and justice to be found 
in the workings of  nature shall serve as the basis of  action. 
(5) Wisdom and knowledge shall be sought throughout the world for the purpose of  
promoting the welfare of  the Empire. 
3 See theories of  emphasizing public discourse, see Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of  the State 
Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of  Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991, 1962), 
translated by Thomas Burger; Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980). 
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internal continuity theory oversimplify the constitutional experience of  the Japanese people, we have 
to confirm the starting point of  their modern constitutionalism. The aim of  this preparatory chapter 
is to obtain a perspective from which we will be able to theorize as the third way the constitutional 
experience in postwar Japan by clarifying the features and problems of  the first modern Japanese 
constitutional regime. It will show that the idea of  the kokutai, the government system in which the 
tenno in one line unbroken ages for eternal held and exercised sovereign power, was the essential 
obstacle to liberal democratization of  politics in the postwar era, which both theories either 
intentionally or unintentionally fail to identify.  
First in this chapter, we will review the path to creation of  the Meiji constitutional regime. 
When the Meiji Constitution was established, the governing leaders attempted to reserve their power 
in it. Thus the government system was apt to be absolutist. For example, the tenno was vested with 
various prerogatives in almost all areas and the government was independent of  the Imperial Diet. 
However, because the constitutional regime was created to cope with the popular movement for 
political participation, the governing leaders had to make some concession to liberal democratic 
claims. They had to establish the popularly elected House of  Representatives anyway. Thus, the path 
itself  reveals its complicated characters mixed between absolutism and constitutionalism.  
Then we will examine the conspicuous features of  the Meiji Constitution. Its fundamental 
principle was that the tenno (the emperor) in one line unbroken for ages eternal should reign and 
govern forever as sovereign. Thus direct governance of  the emperor was principled in the Meiji 
regime. We will discuss its governmental structure from perspectives of  a relationship between the 
Imperial Diet and the government, various advisory institutions, and protection of  rights. Then we 
will examine the actual operation of  the Meiji Constitution. A conflict of  absolutism and 
constitutionalism seemed to be solved in a way that parliamentary government became a political 
practice in the 1920s. However, the fanatic ultra-nationalist movement vandalized the Meiji 
constitutional system, which led Japan to the defeat in World War II. Finally, we will consider the 
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debate of  constitutional interpretation between conservative Hozumi and Uesugi and liberal Minobe. 
While the former enthusiastically represented an absolutist part of  the Meiji Constitution, the latter 
vividly showed how liberal the constitution was. The discussion in this chapter will identify the most 
serious problem of  the Meiji Constitution: the tenno in one line unbroken for ages eternal was 
situated outside the constitutional framework, which inherently limited liberal democratization of  
politics. 
 
2. Path to the Meiji Constitution 
The Meiji government pursued modernization of  society to avoid colonization by the 
Western advanced powers in the imperialist competition. The leaders of  this new government 
adopted the policies of  fukokukyohei (enriching the wealth and military strength of  the country), 
shokusankogyo (promoting industry and increasing products), and bunmeikaika (cultivating human 
intelligence and progressing civilization, particularly Westernization). Along these goals, the 
government came to believe that Japan should have a Western type of  written constitution. There 
were several factors which made them believe so.4  
One of  the external factors was that the government had to amend unequal treaties with 
Western advanced countries to keep independence of  the country. According to the then existing 
treaties, the Japanese government did not enjoy tariff  autonomy or exercise jurisdiction over 
foreigners in Japan. The advanced countries had a good excuse that they were afraid of  unfair 
treatment of  their own peoples because Japan did not have a well established Westernized legal 
system. To start negotiations for renewal of  treaties with the Western countries, it was necessary for 
the Japanese government to enact a Western style of  statutes and accordingly establish 
                                                 
4 See Inada Masatsugu, Meiji kenpo seiritsushi (History of  the Birth of  the Meiji Constitution) 2 vols. (Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, 1960, 1962); Kenneth Colegrove, “The Japanese Constitution,” 31 American Political Science Review 
1027-1049 (1937); George M. Beckmann, The Making of  the Meiji Constitution: The Oligarchs and the Constitutional 
Development of  Japan, 1868-1891 (Lawrence: University of  Kansas Publications, 1957); George Akita, 
Foundations of  Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900 (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University 
Press, 1967). 
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administration of  justice. A constitution is the most basic in a legal system. Furthermore, many 
governmental elites at that time believed that constitutionalism was a source of  wealth and strength 
for Western advanced countries and that Japan as a developing country should follow Western 
constitutionalism to achieve its goal of  the nation’s wealth and strength.5  
As internal factors for establishing a constitution, there were necessities to the hanbatsu 
government with serious difficulties (hanbatsu means clans based upon homelands of  the leaders of  
the Meiji Restoration, particularly Satsuma and Choshu). Japan was experiencing a rapid 
development of  society. The old governmental system was effective for a decentralized feudal 
agrarian state. However, it was obsolete in a centralized capitalist state toward which Japan was 
proceeding. Bureaucratic despotism, arbitrariness of  conjectural judgment, and inconsistency in 
policy were the objects of  criticism of  the hanbatsu government. Thus it was necessary for the Meiji 
government to secure the consistent policy-making process and organization of  top governmental 
personnel. The government elites thought that a written constitution would well serve these purposes. 
From a viewpoint of  real politics, in addition, a new constitutional regime was expected to maintain 
balances of  powers among the hanbatsu oligarchs and between old hanbatsu leaders and newly 
empowered bureaucrats.6 At any rate, the hanbatsu oligarchs who were outsiders in the elite circle of  
the old regime had to create a new stable political order to avoid a legitimacy crisis even if  they 
appealed to the authority of  the rediscovered and revitalized emperor.7  
Furthermore, and most importantly, the Jiyu Minken Undo (the movement for parliamentary 
government and people’s rights to freedom and to participate in the political process) was so 
vehement that the Meiji government elites had to make some compromise with people’s demands to 
establish representative government if  they wanted to keep their power to rule intact. The Jiyu 
                                                 
5 See Nagai Hideo, “Meiji kenpo no seitei (Establishment of  the Meiji Constitution)” (1962) in Yasuda Hiroshi 
& Minagawa Masaki, eds., Meiji kenpo taisei (The Meiji Constitutional Regime) (Tokyo: Tokyodo Shuppan, 
2002), 153-156. 
6 See Nagai, “Meiji kenpo no seitei,” 156-158. 
7 For the problems of  legitimacy and authority with which the new leaders were confronted, see Bernard S. 
Silberman, Cages of  Reason: The Rise of  the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain 
(Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1993), chaps 6 & 7. 
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Minken Undo was a popular movement that nationally developed to claim both negative freedom and 
positive freedom from 1874 into the 1880s.8 The movement severely criticized the monopoly of  
political power by the hanbatsu oligarchs and strongly demanded the right to participate in the 
government process. In the Jiyu Minken Undo, people proposed a lot of  constitutional plans through 
discussing what organization of  the state was good for the people. They enthusiastically advocated, 
among other things, a constitutional government, a parliamentary system, natural rights theory, and 
local self-government. Its central claim resided in establishing a parliament. In January 1874, Itagaki 
Taisuke9 and others submitted a petition for establishment of  a parliament composed of  publicly 
elected representatives. 10  Similar petitions followed and newspapers deeply associated with the 
movement heatedly argued for opening a diet. To cope with the desires of  people to have civil rights 
and civil liberties and a parliamentary government, the hanbatsu government was compelled to 
present their own conception of  the new state. Because Western constitutional ideas were prevalent 
all through the debate, the hanbatsu government itself  needed to show their plan in a Western 
constitutional fashion. 
The making of  a written constitution, therefore, meant to the government elites self-
restraint on the one hand and preservation of  their leadership on the other. In July 1881, Iwakura 
Tomomi expressed fundamental principles and opinions on constitutional government. The 
documents were drafted by Inoue Kowashi, who would soon play an important role in writing the 
Meiji Constitution through rendering assistance to Ito Hirobumi, the chair of  the committee for 
drafting the constitution. The opinions would be mostly adopted in the Meiji Constitution. The main 
fundamental principles were the following: 
1 The Constitution shall emanate from the emperor and the policy of  a gradual approach 
toward constitutional government shall prevail. 
                                                 
8 For the Jiyu Minken Undo, see Emura Eiichi, ed. Jiyu minken to meiji kenpo (People’s Right to Participate in Politics 
and the Meiji Constitution) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1995). 
9 Itagaki was once a member of  the new government and resigned after his defeat of  the debate on diplomatic 
policy toward Korea. He had become one of  the most prominent and formidable leaders of  this movement and 
organized the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) in October 1881. 
10 This famous petition is generally understood to mark the beginning of  the movement 
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2 Law of  succession to the throne have followed traditional rule since the ancestors. It shall 
be provided in the Imperial House Law separated from the Constitution. 
3 The emperor shall have supreme command over the army and navy, declare war, make 
peace, conclude treaties, appoint and dismiss all civil and military officers, confer marks of  
honor, order pardons, and open and close parliament and dissolve its house. 
4 Ministers of  state shall be responsible to the emperor.  
5 Parliament shall consist of  two houses: An upper house composed of  members appointed 
by the emperor and members elected from among the ranks of  peers and former samurai, a 
lower house of  popularly elected representatives. The election law for the lower house shall 
include a property qualification for the suffrage. 
6 When parliament does not pass an annual budget bill, the government may execute the 
provisions of  the budget of  the previous year. 
7 Rights and duties of  subjects shall be provided. 11 
 
The opinions attached to the fundamental principles shows their way of  thinking about 
constitutional government. The first opinion says that when Japan introduces constitutional 
government, it is important to “decide on a system of  constitutional government that is suitable to 
[Japan’s] national polity and customs.” 12  Generally, there are two models of  constitutional 
government under monarchy in the world: English and Prussian. In the opinion’s analysis, the 
English Parliament enjoys administrative power as well as legislative power. The king has power only 
in name, and the prime minister holds real power over state affairs. The prime minister is a leader of  
the majority party in the parliament. Political party politics leads to unification of  legislative and 
administrative powers in the parliament. In England, therefore, “Although, in name, sovereignty is 
shared by the king and parliament, in reality sovereignty lies chiefly in parliament.” This situation 
looks like that of  Japan from the middle to early modern age, where the emperor reigned as the 
spiritual authority but the shogun, the top officer of  the military, governed the country. On the 
Prussian model, in sharp contrast, the king both reigns and rules the country. The king shares 
legislative power with the parliament but holds administrative power by himself. The prime minister 
is appointed by the king without any relation to his status in the parliament. As practice, the king 
                                                 
11 See Iwakura, “Taikouryou (The Fundamental Principles),” in Tsutsui Wakamizu, Banno Jyunji, Sato Kouji, 
and Nagao Ryuuichi, eds., Nihon kenposhi (History of  Japanese Constitutional Law) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppannkai, 1976), 104-105; Inada, Meiji kenpo seiritsushi, 465-491. See also, Beckmann, The Making of  the 
Meiji Constitution, 59, 143-148; Colegrove, “The Japanese Constitution,” 1040-41. 
12 Iwakura, “Opinion on the Constitutional Government,” in Beackmann, The Making of  the Meiji Constitution, 
144. 
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selects as the prime minister a person who is expected to gain support from the parliament; political 
parties never play a formally decisive role in the administration of  state affairs. When she establishes 
a constitutional government, Japan starts something new, and thus has to decide which model she 
will copy. The first opinion recommends taking the Prussian rather than English model for two 
reasons. First of  all, whereas England has a long time two-party system that secures changes of  
cabinet, political parties had not organized yet in Japan. In such a situation, speculation grows, a few 
large parties would not be formed but numerous small parties would spring up. As a result, they 
would fight with one another to seek administrative power, and instability in the government might 
lead to resort to arms to overcome difficulties in the political agenda. Secondly, as the first opinion 
points out, there is a shortage of  capable candidates for the prime minister in the country. It implies 
that the hanbatsu oligarchs should maintain the power to govern. The opinion concludes with 
expressing deep suspicion against people who have praised the English model because they ignore 
the current condition of  Japanese society. It is impossible for a Japanese political party system to 
develop rapidly and firmly enough to establish as steady a constitutional government as England 
enjoys now. Gradual advancement on the Prussian model should be recommended. 
 The second opinion goes further to state that the government should be based upon the 
emperor’s prerogative, not the will of  parliament. When a new constitution is framed by following 
the Prussian model, it is necessary for it to have three provisions. It must have a provision that the 
emperor holds the right to appoint and dismiss ministers and other higher officials. The ministers of  
state thus “depend upon the favor of  the Emperor and the trust of  the nation, and they are not 
controlled by the opinions of  the people.” To avoid a system of  collective responsibility of  the 
cabinet as in England, the new constitution must provide that responsibilities of  ministers are 
divided into instances of  collective and individual responsibilities as in the French Constitution of  
1875. In order to cope with the parliament, moreover, the new constitution must copy Article 109 of  
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the Prussian Constitution that provides that taxes of  the previous year shall remain in force.13 And 
the third opinion criticizes two proposed constitutional plans from the second and third points of  the 
second opinion.14  
Making the Meiji Constitution proceeded along Iwakura and Inoue’s argument above. One 
day after the dismissal from the government of  Okuma Shigenobu, a champion of  the English style 
of  parliamentarism, the hanbatsu government finally made public their decision to move to a 
constitutional government. The imperial rescript was issued on October 12, 1881, which stated that 
the government promised to establish a constitution and convoke a diet by the year of  1890.15  
After he returned from his constitutional research trip to Europe, mainly Prussia,16 Ito 
Hirobumi was appointed the chairman of  a consultative committee on drafting a constitution and 
other important laws. He shared with his fellow oligarchs a vision of  constitutionalism: a written 
constitution only confirms the monarch’s sovereign right to govern and the monarch is situated 
above both legislative and administrative powers without any legal interference. Constitutional 
government meant to Ito and other hanbatsu members above all a constitutional monarch with a 
systematic and efficient rule through legal institutions. The idea of  limited government that is the 
indispensable element of  modern constitutionalism was deliberately ignored because Ito and his 
allies had to find reasons and ways to fight back at people’s natural right to participate in politics 
widely inspired in the Jiyu Minken Undo.17  
It was true that Ito and his fellows firmly rejected the personal arbitrariness of  a monarch.18 
Given the fact that a parliament would be convoked soon, however, they had to create an institution 
of  a powerful monarch who is the sole source of  political legitimacy in general and the impending 
constitution in particular to avoid the parliamentary government the Jiyu Minken Undo heatedly 
                                                 
13 Iwakura, “Opinion on the Constitutional Government,” 146-147. 
14 Iwakura, “Opinion on the Constitutional Government,” 147. 
15 The full text of  the imperial rescript, see Inada, Meiji kenpo seiritsushi, 1: 527. 
16 For Ito’s trip to Europe, see Inada, Meiji kenpo seiritsushi, 1: 565-598. 
17 Ito’s letter to Iwakura, see Inada, Meiji Kenpo seiritsushi, 1: 584-585. 
18 For example, Ito’s letter to Iwakura, see Hiratsuka Atsushi ed., Ito Hirobumi hiroku (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1929), 
292. 
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advocated. Direct governance by the emperor would have to be the fundamental principle of  the new 
constitution so that the hanbatsu oligarchs could keep their ruling powers intact. Ito compared the 
Prussian constitutional government to a large machine by which all things run in order. Although 
the monarch seemed to be one part of  the machine from the text of  the constitution, in reality he 
had never been an inner part but operated the machine from the outside. The monarch was the 
superintendent who took care that everything should not be stagnant. 19  In Prussia under the 
leadership of  Chancellor Bismarck, Ito discovered a solid foundation of  his version of  
constitutionalism. He found that a combination of  the Japanese tradition of  over 2500 years and a 
Western idea of  legality well served an efficiently organized government.20 The hanbatsu oligarchs 
perceived constitutional government mainly as structuring powers in terms of  stability and 
rationality.21 Their concerns did not reside in rule of  law but in rule by law. In sum, they understood 
the constitution as an elitist instrument for ruling the people. The idea that the constitution is a 
channel for arranging various private interests among the people for the public good was entirely 
foreign to them. From this perspective, the forthcoming constitution would be unlikely to create a 
common basis upon which public dialogue between common citizens and the government elites 
could be performed well.  
For the hanbatsu government, the basic strategy of  making a constitution was the kintei 
kenpo shugi (the principle that the emperor grants to the subjects a constitution as his charity). It was 
the emperor that would create a new constitutional order. Following this principle could successfully 
make the emperor situated outside the constitution, even if  the constitution would provide for the 
powers of  the emperor. It was quite natural, therefore, that the mintei kenpo shugi (the principle that 
the people collectively establish a constitution) was left out of  consideration from the very beginning. 
As a consequence of  the kintei kenpo shugi, only a small number of  elites were allowed to discuss the 
new organization of  political power and prepare documents the limited discussion reflected. Most 
                                                 
19 Ito’s letter, Hiratsuka ed., Ito Hirobumi hiroku, 307-308.  
20 Ito’s letter to Iwakura, Inada, Meiji kenpo seritsuahi, 1: 585. 
21 Kido & Okubo, see Matsumoto, Meiji shisoshi, 28-44. 
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importantly, the deliberation of  a new constitution was in secret. Various private constitutional plans 
that were published and discussed during the Jiyu Minken Undo---they included provisions for a 
parliamentary government system---were regarded as irrelevant to the preparatory activities of  the 
government except for only a negative meaning that they showed what the new constitution must 
not look like.22 
On February 11, 1889, the Emperor Meiji granted the Prime Minister Kuroda Kiyotaka a 
scroll with the text of  the constitution in the audience chamber of  the imperial palace. Kuroda 
received the scroll with a profound bow. The ceremony lasted for less than ten minutes.23 People 
generally welcomed the new constitution and celebrated its promulgation as an unprecedented event. 
The celebratory events all over Japan were sponsored by the government, although people did not 
know the contents of  the new document they celebrated.24 Only about thirty high officials had 
opportunities to see governmental drafts and express their opinions toward a constitution of  a new 
regime.25 People were overjoyed at the promulgation itself  before they came to discern “gems” from 
“tiles” in the Meiji Constitution.26 
What people celebrated was, thus, not the contents of  the Constitution but the fact that 
Japan joined a club of  constitutional states in the world. At that time, a written constitution was to a 
considerable degree conceived as something associated with advanced civilization and progress. Two 
months after the promulgation, for example, Ienaga Toyokichi, future professorial lecturer at Waseda, 
Keio, and the University of  Chicago, delivered a speech as a Ph.D. candidate in political science at 
                                                 
22 See Tsutsui, Nihon kenposhi, 102. 
23 For the ceremony of  promulgation of  the Meiji Constitution and its meaning, see Carol Gluck, Japan’s 
Modern Myth: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 42-49. 
24 For the state of  ceremonial affairs around the country before and on the promulgation day and memoirs on 
the promulgation, see Sakuhinsha henshubu ed., Tokuhon Kenpo no Hyakunen: Daiichikan Kenpo no tanjyo 
(Reader: For One Hundred Years of  Constitutions, vol.1 The Birth of  the Constitution) (Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 1989), 
131-219.   
25 See Ienaga Saburo, Rekishi no nakano kenpo (Constitutions in History) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 
1977), 1: 54. 
26 The words “gems” and “tiles” were used by Nakae Chomin, a theoretical leader of  the Jiyu Minken Undo. 
See Kotoku Shusui, Chomin sensei in Tokuon kenpo no hyakunen, 188-189. See also, Nakae Chomin, “Kenpo 
happu no seiten ni tsuite jinmin no kietsu (People’s Joy on the Ceremony of the Promulgation of the 
Constitution),” Toun Shinbun, February 10, 1889 in Matsunaga Shozo, ed., Nakae Chomin hyoronshu (A 
Collection of  Essays of  Nakae Chomin) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), 218-220. 
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Johns Hopkins University, claiming that the process from the Restoration to establishment of  the 
Meiji Constitution could be understood as self  cultivation by the Japanese people and that positive 
commitment to politics by enlightened people led to the constitution. Developments in trade, 
publishing, railroads, telegraphy, higher education, and science, and the spread of  Christianity, in 
Ienaga’s view, made feudalistic despotism unexecutable in Japan. He believed that the Meiji 
Constitution brought Japan into a new era of  freedom.27  
To the leading newspapers’ surprise, in fact, the Meiji Constitution was more democratic 
than people had expected.28 However, we should not miss the fact that the day of  the promulgation 
ceremony was deliberately chosen because February 11 was the kigensetsu, anniversary of  the 
mythical founding of  the empire. Indeed, the Meiji Constitution was established when the Emperor 
Meiji swore “to the Imperial Founder of  Our House and to Our other Imperial Ancestors” that he 
“shall maintain and secure from decline the ancient form of  government.”29 This is a symbol of  the 
conspicuous feature of  the Meiji Constitution: the most traditional authority with appearance in a 
Western modern style. Inconsistencies seems obvious if  constitutional government meant to the 
hanbatsu oligarchs structuring political power in terms of  rationality and efficiency because lineage is 
contingency based upon one’s birth and in conflict with rationality in the modern sense.30 Therefore, 
successful operation of  the Meiji Constitution required that a subtle balance be struck between the 
traditional authority allegedly unique to Japan and the Western way of  thinking. And, as a matter of  
practice, it was deeply problematic because the traditional authority situated outside the constitution 
always seemed ultimately to prevail.    
 Another important feature of  making the Meiji Constitution was a lack of  public criticism. 
                                                 
27 Ienaga Toyokichi, “Japan’s Preparation for her Present Constitution,” in The Constitution of  the Empire of  
Japan (Johns Hopkins University, 1889). See also Ienaga Toyokichi, The Constitutional Development of  Japan, 
1851-1881 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1891). Ota Masao, ed. and trans., Ienaga Toyokichi to Meiji 
kensei shiron (Ienaga Toyokichi and Essays on Japanese Constitutional History) (Tokyo: Shiyosha, 1996). 
28 See Nagai, “Meiji kenpo no seitei,” 150-152. See also, Inada, Meiji kenpo seiritsuhi, 2: 926-944 
29 Dainihon teikoku kenpo (the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan),Tsuge-bumi, Imperial Oath Sworn in the 
Sanctuary in the Imperial Palace. 
30 John Rawls tries to exclude contingencies from his theory of  justice by using the veil of  ignorance. See John 
Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
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Even after the declaration of  convocation of  the Diet in ten years by the imperial rescript on October 
12, 1881, the people of  the Jiyu Minken Undo still continued to advocate political participation in 
general and constitutional convention in particular. While it started its own preparation, the hanbatsu 
government adopted a hard line policy against opposition. By the order of  the Minister of  Home 
Affairs, the police might enforce regulations that prohibited the right to present petitions and to hold 
public meetings. On December 25, 1887, the hoan jyorei (peace preservation ordinance) was 
promulgated and enforced and by applying this ordinance, over five hundred people who seemed to 
the government dangerous to the public peace were immediately banished from Tokyo.31 The police 
might treat criticisms on the promulgated Constitution as crimes against the public peace.32 
In marked contrast, most Western constitutions were created more or less as a result of  
public deliberation. The debate between Federalists and Anti-Federalists in the United States is one 
paradigm of  constitutional making in the modern era. Public deliberation including severe criticisms 
gives the regime much political legitimacy. The Meiji constitutional regime was based upon a system 
in which the most important element of  a modern constitution, freedom of  expression, was 
extremely fragile from its inception as the result of  the kintei kenpo, a constitution “bestowed upon 
the nation as a gracious imperial gift.”33 This also implies that the Meiji constitutional regime might 
be vulnerable to a serious leadership crisis because it had not been founded upon widely deliberated 
opinions, which usually accord the diffuse support to the regime all the more. 
The establishing process of  the Meiji Constitution shows both some kind of  self-restraint 
and an attempt to found a solid basis of  power on the part of  the hanbatsu oligarchs.34 The Meiji 
constitutional regime was expected to be placed somewhere between authentic absolutism and 
constitutionalism. From a liberal democratic point of  view, therefore, it was crucially important to 
                                                 
31 See Beckmann, The Making of  the Meiji Constitution, 80-81. 
32 Obinata Sumio, “Meiji kenpo no seiritsu (The Establishment of  the Meiji Constitution),” in Emura Eiich, 
ed., Jiyu minken to meiji kenpo, 221-223. 
33 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myth, 43. 
34 Ienaga Suburo points out that the framers of  the Constitution rejected constitutionalism from below but at 
the same time denied total negation of  constitutionalism. See Ienaga Saburo, Nihon kindai kenpo shisoshi kenkyu 
(A Study on History of Constitutional Thoughts in Modern Japan ) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967), 86-92 
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ask how people could expand their rights to freedom and to participate in the political process under 
the conditions of  the compromises and contradictions the Meiji Constitution involved. It was thus 
necessary to discern “gems” from “tiles” in the Meiji Constitution and to polish the gems carefully. 
As Nakae Chomin, a great philosopher nicknamed the Jean-Jacques Rousseau of  the East, pointed 
out, constitutional development under the Meiji Constitution should be stimulated by efforts to 
strengthen a process in which the onshiteki minken (the right to participate in politics as a gift from 
above) is replaced by the kaifukuteki minken (the right as a gain from below).35 From a judgment of  
the early public discourse on the Meiji Constitution, one can expect that the powers and structure of  
the Diet would be at the forefront of  liberal democratization. Thus, expanding protection of  civil 
rights did not necessarily constitute the highest priority on the liberal democratic agenda. For better 
or worse, the early debates on making the Meiji Constitution were characterized as state-centered.36 
Compared with intensified public and national interests, private and personal interests were forced to 
recede into the background.  
 
3. Prominent Characteristics of  the Meiji Constitutional System37 
(1)Dualism  
 Unlike Western monarchical countries, the Meiji hanbatsu government decided to establish a 
dual system of  fundamental law of  the nation: one was the Constitution and the other was the 
Koshitsu Tenpan (the Imperial House Law).38 The Koshitsu Tenpan, which was put into effect at the 
same time as the Meiji Constitution, dealt with matters concerning the imperial family. The Imperial 
                                                 
35 See Kotoku Shusui, “Chomin sensei,” in Inada, Meiji kenpo seiritsushi, 2: 925-926. Nakae Chomin, Sansuijin 
keirin mondo (Discussion on Statesmanship by Three Drunken Men) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965, 1887), 196-197. 
36  See Matsumoto Sannosuke, Meiji shiso ni okeru dento to kindai (Tradition and Modernity in Meiji Japanese 
Thought) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppannkai, 1996), 6-11. 
37  Minobe enumerated as features of  the Japanese monarchy kintei kenpo shugi, self-determination of the 
imperial house, prerogative-centered principle, and separation of  politics and the military. Minobe Tatsukichi, 
Nihon kenpo no kihon shugi (Basic Principles of  Japanese Constitutional Law) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1934), 3-
100 (hereinafter cited as Minobe, Kinoshugi). 
38 For the English text of  Koshitsu tenpan, see Ito Hirobumi, ed., Commentaries on the Constitution of  the Empire of  
Japan, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Chuo Daigaku, 1906), 171-184. 
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House Law was promulgated as the form of  an imperial order but it did not appear even on an 
official gazette, unlike the Constitution. This meant that the imperial family enjoyed the right to self-
determination about their domestic matters, however seriously they affected political affairs of  the 
nation.39 Theoretically, for example, the Diet could have held a power to grant consent on succession 
to the throne, as the British Parliament does. That was not the case, however, in the Meiji 
constitutional system.40 In fact, the Diet was totally excluded from the process of  decision-making on 
matters of  the imperial family.41 And that was exactly what the framers of  the system intended. It 
seemed to the framers that popular control of  the imperial matters was absolutely out of  the question. 
The framers considered the Koshitsu tenpan “a House Law” and the purpose of  its enactment was to 
make the instructions of  the imperial ancestors “more exact and express”. 42  The semi-official 
commentary on the Meiji Constitution and Imperial House Law written by Ito Hirobumi explains 
that the consent of  the Imperial Diet was unnecessary for amending the Imperial House Law. The 
emperor had not enacted totally arbitrarily this law because he received the family instructions from 
his ancestors and would hand them down to posterity. From the same reason, the subjects could not 
interfere with this law.43 The Imperial House Law therefore coexisted with the Meiji Constitution as 
the ultimate authority in its field outside any democratic control. 
 
                                                 
39 When the Koshikirei (the Order on Official Legal Form) was established in 1907, amendments to Koshitsu 
tenpan were required to be published in an official gazette. Thus, amendments of  1907 and 1918 appeared in 
official gazettes. See Ito Hirobumi, “Koshitsu tenpan gige” in Kenpo gige, Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, ed. (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1940), 128 n. 2. 
40 According to the provision of  the Meiji Constitution, “The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by 
Imperial male descendants, according to the provision of  the Imperial House Law.” (Article 2). 
41 Commentaries offers the intention of  the framers. Detailed provisions on the imperial house affairs do not 
appear in the Constitution because “no interference of  the subject shall ever be tolerated regarding them.” Ito, 
Commentaries, 6. Moreover, the Meiji Constitution provided that “No modification of  the Imperial House Law 
shall be required to be submitted to the deliberation of  the Imperial Diet” (Article 74). Commentaries explains 
why no deliberation on revision of the Imperial House Law in the Diet. It is because “Imperial House Law is 
one that has been settled by the Imperial Family concerning their own affairs, and no relation to the reciprocal 
rights and duties of  the Emperor or of  His subjects toward each other.” Ito, Commentaries, 155-156. However, 
who is the emperor, for example, influences the rights and duties of  the people very much because the Meiji 
constitutional system adopted the principle of  direct governance by the emperor.  
42 Koshitsu tenpan jyoyu (Imperial House Law Preamble) in Ito, Commentaries, 171. 
43 Ito, “Koshitsu tenpan gige” in Kenpo gige, 127. 
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(2) Divine Right 
 As discussed above, the Meiji Constitution was established as a benefit by the merciful 
emperor. The enactment derived its sole authority from the will of  the emperor. A fundamental 
assumption was that it was the emperor who made the constitution. The principle of  kintei kenpo 
unchallengeably stood solid. By following this principle, the emperor monopolized the power to 
make a constitution.44 The emperor “in virtue of  the supreme power We inherit from Our Imperial 
Ancestors, promulgate[d] the present immutable fundamental law, for the sake of  Our present 
subjects and their descendants.”45 The emperor was thus regarded as sovereign, although there was 
no Japanese word for sovereign or sovereignty in the Meiji Constitution. In his Commentaries, Ito 
Hirobumi, the chief  person in leading duties of  making the constitution, explained that “the 
relations between Sovereign and subjects were established at the time that the State was first 
founded.”46 The emperor was characterized as “Heaven-descended, divine and sacred” and “pre-
eminent” above all his subjects.47  
More precisely, sovereignty resided in the unbroken line of  emperors, descending from 
Amaterasu Omikami (the legendary sun-goddess).48 The emperor’s power to govern Japan derived 
from the founding myth of  the state. According to Joyu, Preamble of  the Meiji Constitution, “The 
right of  sovereignty of  the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath 
them to Our descendants.”49  Appealing to the tradition was an essential tone of  constitutional 
                                                 
44 The power to amend a constitution can be understood as institutionalized constitutional power. The Meiji 
Constitution preserved the power to project constitutional amendments for only the emperor. Article 73 of  the 
Constitution of the Empire of  Japan read “When it has become necessary in future to amend the provisions of  
the present Constitution, a project to the effect shall be submitted by the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.” 
45 Kenpo happu chokugo, Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of the Constitution, par. 1. 
46 Ito, Commentaries, 1. 
47 Ito, Commentaries, 7. 
48 Article1 of  the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan: “The Empire of  Japan shall be reigned over and 
governed by a line of  Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” Article 4: “The Emperor is the head of  the Empire, 
combining in Himself  the rights of  sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of  the present 
Constitution.”  
49 Further, Tsuge-bumi (Imperial Oath Sworn in the Sanctuary in the Imperial Palace) declared that “We now 
establish the Imperial House Law and the Constitution. These Laws come to only exposition of grand precepts 
for the conduct of  the government, bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of  Our House and by Our other 
Imperial Ancestors.” 
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storytelling. Therefore, the Meiji Constitution was understood as confirmation, not declaration, of  
the status of  the emperor as sovereign. Indeed, the Meiji constitutional regime was believed to be 
established to “make and secure from decline the ancient form of  government.”50 The “sacred and 
inviolable”51 emperor was not contained within the constitutional regime. The written constitution 
could not change the unbroken line of  successions of  the throne for ages eternal and that was 
believed to last forever because the latter created the former. At all events, popular consent played no 
role whatsoever in authorizing constitution-making power or sovereign will. 
As a natural corollary of  invoking the founding myth, a close connection between the state 
and Shinto was presupposed in the Meiji constitutional system. In fact, the emperor also held the 
status of  the chief  Shintoist priest. Shinto was the religion both of  the imperial family and the 
Japanese state. To that extent, on the other hand, freedom of  religion, which was supposed to be 
guaranteed to the subjects, was restricted not only by nature but also due to the conditions set by the 
constitutional provision.52  
Furthermore, the idea of  divine right presupposed an entity responding to its rule. There 
had to be those who were subject to divine rule. When the idea works well, most people must accept 
the divine right to rule as legitimate. The Meiji constitutional regime included an ideological 
apparatus for acquiring popular, albeit not necessarily positive, support. The emperor promulgated 
the Kyoiku Chokugo (Imperial Rescript on Education) on October 30, 1890,53 about twenty months 
after he promulgated the Meiji Constitution and a month before he was supposed to convoke the 
Imperial Diet. The logical structure of  the Kyoiku Chokugo was the same as the Meiji Constitution. 
The morality the Rescript advocated was “the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be 
                                                 
50 Tsuge-bumi (Imperial Oath Sworn in the Sanctuary in the Imperial Palace), par. 1. 
51 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 3. 
52  Article 28 of  the Constitution of the Meiji Constitution: “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not 
prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of  religious 
belief.” Unlike other freedoms such as freedom of speech, there was no reservation of  law as for the guarantee 
of  freedom of  religion. See also Article 29 “Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of  law, enjoy the liberty 
of  speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.” 
53 For the English text, see Gluck, Japan’a Modern Myth, 121.  
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observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places.”54 
In the Meiji Constitution, great emphasis was placed upon the long tradition and eternality in the 
future. And the Rescript set forth that loyalty and filial piety were central values in education. “Our 
Imperial Ancestors (waga koso koso) have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and 
have deeply and firmly planted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty (chu) and filial piety (ko) 
have from generation and generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of  the 
fundamental character of  Our Empire (kokutai no seika), and herein also lies the source of  Our 
education (kyoiku no engen).” 55  
The Rescript adopted ideological strategies for not only private morality but also the public 
virtue the hanbatsu government believed would be necessary to maintain their version of  
constitutionalism. On the one hand, kyodo aikoku (united patriotism) meant fidelity, subjection, and 
devotion to the state, particularly the emperor. Kyodo aikoku was foremost emphasized because the 
government believed that opposition would present great danger to the forthcoming constitutional 
system. Traditional Confucianism did not necessarily supply such kinds of  virtue. Thus a unified 
patriotic attitude among the subjects had to be cultivated. On the other hand, the emperor state was 
created more or less on the model of  a patriarchic family. Logically, Confucian morality worked well 
here. Because the newly introduced Western thought and philosophy had tremendous influence 
upon private morality, there was the urgent necessity of  reemphasizing ko (filial piety) on the part of  
the government. These two virtues were believed to stimulate the subjects to conform to government 
needs.56  
Therefore, the Monbusho (Ministry of  Education) eagerly enforced the Rescript through its 
institutionalization. The Monbusho distributed copies of  the Rescript to schools and regulated their 
storage, handling, and ceremonial reading by instruction rules. Pupils and students were compelled 
                                                 
54 Gluck, Japan’a Modern Myths, 121. 
55 Gluck, Japan’a Modern Myths, 121. 
56 See Ishida Takeshi, Meiji shiso seiji shi Kenkyu (Studies on History of  Meiji Political Thought) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 
1954); Matsumoto Sannosuke, “Kazoku kokkakan no kozo to tokushitsu (The Structure and Characteristics of  
the Familial View of the State) in Meiji shiso ni okeru dento to kindai, 23-47.  
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to attend ceremonies such as hodoku (reading the Rescript reverently) and hotai (saluting the Rescript) 
in schools. Through school textbooks that the Monbusho had come to publish, moreover, kyodo aikoku 
and ko were implanted in their minds. 57  Later, the Rescript on Education appeared in public 
ceremonies and became an important basis of  national morality. Kokoku sekishi, messhi hoko (as 
children of  the emperor, selfless devotion to the state he governs) were repeatedly emphasized. As a 
result, the governmental system based upon the idea of  divine right required the state to monopolize 
not only public but also private morality. All aspects of  human life depended upon the divine right to 
rule inherited from the emperor’s ancestors in an unbroken line and bequeathed to everlasting 
posterity, which even the emperor as sovereign could not by himself  change.   
 
(3) The Imperial Prerogative-centered Governmental System 
 The fundamental premise of  the Meiji constitutional system was that the emperor directly 
governed the people with advisory supports. The emperor “combin[ed] in Himself  the rights of  
sovereignty” and “exercise[d] them, according to the provisions of  the present Constitution.”58 This 
meant that the emperor held sovereign powers as a whole but did not necessarily exercised them by 
himself. In terms of  the Constitution, the emperor exercised “the legislative power with the consent 
of  the Imperial Diet”59 and the executive power with advice of  the ministers of  state.60 The courts of  
law exercised judicial power “in the name of  the Emperor.”61  
The emperor as constitutional monarch was no longer an absolute sovereign. 62 
Constitutional limitations were imposed on the emperor. The governmental affairs were mostly 
                                                 
57 For the institutionalization of  the Rescript by the Monbusho, see Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 146-150. 
58 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 4. 
59 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 5. 
60 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 55. 
61 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 57. 
62 Commentaries expressed an aversion for despotism. “The combination of  all the governmental powers of  the 
State in one person, is the essential characteristic of  sovereignty, and the carrying of  those powers into effect in 
accordance with the provisions of  the Constitution, denotes the exercise of  sovereignty. When the essential 
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despotism. When, on the other hand, there is such exercise of  sovereignty without its essential characteristic, 
the tendency will be towards irregularities and supineness.” Ito, Commentaries, 8. 
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performed with the support of  his advisers. However, the emperor kept a wide range of  political 
powers intact in the Meiji constitutional system. The Constitution was thus regarded as mere self-
restraint by the emperor. The Meiji constitutional regime was characterized as imperial prerogative 
centered.  
According to Minobe Tatsukichi, there were four features of  the prerogative-centered style 
of  the Meiji constitutional regime.63 First, the Imperial Diet only participated in the governmental 
process. Because it was the emperor, not the Diet who enjoyed the legislative power,64 the Diet was 
intended to play a subsidiary role in the legislative process. It had no official power to directly order 
the people. Decisions made by the Diet did not constitute the will of  the state by itself  until the 
emperor gave sanction to them.65 Law was promulgated not as an expression of  the Diet’s will but as 
a presentation of  the will of  the emperor.  
As a consequence of  its subsidiary role, secondly, the Imperial Diet could not act by itself. 
Only the emperor was entitled to convoke the Diet. It was also the emperor’s prerogatives to open, 
close, and prorogue the Diet and to dissolve the House of  Representatives.66 The Diet had no right to 
assemble voluntarily. 67  Further, members of  both the House of  Peers and the House of  
Representatives were denied a right to ask the emperor to convoke the Diet.  
Third, even without the consent of  the Imperial Diet, actions of  the government were 
presupposed to be maintained by the exercise of  a wide range of  the imperial prerogatives. The 
emperor might issue emergency imperial ordinances instead of  laws, if  it was urgently necessary for 
the government to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities when the Diet was closed.68 In 
the same way, if  there was urgent necessity for maintenance of  public safety, the government might 
“take all necessary financial measures” by the form of  an imperial ordinance without the consent of  
                                                 
63 See Minobe, Kihonshugi, 86-89. 
64 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 5. 
65 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 6. 
66 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 7. 
67 See Ito, Commentaries, 14. 
68 See the Constitution of the Empire of  Japan, art. 8. The government had to present such urgent Imperial 
ordinances to the Imperial Diet at the next session in order to obtain its approval. See ibid., art. 8 par. 2. 
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the Diet which could not be convoked.69 When the Diet did not vote on the budget or when the 
budget could not be made, moreover, the government should execute the budget of  preceding year.70 
These three cases all exemplified a way of  governmental legislative actions without the participation 
of  the Imperial Diet. As a matter of  emergency policy, when it came to a state of  siege, things were 
more decisive. The emperor had the right to declare a state of  siege71 and the constitutional rights of  
the subjects would become suspended under it.72  
Fourth, the Meiji Constitution allowed the emperor to enjoy a wider range of  prerogatives 
than most Western monarchies did. The emperor held the power to project constitutional 
amendments,73 along with executive prerogatives such as powers to appoint and remove official,74 
determine administrative organizations, 75  conclude treaties, 76  bestow honors, 77  grant pardons, 78 
command the Army and Navy,79 and determine military organizations.80 Several prominent features 
are worth special note. First of  all, the emperor might issue imperial ordinances without any 
statutory delegation “for the maintenance of  the public peace and order, and for the promotion of  
the welfare of  the subjects.”81 This meant that the government might be a legislator on substantial 
matters. Matters on foreign affairs were also beyond the control of  the Imperial Diet.82 Only the 
emperor could conclude treaties. No parliamentary consent was required. Declaration of  war and 
                                                 
69 See the Constitution of the Empire of  Japan, art. 70. The government had to submit such measures taken as 
a form of an Imperial ordinance to the Imperial Diet at the next session in order to obtain its approval. See 
ibid., art. 70 par. 2. 
70 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 71. 
71 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 14, par. 1. 
72 See the Constitution of the Empire of  Japan, art. 31. However, this prerogative had never been exerted. See 
Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, Kenpo (Constitutional Law) 5th ed. (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1973), 35. 
73 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 73. 
74 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 10. 
75 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 10. 
76 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 12. 
77 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 15. 
78 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 16. 
79 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 11. 
80 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 12. 
81 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 9. 
82 The framers of  the Constitution confirmed exclusion of  the Diet from matters on foreign affairs. “The 
principal object of  the present Article [13] is to state that the Emperor shall dispose of  all matters relating to 
foreign intercourse, with the advice of  His Ministers, but allowing no interference by the Diet therein.” Ito, 
Commentaries, 30-31. 
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making peace also belonged to the imperial prerogative. Here again the Diet did not have any power 
to intervene either.83 The most important area, however, that was outside the parliamentary political 
process was tosui-ken, the power to command the military forces. The advice of  the government was 
not necessary for the power, not to mention the consent of  the Imperial Diet. It was called 
independence of  tosui-ken, which turned out to be one of  the most serious causes of  the breakdown 
of  the Meiji constitutional system.  
 
(4) Independence of  tosui-ken 
The emperor was the supreme commander of  the Army and Navy84 as well as the head of  
the state and the chief  priest of  Shinto. The emperor always wore a military uniform when he 
appeared in public.  
As described above, tosui-ken was situated outside the reach of  the civilian government. But 
there was no explicit provision on the independence of  tosui-ken in the Meiji Constitution. 
Commentaries explain the framers’ intention that “paramount authority in military and naval is 
combined in the Most Exalted Personage as His sovereign power, and that those affairs are in 
subjection to the commands issued be the Emperor.”85 There was no mention of  governmental 
advice on the prerogative to command the military forces. It was evident, however, that the Imperial 
Diet had nothing to do with this prerogative. To the contrary, the prerogative to determine 
organizations of  the Army and Navy based upon Article 12 was clearly intended to be exercised with 
advice of  the ministers of  state.86 Thus it could be inferred from the explanations Commentaries gave 
that the prerogative as the commander-in-chief  was out of  reach of  even the government. In fact, the 
commanding power of  the emperor was interpreted as independent of  the government. Even liberals 
                                                 
83 The Constitution of the Empire of  Japan. art. 13. Nakae Chomin criticized the weak Diet that appeared in 
the Meiji Constitution. Among other things, Chomin believed, the Diet and the people should have 
participated in concluding treaties, declaring war, and making peace. See Kotoku Shusui, Chomin sensei, in 
Tokuhon Kenpo no hyakunen, 1: 189. 
84 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 11. 
85 Ito, Commentaries, 28. 
86 Ito, Commentaries, 28. 
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such as Minobe Tatsukichi confirmed that its independence was the practice that was initiated before 
the Meiji Constitution was promulgated and had continued under it.87 In sum, the independent 
commanding prerogative was regarded as a constitutional custom law from the early Meiji period.88 
The word tosui meant military strategies and tactics. Because special knowledge and skills 
were needed in the actual military operation,89 it was thought that the emperor should be advised not 
by the ministers of  state, who were mostly civilians, but directly by the Chief of the General Staff 
Office (Army) and the Chief of the Naval Staff Board (Navy).90 Under the Meiji constitutional 
regime, the meaning of tosui had expanded so as to include preparations in peacetime for actual 
military operation such as “training of officers and soldiers, the organization of the armed forces, the 
appointment of officers, and even the determination of the size of the armed forces.” 91  Such 
preparations were called gunsei, administrative matters regarding the military.92 Theoretically, tosui 
(gunrei, military order) and gunsei are different concepts because the organization of the armed forces 
itself can be separated from actual strategies and tactics. Unlike gunrei, the Meiji Constitution could 
                                                 
87 See Minobe Tatsukichi, Kenpo satsuyo 5th ed. (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1932), 322; Minobe, Kionshugi, 95-96. 
88 The Gunjin chokuyu (the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of  1882) was one of  the important documents on 
military matters. The Rescript clarified that the commanding power belonged to a prerogative of  the emperor, 
that the Army and Navy were the military of  the emperor, not the state, that the soldiers and sailors with one 
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nor meddle in politics,” but with single heart fulfill their essential duties of  loyalty, and that they should accept 
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89 Minobe explains the reason of the prerogative independent of  the government. “The main purpose of  
supreme command is to combat against present or hypothetical enemies. To accomplish this purpose, it is 
necessary that the military forces can act freely and rapidly and that strict secrecy of  operations must be 
observed. Thus, no interference of  outsiders must be allowed. When even the ministers of  state can participate 
in matters of  supreme command, it brings dangers that the military actions will become weak.” Minobe, Kenpo 
satsuyo, 322. 
90 Because ministers of  war and the navy were members of  the government, they were officials for political 
duties from a proper division of  labor. However, they were deeply connected to the matters of  military 
strategies and tactics. As a standard interpretation, both ministers held a privilege to report to the emperor, 
along with the Chiefs of the General Staff Office and of the Naval Staff Board. See Momose, Jiten Showa zenki 
no nihon, 257. 
91 Miyasawa, Kenpo (Constitutional Law), 32. For the translation of this part, see Tanaka, The Japanese Legal 
System, 633. 
92  Commentaries exemplified as the power of  determining the military organization “the organization of 
military divisions and fleets, and all matters relating to military districts and sub-districts, to the storing up and 
distribution of arms, to the education of  military and of naval men, to inspections, to discipline, to modes of  
salutes, to styles of  uniforms, to guards, to fortifications, to naval defences, to naval ports and to preparations 
for military and naval expeditions.” Ito, Commentaries, 28-29. 
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be appropriately interpreted in the way that gunsei should have been managed with the advice of the 
ministers of state under Article 12.93 As matters that should be classified as gunsei increasingly shrank, 
in fact, the category of gunrei overwhelmed that of gunsei. Furthermore, even the gunsei matters that 
were not independent of the governmental control were executed with the advice of the ministers of 
war and of the navy, who should be respectively appointed from only generals or lieutenant generals, 
or admirals or vice-admirals on the active lists.94 This customary principle was crucially important 
because the prime minister could not organize his cabinet without support from the army and navy, 
which alone controlled personnel in active service. If the military were powerful, then the cabinet 
had to make a significant concession to keep the government workable. As a consequence, the term 
tosui had increasingly come to be understood to cover almost all things related to the military forces. 
In fact, when political parties played a pivotal role in the democratic process, the ministers of war 
and of the navy should not be necessarily from high rank officers in active service, although virtually 
all the ministers were actually selected from active lists.95 The collapse of the political party cabinet 
system vividly showed expansive influence upon the democratic process of the extra-constitutional 
principle that the ministers of war and of the navy should be high-ranking officers in active service. 
In such a situation, civilian control could not be expected to work well enough to keep 
inexperienced Japanese democracy from breaking down. The Meiji constitutional system lacked one 
                                                 
93 Article 12 of  the Constitution of the Empire of  Japan read “The Emperor determines the organization and 
peace standing of  the Army and Navy.” In Minobe’s interpretation, this prerogative on the organization of the 
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of the most rudimentary elements of democracy.96 Independence of tosui-ken was widely regarded as 
“an effective springboard for the rise of extreme militarism.”97 
 
4. Relationship between the Imperial Diet and the Government 
 As described above, the Meiji constitutional regime was created in the way that the emperor 
was supposed to play a central role as the head of  state, the commander-in-chief, the chief  priest of  
Shinto, and the head of  the imperial family simultaneously. Politically speaking, it was a system of  
the direct governance of  the emperor founded upon the imperial prerogatives, which were intended 
to be exerted with the advice of  the ministers of  state.98  
In contrast, the Imperial Diet enjoyed only relatively limited powers. The Diet was not an 
official legislative body that directly exercised its power over the people but an organ supporting the 
emperor who monopolized sovereign power.99 The Diet held constitutional powers such as one to 
give its consent to law including to initiate projects of  laws, 100  to approve emergency imperial 
ordinances,101 to give its consent to an annual budget,102 and to approve imperial ordinances of  
emergent financial measures.103 The Diet’s power to participate in the legislative process was even 
narrowed because the Meiji Constitution allowed the emperor to issue imperial ordinances that were 
independent of  a statutory basis.104 Moreover, the parliamentary control over budget was also limited 
as described above. Even though the Diet did not approve the new budget before a fiscal year began, 
the government could execute the budget of  the preceding year.105 This constitutional provision 
                                                 
96 See Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 241-251. 
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98 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 55. 
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100 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 38. 
101 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 8 par. 2. 
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104 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 9. 
105 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 71. 
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made the parliamentary approval of  the budget rather nominal.106 
The Diet was formally weak in relation to the government as well as to the emperor. The 
government was formed by appointment of  the emperor.107 On the one hand, the confidence of  the 
Diet, particularly of  the House of  Representatives, was no condition of  forming or maintaining the 
government. On the other, the House of  Representatives was resolved by an imperial order that was 
issued by the emperor with the advice of  ministers of  state.108 This asymmetry caused the Diet to 
lack the most powerful weapon available for the controlling the government.  
 Another problem of  the weak Diet resided in its composition itself. The Imperial Diet 
consisted of  the Houses of  Representatives and of  Peers as modeled on the British Parliament.109 
The members of  the House of  Peers were the members of  the imperial family, the peerage, and those 
who were appointed by the emperor.110 This House had no democratic legitimacy. The framers 
argued, however, that bicameralism was necessary in order that deliberations might be “thorough 
and minute” and that “public opinion [might] be impartially represented.”111 They to some degree 
recognized that the House of  Peers served as a bulwark for the imperial house and a preserver of  
conservative elements. However, they claimed that the unitary head of  state needed different types 
of  organizations to govern the state well just as incorporation and cooperation of  sets of  different 
organs were necessary for the healthy activity of  the mind of  higher organic beings. Thus, it was 
necessary, they contended, that the ideas of  the people should be transmitted to the sovereign 
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107 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 10. 
108 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, arts. 7 and 55.  
109 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 33. See Minobe, “Kizokuin ron,” Gendai kensei hyoron, 143.  
110 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 34. The Kizokuin rei (the Imperial Ordinance concerning the 
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111 Ito, Commentaries, 69. 
 68 
through different media. Because the purpose of  a representative system was “to draw profit from 
the results of  public deliberations”,112 the framers feared that unicameralism would reflect only 
partial ideas among the people and then prejudiced opinions would prevail over deliberated wisdom.  
[W]hen all the political forces are united in a single House, and are left to the 
influence of  excited passions and abandoned to one-sided movements, with no 
restraining and equalizing power over them, that House may in the intemperance of  
biased excitement, overstep the limits of  propriety, and, as a consequence, bring 
about the despotism of  the majority, which may in turn lead to anarchy. Evils would 
be far greater under such a state of  things, than they were in the days when there 
was no representative system at all.113 
 
Thus, the framers placed emphasis upon opinions that were expressed through other than public 
election. However, they failed to defend the constitution of  the House of  Peers. They only presented 
the shortcomings of  a unicameral public elected chamber system. Rather, a real problem here is 
whether the framers’ assumption was proper. It is entirely true that despotism of  the majority is one 
of  the most serious problems in democratic society.114 Did the Meiji Constitution really create an 
institution that was democratic enough to express the will of  a majority of  the people? Despotism of  
the majority becomes a serious problem after the democratic political process functions significantly. 
After all, the Meiji constitutional regime could be essentially regarded as self-preservation of  power 
as well as self-restraint on the part of  the minority elite. 
Unlike the House of  Peers, to be sure, the lower house was founded upon popularly elected 
representatives.115 However, the nature of  representation was so limited that the people could not be 
re-presented in the House of  Representatives. In fact, representatives were elected in the election 
with extremely limited suffrage. Voters were only men who were 25 years of  age or over and who 
paid 15 yen or over as land and income taxes. At the first general election of  1890, there were about 
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of  Chicago Press, 2000). 
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450,000 eligible voters, 1.24 percent of  the then population.116 Even after universal suffrage for men 
of  25 years old or over was introduced in 1925, there were about 12,400,000 eligible voters, 21 
percent of  the population in 1928.117 The House of  Representatives itself  could claim only weak 
democratic legitimacy. Its foundation was not solid enough to cope with undemocratic political 
movement. The political situation of  the time therefore showed much room for democratization 
before the problem of  despotism of  the majority was discussed. 
Moreover, the Imperial Diet was the kind of  bicameralism where both houses are equal in 
their powers with minor exceptions. 118  It can be said, more precisely, that the House of  Peers 
established superiority over the House of  Representatives because while organization of  the House 
of  Peers was a matter of  an imperial ordinance, the House of  Representatives was composed 
according to the law.119 Thus, the House of  Peers could participate in reorganizing the House of  
Representatives as a part of  the law-making process. In contrast, the latter was excluded from 
reforming the former.120 In this way, the lower house that was a limited democratic institution more 
suffered from the way of  organizing parliament as a whole in democratic legitimacy. 
 As for the government, the Meiji Constitution introduced an advisory system on the part of  
respective ministers of  state. The emperor might receive advice of  his ministers of  state in regard to 
state affairs.121 Following Western monarchies, the ministers of  state were required to countersign all 
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laws, imperial ordinances, and imperial rescripts relating to state affairs. 122  The ministers took 
responsibility only to the emperor. The responsibility of  the ministers was political here, not criminal 
or civil.123 The ministers of  state respectively took responsibility to the emperor for their advice. The 
framers explained from the appointer-appointee relationship the reason why they adopted the 
individual responsibility principle. It was the emperor who held the prerogative to appoint and 
remove the ministers of  state.124 The Imperial Diet had nothing whatsoever to do with appointment 
and dismissal of  governmental officials. Thus the ministers were naturally irresponsible for the Diet. 
The people were also irrelevant here. The emperor alone could decide on responsibility of  the 
ministers “because the Sovereign possesses the rights of  sovereignty of  the State.”125  
Furthermore, even the prime minister had no power to appoint and dismiss the ministers of  
state. The framers argued that “[T]he Minister President and the other Ministers of  State, being alike 
personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of  each one of  them are, in every respect, 
controlled by the will of  the Emperor, and the Minister President himself  has no power of  control 
over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the latter ought not to be dependent upon the 
former.”126  
Surprisingly, the term ‘cabinet’ was not found in the Meiji Constitution. 127  Before its 
promulgation, however, a cabinet system was established, replacing the old executive branch on 
December 22, 1885. The newly established cabinet system realized a cabinet led by a powerful prime 
minister who pointed directions of  the governmental policies to other ministers and commanded 
administrative departments and countersigned all law and imperial ordinances with the competent 
ministers.128 When the Meiji Constitution was promulgated, some doubt was expressed whether such 
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a powerful prime minister system might be in conflict with the constitution. At the promulgation of  
the Meiji Constitution, the existing legal rules that were repugnant to the constitution did not come 
into effect.129 Then the framers in turn changed the cabinet system to conform to the constitution. 
Antagonism among the hanbatsu oligarchs led to disfavor the cabinet system based upon the 
powerful leadership of  the prime minister. The Naikaku kansei, the Imperial Ordinance regarding the 
Organization of  the Cabinet of  1889, provided that “[t]he minister president of  state stands at the 
head of  the ministers of  state, reports affairs of  state to the sovereign and, in compliance with 
imperial instructions, has general control over the various branches of  administration.”130 Unity of  
the cabinet under strong leadership loosened now, although important matters such as drafts of  law 
and budget, and treaties with foreign countries were to be decided by a cabinet meeting.131 The prime 
minister did not have a constitutionally defined status in the first place. Thus the prime minister 
could not be institutionally influential enough to control his fellow ministers to have them realize a 
sense of  oneness. As a constitutional principle, the ministers of  state should be not collectively but 
respectively responsible to the emperor for their advice. The prime minister was only primus inter 
pares. 
The profound reason why the framers refused the joint responsibility of  the ministers was 
fear and disgust for party politics reflecting public opinion. “The evil” of  a cabinet system based 
upon the principle of  joint responsibility of  the ministers was that “the power of  party combination 
will ultimately over-rule the supreme power of  the Sovereign.”132 Such a system was believed to be 
incompatible with the spirit of  the Meiji Constitution.  
Therefore, the weak collectiveness of  the cabinet without the confidence of  the Imperial 
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Diet was prominently characteristic of  the constitutional text. To be sure, both Houses of  the 
Imperial Diet could make representations to the government133 and might present addresses to the 
emperor.134 Other than these methods, however, the Imperial Diet had officially nothing to do with 
the cabinet. In fact, the Chozen shugi, transcendental principle, was the framers’ original intent. 
According to the principle, the government should hold itself  aloof  from political parties and 
factions and take an impartial course.135 In brief, a parliamentary cabinet system was not an original 
choice under the Meiji constitutional regime. 
Interestingly enough, however, the framers clearly made a considerable concession. They 
admitted that the cabinet might sometimes assume joint responsibility. The government as a whole 
took care of  important matters both internal and external, and thus no single administrative 
department alone could properly discharge the duties on such matters. When such important matters 
were carried out, “all the Ministers of State shall take united counsel, and none of  them is allowed 
to leave his share of  the business a burden upon his colleagues.”136 This concession could be crucial 
for a cabinet system under the Meiji Constitution because the cabinet itself  was entitled to decide 
what were important matters for the state. The principle of  joint responsibility would probably 
become the widely applicable exception, though not the rule. 
 Another significant concession the framers made was on to whom the ministers were 
responsible for their administration of  state affairs. As we saw, the framers argued that the ministers 
directly assumed political responsibility to the emperor. That was the fundamental principle of  the 
Meiji Constitution. Here again, however, there was an important concession that “Ministers are 
directly responsible to the Emperor and indirectly so to the people.”137 The framers acknowledged that 
the Diet might pose questions to the ministers and “demand[ed] open answers from them before the 
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public”. They also pointed out the possibility that the Diet might “present addresses to the Sovereign 
setting forth its opinions.” 138 As a result, when the emperor exerted his prerogative to appoint the 
ministers, the framers further argued, “the susceptibilities of  the public mind must also be taken into 
consideration.”139 This concession the framers had to make vividly showed how great the influence 
of  the Jiyu Minken Undo was.140 If  the ministers of  state took responsibility for their policies even 
indirectly to the people, and this were widely supported, there was a good chance that a quasi-
parliamentary government would operate as a constitutional practice. Here we can easily find a 
discrepancy between absolutism and constitutionalism in the Meiji constitutional regime. 
 Indeed, there might be enough room for a parliamentary government system in 
constitutional interpretation. From a liberal point of  view, the Diet enjoyed the power to participate 
in state affairs as widely as the ministers of  state were responsible for them and had duties to 
supervise the administrative departments. The Diet might observe the governmental policies on 
behalf  of  the people, discuss and criticize them, and then clarify responsibilities of  the government 
for the people.141 Because the government initiated almost all bills and the Diet only formally passed 
them as the reality of  Japan, Minobe argued, monitoring and criticizing of  the government rather 
than participating in legislation should be considered a primary function of  the Diet. As means of  
supervising the administrative department, either House of  the Diet held powers to present addresses 
to the emperor,142 to make presentations to the government,143 to receive petitions of  subjects,144 to 
review the limited state affairs, to address a question to the government,145 and to receive reports 
from the government.146 Among them, the power to make a resolution is worth special notice. 
Although there were no provisions concerning resolution in the Meiji Constitution or the Law of  
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Houses, it was thought that a house might adopt a resolution as a matter of  nature because 
resolution only expressed an opinion of  a house and had legally nothing to do with other 
institutions.147 The power included votes of  non-confidence in a cabinet or a particular minister of  
state, resolutions on an interpretation of  the constitution, and votes on the illegality of  governmental 
actions. Resolutions by a house were interpreted as having no legal effect. To be sure, the ministers 
of  state had responsibility to the emperor who appointed them and they did not have necessarily 
seats of  the Diet. Thus non-confidence resolutions did not entail mandatory resignation of  ministers. 
In reality, however, the political influence of  non-confidence vote148 could be sufficiently great for the 
cabinet to take counter-actions such as reshuffle of  the cabinet, resignation, and dissolution of  the 
House of  Representatives. If  this kind of  constitutional interpretation came to be considered 
convincingly valid in the course of  political development of  the Meiji Constitution, a parliamentary 
government would be realized based upon the principle that the cabinet must have support from the 
House of  Representatives in a way that it was clearly against the original intention of  the framers.149 
 
5. Pluralism in Advisory Institutions 
When he exercised his prerogatives, the emperor was supposed to receive advice from 
various agents. Besides the prime minister, the ministers of  state, or the cabinet, there were several 
advisory institutions in the Meiji constitutional system such as the Minister of  the Imperial 
Household, the Lord Keeper of  the Privy Seal, the genro (the group of  senior statesmen), the Privy 
Council, and the General Staff  Office and the Naval Staff  Board in peacetime and the Imperial 
Headquarters in wartime. The prime minister and his cabinet could not monopolize the advisory 
position to the emperor even regarding state affairs. That was a distinctive feature of  the Meiji 
constitutional regime. Pluralistic supporting institutions competed with one another for the 
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emperor’s will that was the only source of  legitimacy in order to realize their own political agenda. 
Such a political situation caused a serious problem of  irresponsibility in decision making and in fact 
the Meiji constitutional system led to a disastrous result in the end.   
When the cabinet system was organized in 1885, the Ministry of  the Imperial Household 
was established independently of  the cabinet. Since then the imperial household has been 
conceptually separate from the state. The ministry represented one part of  this dualism. The 
Minister of  the Imperial Household, the chief  of  the ministry, supported the emperor only as to 
matters relating to imperial house affairs. Because he was not a minister of  state, the minister was 
competent to give advice on no state affairs.  
The Lord Keeper of  the Privy Seal was a shinnin-kan (official who was personally appointed 
by the emperor) and regarded as a liaison between the state and the imperial household. He had an 
official duty to always be in attendance on the emperor and support him. He himself  had no power 
to present addresses to the emperor but as a close attendant expressed his opinions about not only 
the imperial household but also state affairs.  
Both the Minister of  the Imperial Household and the Lord Keeper of  the Privy Seal were 
basically officials for the imperial household. However, they played an important role in the political 
process because the line between state affairs and imperial family matters was often vague and 
because they were so close to the emperor that they could screen those who were allowed to gain 
access to the emperor.150   
The genro (the group of  senior statesmen) was an extra-constitutional institution. At the 
Meiji period, the genro were recognized as the senior statesmen from Satsuma and Choshu who had 
held central positions in the political and military world since the Meiji Restoration and gave the 
emperor advice on important issues of  the state affairs. Particularly, one of  the most important 
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functions of  the genro was to recommend the emperor an appropriate candidate for the next prime 
minister.151 In fact, the genro maintained this function, although its characteristics changed from a 
group of  the influential statesmen with mediatory abilities to a group of  leaders of  the hanbatsu 
bureaucrats.152 As the Kensei Yogo Undo (Movement for Vindication of  Constitutional Government) 
developed and demands for more democratic political styles became powerful, the genro’s influence 
diminished. At the Taisho period, the genro were understood as leaders who retired from the front 
line of  the political world and gave the emperor advice on candidacy of  the prime minister and on 
matters concerning the imperial household.153 The genro thus had a close connection with important 
officials in the imperial household. As the Minister of  the Imperial Household and Lord Keeper of  
Privy Seal, the genro also played a significant role in screening people who had access to the 
emperor.154 When the last genro, Prince Saionji Kinmochi, died at the age of  90 on November 24, 
1940, the genro as an institution also ceased to exist. 
As discussed above,155 matters related to the military operations were differently treated, 
even though they were regarded as what belonged to the state affairs. The cabinet could not give the 
emperor advice on tosui matters, which were interpreted as independent of  the governmental control. 
Thus, the Chiefs of  the General Staff  Office and of  the Naval Staff  Board played a crucial part in 
political decision making as their qualifications even in peacetime. Because the ministers of  war and 
of  the navy were also understood as being privileged to present addresses to the emperor about tosui 
matters, the cabinet had not necessarily unified opinions on the military affairs and even so the 
cabinet could remain in power. The civilian government had no control over the armed forces.     
As to state affairs, there was another important advisory institution, the Privy Council. It 
was a conspicuously authoritarian body in the governmental process. The Privy Council as the organ 
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for the hanbatsu oligarchs once supported the government against political parties. As a quasi-
parliamentary government system developed based upon party politics, however, the Council 
became antagonistic to the government. The Council was regarded as a major obstacle to realizing 
the democratic governmental process. The Privy Council is understood as an example that pluralism 
in supporting the emperor led to irresponsible politics. Therefore, here we will pay some attention to 
the functions the Privy Council discharged.  
The Privy Council was “an institution peculiar to Japan that was seldom if  ever comparable 
in any constitutional state of  the world.”156 The Council was established as “the highest body of  the 
Emperor’s constitutional advisers” in the same way as the cabinet was.157 The framers of  the Meiji 
Constitution intended the Council to “be impartial, with no leanings to this or that party,” as a 
consultative body.158 Moreover, the Council was designed to serve as “palladium of  the Constitution 
and of  the law”159 in the Meiji constitutional system without any kind of  control of  constitutionality 
by the court.   
The Council had two major functions reflecting the constitutional dualism. One was 
regarding state affairs, and the other regarding the imperial household. The Privy Council performed 
duties on succession to the throne and regency.160 From the European standard of  monarchies, 
however, these duties should have constituted state affairs. As a constitutional organ, the Privy 
Council dealt with important state affairs such as: (1) Drafts of  law and doubtful points relating to 
the provisions of  the constitution and laws and ordinances supplementary thereto. 161  (2) 
Proclamation of  martial law under Article 14, and the imperial ordinances issued under authority of  
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Articles 8 and 70 of  the constitution, as well as all other imperial ordinances having penal 
provisions.162 (3) International treaties and agreements.163 (4) Matters relating to the amendment of  
the organization of  the Privy Council, and to the rules for the conduct of  its business.164 (5) Matters 
specially submitted to its deliberation for advice, in addition to those above mentioned.165 In 1938, 
the provision regarding jurisdictions of  the Privy Council was amended to clarify and codify existing 
customs.166 Almost all of  these matters belonged to the emperor’s prerogatives that were out of  any 
formal control on the part of  the Imperial Diet.167 Thus the Council could and indeed did have a 
great influence on the political process in prewar Japan. 
The Privy Council was composed of  a president, a vice-president, and 24 councilors. The 
Councilors must be men of  forty years old or over. 168 In practice, however, most new appointees 
were men who had approached or surpassed the retiring age. The average age of  the Councilors was 
seventy-three in 1931.169 In the Meiji period, people with highly distinguished careers were appointed 
Councilors and the presidents of  the Council were the genro class, such as Ito Hirobumi, Kuroda 
Kiyotaka, and Yamagata Aritomo, who were all former prime ministers. It was not rare that 
politicians who were not appointed prime minister or important cabinet members were appointed 
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Councilors. The office of  Councilors once functioned as a waiting position and substitute for an 
appropriate higher office. 170  Later, the main sources of  recruiting Councilors were bureaucrats, 
servicemen, judges, and scholars. 
In practice, the Privy Council was powerful enough to be sometimes called a third house of  
the legislature. Unlike the Houses of  Representatives and of  Peers, however, the Privy Council was a 
passive institution. Only when the emperor consulted them did the Privy Councilors begin their 
duties to deliberate upon important matters of  state.171 The consultation was assigned by means of  
imperial message. There were two forms of  consultative matters that came before the Council. One 
was that of  a draft the cabinet prepared. This form was taken when the cabinet proposed laws and 
ordinances, and submitted treaties for ratification. The other was in the form of  a mere request of  
opinion of  the Council. This form was used when interpretation of  the constitution and laws was at 
issue.172 The Council collectively reported to the emperor about its opinion. Thus no Councilors 
were allowed to express dissenting opinions. It was entirely up to the emperor to adopt or refuse the 
Council’s opinion.173  
The Privy Council as an advisory body for the emperor might be concurrent with the 
government that also gave advice to the emperor and took responsibility for it.174 The prime minister 
and cabinet members attended a plenary session of  the Council and were eligible to vote an item. 
The Councilors were superior to the cabinet members in number. When there was a disagreement 
between both sides, thus, the government inevitably failed to realize its will.175 Because the emperor 
had discretionary decision-making power, by following the general rule of  state affairs, the 
government gave advice to the emperor as to whether he would accept an opinion of  the Privy 
Council or not. If  the government reported to the emperor on adopting or refusing consultative 
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matters in accordance with its will, it confused the situation, because the government itself  
participated in the decision-making process of  the Council, thus, it contradicted itself  when its 
advice was to reject the Council’s opinion. As a result, when the government and the Council 
disagreed with each other, theoretically there were three options available to the government: first, it 
would report to emperor its own opinion; second, it would present to the emperor an address on 
dismissal of  the Councilors; third, the government could decide to resign. As a matter of  real politics, 
however, it was inappropriate from a viewpoint of  constitutional government that the confused 
emperor who received conflicting pieces of  advice was forced to decide directly. Thus, resignation of  
the cabinet was always the only actually available option.176  
In this way, when the government disagreed with the Council, the opinion of  the latter 
prevailed over that of  the former. The rule that cabinet members might vote in the Council did not 
contribute to fortifying the power of  the government. Rather, it led to a real balance of  powers that 
the government was subordinated to the Privy Council. The Council that was entirely irresponsible 
as a mere advisory institution played an unmatchably important role in the political process. 
According to the Meiji Constitution, only the ministers of  state were fully responsible for their 
advice to the emperor. However, the Privy Council that might restrict governmental activities 
without burdening any political accounts could prevent responsible politics from being realizing in 
prewar Japan.177 Particularly after a political party cabinet system was established as a constitutional 
practice, the Council might be a reactionary player to distort a democratic, even if  weak, will the 
government expressed through its policy. There was a serious defect in the institutional design.178 
The Privy Council was designed to be conservative from the outset. The reasons why this 
extra institution that seemed to be not necessary in modern constitutionalism should be established, 
according to Ito Hirobum, were organization of  a powerful mechanism for constitutional guarantee, 
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necessity of  an adviser to the emperor at a conflict between the cabinet and both houses of  the 
Imperial Diet, and avoidance of  arbitrariness on the part of  the cabinet or the Diet. 179  At the 
beginning of  the Meiji constitutional regime, the Council and the government acted in harmony, 
because both ministers of  state and Councilors had a common background of  hanbatsu (clans) that 
was oligarchic and in antagonism against the democratic demands of  the people. Cabinets were 
formed along the chozen shugi, transcendental principle. Thus the Privy Council could be as 
irresponsive to the social trend of  the times as the cabinet.  
When a political party cabinet system gradually established itself  as a constitutional 
practice, however, the Council came to play a distinctive role in the political process. In fact, the 
Council expressed its distaste for a political party cabinet and foreign policy for international 
cooperation. The Councilors acknowledged themselves as guardians of  the Meiji Constitution, but 
they were no longer an “impartial” consultative body. Appealing to veto power as the ultimate 
interpreter of  the constitution, the Council became a body for checking the democratization of  the 
governmental process. 
In January 1924, Kiyoura Keigo, the president of  the Privy Council, was appointed the 
prime minister and formed his cabinet based upon the House of  Peers, not the House of  
Representatives. This cabinet thus followed the chozen shugi, transcendental principle, and was very 
unpopular among journalists because the Kiyoura cabinet represented the privileged class of  society 
and seemed to be against new democratic development of  politics people wanted after World War I. 
Three political parties, Rikken Seiyukai, Kenseikai, and Kakushinkurabu, jointly protested against the 
Kiyoura cabinet, defended constitutional government in general, and proposed the introduction of  
universal election, reorganization of  the House of  Peers, and administrative and budgetary reforms 
in particular. The coalition of  these three parties was called gokensanpa. The general election of  the 
House of  Representatives held in May 1924 resulted in a victory for gokensanpa. They won 283 seats 
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of total 466 seats and Kenseikai became the leading party with 151 seats. Its president, Kato Takaaki, 
was appointed the prime minister and led the three-party-coalition cabinet. After that a relatively 
stable system of  parliamentary cabinet government continued until May 1932, when a group of  
servicemen assassinated the Prime Minister Inukai Takeshi (the May 15 Incident).180  
As political party politics developed, the Privy Council clearly became a body for 
supervising the executive department. In fact, the Council overthrew the Wakatsuki cabinet, which 
was based upon the political party Kenseikai in the House of  Representatives.181 In the spring of  1927, 
the Bank of  Taiwan was at a standstill and on the brink of  failure. To avoid finance crisis throughout 
the country, the Wakatsuki cabinet decided to offer salvation for the Bank of  Taiwan by allowing the 
Treasury to guarantee that the Bank of  Japan would provide financing of  two hundred million yen 
for the Bank of  Taiwan. The cabinet prepared an emergency imperial ordinance182 of  that policy and 
submitted it to the Privy Council for consideration. A committee of  investigation of  the Privy 
Council immediately reviewed the request of  the cabinet and reported a denial of  the ordinance on 
the very next day. The general trend in the Privy Council was harshly critical of  the Wakatsuki 
cabinet. Leading members of  the Council were especially antagonistic to the cabinet of  Kenseikai 
because its diplomatic policy toward China seemed to them too weak-kneed. At a plenary session, 
the Council and the cabinet were diametrically opposed to each other. The Council expressed its 
disfavor of  the cabinet’s diplomacy, which was irrelevant to deliberation on the policy to evade the 
financial crisis. The cabinet refused to amend or withdrawal the proposed ordinance. As a result, the 
proposed ordinance was denied 11 to 19. Prime Minister Wakatsuki then decided to resign rather 
than fight back by asking the emperor to remove the Councilors. He collected the resignations of  his 
cabinet members to submit them to the emperor. The president of  the opposition party Rikkenn 
Siyukai, Tanaka Giichi, was appointed the succeeding prime minister. The cabinet adopted a 
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moratorium on a five hundred million yen scale. On April 22, two days after its formation, the Privy 
Council easily approved the proposed emergency imperial ordinance this time. Tanaka and his 
cabinet, meanwhile, criticized the weak-kneed diplomacy of  the former foreign minister Shidehara 
Kijuro and thus took a hard line on China.  
The most serious problem for the Privy Council was not that the Councilors were 
reactionary and antagonistic to party politics but that even when they behaved in good faith, the very 
existence of  the Council distorted responsible politics and public reason. The Wakatsuki cabinet’s 
resort to the emergency imperial ordinance was interpreted as unconstitutional because the cabinet 
had plenty of  time to submit a proposal of  rescue to the Imperil Diet during its session.183 If  so 
interpreted, the Council had an institutional duty to oppose the governmental proposal. 184  The 
Council in secret deliberated on important issues concerning the state affairs. All activities of  the 
Council were officially closed to the public.185 Whatever conclusion it might come to draw, therefore, 
the Council’s opinion failed to make a contribution to the publicly deliberated decision making 
process in society. Rather, its secrecy furthered temptations of  opposition parties, the military, and 
other outsiders of  the government to work on the Council in order to exercise unfair influence on the 
political decision making process. The Privy Council obviously involved serious institutional 
shortcomings.     
Against party cabinet government, the Privy Council functioned as not only a bulwark of  
the bureaucratic elite, but also a pathfinder of  the ultra-nationalistic movement, whether it intended 
to or not.186 The Privy Council was one of  the most severely criticized institutions in the Meiji 
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constitutional system.  
 
6. Protection of  the Rights of  Subjects and the Judiciary 
 Although the Meiji Constitution had a sort of  the Bill of  Rights, the rights declared there 
were not those inherent in human beings. Rather, they were considered gifts to the subjects from a 
benevolent emperor.187 The framers of  the Meiji Constitution believed from the beginning of  their 
plan that a modern constitution needed a declaration of  some kind of  rights but that they should not 
be so powerful as to trump national policy. As a result, the declaration of  rights generally came with 
the horitsu no ryuho, reservation of  law. For example, freedom of  speech, one of  the most important 
rights in liberal democracy, was guaranteed “within the limits of  law”.188 It is true that reservation of  
law has a positive side of  its significance. The executive branch cannot infringe upon rights without 
any explicit foundation of  statute. Executive arbitrariness is always a real threat to the rights of  
citizens. The Meiji Constitution might be understood as providing some safeguard against invasion 
of  rights in this sense. On the other hand, however, reservation of  law also has a negative meaning. 
Once law is established by following proper procedures, even the rights of  citizens can be 
legitimately restricted in the name of  democratic authority. We know that there is a good argument 
that the rights of  citizens could be protected well in a majoritarian scheme.189 However, that was not 
the case with the Meiji Constitution. As described above, the Imperial Diet enjoyed no legislative 
power in the real meaning of  the word. It was a mere organ for giving consent to the emperor, who 
possessed the prerogative of  legislation. In addition, the Diet was not so democratized as to be a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Conference),” and “Hamaguchi naikaku to rondon gunshuku kaigi (The Hamaguchi cabinet and the London 
Navy Disarmaments Conference),” in Daiichiji sekai taisen to seito naikaku, 294-295, and 324-327. Masuda, 
Tennosei to kokka, 147-179. 
187 The subjects bunzai controversy between Mori and Ito, see Inada, Meiji kenpo seiritsushi, 2: 627-631. 
188 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 29. Freedom of  religion was an exception. The subjects 
enjoyed freedom of  religious belief  “within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to 
their duties as subjects”. Ibid., art. 28. Because the state and Shinto was unified in the Meiji constitutional 
scheme, freedom of  religion was difficult to enjoy as such. 
189 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of  Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998). 
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body for representation of  the nation. 
 If  the Diet could not be counted on, how about the judiciary to protect the rights of  citizens? 
The judiciary decided civil and criminal cases in the name of  the emperor.190 The principle of  trials 
conducted according to law, the framers contended, had to be solidly established. From the framers’ 
perspective, however, “the Sovereign is the fountain of  justice, and His judicial authority is nothing 
more than a form of  the manifestation of  the sovereign power.”191 Although as a result of  the 
prerogative-centered system, the emperor appointed judges and the court declared judgments in the 
name of  the emperor, the courts were planned to discharge their functions in an unprejudiced way 
because the emperor did not “take it upon Himself  to conduct trials, but cause[d] independent courts 
to do so, in accordance to law and regardless of  the influence of  the administrative.” 192 
The right to trial was guaranteed in the Meiji Constitution. 193  In fact, the court was 
prohibited from refusing to hear civil cases.194 As in most European continental countries, however, 
the judiciary did not hear administrative cases but the administrative court did so as an 
administrative organ. 195  In the framers’ view, there were two reasons why it was necessary to 
establish a court of  administrative litigation different from judicial courts. First, the administrative 
department was also required to be independent as the judicature. The review of  administrative 
measures by the judiciary could have made administrative authorities “in a state of  subordination to 
judicial functionaries.” The administrative department should have discretionary judgment on 
“benefits to society and happiness to the people” and freedom of  action in securing them.196 
Secondly, specialty in administrative judgments had to be protected because judges were lacking in 
professional training in identifying administrative demands. From the framers’ perspective, “the 
                                                 
190 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 57. 
191 Ito, Commentaries, 111-112. 
192 Ito, Commentaries, 114. 
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question of  administrative expediency is just what judicial authorities are ordinarily apt to be not 
conversant with.” The administrative departments served promotion of  public interests and thus “it 
[would] become necessary under certain circumstances to sacrifice individuals for the sake of  the 
public benefit.”197 To maintain the public interest, in fact, administrative acts were regarded as legal 
unless the competent court of  administrative litigation revoked them. The framers surely gave 
priority to the public goods over private interests when they annotated that Article 61 of  the Meiji 
Constitution must be understood to mean that “no suit can be brought against those measures that 
have been carried out in conformity with law or with the functionary power of  the office in 
question” and that “mere damage to one’s interest, though it can become the ground of  a petition, 
begets no right of  bringing an administrative litigation.”198 The Gyosei Saiban Ho (Administrative 
Justice Act) declared that the administrative court heard only cases that were specifically enumerated 
in statutes or orders.199 Thus, legal positivism made standing to sue the administrative agencies 
narrow.200  
Judicial review was not expressed clearly in the Meiji Constitution, unlike the current 
constitution.201  There was a consensus that the court might review the propriety of  procedural 
aspects of  statutes.202 The question, however, remained whether the court could review the substance 
of  statutes.203 On the one hand, conservatives such as Hozumi Yatsuka and Uesugi Shinkichi who 
advocated a prerogative-centered interpretation to enhance the sovereignty of  the emperor favored 
judicial review because it worked as a useful check against the Imperial Diet that generally was more 
democratic than the bureaucratic government. Liberals, on the other, such as Minobe Tatsukichi and 
Sasaki Soichi denied this power of  the court because it would betray their cause of  democratization 
of  the political process. Liberals championed the parliamentary cabinet system. The court itself  
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disclaimed the judicial review of  statutes several times, while it could review orders. That was the 
judicial precedent.204  
In theory, the denial of  judicial review reflected an idea that the ultimate interpreter of  the 
constitution should not be the judiciary but the legislative branch. That was based upon an 
assumption that the people would agree, even if  indirectly, to diminish their benefits from their ruler 
when the Meiji Constitution provided for the requirement of  the consent of  the Imperial Diet. In 
reality, however, there were several players such as the emperor, the genro,205 the House of  Peers, and 
the Privy Council in the political process in the Meiji constitutional system and they were totally 
independent of  democratic control. Thus the assumption was not necessarily wrong but only 
limitedly plausible. 
More fundamentally, the system of  guaranteeing rights expressed in the Meiji Constitution 
reflected ambivalent aspects of  the regime once again. The exchange between Ito Hirobumi and 
Mori Arinori in the process of  deliberation on the draft of  the constitution in the Privy Council is a 
good example of  the discrepancies between absolutism and constitutionalism the Meiji Constitution 
involved. Mori, the minister of  education, proposed to revise the draft of  chapter 2 “rights and duties 
of subjects” to “responsibilities of  subjects.” Mori argued that the word of  subject usually used to 
express a relation to the emperor. Unlike Western monarchies, Mori believed, the Japanese subjects 
could not claim their rights from the emperor but only took their responsibilities. Mori opposed the 
enumeration of  rights in a very important code such as a constitution.206 Ito strongly criticized 
Mori’s view on a constitution. The spirit of  establishing a constitution, in Ito’s opinion, resided in, 
first of  all, limitation of  sovereign power of  monarch, and secondly, guarantee of  rights to subjects. 
Without a bill of  rights but only with enumeration of  responsibilities, a constitution should not have 
been framed. Unless monarchical powers had been limited and rights of  subjects had been protected, 
                                                 
204 Taishin in hanketsu, July 11, 1912, keiroku 19: 790; October 23, 1913, keiroku 20: 1924. Minobe, Koho hanrei 
taikei, 1, 47. See also, Miyasawa, Kenpo, 36. 
205 See Ito Yukio, “Genro no keisei to hensen ni kansuru jyakkann no kousatsu,” Yasuda & Minagawa, eds., 
Meiji kenpo taisei, 247-267. 
206 See Inada, Meiji kenpo seiritsushi, 2: 629. 
 88 
that system must have been regarded as tyrannical.207 Here Ito presented his understanding of  a 
constitution as an instrument for limiting powers and that conformed to the modern idea of  
constitutionalism. As a matter of  fact, Ito’s opinion was accepted at the meeting of  the Privy 
Council. 
However, there was a twist in this exchange. Mori himself  as a man of  enlightenment 
believed that the rights of  subjects were natural rights. Whether a constitution was established or not, 
therefore, subjects by nature enjoyed rights such as freedoms of  speech and religion and property 
right. To Mori, despotism meant a political system in which monarchical powers were promoted for 
nothing, while the natural rights of  subjects were so lawlessly treated as to be ignored. In Western 
countries, the distinction between the state and monarch had been clarified and thus subjects could 
claim some rights even from the monarch. In Japan, by marked contrast, there had been no such 
distinction. To Mori, therefore, the phrase that subjects had rights and duties to the emperor made 
no sense whatsoever.208 We can understand that Mori attempted to distinguish the area of  state 
organization a constitution covers from privately autonomous areas regulated by natural law. From 
Mori’s perspective, the forthcoming constitution had to be a fundamental law for its proper area and 
it should not encroach upon the autonomously regulated domain.209 
In sharp contrast, Ito maintained his positivist idea of  constituting a political order. Natural 
law thought was irrelevant in Japan because such foreign thought served the creation of  a 
government and it was obviously against the Japanese tradition. In Ito’s view, it was the forthcoming 
constitution that established rights of  subjects. The constitution would never confirm that people had 
already enjoyed rights as an accomplished fact, but for the first time declare that it would grant 
subjects civil rights and civil liberties.210 
Therefore, we cannot welcome at face value the conception of  constitutionalism Ito argued 
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for. It is true that Ito’s version includes some idea of  limited government and that even such an idea 
was highly valuable for liberal democracy in Japan, retrospectively because it could not be publicly 
developed at the final stage of  the Meiji constitutional regime. However, if  we followed such 
constitutionalism, a constitution would in the end become a mere piece of  written paper, which 
expresses self-restraint of  sovereign power at his convenience. Precious rights would be at the mercy 
of  the emperor’s will. To that extent, Mori’s argument is worth listening to. When they are 
confronted with outrageous political power that is apt to expansively invade every aspect of  human 
life, individuals can confine themselves to the autonomous private sphere with rights guaranteed. 
The Meiji constitutional system failed to provide people with a fortress.  
A serious problem Mori had never raised is, however, how to draw a line between the 
spheres ruled by natural law and those governed by artificial constitutional law. Ultimately, the 
private sphere can be identified only by the process in which the people who are more or less the 
object of  rule participate. In fact, however, the very next day of  promulgating the Meiji Constitution, 
the Prime Minister Kuroda Kiyotaka publicly stated that the subjects should not meddle in 
constitutional affairs.211 Popular commitment to participation in creating a new political order was, 
after all, totally foreign to the kintei kenpo shugi (the principle that the emperor grants to the subjects a 
constitution as his charity). 212 Ito, the father of  the constitution, accordingly stressed in the public 
address that people should keep the fact in mind that this constitution was what the emperor granted 
to his subjects with his deep affection and favor.213   
 
7. The Meiji Constitution in Operation 
The Meiji Constitution attempted to create a new regime where the traditional source of  
authority would be connected to a modern notion of  political legitimacy. Its purpose was, on the one 
hand, to maintain a sort of  absolutism and, on the other, to introduce a Western conception of  
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constituting politics according to law. The sovereign was placed in “a line of  Emperors unbroken for 
ages eternal” and the emperor himself  was regarded as “sacred and inviolable.”214 This central 
element of  the Constitution was clearly based upon a traditional image of  authority. Even though 
the emperor “combin[ed] in Himself  the rights of  sovereignty”215 and thus separation of  powers was 
not thorough, there were considerable chances to authorize political power democratically because 
once some sort of  constitutional political system starts, political decisions need public or at least not 
completely private explanations to justify them. 
In fact, Ito Hirobumi, a key politician who led the constitutional drafting process, assumed 
an ambivalent attitude toward constitutional writing in Japan. Although there were no European 
countries in the late nineteenth century that had not practiced constitutional politics, in Ito’s view, 
the Japanese situation was considerably different because such a constitutional writing was totally 
novel. Before framing a constitution, the axis of  Japan as a nation had to be explored and 
determined. Unlike Western counties, there was no real influence of  religion on the Japanese people. 
What should be the axis of  the Japanese nation was, in Ito’s opinion, only the imperial family and a 
constitutional drafting should follow this axis.216  
Ito considered the emperor system in Japan equivalent to Christianity in the West. The 
emperor should be the moral foundation of  a Japanese constitutional regime. In the framers’ view, 
new governmental principles should tie directly to this morality. Constituting a governmental system 
by the monarchical principle meant preservation of  the imperial morality that the framers assumed 
prevalent and consistent in Japanese history. The Meiji Constitution was thus not only a document 
of  governmental principles but also a declaration of  the fundamental rule of  morality.  
Such an image of  the emperor of  course reflected the reconstruction the framers attempted 
in order to authorize their power. The emperor system had varied in its reality from age to age in 
Japanese history. There were periods in which the emperor was almost forgotten. A main purpose of  
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framing the Meiji Constitution therefore fortified the status of  the emperor by appealing to the 
founding myth and the alleged uniqueness of  the unbroken tradition thereafter.  
However, Ito himself  realized that introducing some sort of  constitutionalism to Japan 
could lead to limiting political power, even sovereign power. As partially described above, important 
controversies occurred in the framing process at the Privy Council. Some councilors expressed their 
dissatisfaction because the proposed constitutional articles seemed to them to be against the 
supremacy of  the emperor. The consent of  the Imperial Diet to the legislative power the emperor 
exercised and the guarantee of  rights of  the subjects were targets of  such criticisms.217 By rejecting 
the criticisms, Ito reiterated that once a constitutional system was created, even the power of  the 
emperor should be subject to the limits set by the constitution. In Ito’s view, writing a constitution 
meant to make a commitment to an idea of  the limited government to some extent. 
In this way, the Meiji constitutional regime involved serious contradictory elements from 
the very beginning. A Western concept of  constitution was founded upon traditional authority. The 
Meiji Constitution was a compromise between the absolute status of  the emperor as preexisting 
sovereign and an idea traditionally cherished in constitutionalism that because power is apt to be 
abused, a healthy governmental scheme needs articulated limitations on power holders.  
Because there were the contradictory elements built into the text of  the Meiji Constitution, 
its operation could vary according to which element an interpreter placed emphasis upon.218 If  some 
regarded the traditional aspect of  the constitution as crucially important, then sovereignty of  the 
emperor came to the central point of  its interpretation. If  others made much of  the elements of  
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constitutionalism in the constitution, then separation of  powers, parliamentary cabinet government, 
independence of  the judiciary, and so on became a matter of  utmost concern on the interpretive 
agenda.  
In fact, the Meiji Constitution went through many twists and turns before the regime 
collapsed. The framers’ original intent on the government was, as discussed above, that the 
government must stand aloof  to avoid the influence of  political parties. The framers thus refused the 
English model and followed the Prussian one. Immediately after the establishment of  the Meiji 
Constitution, the intent was realized as a bureaucratic cabinet system that was independent of  
political pressure of  the Imperial Diet generally more democratic than the government. This was 
called the chozen naikaku (transcendental cabinet).219 However, the constitution neither prohibited 
ministers of  state from being members of  the Diet nor banned them from negotiating with it. The 
constitution might be interpreted as tolerating parliamentary cabinet government.220 According to 
this interpretation, a party cabinet government would be perfectly constitutional. Whether a 
transcendental bureaucratic cabinet or a parliamentary cabinet government, it would all depend 
upon the circumstances of  actual political practices at particular times.221 
Indeed, Okuma Shigenobu, who was Minister of  Foreign Affairs when the Meiji 
Constitution was put in effect and the chairman of  the Rikken Kaishinto (Constitutional Progressive 
Party), delivered an address declaring that the success of  a constitutional system depended upon not 
what its text stipulated but how it was made to work, that a party cabinet government was not 
necessarily provided for in the constitution, and that as in the United Kingdom, a party cabinet 
government was expected to be formed after full development of  political parties here in Japan.222 
We can say that the Meiji Constitution to some extent expected a parliamentary government system 
to develop gradually. The constitution itself  granted the Imperial Diet the power to give consent to 
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bills and budgets the government proposed, no matter how weak the Diet might be otherwise. The 
transcendental government soon came inevitably under the influence of  the Diet with the power to 
consent because, whether one liked it or not, the governmental process in constitutionalism 
contained institutional interactions by its very nature. 
Okuma’s expectation turned out to be right as early as 1898 when Okuma himself  first 
organized a cabinet government. At that time, however, the foundation of  the party cabinet system 
was not so solid as to last long enough to carry out important policies. The first and second Kensei 
Yogo Undo (the Movement for Vindication of  Constitutional Government), 223  the campaign for 
cabinet formation based upon a majority will of  the House of  Representatives, finally led to a 
relatively stable party cabinet government system. Majority party leaders organized cabinets with the 
support of  the lower House between 1924 and 1932. Election by universal suffrage among men of  25 
years or older was also realized in 1925. Changes in the government with the confidence of  a 
majority party became a principle of  political practice. The principle was called the kensei no jodo 
(normal course of  constitutional government). 224  This period experienced the most democratic 
political process in the Meiji constitutional regime.225 
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After the Manchurian Incident of  1931, however, the tendency toward a democratic 
governmental process twisted once again.226 The Great Depression hit Japan severely. The financial 
and agrarian crises were so serious that a feeling of  blockade was wide spread all over the country. 
Japan started to wage the Fifteen Years’ War against China. A fascistic moment approached. A 
group of  young radical naval officers and army cadets assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Takeshi in 
the May 15 Incident of  1932. Inukai was one of  the most influential leaders of  the Kensei Yogo Undo 
(the Movement for Vindication of  Constitutional Government). This coup d’etat was a failure as an 
attempt to restructure the state but it had an enormous impact on the political process. Party cabinet 
came to an end. By using the independence of  tosui-ken, leaders of  the military forces seized real 
power over the government. Violence rather than speech became a decisive medium of  politics. 
Another form of  terrorism against important officials of  the government materialized in the 
February 26 Incident of  1936. The China Incident of  1937 brought total war against China, which 
led to the Pacific War against the Allies in 1941.The Kokka Sodoin Ho (All Nation Mobilization Act) 
was enacted in 1938 and political parties were dissolved. Japan rushed into a total war regime. The 
general election of  1942 is remembered as the yokusan senkyo (assistance election). The Yokusan seiji 
kai (Political Association for Assistance of  Imperial Rule) was the only faction in the House of  
Representatives.227 In this situation, the Imperial Diet became a mere body to say yes to the measures 
the government proposed. The gradual development of  constitutional democracy ceased there. The 
fanatical military clique was rampant until Japan was defeated in August 1945.228 The period from 
1932 to 1945 is called kurai tanima (the Dark Valley). 
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8. Two Schools of  Constitutional Interpretation: The Organ Theory Controversy 
If  the Meiji Constitution was a compromise between two conflicting ideas----absolutism 
based upon reclaimed traditional authority and constitutionalism introduced from the West, then its 
interpretation could develop along either of  them. Generally, there were two conflicting schools of  
constitutional interpretation. One was more theocratic and authoritarian. The other was more liberal 
and democratic.229 
The first school of  constitutional interpretation was in concert with the framers’ original 
intent. This school well reflected the kintei kenpo shugi. It emphasized the emperor’s divine right to 
govern. More precisely, it sanctified divine descent to govern Japan on the ground of  the founding 
myth. It thus paid close attention to the phrase in joyu, the preamble of  the Meiji Constitution: “The 
right of  sovereignty of  the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath 
them to our descendants.”230 This divine school was apt to interpret the Meiji Constitution to make 
prerogative politics as expansive as possible.  
Hozumi Yatsuka (1860-1912), professor of  constitutional law at the Tokyo Imperial 
University, was the most influential spokesman of  this divine school.231 Before the promulgation of  
the Meiji Constitution, Hozumi had already presented a constitutional theory that was favorable for 
the hanbatsu government. The emperor alone enjoyed power to create a constitution because he held 
sovereign power in Japan. Thus, the subjects were not entitled to participate in the process of  
establishing a constitution. Moreover, a constitution could not restrain the emperor from changing it 
because he as sovereign created the constitution and thus he could even abolish it without any 
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reservation.232 At the beginning of  the Meiji constitutional regime, in fact, Hozumi’s interpretation 
was regarded as authoritative because he theorized the framers’ intent that the constitution was an 
instrument for the efficient, systematic, and stable operation of  state power. 
The primary purposes of  Hozumi’s constitutional theory233 were both to deny a thesis of  
state sovereignty that eventually came to mean that the emperor’s power was restricted by parliament 
with representation of  the people and to refuse the idea of  “I am the state” that was a symbol of  
absolute monarchy overthrown by civil revolution. 234  To accomplish his aims, Hozumi tried to 
combine and unite the state and the imperial throne by appealing to the notion of  kokutai of  the 
unbroken line of  the emperors for ages eternal. 235  The first feature of  Hozumi’s constitutional 
interpretation was the imperial throne sovereignty thesis. The reason why the throne, not the 
emperor himself, was regarded as the sovereignty holder was that the throne well matched eternality 
and powerfulness of  the state, while the life of  a real person was too short and its power was too 
weak to cope with them.236 The second feature of  Hozumi’s theory was the idea of  “the emperor is 
the state.” Sovereignty that resided in the imperial throne was expressed in the person of  the 
emperor.237 This idea meant that, on the one hand, the supreme and enormous natural will of  the 
emperor as a real person fulfilled the will of  the state (legal will) and that, on the other, sovereignty 
that was supreme, independent, inseparable, and unlimited in its nature238 made a pair of  absolute 
obedience to such sovereignty and thus this relationship made political order of  society maintained. 
By combining the emperor and the kokutai, and the state and the kokutai, Hozumi created the thesis 
that “the emperor is the state” from the concept of  kunshu kokutai and the state order as a 
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relationship of  absolute obedience to sovereignty. This thesis could avoid both state sovereignty in 
the monarchy and absolute obedience to the monarch as the idea that “I am the state” inspired.239 
Thus the emperor’s prerogative politics developed along this reasoning. Let us consider Hozumi’s 
constitutional theory in more detail. 
In his theory, Hozumi distinguished between kokutai (form of  state) and seitai (form of  
government). The former meant a distinction of  state according to residence of  sovereignty: kunshu 
kokutai (monarchical form of  state) and minshu kokutai (democratic form of  state).240 The latter was a 
distinction of  ways that sovereignty exercised: sensei seitai (despotic form of  government) and rikken 
seitai (constitutional form of  government).241 With the Meiji Constitution, Hozumi argued, Japan 
became a state of  the kunshu kokutai (monarchical form of  state) and rikken seitai (constitutional form 
of  government).  
However, a main point of  his theory lay not in a purely academic classification of  forms of  
state and government, but an ideological claim that kokutai had been decided by the history of  a state 
as an undisputable fact and a national conviction242 and that a constitution could not change kokutai 
but only seitai.243 In Hozumi’s understanding, the sovereignty of  the Japanese state resided in the 
unbroken line of  the throne for ages eternal and this formed the everlasting kokutai of  the state.244 
The kokutai was understood as not artificially constitutive but historically and consciously 
determinative as the people. Hozumi thus founded the idea of  kokutai with a special constitutional 
meaning. 
Hozumi’s ideological attempt was also to reject parliamentary government based upon 
party politics, which was once again in harmony with the framers’ view. If  the Diet had been 
composed of  only representatives of  the nation and its majority controlled the government, he 
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believed, the fundamental structure of  the Japanese state would have been revolutionarily changed as 
if  an old state fell and a new state arose. 245  In a parliamentary governmental system, the 
representatives of  the people would monopolize both legislative and administrative powers. 
Adoption of  such a system would transform the political characteristics of  Japan from the kunshu 
kokutai and rikken seitai to the minshu kokutai (democratic form of  state) and sensei seitai (despotic 
form of  government). Hozumi refused the party cabinet government as absolutely unacceptable 
because it would betray the eternality of  the kokutai. 
His idea of  the rikken seitai needs further explanation. Particularly, the reason why a 
parliamentary government system was regarded as a despotic form of  government was complicated 
in terms of  a common understanding of  constitutionalism. Surprisingly, Hozumi admitted that the 
essence of  constitutionalism consisted in the separation of  powers. Legislative, administrative, or 
judicial powers should be distinguished so that the constitution could demarcate the boundaries of  
competent fields among the legislature, government, and courts. In this respect, constitutional 
government was different from despotism in which a single organ of  the state arbitrarily exerted 
confused legislative, administrative, and judicial powers.246 Parliamentarism was thus understood as 
a kind of  despotism because parliament usurped administrative power the constitution properly 
granted to the government. 247 Hozumi’s antagonism toward parliamentary government also reflected 
his distinctive conception of  constitutionalism. It was contrary to a common understanding of  
constitutionalism, which tells us that we should watch the administrative power carefully because 
abusive exercise of  power usually occurs in this field of  state power. To Hozumi, oppression of  
majority seemed the most serious problem for a stable political order. In misunderstood sympathy 
with the warning John Stuart Mill gave in his On Liberty, Hozumi contended that a representative 
system easily led to disastrous tyranny of  majority.248 Legislative despotism was, thus, believed to be 
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more dangerous than governmental despotism. Constitutionalism properly interpreted in Hozumi’s 
view prevented the Diet from invading the sphere granted to the government. 
The deep suspicion of  the Diet Hozumi expressed derived from his fear and hatred of  
disorder the masses might cause. What he most feared was the minshu kokutai and sensei seitai 
exemplified irrational despotism by the masses as the result of  the French Revolution.249 To Hozumi, 
it had proved that the most ferocious despotism was realized by the people, not by the monarch.250 
Hozumi bore constant enmity against popular participation in the political process because the 
masses tended to want the government to solve social problems such as food, housing, and jobs, and 
eventually could not reasonably discipline themselves so that a powerful outsider had to maintain 
social order to avoid uncontrollable despotism.251 Thus his constitutional theory was mainly for 
advocating an absolute emperor system that seemed to him suitable not only for the Japanese 
tradition but also for an ongoing transformation to mass society. 
Hozumi’s theoretical reasoning reached the same conclusion. When separation of  powers 
was the essence of  constitutionalism, conflicts among three organs were expected to occur frequently. 
Thus there necessarily had to be something for stabilizing the whole constitutional system. In 
Hozumi’s opinion, only sovereign power could unify and harmonize three different branches. 
Sovereign power had to be so intensified as to discharge well the function of  unification and 
harmonization. Constitutionalism, Hozumi argued, required the solid status of  a sovereign monarch 
and expansion of  his political power. Without any favor of  one organ, the head of  state with 
sovereignty stood aloof  from the three powers. Prerogative politics must not be interfered with by 
any subordinate organs. 252  To Hozumi, ironically enough, constitutional government needed a 
powerful emperor-centered system. 
In Hozumi’s view, therefore, sovereignty must be original, absolute, and unlimited. 
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Sovereignty was only under self-limitation, which sovereign will could always change.253 Sovereignty 
understood thus belonged to the imperial throne. Since the earliest times, the will of  the emperor had 
been supreme and absolute and nothing had been able to restrict it. Therefore, even after it 
established a constitution, sovereign power was not necessarily subject to it. Because he established 
the constitution, the emperor was free to change and abolish it without any reservations.254 Sovereign 
power was well beyond all kinds of  law. To Hozumi, constitutionalism did not mean limitation of  
political power. In contrast, the rights of  the subjects were not real rights. Constitutional provisions 
regarding rights meant that statutes checked what the administrative staff  might do. These provisions 
were the orders to administrators that established norms of  action for them. They were not regarded 
as constitutional declarations on what subjects could do without governmental intervention. 
Interests that the subjects had, if  any, were mere reflections of  these orders.255  
Thus, absolute obedience to sovereign power was one of  the most important aspects of  
Hozumi’s constitutional theory. For example, he contended that equality could be meaningful only 
under enormous sovereignty. That was because he believed that men were unequal in a state of  
nature. There were the powerful, the weak, the wise, the foolish, the rich, and the poor in society by 
nature and thus there would be inevitable despotism by physical strength, intellectual power, and 
financial power.256 When he advocated absolute obedience to unlimited sovereignty, Hozumi also 
relied upon a family view of  the state. The state was regarded as extended family. While father as the 
head of  family held absolute power over his family members, he took care of  them to maintain 
household welfare. Family members in turn respected and obeyed the father. The head of  state 
enjoyed absolute sovereign power over subjects to maintain social welfare, just as a father did for his 
family. Patriarchy and paternalism were the foundation of  Hozumi’s constitutional theory. Indeed, 
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he greatly emphasized anachronistic ancestor worship.257 
In Hozumi’s constitutional theory, as a result, the powers of  the Imperial Diet and ministers 
of state were interpreted in such a way as to make them as limited as possible but those of  the Privy 
Councilors and House of  Peers as expansive as possible. At an early stage of  the Meiji constitutional 
regime, Hozumi’s constitutional interpretation well served the intentions of  the hanbatsu government. 
However, he emphasized the emperor’s prerogative too much to deny delegation of  legislative 
powers to administrative orders because strict constitutional interpretation made such delegation 
against the principle of  separation of  powers, which would lead to despotism.258 All governmental 
officials knew that state activities in the twentieth century could not be executed without delegation 
of  legislative power to the administrative departments. As constitutional government developed, 
Hozumi’s interpretation lost its original influence. His theory gradually became obsolete. 
In its place, another school of  constitutional interpretation became more and more 
influential. It was well known as the tenno kikan setsu (the emperor organ theory). Minobe Tatsukichi 
(1873-1948), professor at the Tokyo Imperial University, was the most eminent scholar of  this 
school.259 
Criticizing Hozumi’s constitutional interpretation, Minobe argued for parliamentarism 
under monarchy. First, he dismissed the idea of  kokutai as a legal analytical tool. To Minobe, the 
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kokutai meant the most important historical and ethical characteristics of  the Japanese state.260 The 
kokutai could not be understood independently of  the unbroken line of  emperors for ages eternal and 
was in fact incomparable in the world.261 In Minobe’s opinion, such a historical and ethical nature 
could not be translated into mere legal terms such as monarch and democracy. Minobe rather 
insisted that the regime of  a state, or the foundation of  the legal structure of  a state should be 
referred to as the seitai.262     
Further, Minobe opposed an interpretation that sovereignty was absolute and unlimited 
power. Unlike the kokutai, shuken, sovereignty, is a notion purely introduced from the West and has 
several meanings.263 Minobe suggested that the term should be used precisely to avoid unnecessary 
confusions because shuken had multiple meanings and sometimes meant tochiken, the state’s right to 
govern it. For Minobe, shuken was not necessarily the same as tochiken. Shuken was often interpreted 
as single and inseparable, supreme and independent, and absolute and unlimited,264 but tochiken 
should not be understood in the same way. While tochiken meant the power to fulfill the purposes of  
the state by ruling a certain territory and people, 265  in federalism, for example, it might be 
separable 266  and not necessarily supreme and independent. 267  According to Minobe, it was the 
personality or will of  the state that was supreme and independent.268 Tochiken had nothing directly to 
do with it. 
However, what repelled most him was the contention that sovereignty was absolute and 
unlimited. Even though the will of  the state was not absolute or unlimited because it was limited 
both by natural power such as custom law and rule of  reason developed in society and by 
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autonomous limits such as statutes and treaties,269 tochiken, the right to govern was all the more 
limited because it was a right of  the state and a right had its effect by sanction of  law and thus the 
right was guaranteed within the limits law recognized.270 Minobe mentioned territorial, interpersonal, 
formal, and substantive limits upon the right to govern.  
Minobe also rejected the argument that in monarchy, sovereignty belonged to both the state 
and monarch. In the usage of  monarchical or popular sovereignty, sovereignty meant the power to 
constitute the supreme will of  the state. 271 The monarch or the people had this power not as their 
own right but as representatives of  the state. 272  The power of  the monarch to govern was not 
necessarily as expansive as the right of  the state to govern. In constitutional monarchy, the power to 
govern had to follow constitutional rules and thus the power did not cover all aspects of  the right of  
the state to govern.273 Therefore, Hozumi’s thesis that “the emperor is the state” was based upon the 
confusion of  multiple meanings of  sovereignty. In the term of  monarchical sovereignty, sovereignty 
meant the supreme power to govern, and the exercise of  the right of  the state to govern derived its 
supreme source from the monarch. As a consequence, the power of  the monarch was dependent 
only on the constitution and constitutionally proper to him with its exercise in his name.274 
Minobe then presented his own interpretation of  Japanese monarchism. The emperor held 
the power to govern as his proper power because he had enjoyed it since the founding of  the 
Japanese state as a historical fact. “A line of  Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”275 showed a 
historical fact on the one hand and expressed that it was to be an everlasting principle for the future 
on the other.276 But Minobe argued that sovereignty, the right to govern, belonged to the state as a 
legal personality. In his opinion, historical evidence showed that the emperor himself  had held the 
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power to govern not for his private interest but for the state as the whole.277 Monarchism in Japan 
meant that the powers to govern all derived from the emperor. The emperor was regarded as one 
supreme organ in the state as a corporation. The constitutional provision that “The Emperor is the 
head of  the Empire, combining in Himself  the rights of  sovereignty”278 well showed that the emperor 
could be described as the brains of  the state on the analogy of  human body.279 It did not mean that 
sovereign power privately rested with the emperor himself. It rather meant that their original source 
derived from the emperor, while the powers to govern were dividedly held by several organs of  the 
state.280 
Article 4 of  the Meiji Constitution also declared that the power to govern was exercised 
“according to the provisions of  the present Constitution.”281 The emperor’s power to govern was 
clearly under the Constitution and thus it should not be absolute. Surely the Meiji Constitution was 
the kintei kenpo, the constitution bestowed as a favor to his subjects by the merciful emperor. However, 
once the constitution was established, it became the supreme law of  the nation and even the 
emperor’s prerogatives to govern were under it not only for the present but also for the future.282 Even 
the creator of  the Constitution could not abolish it at will. To Minobe, constitutionalism was meant 
to be an autonomous limitation on the political power of  the state. 
Minobe’s constitutional theory therefore rejected the idea of  constitutional power, which 
usually is regarded as powerful enough to revolutionize an established political order.283 He was 
significantly alert to the dangers unlimited political power might cause. His main concern thus lay in 
rationally theorizing a once established constitutional order, definitely not in dynamically creating a 
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new political order.284  
Minobe believed that constitutionalism was founded upon ideas of  democracy and 
liberalism. To him, democracy as popular sovereignty was completely unacceptable because it was 
sharply against the kokutai of  the Japanese state.285 However, democracy as a principle that the 
governmental policies reflected the will of  the people as greatly as possible could coexist with 
monarchism. In Minobe’s opinion, such a view on democracy had already been adopted to some 
extent in the Meiji Constitution. The emperor governed the state with the support of  the people and 
the Imperial Diet in place of  the people supported the emperor.286 Its decisions were regarded as the 
expression of  the popular will. The governmental process thus should be realized dependently on 
them. This was what Minobe called the emperor’s government with the support of  the people, and 
his version of  democratic politics. 287  Minobe continued to point out that democracy needed 
responsible politics. Taking responsibility meant submission to the criticisms of  others. Unlike 
despotism, constitutional politics required that the governmental process should reflect the popular 
will. When a governmental policy was against what the people wanted to realize, they should have 
some means of  criticizing it. The system of  assuming responsibilities by the ministers of  state288 was 
established for this purpose. The Meiji Constitution, in Minobe’s interpretation, declared a principle 
of  responsible politics that the ministers of  state were responsible for all the political activities of  the 
government. The principle meant that the Imperial Diet might hold the ministers of  state responsible 
for their policies and that, more fundamentally, the people could constitutionally exercise freedom of  
speech in criticizing the policies of  the government. 289  As to another supporting idea of  
constitutionalism, Minobe argued that liberalism claimed respect for personal dignity and made each 
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individual live as a free person, which the Meiji Constitution only reinforced.290 In Minobe’s view, 
the Meiji constitutional system confirmed what had been realized since the Meiji Restoration after 
the abolition of  feudalistic institutions. Moreover, the Meiji Constitution had first introduced the 
idea of  government by law.291 Unlike bureaucratic despotism, administrative and judicial powers had 
to be executed according to law.292 By the constitutional form of  government, in sum, Minobe meant 
parliamentarism, politics for the people, responsible politics, separation of  powers, and legalism.293    
In this way, Minobe argued for limited political power. One the one hand, he maintained 
that the prerogatives of  the emperor were constitutionally limited powers of  an organ of  the state294 
and that the Meiji Constitution enumerated all the prerogatives the emperor held.295 For a salient 
example, Minobe argued that the exercise of  the prerogative to organize the Army and Navy296 was 
required to have the support of  a minister of  state, or the government, while the prerogative to 
command the Army and Navy297 was interpreted as independent of  the government based upon 
traditional custom.298 In sharp contrast, Minobe interpreted the constitutional declaration of  rights 
of  subjects as mere enumeration of  examples. In his view, there were important rights the Meiji 
Constitution did not mention such as freedom to choose and change one’s occupation, freedom of  
marriage, freedom of  business, freedom of  contract, freedom of  education, academic freedom, and 
so on.299 The declaration of  rights and freedoms should be understood as the general establishment 
of  legalism, or the governmental process on a legal basis.300 
Therefore, Minobe paid close attention to the elements of  democratic politics that the Meiji 
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Constitution involved to some extent. He gave priority to the democratic control of  political power 
in his constitutional interpretation. Among other things, the Imperial Diet was interpreted as the 
representative organ of  the people to enhance democratic checks on the governmental process by an 
otherwise institutionally weak body, even though the House of  Peers had no legitimacy whatsoever 
through popular will.301 Minobe widely recognized a supervisory function of  the Diet.302 In his 
interpretation, the House of  Representatives might adopt even a resolution of  non-confidence in the 
government, although the Meiji Constitution did not clearly provide that the House enjoyed that 
power.303 In response to such a resolution, the cabinet might dissolve the House of  Representatives. 
Here the cabinet was interpreted as collectively responsible for its policies not only to the emperor 
but also to the House of  Representatives.304 Such an institutional interaction is no other than a 
parliamentary system. This was a greatly rational interpretation though in opposition to the original 
intent of  the framers.305 Minobe offered the most convincing theory for rationalizing politics within 
the Meiji constitutional regime. As of  1932, Minobe could triumphantly declare that “the custom of  
parliamentary government system was almost established at least under the recent political 
circumstances in Japan.”306 It is fair to say that Minobe’s constitutional interpretation made the most 
distinguished contribution to developing parliamentary politics in prewar Japan.  
A debate over Minobe’s organ theory broke out in the magazine Taiyo (the Sun) in 1912.307 
Uesugi Shinkichi (1878-1929), a leading disciple of  and the successor at the Tokyo Imperial 
University to Hozumi Yatsuka, attacked Minobe’s organ theory as an infraction of  the concept of  
the kokutai.308 Uesugi contended that sovereignty resided in the emperor, not in the state and that if  
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the emperor had been an organ of  the state as a corporation, he would have been a servant who 
worked for the people. To Uesugi, such a theory seemed democratic enough to transform the 
Japanese fundamental characteristics from monarchy to democracy. 309  Minobe refuted Uesugi’s 
accusation. He maintained that Uesugi misunderstood his constitutional theory in three ways: first, 
his state corporation theory was regarded as a claim that the state was the people; second, if  the 
monarch was an organ of  the state, the monarch worked for a distinctive entity, the state; third, if  a 
person worked for a different person, he was a servant and if  the monarch was an organ, he was a 
servant of  the people. Because of  these three misunderstandings that could easily be avoided, 
Uesugi’s denouncement of  Minobe as a destroyer of  the founding regime had no convincing 
power. 310  Although Uesugi again denied Minobe’s organ theory from the emperor sovereignty 
theory,311 third party participants except Hozumi favored Minobe and expressed their deep doubts on 
Uesgi’s unscholarly arguments. 312  Appealing to the concept of  the kokutai indeed made calm 
academic discussion very difficult, if  not impossible, because the kokutai was usually deeply 
connected to moral conviction, not rationalization by nature.  
At that time the debate happened against the background of  what is called the Taisho 
Democracy. That was when political party politics gradually developed toward a parliamentary 
government system within the limits of  the Meiji Constitution. Minobe himself  actually led the 
times. It was thus quite natural that Minobe was predominant in the mostly academic debate.  
Although the debate between Uesugi and Minobe assumed the form of  a dispute in 
constitutional interpretation, as Matsumoto Sannosuke has pointed out,313 it was also a head-on 
collision of  two schools of  thought: statist particularism that had supported the policy of  the fukoku 
kyohei (enriching the wealth and military strength of  the country) since the Meiji Restoration and 
universalism or constitutionalism that was more open to the world and had emerged since the end of  
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the Sino-Japanese War. The fact that the debate ended in favor of  Minobe vividly showed that the 
rational and universalistic trend was then more influential than statist particularism in Japanese 
society. 
Twenty years later, however, the atmosphere that was once surely advantageous for 
Minobe’s constitutional theory had already disappeared when a second controversy over the same 
topic occurred. Political party politics yielded to violence, militarism, and conformism after the May 
15 Incident of  1932. In February 1935, Baron Kikuchi Takeo delivered a speech at a plenary session 
of the House of  Peers that he denounced Minobe’s organ theory as overwhelmingly Western and 
thus anti-kokutai of  traditional Japan and that he required the government to undertake stricter 
controls over such anti-kokutai theories and to ban especially Minobe’s books.314 The government first 
did not observe the problem so seriously. Prime Minister Okada Keisuke responded that although he 
did not feel the term organ entirely appropriate and he did not support the organ theory, he believed 
that we left appropriateness of  the theory to scholars’ judgments rather than to a political decision.315 
It is noteworthy that no one paid careful heed to free speech and academic freedom.316 The fact 
implies that the Meiji constitutional regime granted no, or at least little, real protection to the inner 
spiritual activities of  individuals. 
Minobe, then professor emeritus and a member appointed by imperial order of  the House 
of  Peers, made a counter-speech, a personal defense. He determinedly repeated that his state 
corporation theory that situated the emperor as supreme organ of  the state was not against the 
kokutai but indeed best fitted to the structure of  the Meiji Constitution and Japanese tradition.317 
However, Minobe’s counter-speech brought more ferocious accusations. The denouncement of  
Minobe’s organ theory this time became a more clearly shaped political movement that aimed not 
only to suppress a liberal and democratic interpretation of  the Constitution and promote more 
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authoritarian and intolerant kokutai ideology, but also to remove Prime Minister Okada and liberal 
attendants on the emperor. The right wing and militarists intensively held demonstrations against the 
rebellious organ theory and for clarifying the concept of  kokutai. The Houses of  Peers and of  
Representatives unanimously pass a proposition and resolution on clarification of  the true meaning 
of  kokutai, respectively.318 Because both the army and navy were severely opposed to the organ theory, 
the cabinet, which had active high officers as the ministers of  war and of  navy, worried over how to 
treat this accusation. The cabinet made more and more concessions to the movement in order to 
avoid resignation due to disharmony and to hold the damage to a minimum. Okada twice declared 
the government position on clarification of  kokutai.319 The government banned Minobe’s three books 
on the Meiji Constitution and ordered him to rewrite parts of  two other books on review of  political 
affairs.320 Although the government suspended prosecution of  Minobe for lese majesty and crimes 
against the Law of  Publication, he was forced to resign from the House of  Peers and retired from 
public life. 321 Other important organ theorists, Ichiki Kitokuro, the president of  the Privy Council 
and a former mentor of  Minobe, and Kanamori Tokujiro, chief  of  the Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
resigned from their offices in 1936. Another lethal form of  terrorism befell the Okada cabinet in 
February (the February 26 Incident). The Ministry of  Education published a textbook Kokutai no 
hongi (The True Meaning of  Kokutai) in May 1937. It clearly denied the emperor organ theory, 
emphasized the founding myth, ideology of  a line of  emperors unbroken for ages eternal, and the 
emperor’s sovereignty, and moreover maintained that the emperor was a living god.322 The organ 
theory incident finally killed even a weak version of  constitutionalism in Japan. Political constitution 
thereafter depended upon fear and violence. In fact, it was the government, not the people 
themselves that had ultimate decision-making power over which human spiritual activity was 
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legitimate or not.323 
What was most ironical in the organ theory incident is that even the House of  
Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution on accusing Minobe’s constitutional theory and 
requiring the government to clarify the true meaning of  kokutai. Minobe as a constitutional scholar 
rendered the most distinguished service to the development of  Japanese political party politics. His 
organ theory was without doubt the most salient theoretical foundation upon which the 
parliamentary government was to some degree realized under the Meiji constitutional regime that 
was not necessarily advantageous for a political party from the originalist point of  view. However, 
some members of  the Seiyukai, the leading political party, were in the vanguard of  the movement for 
the denouncement of  the organ theory. The Seiyukai attempted to utilize this movement as a good 
opportunity to overthrow the Okada cabinet. Because they had over 300 seats in the House of  
Representatives, in fact, the Seiyukai themselves believed that they deserved to make a single party 
cabinet. That was why they were frustrated. Minobe was commonly regarded as close to the Minseito, 
another large political party. But the Inukai cabinet itself, based upon the Seiyukai, recommended to 
the emperor Minobe as a member appointed by imperial order of  the House of  Peers. 
Retrospectively, Minobe was the most suitable person the last party cabinet recommended because 
of  distinguished services to the state.324 Moreover, the Minseito also agreed with the Seiyukai on 
rejecting anti-kokutai constitutional theories. Because if  they had not supported the resolution, they 
would have been identified as rebellious as Minobe was considered; such conformism due to fear of  
exclusion well showed that the kokutai ideology devoured all.      
However, the circumstances surrounding the political party had dramatically changed when 
the organ theory incident occurred. Since Prime Minister Inukai was assassinated in the May 15 
Incident, the party cabinet system had ended and the influence of  political party had significantly 
declined. When he reported to the emperor a candidate for the next prime minister, the genro Saionji 
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no longer followed the kensei no jodo (normal course of  constitutional government). 325  The 
parliamentary principle had already been disregarded because the political party had lost public 
confidence in stabilizing the political situation. The fact of  the unanimous resolution on the 
denouncement of  the organ theory was clear evidence that the custom of  parliamentary government 
was not established firmly enough to cope with difficulties. Once a political party stood outside the 
government, it was tempted to make the most of  available options some of  which obviously had 
even anti-party tendencies. In the organ theory incident, indeed, the beneficiaries themselves were 
self-contradictorily willing to destroy their own theoretical foundation.      
What, then, is the meaning of  the organ theory incident? This is deeply related to 
evaluation of  the Meiji Constitution itself, its development, and two schools of  its interpretation. 
One influential explanation comes from dualism of  interpretation.326 According to this explanation, 
two constitutional interpretations were in use in different applicable fields. The top governmental 
officials seemed to utilize a double standard on constitutional interpretation. The organ theory 
championed by Minobe was widely accepted by highly educated people. Hozumi’s theory was for 
common citizens. In order to govern the people efficiently, on the one hand, it was convenient for the 
government to emphasize absolute obedience to the emperor’s power that was the essence of  
Hozumi’s constitutional interpretation. They realized, on the other, that Hozumi’s theory did not 
work well in the area of  high politics. Hozumi sought the weakest possible Imperial Diet and denied 
party politics and parliamentary government. Hozumi’s interpretation was, however, irresponsive to 
the reality, in which, in so far as the Diet held the power to consent to legislation and the budget, it 
exercised non-negligible influence over the government. His prerogative politics centered vision 
became out of  date with the development of  Japanese political culture. Hozumi’s rejection of  the 
delegation of  legislative power to administrative departments was in fact unrealistic in the age of  the 
administrative state. Thus Hozumi’s interpretation prevailed only in the areas of  school education, 
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military education, and police education, where submissive obedience was usually most required.327 
 In this explanation, the organ theory incident is understood in the way that the organ theory 
as an elitist interpretation was repudiated by a more common theory of  divine right. The military 
and the ministry of  education in charge of  elementary education who believed in a constitutional 
theory strictly consistent with the kokutai ideology successfully attempted to dismiss the elitist 
agreement on dualism of  constitutional interpretations and unified the official interpretation in their 
favor. 
 This skillful explanation has gained wide support. However, it goes rather too far in that the 
organ theory had never gripped common people’s mind.328 In fact, Minobe first developed his theory 
systematically in Kenpo kowa, which was published based upon a series of  lectures to teachers at 
junior high schools. More importantly, Minobe was accused after he had expressed his organ theory 
for about thirty years as a professor at the most influential university.  
Therefore, there is another explanation that the incident was a legal and bloodless coup 
d’etat. The incident is understood as a part of  the movement that aimed to overthrow democratic 
and liberal elements of  the Meiji Constitution and to create a regime with unlimited state power.329 
In others word, the incident is regarded as a successful attempt to amend the Constitution outside 
the amending process.330 This second explanation is based upon an assumption that the organ theory 
was the most appropriate interpretation of  the Meiji Constitution. In this explanation, moreover, 
Minobe built his constitutional theory upon a traditional sense of  community by which a crystal-
clear dichotomy between law and morality was not necessarily accepted.331 It was because there was 
believed to be no essential difference between society autonomously regulated by morality and the 
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state as an institution artificially regulated by law.332  
However, Minobe’s constitutional interpretation expressed only one side of  the Meiji 
constitutional regime, in so far as the Meiji Constitution relied upon the idea of  a line of  emperors 
unbroken for ages eternal and the premise that the Constitution merely confirmed the governmental 
principle that had already been established. Because the Meiji Constitution was a product of  
compromise between the emperor absolutism and constitutional government, an orthodox theory 
necessarily lay in somewhere between despotism and constitutionalism.333 It is true that Minobe’s 
organ theory was the most rational constitutional interpretation. But the Constitution itself  included 
from the very beginning what was beyond rationalization. Minobe himself  expressed his regret for a 
fact that there were disagreements between his view and many others in basic theory and 
interpretation of  constitutional clauses.334 When rationalization went too far, there could naturally 
be reactionary movements. The emperor organ theory incident should be understood as a reflection 
of  the compromise the Meiji constitutional regime involved.    
 
9. Conclusion: Difficulties in the Meiji Constitution to Overcome 
As has been discussed so far, the Meiji Constitution was established with the aim of  
preserving the hanbatsu leadership with a mixture of  the traditional authority of  the emperor and a 
Western concept of  constitutional government from the outset. The Meiji constitutional regime thus 
had its inside conflicting elements of  absolutism and constitutionalism. With gradual political 
development, Japan to some extent managed to operate a liberal democratic political system during 
some of  the prewar period. Particularly, from 1924 to 1932, six political party cabinets were 
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consecutively organized and this can thus be called the most democratized period of  the Meiji 
constitutional regime. In the 1930s, however, the fanatic militaristic clique destroyed some liberal 
democratic elements that once seemed promising and finally overthrew the constitutional 
governmental system that to some extent worked well, even though the Constitution involved 
various limits. Therefore a question arises as to why the Meiji constitutional regime failed if  it was 
resilient enough to tolerate the liberal democratic governmental process once in its history by 
“betraying the framers’ original expectation”.335 
Mitani Taichiro has pointed out five conditions under which the political party cabinet 
system could function well in the Meiji constitutional regime: 1) supremacy of  the House of  
Representatives over the House of  Peers, 2) pervasion of  the constitutional theory that justified the 
supremacy, 3) political neutralization of  the Privy Council, 4) partisanship of  the bureaucrats, and 5) 
international detente under the Washington regime and a corresponding decline in the political 
influence of  the military. 336  It is important to note that these conditions are all factual, not 
institutionalized. Thus when the political circumstances changed, the party cabinet was immediately 
faced with difficulties in maintaining its own system. In fact, the reverse conditions brought the party 
cabinet to an end: 1) dilution of  political importance of  the majority in the House of  Representatives, 
or malfunction of  the political party as the subject of  unifying the regime, 2) denouncement of  
Minobe’s constitutional theory in the emperor organ theory incident, 3) active interventions in 
political affairs by the Privy Council, 4) spread of  an anti-party attitude among the bureaucrats, and 
5) challenges by the military to the Washington regime to maintain interests in China.337 
Therefore we can say that the Meiji constitutional regime lacked the institutional 
guarantees of  the democratic political process. Among other things, democratic control was not 
strong enough to restrain a minority from realizing a tyrannical rule. Even participants in the 
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governmental process were not completely clear about who assumed political responsibility. The 
cabinet, which was considered the most ordinary advisory institution for the emperor, could not 
monopolize powers to support him. For example, the emperor as the supreme commander in chief  
was always situated outside the will of  the cabinet.338 Even liberals as Minobe interpreted that the 
prerogative to command the army and navy was independent of  the government and that its exercise 
was subject to only the support of  the top military officials.339 The House of  Peers, the Privy Council, 
and the genro were also influential participants in the governmental process. Thus, institutions 
independent of  the democratic will played an important role in the decision-making process. More 
fundamentally, the Meiji Constitution adopted the principle that the emperor directly governed.340 
This principle was not necessarily consistent with the rule of  advice and support of  the ministers of  
state or others that was appropriate for constitutional monarchy because while the former was based 
upon the emperor’s own positive will on governmental affairs, the latter relied upon his negative will 
by which he always gave consent.341 The institutional arrangements the Meiji constitutional regime 
had meant that there was no clear ultimate rule on who assumed political responsibility for decisions 
the state always had to make to maintain political order for collectiveness. Multiple participants 
might be all irresponsible for what they did. 
Secondly, we can point out that customs of  the democratic political process were not solid 
enough either to overcome serious institutional defects involved in the Meiji constitutional system. 
Some of  the actual political circumstances were constructive, not pre-determined and thus 
participants could maintain, consolidate, and develop them. Unfortunately, however, participants in 
democratic politics in prewar Japan had only a weak commitment to the parliamentary government 
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system itself. For example, the emergency imperial ordinance342 was once a convenient tool for 
bureaucratic despotism because, with resort to the measure, it was possible for the government to 
short-circuit efforts to gain consent to legislation from the Imperial Diet. This convenient detour was 
also in common usage even under the political party cabinet, regardless of  party difference.343 The 
case of  an amendment to the Chian Iji Ho (Peace Preservation Law) was a good example of  lack of  
respect for the democratic political process.344 In 1929, after the bill to amend the Peace Preservation 
Law was shelved in the fifty-fifth Imperial Diet, the Seiyukai Tanaka Giichi cabinet decided to enact 
it as an emergency imperial ordinance. Although the opposition party, Minseito, and some Privy 
Councilors doubted the constitutionality of  such an enactment,345 the amendment was promulgated 
as an emergency imperial ordinance because there was a wide demand for undertaking stricter 
control of  communists and anarchists and for imposing severer punishments on them. In the next 
fifty-sixth Imperial Diet, both Houses passed a resolution to approve the emergency imperial 
ordinance and thus the ordinance maintained its effect as a law.346 Because the Peace Preservation 
Law aimed directly at limiting freedom of  speech and freedom of  conscience, the amendment 
should have been thoroughly deliberated in the Diet. The framers themselves expressed the fear that 
if  the government utilized this power “as a pretext for avoiding the public deliberations”, the 
Constitution “would be far from serving as a bulwark for the protection of  the people.”347 The 
government’s frequent appeals to emergency ordinance suggested that, on the one hand, the power 
to give the consent the Diet was granted was not negligible but that, on the other, even party 
members did not care much about politics based upon public deliberation which is certainly centered 
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in a parliamentary government system.  
In this relation, the opposition did not work well. Because the ruling party almost always 
won a general election in prewar Japan, an opposition party desperately sought something to break 
the deadlock. To criticize and force the government to resign, therefore, an opposition party was 
inclined to be possessed by a temptation to count on independent organs such as the Privy Council, 
the House of  Peers, and the military to compensate for its own weakness.348 
In the first place, however, even in the period of  the political party cabinet, only three prime 
ministers, Hara Takashi, Hamaguchi Osachi, and Inukai Takeshi had seats in the House of  
Representatives, and all of  them were assassinated.349 This evidence well symbolizes the limits of  
political party politics under the Meiji constitutional regime. 
More fundamentally, the Meiji constitutional system was ultimately contradictory to the 
idea of  persuasion through mutual interaction by speech, upon which democratic politics must rely. 
The Meiji Constitution was a kind of  compromise between traditional Japanese authority and 
constitutionalism of  a Western origin. But its central logic was the kokutai ideology of  a line of  
emperors unbroken for ages eternal. At the establishment of  the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor 
Meiji swore to the imperial founder and other imperial ancestors that he should “maintain and 
secure from decline the ancient form of  government”,350 because he inherited his right to sovereignty 
of  the state from his ancestors in “a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal”.351 As a matter of  
constitutional logic, the emperor himself  was restricted by the intents and practices of  the founder 
and his ancestors. In fact, this logic was declared in the Tsugebumi (Imperial Oath Sworn at the 
Sanctuary of  the Imperial Palace). The Meiji Constitution was considered a mere expression in the 
form of  fundamental law of  “the instructions bequeathed by” the imperial founder and by other 
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ancestors.352 In this way, the provisions of  the Constitution on the emperor were not creative but only 
declaratory. 
Therefore, the emperor did not necessarily stand inside the constitutional regime. If  the 
emperor was independent of  the Constitution in essence, the power to govern the people was 
ultimately out of  constitutional control. Constitutionalism tended to fail here. We can understand 
that when he advocated the emperor organ theory, Minobe attempted to put the emperor into the 
constitutional limits by excluding the concept of  the kokutai from his constitutional theory. As 
discussed above, his manner of  interpreting the Meiji Constitution was absolutely exquisite and he 
succeeded to a considerable degree. But he became a victim of  the ultra-nationalistic movement of  
1935, when his theory was suppressed.  
The failure of  the organ theory also clarifies the structure of  the Meiji constitutional regime 
that the state, more precisely the kokutai, monopolized internal values such as truth, morality, and 
beauty. 353  The Constitution and Kyoiku Chokugo (the Imperial Rescript on Education) 354  were 
understood as the official documents of  such a declaration. Because it was founded upon the 
unification of  spiritual authority and political power, the prewar Japanese state held in herself  the 
standard of  judgment on governmental activities. Thus the state never confronted serious challenges 
to its legitimacy. In such a situation, the standard of  values came down to relative distance from the 
emperor, the embodiment of  ultimate value in both the state and society. Moreover, even the 
emperor himself  could not be completely free because his status and power were inherited from his 
ancestors in a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal. 
Therefore, if  liberal democracy functions in an ultimate situation at all, Japan must be 
liberated from the kokutai ideology. The emperor should derive legitimacy from only a constitution. 
Modern constitutionalism is an effort to give the state a constructive political order. The tradition 
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itself  is filtered by deliberated opinion, whether one likes it or not. How can the emperor be 
concretely taken into a constitution? That will be a pressing problem in the new era. But one thing 
for sure is that success of  constitutional democracy there depends upon a change in a view of  a 
constitution. The framers of  the Meiji Constitution understood the constitution as an elitist 
instrument for ruling the people. They welcomed rational and efficient rule by law. Such basic 
characteristics generally determined the course of  the Meiji Constitution. In this respect, Minobe’s 
organ theory was not an exception. Rather, a new constitution should create a common basis upon 
which public dialogue between common citizens and the government elites could be performed well. 
Only with such a basis, will democracy be able to take root in Japanese society. After all, in a 
complex, diversified, and pluralistic society as ours, the constitution has to be a channel for 
arranging various private interests among the people to the public good. 
Because the theorists both of  the external imposition and of  the internal continuity tend to 
oversimplify Japanese constitutional history, they do not pay much attention to constitutional 
experiences in the Meiji regime. Whether one likes it or not, the limits of  the Meiji Constitution as 
we have discussed inevitably set a starting point of  struggling to reconstruct political order in the 
postwar era. By obtaining the benefit of  this analysis, the third way theorizes the more complicated 
experience about the defeat in the war and the creation of  the new constitution. How then can we 
conceptualize the postwar constitutional experience?  
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Chapter 2 
Failure of  the Japanese Government to Revolutionize the Constitution 
 
1. Introduction 
2. A New Era 
3. The Initial Process of  Constitutional Reform 
4. The Reluctant Japanese Government: Traces of  the Matsumoto Committee 
5. The Japanese Government’s Failure: The Lack of  Passion and Ideals  






 The Meiji constitutional system, which once realized democratic practice of  politics to a 
considerable extent, collapsed because it suffered severely from the attack of  the ultra-nationalist 
movement. To common citizens, defeat in World War II was liberation from totalitarian rule for the 
last decades. It also invited the Japanese people to face the serious task of  the reconstruction of  the 
postwar political order. Interestingly enough, there were no disputes over the goal of  reconstruction. 
Liberal democratization of  Japan had to be pursued. Whether one liked it or not, the Potsdam 
Declaration set a basic scheme for postwar Japan. 
If  liberal democratization of  politics was required, a question arouse as to the nature of  the 
Meiji Constitution. Did not it serve liberal democratization? If  so, what was wrong with it? Serious 
reconsideration of  the fundamental law obviously seemed to be needed. In the trend of  the world, 
defeated nations especially cannot keep their old governing system intact.1  
However, the Japanese government did not seem to take the defeat seriously. The governing 
elites optimistically hoped that the kokutai would be retained even after the state surrendered. They 
were so confident in the existing constitutional system that a small modification would be good 
enough to meet the requirement of  establishing “in accordance with the freely expressed will of  the 
                                                 
1 See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 15. 
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Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.” 2  They opportunistically 
understood that the “ultimate form of  government” could “be established by the freely expressed 
will of  the Japanese people.”3 The Potsdam Declaration also required the Japanese government to 
“remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of  democratic tendencies among the Japanese 
people.”4 For the governing elites, the magic words were “the revival and strengthening”. They 
possibly meant that because what already existed disappeared for some reason, the government 
should restore it. However, the same article carried another sentence: “Freedom of  speech, of  
religion, and of  thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.”5 
This requirement was extremely difficult to achieve on the premise of  the Meiji Constitution because 
the Meiji constitutional regime was not consistent with the idea of  fundamental human rights.  
As the last chapter has clarified,6 the Meiji regime was founded upon the kokutai ideology 
that the tenno in one line unbroken for ages eternal held and exercised sovereign power over the 
Japanese state. In this ideological world, the tenno monopolized the standard of  values. Thus people 
could not enjoy inner freedom. According to this ideology, further, even the tenno had no freedom to 
govern the state because the constitutional power to rule on the part of  the tenno was a product not 
of  the tenno’s will but of  the will of  the imperial founder and ancestors. Under this governmental 
system, the liberal democratization of  politics should soon be deadlocked because of  its intrinsic 
limits. To develop liberal democracy fully, it was inevitable to take the tenno into a constitutional 
framework. To do so, it was necessary to break off  with the kokutai ideology of  one line unbroken for 
ages eternal. However, the governing elites could not see the problems the Meiji Constitution had 
had because they were so privileged that they might identify themselves with the regime. Thus, they 
could not present a conception of  a new political order for postwar Japan.   
                                                 
2 The Potsdam Declaration, art. 12, Foreign Relations of  the Unites States(FRUS), 2 (1960): 1474-1476 in RM024 
3 Reply by Secretary of  State to Japanese Qualified Acceptance, August 11, 1945, Political Reorientation of  Japan, 
Appendix II, 415 in RM026. 
4 The Potsdam Declaration, art. 10, FRUS, 2 (1960): 1474-1476 in RM024. 
5 The Potsdam Declaration, art. 10, FRUS, 2 (1960): 1474-1476 in RM024. 
6 See Chapter 1 especially section 9. 
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This chapter will explore the failure of  the Japanese government to frame a fundamental 
law appropriate for a new era. On the one hand, the external imposition theory criticizes GHQ’s 
imposition of  the postwar constitution upon the Japanese people. However, the Japanese 
government accepted the Potsdam Declaration and thus was under an international obligation to 
execute the liberal democratization of  politics. Although the government had opportunities to create 
a postwar constitutional order by itself, the governmental and intellectual elites were so obsessed 
with the retention of  the kokutai that they could not adapt themselves to the new situation of  the 
international pledge. The third way should internalize the failure of  the Japanese government. On 
the other hand, the internal continuity theory emphasizes that the symbolic tenno institution matches 
the authentic tradition of  Japan. However, it tends to ignore the significance of  the defeat. The 
required liberal democratization of  politics could not be achieved by simply returning to the pre-
modern conditions. Thus the third way has to examine carefully the meaning of  the defeat and the 
governmental failure to take a chance of  constitutional reform. 
In this chapter, first, we will review how a new era started. The political meanings of  the 
requirements the Potsdam Declaration had set forth are our central concern. Next, we will examine 
the initial process of  constitutional revision immediately after the war. The starting point of  
constitutional reform in postwar Japan was the suggestion of  General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme 
Commander for Allied Powers, to Prince Konoe Fumimaro, deputy prime minister of  the 
Higashikuni cabinet. Konoe and the Office of  the Privy Seal tried to assume governmental 
responsibility for constitutional revision. Their action incurred the repulsion of  the government. 
Escalation of  both domestic and international criticisms against Konoe caused MacArthur and 
GHQ to modify their direction for seeking a partner of  reform. This group’s work had the distinctive 
feature that they kept contact with high American officials to know what the American side wanted. 
It also showed the elitist limits of  retaining the kokutai ideology. 
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Further, this rivalry between the office of  the privy seal and the cabinet led to the 
establishment of  the Kenpo Mondai Chosaiinkai (the Committee for the Investigation of  Constitutional 
Problems). Matsumoto Joji, minister of  state, was the chairman and the committee had outstanding 
constitutional scholars and legal bureaucrats. However, the name of  this committee well reflected the 
conservative attitude of  the government toward constitutional reform. Their reluctance and 
isolationism resulted in a narrow-viewed approach to constitutional revision. On February 1, 1946, 
the Mainichi Shinbun abruptly reported the alleged drafted of  the Matsumoto Committee. This 
shocked many Japanese people and the GHQ staff  because the reported draft seemed to them too 
conservative to carry out the liberal democratization of  politics in postwar Japan. This scoop was a 
critical turning point in the process of  making the postwar constitution. After that the Government 
Section of  the GHQ took the leadership. We will carefully examine the failure of  the Matsumoto 
Committee. If  imposition of  the constitution occurred, that was the Japanese government’s fault, not 
anyone else’s. We will explore why the government failed.      
The final section of  this chapter will consider what Minobe Tatsukichi thought about 
reconstruction of  the political order after the defeat. Minobe, who advocated a theory that even the 
tenno was one organ of  the state, was a liberal champion under the Meiji constitutional regime. His 
excellent constitutional interpretation helped a quasi-parliamentary government system to develop in 
prewar Japan. Such an interpretation was against the original intent but widely accepted before the 
tenno organ theory incident in 1935. Minobe was a victim of  the fanatic ultra-nationalist movement. 
People were thus eager to know what this liberal giant would say about constitutional revision after 
the war. Surprisingly, Minobe was quite hesitant to amend the Meiji Constitution immediately. He 
believed that it was flexible enough to execute tasks for the liberal democratization of  politics. When 
he argued for cautious treatment of  the matter, he definitely represented the governing elites. 
However, constitutionalization of  his tenno organ theory, which was basically the plan of  the 
Matsumoto Committee, did not solve the serious problem inherent in the Meiji Constitution. True 
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liberal democratization could not be realized until a fundamental law rejected the logic of  the kokutai 
ideology that the tenno in one line for ages eternal should govern Japan by following the will of  the 
imperial founder and ancestors. Unfortunately, Minobe failed to present an innovative conception of  
politics for the new era. The section will explore the reason for his failure in his constitutional 
thinking.   
 
2. A New Era 
 World War II finally ended when Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration without any 
reservation on August 14, 1945.7 Japan had been defeated not only militarily but also ideologically. 
Japan, governed by the military clique of  fanatic ultra-nationalists, could not draw a grand design for 
the postwar world. Japan failed to propose a fundamental idea that could be universally expanded 
beyond the politics of  imperialism. The Japanese behavior was nothing but military invasion with an 
economic bloc. It was difficult for the particularistic kokutai ideology to have universal appeal to 
others in the world. This is in sharp contrast to the fact that at a very early stage in the war, the U. S. 
President, Franklin Roosevelt, presented the “Four Freedoms,” which eventually became the 
cornerstones of  the Charter of  the United Nation.8 
 With the surrender, anyway, Japan had recovered peace for the first time in fifteen years. The 
next difficult question was how political order had to be restored. The conditions of  rebuilding the 
nation were established in the Potsdam Declaration. 9  Its main provisions relevant to postwar 
reconstruction claimed the following:  
                                                 
7 Although some Japanese have tried to argue for conditional surrender, they have been unsuccessful. For the 
nature of  the Japanese surrender and its difference from that of  Germany, see Sato Tatsuo, Nihonkoku Kenpo 
Seiritsushi (Tokyo: Yuhikau, 1962), 1: 105-133 (hereinafter as Sato, Seiritsushi). 
8 It is worth noting that the U. S. did not completely dispel an imperialistic attitude when the U.S. agreed that 
the USSR had invaded the former Japanese territory in northern China and occupied the Chishima (Kuril) 
Islands. 
9 Proclamation Defining Terms for the Japanese Surrender, Signed at Potsdam and Issued by the President of  
the United States (Truman) and the Prime Minister of  the United Kingdom (Attlee) and Concurred in by the 
President of  the National Government of  China (Chiang), July 26, 1945. 
 126 
Article 10: The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and 
strengthening of  democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of  
speech, of  religion, and of  thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human 
rights shall be established. 
 
Article 12: The occupying forces of  the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as 
soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in 
accordance with the freely expressed will of  the Japanese people a peacefully 
inclined and responsible government.10 
 
Article 12 seemed to require Japan to create a new government based upon the principle of  popular 
sovereignty. On August 10, 1945, before accepting the Declaration, the Japanese government 
expressed their expectation of  its favorable interpretation. The maintenance of  the kokutai, where the 
tenno in one line unbroken for ages eternal exercised sovereign power, was the most important 
problem for the government elites to deal with. In the inquiry, the Japanese government stated that it 
was ready to accept the Potsdam Declaration “with the understanding that the said declaration does 
not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of  His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.”11 
The Allied Powers did not reply directly to the Japanese inquiry, but issued the following statement 
that further explained their position (the so-called Byrnes’ reply).12 
“From the moment of  surrender the authority of  the Emperor and the Japanese 
government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of  the 
Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the 
surrender terms.” 
 
“The ultimate form of  government of  Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam 
Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of  the Japanese people.” 
 
Then the Japanese government officially accepted the Declaration on August 14. In the Imperial 
Rescript on the same day, the tenno told his subjects that he accepted the Potsdam Declaration in 
“Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of  the Imperial State”.13  The tenno 
                                                 
10 Potsdam Declaration, FRUS, 2(1960): 1474-1476 in RM024. 
11 Japan’s Qualified Acceptance, Legation de Suisse Washington, D.C., August 10, 1945 in RM025. 
12 U. S. accepts Japan’s surrender (8/11/45) Secretary Byrnes in RM026.  
13 Japan surrenders (8/14/45) Emperor Hirohito: Imperial Rescript in RM027. The tenno contended that he 
declared war “out of  Our sincere desire to ensure Japan’s self  preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it 
being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of  other nations or to embark upon 
territorial aggrandizement.” And then he told subjects that “it is according to the dictate of  time and fate that 
We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the 
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concluded his statement with the kokutai ideology again: “kokutai no seika no hatsuyo”; “Cultivate the 
ways of  rectitude; foster nobility of  spirit; and work with resolution so as ye may enhance the innate 
glory of  the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of  the world.”14 
The Japanese government elites, thus, believed that they could maintain the kokutai, the 
governmental system in which the tenno as sovereign in a line unbroken for ages eternal holds the 
prerogative to govern Japan.15 Objectively, however, there was a serious problem as to whether their 
belief  had a reasonable basis. A few Japanese elites suspected that Article 12 of  the Potsdam 
Declaration and the Byrnes’ reply would be inconsistent with the idea of  the kokutai.16 Because of  
such an apprehension that acceptance of  the Declaration would deny the tenno’s prerogatives as 
sovereign, which could lead to a revolt of  fanatic militants, indeed, the government intentionally 
translated Byrnes’ reply into ambiguous Japanese.17 The phrase “the form of  government” could 
mean the whole structure of  a governmental system and then if  it had been “established by the freely 
expressed will of  the Japanese people”, it would have been clearly contrary to the traditional concept 
of  the kokutai, sovereignty of  the tenno in a line unbroken for ages eternal. However, the 
governmental official translation uses the Japanese phrase “seifu no keitai”, which may be 
interpreted as the form of  the executive department. Following this interpretation, the top 
governmental officials hoped that formation of  liberal and democratic cabinets, which once actually 
occupied the mainstream during the prewar period, would meet the conditions the Potsdam 
Declaration and Byrnes’ reply set forth for the democratization of  postwar Japan. 
                                                                                                                                                             
unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.” The Japanese people directly listened to what the tenno told 
them in the rescript on the radio at high noon the next day. 
14 Japan surrenders (8/14/45) Emperor Hirohito: Imperial Rescript in RM027. 
15 For the Japanese acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration, see Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 8-31. For the American side, 
see Dale M. Hellegers, We the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of  the Japanese Constitution (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), vol. 1; Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 32-56.  
16 Toyoda and Shimomura Notes in Sato, Siritsu shi, 1: 23. 
17 The first sentence above in Byrnes’s reply was translated as followed: “…tenno…no kenpen ha… rengogun 
saikou shireikan no seigen no motoni okareru monotosu< shall be subject to>.” The second sentence above 
was translated as followed: “Saishuteki no nihonkoku seifu no keitai ha<the ultimate form of  government of  
Japan> … nihonkoku kokumin no jiyu ni hyomei suru ishi niyori ketteiseraru bekimonotosuru.” For the 
official Japanese translation, see Tsutsui et al, eds., Nihon kenposhi, 344-345. 
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In this way, understandings of  these articles of  the Potsdam Declaration and Byrnes’ reply 
could become a critical source of  controversy. By relying upon an interpretation in their favor, 
however, the Japanese government contended maintenance of  the kokutai for the time being. The 
governmental elites thus believed that no serious structural change in the constitutional system 
would be necessary for discharging duties Japan accepted by international agreement. The 
atmosphere among them was well represented in the statement of  Prime Minister Prince 
Higashikuni, who was a member of  the tenno family and the first postwar prime minister. He 
contended that policy for the reconstruction of  Japan must be based upon the maintenance of  the 
kokutai, which was the Japanese people’s firm conviction beyond reason or feeling.18  
In sum, the end of  the war should have brought a new era to Japan. For the common 
Japanese people, there had to be liberation from the established kokutai ideology, which had long 
invaded even internal freedom and monopolized the standard of  value judgments. 19  In reality, 
however, a new idea appropriate for restructuring the nation did not easily gain momentum. In the 
first place, most common citizens had no place to live and were barely able to eke out a living. When 
the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration, the most important issue for the elites 
was not the life and safety of  the people, but rather the maintenance of  the kokutai and the safety of  
the Tenno Showa and his family. They attempted, in vain, to gain from the Allied Powers a promise 
that the status of  the tenno would be untouched.20 However, they still believed that the tenno would be 
sovereign in a postwar governmental system as he had been in the prewar time. The governing elites 
attempted to leave the old system as unchanged as possible. 
 
3. The Initial Process of  Constitutional Reform 
                                                 
18 Prime Minister Prince Higashikuni at the press interview conference in Mainichi Shinbun on August 30, 1945, 
reprinted in Hidaka, ed., Sengo shiso no shuppatsu, 53. 
19 See Chapter 1 section 8. 
20 The U.S. policy toward occupation of  Japan was also ambiguous at the early stage of  the postwar period. See 
Ray A. Moore & Donald L. Robinson, Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur 
(Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 30-33. 
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On October 4 1945, General MacArthur suggested to Prince Konoe Fumimoro revising the 
Meiji Constitution to a more liberal one. Konoe was the minister of  state without portfolio and the 
deputy prime minister in the Prince Higashikuni cabinet, which was headed by a member of  the 
imperial family to cope with the expected resistance of  the military. The maintenance of  the kokutai 
was the primary responsibility of  this cabinet. Apart from the suggestion of  constitutional reform, 
MacArthur issued the directive regarding civil liberties on the same day.21 “In order to remove 
restrictions in political, civil and religious liberties and discrimination on grounds of  race, nationality, 
creed or political opinion,” it required in the directive that the Japanese government remove all 
provisions of  statutes, decrees, ordinances, and regulations that were utilized to suppress the liberties 
of  the people in pre- and mid-war Japan. It listed “freedom of  thought, of  religion, of  assembly and 
of  speech, including the unrestricted discussion of  the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial 
Japanese Government” and discrimination “by reason of  race, nationality, creed or political opinion.” 
What interests me is the fact that it again enumerated the removal of  restrictions on “the collection 
and dissemination of  information” along with freedom of  speech. Guarantee of  freedom of  
expression was a serious concern in groping for a new political order. In addition, the directive also 
precisely ordered the Japanese government to release immediately political and thought prisoners, 
abolish government offices related to control of  thought, speech, religion, or assembly such as all 
secret police organs, the Special Higher Police, and the Protection and Surveillance Commission, 
dismiss police officials, and abolish physical punishment on and mistreatment of  suspects and 
prisoners on the part of  police officials.22 
When he received the directive, Prince Higashikuni concluded that his cabinet would be 
unable to carry out MacArthur’s orders because they seemed to him and his colleagues so liberal 
that the most important purpose of  his cabinet, maintenance of  the kokutai, would become 
                                                 
21 Restrictions on liberty removed (SCAPIN 93) (10/4/45) SCAP to Japanese government, I a in RM039 
(emphasis added). 
22 Restrictions on liberty removed (SCAPIN 93) (10/4/45) SCAP to Japanese government, I c, d, e f  and g in 
RM039. 
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extremely difficult to achieve. Thus, the Higashikuni cabinet resigned the very next day. This cabinet 
had been essentially transitional in the aftermath of  the defeat of  war. The cabinet had lasted for less 
than two months (from August 17 to October 5, 1945).  
The fate of  the Higashikuni cabinet well shows how inconsistent the kokutai ideology was 
with freedom of  thought, speech, and religion. Although he expressed his will to strengthen 
protection of  freedom of  speech, 23  that protection would not be thorough enough to tolerate 
speeches that were incongruous with the concept of  the kokutai. Rather, we should pay close 
attention to the fact that freedom was given to the Japanese people by MacArthur. The Japanese 
government failed to offer a basis for creating a new constitutional regime. Freedom of  speech is one 
of  the most important rights for the proper functioning of  the democratic political process.24 When it 
was required to “remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of  democratic tendencies 
among the Japanese people”,25 it is quite natural to think that suppressive statutes and measures such 
as the Chian Iji Ho (Peace Preservation Act) should be abolished first. However, we should remember 
the fact that universal manhood suffrage was enacted in linkage with the Chian Iji Ho in 1925. 
Constitutional democracy, which was surely once promising, was operated only within the limits of  
the kokutai ideology in prewar Japan. After the defeat in the war, the Japanese people obtained 
freedom from the outside. That was rationed-out freedom.26 Therefore, what Nakae Chomin pointed 
out about the Meiji Constitution basically conforms to the postwar situation. 27  To accomplish 
internalized democratic politics, hard and even painful efforts should be made to replace the onshiteki 
                                                 
23 Prime Minister Prince Higashikuni at the press interview conference in Mainichi Shinbun on August 30, 1945, 
reprinted in Hidaka, ed., Sengo shiso no shuppatsu, 56-57.  
24 See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1948); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of  Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1980); Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of  Speech and the Many Uses of  State Power 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). 
25 The Potsdam Declaration, art. 10. 
26 See, e.g., Kawakami Tetsutaro, “Hiakyu sareta ‘jiyu’ (Rationed-out ‘Freedom’),” in Hidaka, ed., Sengo shiso 
no shuppatsu, 76-79. For criticism of  Kawakami’s conservative view, see Nakano Shigeharu, “Fuyu ni hairu 
(Go into the winter),”ibid., 79-88. See also, Dower, Embracing Defeat, 70. 
27 See Kotoku Shusui, “Chomin sensei,” in Inada, Meiji kenpo seiritsushi, 2: 925-926. Nakae Chomin, Sansuijin 
keirin mondo. 
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minken, or civil rights and civil liberties as a gift from above with the kaifukuteki minken, or those as a 
gain from below.  
 Even after the Prince Higashikuni cabinet resigned en masse, Prince Konoe continued to 
work for constitutional revision. Konoe understood that MacArthur had made the suggestion to him 
as a person, not as a member of  the cabinet.28 As late as October 8, just one day before Shidehara 
Kijuro was appointed the next prime minister, Konoe contacted George Atcheson, Jr., the acting 
political adviser in Japan, to gain some advice and suggestions about constitutional reform. Because 
he had asked the Secretary of  State for the directive on the constitutional revision but had not 
received his response yet,29 Atcheson offered several personal and unofficial comments about the 
problems of  the Meiji Constitution. They included 1) the lack of  a responsible government system; 
2) the emasculation of  the Bill of  Rights by the restriction “within the limits of  the law”; 3) the 
undemocratic House of  Peers; 4) no provision for judicial protection of  people’s rights as against 
government for impeachment of  officials; 5) no provision for civilian control over the army and 
navy; 6) the undemocratic Privy Council; and 7) the lack of  initiative taken by the people’s 
representatives to adopt amendments to the constitution that would be opposed to a government 
reflecting the “freely expressed will of  the people,” and the emperor’s legislative prerogatives without 
the Diet’s participation, which would be the same.30 It is crucially important to note that, in this 
context, the status of  the tenno was presupposed as it was and thus popular sovereignty rather than 
the sovereignty of  the tenno did not emerge as a fundamental issue.31 
Konoe gained a position attached to the office of  the lord privy seal (naidaijin) to devote 
himself  to constitutional revision.32 He told Kido Koichi, the Lord Keeper of  the Privy Seal that 
                                                 
28 See Hideo Tanaka, “A History of  the Constitution of  Japan of  1946,” in Hideo Tanaka, ed., The Japanese 
Legal System (Tokyo: Japan, Tokyo University Press, 1976), 655 n. 1. 
29 The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of  State, October 4, 1945, FRUS, 6(1945) 
736 in RM060. 
30 The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of  State, October 10, 1945, FRUS, 6(1945) 
739 in RM065. 
31 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 22; Moore & Robinson, Partners for Democracy, 66. 
32  For the Konoe problem, see Theodore McNelly, “The Konoe Effort: International and Bureaucratic 
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there was a fear that GHQ would present a draft of  constitutional revision if  the Japanese side 
loitered on the work.33 He thus asked Sasaki Soichi for scholarly advice. Sasaki, a former professor at 
the Kyoto Imperial University and an authority on constitutional law, was considered as influential a 
liberal as Minobe Tatsukichi. On October 11, the tenno appointed Konoe a special assistant for the 
office of  the lord privy seal. Sasaki received the same appointment two days later.  
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Shidehara met MacArthur and accepted a general suggestion 
on constitutional reform and the directive of  five specific reforms on the same day. The five reforms 
were 1) the emancipation of  women through their enfranchisement; 2) the encouragement of  the 
unionization of  labor to give workers safeguard against exploitation and abuse and to raise their 
living standard to a higher level; 3) the “opening of  the schools to more liberal education”; 4) the 
“abolition of  systems which through secret inquisition and abuse have held the people in constant 
fear” by substituting “a system of  justice designed to afford the people protection against despotic, 
arbitrary and unjust methods”; 5) the democratization of  economic institutions “to the end that 
monopolistic industrial controls be revised through the development of  methods which tend to 
insure a wide distribution of  income and ownership of  the means of  production and trade”.34 
Interestingly, constitutional reform was not mentioned in the directive. Because MacArthur had 
already maintained that constitutional revision would be necessary, he should have once again 
ordered it of  the new prime minister. However, that did not happen because Takagi Yasaka, who was 
the professor of  American politics at the Tokyo Imperial University and Konoe’s assistant, asked a 
GHQ insider not to treat constitutional reform as equivalent to five reforms so that the Japanese 
government, particularly Konoe, spontaneously engaged in constitutional reform for the sake of  
appearance.35 On October 13, newspapers reported that the tenno had appointed Konoe as a special 
assistant for the office of  the privy seal and that Konoe would consider the constitutional revision. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Politics,” The Origins of  Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 32-53; Hellegers, We the Japanese People, chap. 11 “’Dust 
and Ashes’: The Konoe Affair,” 2: 438-460. 
33 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 186. 
34 Five fundamental reforms (10/11/45) SCAP to Japanese government in RM041. 
35 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 24-25. 
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Because MacArthur’s order except five reforms was not directly mentioned in that report, the 
Japanese people might well have misunderstood that the Japanese government took the initiative in 
reforming the Meiji Constitution. At this moment, indeed, GHQ was very cooperative with the 
Japanese side on constitutional reform.36 
If  MacArthur had suggested the necessity for constitutional revision to Konoe as a member 
of  the Higashikuni cabinet, the legitimacy of  Konoe’s efforts would have become dubious. In fact, 
MacArthur made a general suggestion about constitutional revision to Shidehara, who succeeded 
Higashikuni: “In the achievement of  the Potsdam Declaration, the traditional social order under 
which the Japanese people for centuries have been subjugated will be corrected. This will 
unquestionably involve a liberalization of  the Constitution.”37 On October 13, the Shidehara cabinet 
rushed to establish the Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinkai (the Committee for the Investigation of  
Constitutional Problems) presided over by Matsumoto Joji, the minister of  state without portfolio. 
The rivalry between Konoe and Shidehara made the issue of  constitutional reform public. On the 
same day, the major newspapers Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri Hochi discussed this subject in their 
editorials, which were generally critical of  the Shidehara cabinet’s passive attitude toward 
constitutional reform. 38  What is noteworthy is that Yomiuri Hochi cast doubt on Konone’s 
qualification as a main promoter of  constitutional revision because he was the leader of  the 
reformist movement that dissolved political parties under the Taisei Yokusan Kai (Imperial Rule 
Assistance Association).39 In Yomiuri Hochi’s opinion, the liberalization of  a constitution necessarily 
accompanied expansion of  parliamentary politics and thus an anti-parliamentarian such as Konoe 
                                                 
36 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 25; Moore & Robinson, Partners for Democracy, 66. 
37 Five fundamental reforms (10/11/45) SCAP to Japanese government in RM041. 
38 “Kintei kenpo no minshuka (Democratization of the imperially established Constitution,” Asahi Shinbun, 
editorial, October 13, 1945 in Kizokuin jimukyoku chosabu, ed., Kenpo kaisei ni kansuru shoron shuroku (A 
Collection of Essays on Constitutional Amendment) (Tokyo, 1946), 1-2 (hereinafter as Shoron Shuroku); 
“Kenpo kaisei no kinkyusei (Urgency of Amending the Constitution),” Mainichi Shinbun, editorial, October 13, 
1945, ibid., 2-3; “Kenpo no jiyushugika (Liberalization of  the Constitution ),” Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun, editorial, 
October 13, 1945, ibid., 3-5.  
39 For Konoe’s political activities, see Yoshida Yutaka, “Konoe Fumimaro,” Yoshida Yutaka, et al., Haisen 
Zengo: Showa Tenno to gonin no shidosha (Around the Wartime Defeated: The Emperor Showa and Five Leaders) 
(Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1995), 11-44.  
 134 
was believed to be inappropriate for taking care of  constitutional reform.40   
The rivalry between Konoe and Shidehara itself  was accompanied by a serious 
constitutional problem: which institution was eligible to consider amendments to the Meiji 
Constitution, the office of  the lord privy seal or the cabinet? The Meiji Constitution preserved the 
power to project a constitutional amendment for only the tenno.41  A project for amending the 
Constitution should “be submitted to the Imperial Diet by the Imperial Order.”42 Theoretically, the 
conclusion depended upon the interpretive stance, whether a prerogative-centered one or 
constitutionalist one. Because the Meiji Constitution, as the “fuma no taiten (immutable fundamental 
law)”,43 was believed to be eternal, interpretation of  the article regarding its amendment had been 
out of  reach of  public discussion. In fact, it had never been changed since its promulgation in 1889. 
An amendment was truly unprecedented. 
Matsumoto criticized the operations of  the office of  the lord privy seal. Because 
constitutional amendment was one of  the most important affairs of  state, the exercise of  this 
prerogative by the tenno must be with the advice of  the cabinet. The cabinet should assume 
responsibility for amending the constitution to the tenno. The work Konoe was performing was 
believed to a preparation for the tenno’s judgment when a proposal of  the government would be 
presented to him.44 Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, a professor of  constitutional law at the Tokyo Imperial 
University, joined Matsumoto in criticizing the procedure that Konoe was following. State affairs 
were supposed to be executed with the advice of  the ministers of  state, and the government naturally 
gave the tenno advice on constitutional amendment and was responsible for it. A project to amend 
the constitution would be submitted to the Imperial Diet and it was the government that presented a 
draft and gave an explanation of  it in deliberation. The office of  the lord privy seal, however, had no 
                                                 
40 “Kenpo no jiyushugika (Liberalization of  the Constitution),” Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun, editorial, October 13, 
1945 in Shoron Shuro, 4. 
41 See Minobe, Nihon kenpo no kihonshugi, 60-64. 
42 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 73, sec. 1. 
43 The Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of  the Constitution, par. 1. 
44 See “Ho no kaishaku o gensei ni (Strict Interpretation of Law),” Mainichi Shinbun, article, October 16, 1945, 
in Shoron Shuroku, 11. 
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relationship to the Diet. The behavior Konoe took was that the small group prepared constitutional 
amendment behind a secret door, which had nothing to do with the government and the Diet. In 
Miyasawa’s conclusion, such behavior was definitely unconstitutional.45 
Sasaki openly opposed the criticisms. As long as a project to amend the Meiji Constitution 
must be based upon an imperial order, no governmental institution could begin to consider an 
amendment without the order. The government needed an imperial order to start their consideration 
as well as the office of  the lord privy seal. There were two kinds of  advice the tenno was given. The 
government gave him advice on actual actions in state affairs. In contrast, the office of  the lord privy 
seal gave him advice only for his good consideration upon constitutional reform. In Sasaki’s opinion, 
thus, the tenno was supposed to have two different pieces of  advice in quality from both the 
government and the office. Although it was the government that gave the tenno advice for an official 
project of  amendment, the office of  the lord privy seal might support the tenno’s personal decision to 
issue an imperial order. So interpreted, duties and responsibilities of  the government and the 
imperial household should be constitutionally separated.46 
In theory, the principle of  responsible government requires the cabinet to take responsibility 
for all kinds of  state affairs. Given democratization of  the constitution on the agenda, public opinion 
was generally supportive of  the argument that the government should assume responsibility for 
constitutional amendment.47 But this constitutional dispute ended in a wholly different manner. As 
the criticism on the work of  the office of  the lord privy seal intensified, Konoe utilized the authority 
                                                 
45 See Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, “Kenpo no seishin ni hansuru naidaijinnfu no shingi (The deliberation in the 
Office of  the Lord Privy Seal is against the Spirit of  the Constitution,” Mainichi Shinbun, October 16, 1945 in 
Shoron Shuroku, 9-10. 
46 See Sasaki Soichi, Mainichi Shinbun, Osaka, October 21, 1945 in Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 192-194. 
47 An editorial of  Asahi Shinbun said that because Kido and Konoe were responsible for the collapse of  the 
Meiji constitutional regime, they were not appropriate for taking charge of  constitutional reform in a new era. 
This editorial also criticized the reluctant Shidehara cabinet for being neglectful of  reforms. Appointment of  
Matsumoto as minister of  state was regarded as a poor excuse. “Kyutai izen tari (A Way of  Government 
Remains Unchanged),” Asahi Shinbun, editorial, October 18, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 18-19. An editorial of  
Tokyo Shinbun was also critical of  governmental support and advice the emperor gained. “Hohitsu no mondai 
(Problems of  Advice),” Tokyo Shinbun, editorial, October 17, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 17-18. However, 
Kanamori Tokujiro, former chief  of  legislation bureau, argued that the work the office of  the lord privy seal 
engaged in should be welcomed for the sake of  study. “Kenpo kaisei sokkou ron (An Argument for Immediate 
Reform of  the Constitution),” Tokyo Shinbun, article, October 25, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 45-46.  
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of MacArthur. For example, he frankly told an Associated Press reporter Russell Brines that the 
project had started with MacArthur’s suggestion in the October 4 meeting.48 On November 1, 1945, 
however, GHQ abruptly announced that MacArthur had suggested the constitutional reform to 
Konoe as “the deputy primer representing the prime minister”, not as an individual. 49  GHQ 
officially broke off  relations with Konoe and his assistants. The GHQ’s denial of  Konoe’s effort to 
amend the Meiji Constitution may have originated with escalating criticisms of  Konoe both in Japan 
and abroad.50 MacArthur had to protect himself  from serious criticisms derived from his mistake in 
choosing a wrong man as a collaborator. 51 Even after Shidehara became the prime minister and had 
been told of  the necessity for constitutional revision, Konoe’s group continued to contact Atcheson 
and GHQ members. Therefore, GHQ did not make an effort to correct Konoe’s misunderstanding.52 
Konoe was eventually under suspicion as a war criminal before the Tokyo Tribunal. He finally 
committed suicide on December 16, 1945.  
Even after the “betrayal” of  MacArthur, Konoe’s group continued its work. On November 
22 and 24, Konoe and Sasaki respectively presented their reports of  the constitutional amendments 
to the tenno.53 On the same day when Sasaki delivered a lecture to the tenno, the office of  the lord 
privy seal was abolished. Konoe’s outline of  the constitutional revision appeared in newspapers after 
                                                 
48 “Tenno taii no jyoko no sonyu mo arieru (Possible Addition of a Clause of  Abdication),” Yomiuri Hochi 
Shinbun, article, October 23, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 45. 
49 “Kenpo kaisei ni okeru Konoe ko no yakuwari o hitei (GHQ denies Prince Konoe’s Role in Constitutional 
Reform),” Asahi Shinbun, article, November 3, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 54-55. See also, MacArthur repudiates 
Konoe (11/3/45) Kenpô Chôsokai in RM075. 
50 See New York Herald Tribune, editorial, October 31, 1945 in RM74. Byrnes, Secretary of  State, sent quotation 
of  the editorial to Atcheson.  
51  See Theodore McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’: The Policy and Process of  Constitutional Reform in 
Occupied Japan,” Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 78. 
52 Atcheson wrote to President Truman saying that there was a serious misinterpretation when Konoe met 
MacArthur. Atcheson alleged that the sentence “’administrative machinery’ of  the government should be 
reformed.” was translated as “the constitution should be revised.” Political developments; Konoe’s role 
(11/5/45) Atcheson to President Truman in RM077. Because Atcheson continued to give advice to Konoe’s 
group, what he wrote there was not wholly true. This incident caused disharmony between MacArthur and 
GHQ and Atcheson and the Department of  State. 
53 Sasaki took a purely scholarly stance and hated to make a political compromise. He could not reach an 
agreement with Konoe about a desirable new constitution under those circumstances. Thus Sasaki separately 
made his own draft. 
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his death.54 While it maintained the principle that the tenno shall be the superintendent and exerciser 
of  sovereignty, the tenno’s exercise of  sovereignty “shall be dependent on the support of  the people.” 
We find democratization of  the governmental process in several important respects. For example, 1) 
the prime minister, who shall be constitutionally institutionalized, shall preside over the cabinet and 
shall be responsible not only to the tenno but also to the Diet. 2) While the House of  Peers and the 
Privy Council shall be abolished, the House of  Representatives shall be strengthened. 3) All 
prerogatives the tenno holds shall be exercised with support of  the Diet. 4) The prerogative to 
command and organize the army and navy shall belong to state affairs and thus the cabinet shall be 
responsible for it. 5) It shall be made clear that the freedoms of  the people take precedence over the 
law. 6) As for constitutional amendment, a procedure based upon popular referendum is being 
considered. This outline well reflected suggestions of  Atcheson and other Americans.55 On the other 
hand, Sasaki’s detailed draft was never published.56 It can be said that Sasaki’s draft carried over the 
basic structure of  the Meiji Constitution when it kept the first four articles intact, although there 
were some noteworthy proposals such as the right to enjoy the necessities of  life as determined by 
law, freedom with limits of  law when required by the public welfare, establishment of  a 
constitutional court and of  self-governing organizations, and referendum on constitutional 
amendment. Although the tenno gave the government those drafts as reference, the Matsumoto 
Committee paid no formal attention to them.57 The works of  the office of  the lord privy seal had 
generally little concrete influence in the later process of  constitutional reform. Rather, they played 
the role of  triggering debates on constitutional reform.58 This role cannot be underestimated, when 
the government and intellectual elites commonly hesitated to support fundamental reform. 
                                                 
54 See “Konoe ko no kenpo kaisei soan (Prince Konoe’s Draft of  Constitutional Revision),” Asahi Shinbun, 
article, December 21, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 90-92. For the English translation, see Konoe’s proposed 
revisions (12/45) Konoe to Emperor Hirohito in RM088. 
55 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 38; Moore & Robinson, Partners for Democracy, 72. 
56 For Sasaki’s draft, see Sato, Seirtsushi, 1: 222-229. For the English translation, see Outline of  revisions 
(11/23/45) Sasaki Sôichi to Emperor Hirohito in RM083.  
57 Sato Tatsuo, a member of  the Matsumoto Committee, testified to the fact. See Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 233. 
58 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 234. 
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This Konoe affair was situated as an important crossroads in the process of  constitution-
writing in postwar Japan.59 After this event, the Matsumoto Committee became the only Japanese 
governmental institution that was in charge of  examining the problems of  the Meiji Constitution. 
On the part of  the United States, MacArthur began to exclude Atcheson, who belonged to the State 
Department, from the constitutional reform issue.60 The Matsumoto Committee could have learned 
lessons from the work of  Konoe’s group on the constitutional revision, which deserves a special note 
in two respects. 
First, Konoe had a close relationship with people who were well informed about the United 
States. Among them was Takagi Yasaka, the professor of  American politics at the Tokyo Imperial 
University,61 who, through an old personal acquaintance, played an important role in obtaining from 
GHQ their vision of  constitutional reform. 62  As discussed above, indeed, Konoe’s outline of  
constitutional amendment was a reflection of  the American suggestions. During the period when the 
German influence on scholarship was overwhelming in Japan, only an extremely small number of  
scholars were interested in the American legal and political system and actually studied law and 
politics in the United States. Therefore, Konoe’s advisory group was highly unusual. It appears that 
there was no counterpart on the Matsumoto Committee, which, in marked contrast, closed its doors 
to the public, came into no contact with American people, and created its own isolated cosmos.63 In 
any event, Konoe’s advisory group knew that the Potsdam Declaration required the Japanese 
government to carry out rather radical political reform. 
                                                 
59 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 43. 
60 McNelly has pointed out five outcomes of  the power struggle in Tokyo from October through December 
1945. “(1) on the international level, the American predominance in the Allied Occupation was preserved and 
enhanced, (2) on the American level, the Department of  War rather than the Department of  State was shown 
to have pre-eminence in the enforcement of  the Occupation, (3) on the SCAP Headquarters level, the 
Government Section rather than the Office of  the Political Adviser would oversee constitutional reform and 
internal politics in Japan, (4) on the Japan level, the cabinet and the Matsumoto committee (parliamentary 
forces) rather than the Lord Privy Seal and the Konoe group (feudal forces) would be entrusted with the 
reform of  the constitution, and (5) the Konoe initiative apparently hastened the process of  constitutional 
reform in Japan.” McNelly, “The Konoe Effort,” The Origins of  Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 53. 
61 Takagi studied at Harvard University. 
62 Others were Matsumoto Shigeharu, who studied at Yale University, and Ushiba Tomohiko. 
63 See Tanaka, Oboegaki 7-8; Koseki, Tanjyo, 40. 
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Secondly, even though the Konoe group attempted to prepare a new Japanese constitution 
in relation to international politics, their effort shows the limits of  the established Japanese 
intellectual leaders. Their outcomes were oriented by the status-quo.64 It is true that their proposal 
included more democratized political institutions, which means the political process was more 
responsible to the people, than the Meiji Constitution. Because such a degree of  democratization 
was regarded as “a sort of  common sense”,65 however, the group was not confronted with the 
fundamental problem: how to take in a constitutional framework the tenno, who was situated outside 
the constitution under the Meiji regime. The kokutai ideology was so influential that the 
internationalized group was also captivated by the old way of  thinking. After all, the elites around 
the power center were far removed from common Japanese citizens. They devoted themselves only 
to maintaining the kokutai they had cherished. 
 
4. The Reluctant Japanese Government: Traces of  the Matsumoto Committee 
 With their narrow interpretation of  the Potsdam Declaration and GHQ’s occupational policy, 
most Japanese intellectuals believed that a fundamental change of  the Meiji Constitution was 
unnecessary for rebuilding of  the nation after the wartime defeat. The government established a 
committee for constitutional issues but the name, Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinkai (the Committee for the 
Investigation of  Constitutional Problems) well expressed the general atmosphere at that moment. A 
term such as amendment, revision, or reform was intentionally avoided and a more neutral term, 
                                                 
64 Konoe admitted that “in the light of  this defeated war, the amendment of  the Meiji Constitution, rather than 
its proper interpretation and practice, is necessary to contribute to build a basis for the future of  the nation.” 
Yet his proposal includes neither a democratized tenno system nor liberalized judicial protection of 
fundamental rights of  the people. Kenpo chosakai jimukyoku, ed., Teikoku kenpo kaisei shoan oyobi kankeibunsho 
No. 6 (Drafts of  Amendment of  the Imperial Constitution and their Relative Documents) (kenshi, sodai 26 go) (July, 
1958), 3. 
 As discussed above, Sasaki’s detailed draft may be worth noting for its proposal of  a constitutional 
court system, even if  that was not conceived as a court for protection of rights of  the people. Besides that, his 
proposal is not greatly different from the Meiji Constitution. Indeed, Sasaki’s draft is based upon the perpetual 
idea that “Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of  Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” See the 
Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art 1. As Minobe, Sasaki who had been regarded as an eminent liberal in 
the previous regime, failed to come up with an innovative idea that would be appropriate in the new era. 
65 Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 233. 
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investigation or research was used to compromise between the sincere belief  of  the government 
members and the actual pressure the political rivalry caused.66 
 Prime Minister Shidehara Kijyuro, who was foreign minister in five prewar cabinets and 
famous for his stance of  international cooperation, had as most Japanese leaders a firm assumption 
that the Meiji Constitution was elastic enough to execute on a statute level the obligations the 
Potsdam Declaration had set forth. In rivalry with Konoe’s work at the office of  the lord privy seal, 
however, the Shidehara cabinet decided to start investigation on constitutional problems and 
assigned Matsumoto Joji to be the competent minister on October 13, 1945. As Konoe group 
developed work on a full scale, the cabinet established the Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinkai (so-called the 
Matsumoto Committee) on October 25.67 Interestingly enough, there was no legal basis for the 
committee, such as chokurei (an imperial order), seirei (a cabinet order), or kakugi kettei (an official 
decision in a cabinet meeting). It was based only upon kakugi ryokai (an unofficial agreement in a 
cabinet meeting).68 
 The committee was composed of  truly distinguished constitutional scholars and legal 
bureaucrats. 69  Advisers Minobe Tatsukichi, Shimizu Toru, and Nomura Junji and members 
                                                 
66 See “Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinkai secchi no shushi (the Aim of  the Committee for the Investigation of 
Constitutional Problems Matsumoto Explained),” in Irie Toshio, Kenpo seiritsu no keii to kenpo jono shomondai 
(Tokyo: Daiichi hoki, 1975), 108 (hereinafter Irie, Keii). 
67  See “Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinkai o secchi (The Government Established the Committee for the 
Investigation of  Constitutional Problems),” Asahi Shinbun, article, October 26, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 48-49. 
68 See Sato, Seiritsushi 1: 252; Koseki, Tanjyo, 80.  
 Kakugi kettei is a kind of decision made by the cabinet and based upon the powers vested in the cabinet. 
It is usually used for more important matters than kakugi ryokai, which is a form of decision-making related to 
the powers vested in each minister. 
69 The main members of  this Committee were: 
 Chairman: Matsumoto Joji (minister of  state without portfolio; an appointed member of  the House of  Peers; 
former professor of  commercial law at the Tokyo Imperial University) 
 Advisers: Shimizu Toru (academician of the Japan Academy; vice president of  the Privy Council) 
  Minobe Tatsukichi (academician of  the Japan Academy; an appointed member of  the House of  Peers; 
professor of  constitutional law emeritus at the Tokyo Imperial University) 
  Nomura Junji (professor of  public law emeritus at the Tokyo Imperial University) 
 Members: Miyasawa Toshiyoshi (professor of  constitutional law at the Tokyo Imperial University) 
  Kiyomiya Shiro (professor of  constitutional law at the Tohoku Imperial University) 
  Kawamura Matasuke (professor of  constitutional law at the Kyusyu Imperial University) 
  Ishiguro Takeshige (secretary general of  the Privy Council)    
  Narahashi Wataru (chief  of  the cabinet legislation bureau) 
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Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, Kiyomiya Shiro, and Kawamura Matasuke were all regarded constitutional 
scholars of  the highest quality. Narahashi, Irie, and Sato were top three of  the governmental legal 
bureaucrats. However, the name of  this committee described its characteristics and well showed its 
limits from the beginning. Matsumoto Joji, the chairman, announced that the main purpose of  the 
committee was to conduct scholarly research on the Meiji Constitution. Even if  the committee 
found problems in the Meiji Constitution, therefore, it did not intend to take the initiative in 
proposing a plan to revise the constitution.70 Thus, the committee’s first obligation was to investigate 
constitutional issues, if  any, in the aftermath of  defeat in the war. It was not to make a draft of  a 
revision of  the constitution, let alone a new constitution. After all, the Shidehara cabinet believed 
that making a new constitution was irrelevant not only for the committee but also for Japan itself. 
 The Matsumoto Committee had two different kinds of  meetings. One was a general meeting 
in which both advisers and members participated; the other was a research meeting in which only 
members participated. In the former, the issues to be examined and the general orientation toward 
them were decided; detailed work was carried out in the latter. The Matsumoto Committee held 
seven general and fifteen research meetings from October 27, 1945 to February 2, 1946. 71  As 
discussions went on, the committee transformed its character from a research body to a draft 
preparation organ. Matsumoto as chairman actually led discussions in the committee. Finally, the 
committee framed two plans and they along with one preliminary plan were submitted to cabinet 
meetings from January 30 to February 4.72 
 Kenpo kaisei yoko (Plan A) proposed minimum amendment to the Meiji Constitution. Here 
we look at only the main points. 1) Articles 1 and 4 shall be kept completely intact. Article 3 “The 
                                                                                                                                                             
  Irie Toshio (chief  of  the first department of  the cabinet legislation bureau) 
  Sato Tatsuo (chief  of  the second department of  the cabinet legislation bureau) 
70  See “Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinkai o secchi (The Government Established the Committee for the 
Investigation of Constitutional Problems),” Asahi Shinbun, article, October 26, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 48-49; 
Mainichi Shinbun, October 26, 1945 in Sato, Seirtsushi, 1: 253; “Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinkai secchi no shushi 
(the Aim of  the Committee for the Investigation of  Constitutional Problems Matsumoto Explained),” in Irie, 
Keii. 
71 For the detailed activities of  the Matsumoto Committee, see Sato, Seiritushi, 1: 252-374; 2: 485-588. 
72 For the four cabinet meetings, see Irie, Keii, 68-86; Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 629-642. 
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Emperor is sacred and inviolable” shall change to “The tenno is exalted and inviolable.” 2) 
Emergency imperial ordinances shall be issued by the tenno in consultation with the newly 
established Diet Standing Committee, according to the provisions of  the Imperial Diet Law. 3) Army 
and Navy shall be changed to armed forces. Organization and peace standing of  armed forces shall 
be determined by law. 4) A new provision shall be enacted that Japanese subjects shall not have their 
rights and liberties impaired without recourse to law. 5) The House of  Peers shall be replaced with 
the House of  Councilors. The House of  Representatives shall be superior to the House of  Councilors 
in the legislative process. 6) A cabinet system shall be determined by law. Ministers of  state shall give 
their advice to the tenno and be responsible for all state affairs including commanding armed forces 
to the Imperial Diet. When the House of  Representatives passes a resolution of  non-confidence in 
ministers of  state, unless the House is dissolved, ministers of  state shall be dismissed. 7) 
Administrative cases shall be determined by the judiciary. 8) Members of  two Houses may project an 
amendment with approval of  one third of  respective members.73  
 Kenpo kaisei an (Plan B) included a little wider reform than Plan A. Old terminology changed 
to something more appropriate in the new era: the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan to the 
Constitution of  Japan, subjects to the people, and the Imperial Diet to the Diet. 1) As to the tenno, 
four drafts were presented in relation to Article 1 of  the Meiji Constitution and three to Article 3.74  
A) The tenno of  a line unbroken for ages eternal combines in himself  the rights of  
sovereignty, which he exercises according to the provisions of  this Constitution. 
B) The sovereignty rights of  Japan are combined in the tenno of  a line unbroken for ages 
eternal, who exercises them in accordance with the provisions of  this Constitution.  
C) Japan shall be a monarchy headed by the tenno of  a line unbroken for ages eternal. The 
tenno combines in himself  the rights of  sovereignty, and he exercises them according to the 
provisions of  this Constitution.  
D) Japan shall be reigned over by the tenno of  a line unbroken for ages eternal.  
 
A) The tenno is responsible to no one in exercising the rights of  sovereignty. The person of  
the tenno is inviolable. 
B) The tenno is the head of  the state, and is inviolable. 
C) The person of  the tenno is inviolable. 
                                                 
73 For Kenpo kaisei yoko (plan A), see Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 551-554. 
74 Translation is by Ray A. Moore. See Koseki, The Birth of  Japan’s Postwar Constitution, translated by Ray A. 
Moore (Boulder: Westview, 1998), 59.  
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They were not substantially different from one another. “A line unbroken for ages eternal” was once 
again a central concept of  constitutional writing. 2) The tenno, in consequence of  an urgent necessity 
to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, may issue, when the Diet is not sitting, 
emergency imperial ordinances in consultation with the Diet Standing Committee. 3) Army and 
Navy shall be abolished and thus there shall no prerogatives to command armed forces and 
determine their organizations. 4) Reservation of  law was still good for this plan. For example, the 
freedoms of  the people shall be guaranteed within the limits of  public interests provided by law. The 
Japanese people shall not have their rights and liberties impaired without recourse to law. 5) The 
Diet was also bicameral: the Houses of  Representatives and of  Councillors. The former shall be 
superior to the latter in certain cases of  legislation. 6) According to law, the cabinet shall consist of  
ministers of  state, who shall give their advices to the tenno and be responsible for it. When the House 
of  Representatives passes a resolution of  non-confidence in ministers of  state, unless the House is 
dissolved, ministers of  state shall be dismissed. 7) Administrative cases shall be determined by the 
judiciary. 8) Members of  two Houses may project an amendment with approval of  one third of  
respective members.75 
 Although both of  them would surely democratize the political process to some degree, they 
basically conserved the structure of  the Meiji Constitution. Some members of  the Matsumoto 
Committee felt frustrated because Plan A was too conservative to change the constitutional regime 
in the new era and thus they prepared the more liberal Plan B.76 Generally speaking, therefore, Plan 
A was more conservative than Plan B.77 But it can be said that their difference was a matter of  degree, 
not of  quality.78 Both of  them were based upon the principle that the tenno was still planned to not 
only enjoy sovereign power but also directly exercise it. It is true that when they introduced the 
parliamentary government system, they attempted to correct the serious defect of  the plurality of  
                                                 
75 For Kenpo kaisei an (Plan B), see Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 567-576. 
76 Irie testified the feeling of  many members toward Plan A. See Irie, Keii, 59-60. 
77 For comparison between Plans A and B, see Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 609-614. 
78 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 609. 
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advisory institutions in the Meiji constitutional regime. Democratic control would increase when the 
cabinet assumed responsibility in a unified manner. Insofar as the principle of  direct governance of  
the tenno was maintained, however, subject of  action and those who assume its responsibility should 
be naturally separated and there would be always ample room for manipulating power and for 
having a good excuse for the failure of  democratic control. Furthermore, these two plans did not 
touch the kokutai ideology at all. As long as a revised constitutional regime was founded upon the 
concept of  “a line unbroken for ages eternal,” the tenno would not yet be situated inside the 
constitutional frame. In such a system, we have little hope of  realizing authentic constitutionalism 
whose central meaning lies in the principle that governmental power should be limited to protect 
individual liberties.     
 As mentioned above, the most outstanding constitutional scholars of  the time were called 
together in the Matsumoto Committee.79 Nonetheless, they could not come up with a new way of  
thinking in the new era. They had been profoundly infatuated with the kokutai ideology, which was, 
however, becoming obsolete. Their failure deserves further exploration. 
 We can point out the narrow-mindedness, self-centeredness, and elitism of  the members, 
particularly Matsumoto. The committee’s relationship to the outside world really mattered. Unlike 
Konoe’s group, the Matsumoto Committee did not officially contact GHQ at all until their draft was 
completed.80 Matsumoto believed that constitutional revision would be carried out spontaneously 
and independently. He often cited in his favor the terms of  the Potsdam Declaration of  “the freely 
expressed will of  the Japanese people”.81 But he interpreted it from his narrow perspective.82  
                                                 
79 Sasaki Soichi, an academician of the Japan Academy, appointed member of  the House of  Peers, and 
professor of  constitutional law emeritus at the Kyoto Imperial University, was not a member of  this committee. 
He had already committed himself  to helping Konoe Fumimaro make a draft for revising the Meiji 
Constitution. He rejected Matsumoto’s offer to join the committee. See Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 260-262. 
80 For no direct relationship between the Matsumoto Committee and GHQ, see Sato, Siritsushi, 2: 615-619. 
81 For example, Matsumoto later recollected the atmosphere when the committee was established. He said that 
the Potsdam Declaration and the related documents clearly guaranteed that the Japanese people could decide 
about the Japanese kokutai whatever they wanted. “Interview with Matsumoto Joji,” in Sato, Seiritsushi, 252. 
82  Along with Matsumoto’s short-sightedness and arrogance, MacArthur’s new non-contact policy also 
influenced relationship between the committee and GHQ. Moore and Robison have pointed out that 
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This committee was, in fact, profoundly isolated not only from international politics, in 
which the Cold War was becoming a crucially important element,83 but also from domestic voices of  
reform. The committee met behind closed doors. Matsumoto only once explained the aim and 
perspective of  the committee in the Imperial Diet as four general principles, when a representative 
criticized the bureaucratic secretiveness of  the government attitude toward constitutional reform.84 
Because the final drafts of  constitutional revision the committee framed faithfully followed the four 
principles, we wonder whether deliberation in the committee improved the quality of  discussion. 
Other drafts private groups and political parties proposed were also available for reference. 
Matsumoto and his members would not listen to what other people, particularly those who were on 
the periphery of  the established regime, wanted to say about the new era. Their perception alone was 
everything.  
But there were several opportunities for self-correction, all of  which Matsumoto and his 
members missed. On October 27, 1945, the committee held its first general meeting, which 
determined its general direction. At the very beginning, Chairman Matsumoto made the purpose of  
this committee clear. He asserted that they did not have to discuss the necessity of  amending the 
Meiji Constitution but would do careful research on problems, if  any, the Meiji Constitution faced.85 
Yet Nomura Junji, an adviser, opposed Matsumoto’s conservative position. Nomura presented his 
understanding that the acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration had required the Japanese 
                                                                                                                                                             
“MacArthur’s policy of  no contact on the high-priority issue of  constitutional reform must also share the 
blame for this failure in late 1945 and early 1946.” Moore & Robison, Partners for Democracy, 78. 
83 There were many countries that claimed more severe punishment on the tenno than the United States. In 
including such countries, the Far Eastern Committee would soon start to discharge its official functions.  
84 On December 8, 1945, Matsumoto in the House of  Representatives presented the outline of  the general 
perspective of  his committee’s work. “1) No change shall be made in the basic principle that the Emperor shall 
exercise the right of  sovereignty. 2) Expand the number of  issues which require decisions by the Diet, and as a 
result, restrict to some extent those which in the past have been called matters of  Imperial sovereignty. 3) 
Expand the ministers of  state’s responsibility to all matters of  State, and reduce the scope for those others than 
ministers of  state to interfere in State affairs. And, at the same time, make the ministers of  state responsible to 
the Diet. 4) Strengthen guarantees of  the people’s rights and freedoms. That is, the people shall not be 
restricted by laws and regulations that are not made by the Diet. And, on the other hand, measures shall be 
adopted to prevent violations of  their rights and freedoms.” See “Kenpo kaisei ni yongensoku (Four Principles 
of  Constitutional Revision),” Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun, article, December 9, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 84. See also, 
Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 422-426. For translation, see Koseki, Birth, translated by Moore, 56. 
85 See Irie, Keii, 24-28; Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 262. 
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government to carry out a thorough democratization of  politics. He raised three points. First, 
abolition of  the army and navy would remove the power to command and organize armed forces. 
Second, there were questions about how to organize the government based upon the freely expressed 
will of  the people. They were, for example, whether a minister of  state must be a member of  the Diet 
and how the House of  Peers should be reformed. Finally, a question had to be asked about what 
Japan would do to strengthen democratic tendencies as expressed in the Potsdam Declaration. In 
this context, Articles 1 through 4 of  the Meiji Constitution86 had to be thoroughly examined because 
Nomura understood that the articles might be inconsistent with intensifying democracy in Japan.87 
He did not believe that the committee could consider self-satisfied constitutional revision without 
disregarding the Potsdam Declaration. Under these urgent circumstances, it was not time to engage 
in an idealistic discussion. But the committee should place priority on narrowed important points 
rather than examine the whole evenly. 88 To Nomura, a drastically critical discussion on the central 
meaning of  the fundamental law seemed inevitable for the renewal of  Japan.  
Matsumoto disagreed with Nomura. He argued that because the Potsdam Declaration 
stated that a responsible government should be established by “the freely expressed will of  the 
Japanese people,” the United States could not force the Japanese government to abolish the tenno 
system. Although there were radical voices of  communists and others, the general will of  the 
Japanese people was as unmovable as a mountain. For Matsumoto, the core of  the Meiji 
Constitution was permanent and thus unchangeable. 89  Moreover, Minobe Tatsukichi, another 
important adviser for the committee, agreed with Matsumoto’s diagnosis of  the situation, asserting 
that the United States had said they would not intervene in maintenance of  the kokutai. 90 The 
general direction of  the Matsumoto Committee was thus so determined. 
                                                 
86 Article 1 reads: “The Empire of  Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of  Emperors unbroken 
for ages eternal.” Article 4 reads: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself  the rights of  
sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of  the present Constitutions.” 
87 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 264. 
88 See Irie, Keii, 24-28; Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 263. 
89 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 264. 
90 See Irie, Keii, 24-28. 
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Another chance of  self-correction came from an interrogation in the House of  
Representatives. An important question was raised there on December 11, 1945, three days after 
Matsumoto clarified the four principles of  the Committee for the Investigation of  Constitutional 
Problems. Mizutani Chozaburo, a member of  the Socialist Party, attacked Matsumoto’s stance 
saying that it was unnecessary to revise Articles 1 though 4 of  the constitution to achieve 
constitutional democratization. Mizutani argued that Matsumoto was simply wrong when true 
democratization of  the constitution was on the immediate agenda because the principle that the 
tenno holds sovereign power conflicted with the as-ideal-as-possible democracy that was desperately 
needed in the new era.91 But Matsumoto once again refused to listen to an unorthodox opinion. He 
responded that monarchy and democracy did not necessarily conflict with each other. In the world, 
he contended, there were many cases in which a dictator governed a republic. The Weimar 
Constitution, which was established after the Kaizer system was abolished, served dictatorship. The 
idea, Matsumoto asserted, was absolutely wrong that the tenno system conflicted with democratic 
tendencies of  politics or that abolition of  the tenno system would bring democratic politics.92 
Matsumoto had a few more chances to frame a constitutional revision plan that would be 
more appropriate for a reconstructing nation. On January 16, 1946, at the twelfth research meeting, 
Irie and Miyasawa suggested that the government should stop assuming a vague position toward 
constitutional reform but instead positively declare to the public a policy and agenda of  the 
government with a more determined attitude.93 In reply, Matsumoto argued that under the situation 
that heated discussions on the tenno system were going on, he thought constitutional revision should 
be completed as soon as possible so that the amended constitution as a fait accompli would put a 
period to discussions of  the tenno system.94 On January 26, Takagi Yasaka, an assistant to Konoe, 
made a suggestion to Matsumoto that he should seek GHQ’s advice on constitutional reform before 
                                                 
91 Mizutani Chozamuro, the Committee of  the Budget, the House of  Representative, December 11, 1945 in 
Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 426-427. 
92 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 427. 
93 See Irie, Keii, 48-49; Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 529. 
94 See Irie, Keii, 49-50; Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 529-531. 
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the committee determined a final draft because Takagi believed that more radical reform was 
necessary. Matsumoto rejected Takagi’s suggestion and repeated his basic position that constitutional 
amendment should be carried out independently and spontaneously and therefore the committee 
had no need to take counsel from GHQ.95 On February 2 at the final general meeting, further, 
Ishiguro pointed out that as long as the general will of  the people agreed on retaining the tenno 
system, open debate should be performed fearlessly so that a radical argument of  a minority would 
lose its influence. But his suggestion was dismissed because many people felt that they could not bear 
to make the tenno system the target of  public discussion from various angles.96 Matsumoto and most 
members paid no attention whatsoever to the significance of  public deliberation, which gives a 
democratic regime more legitimacy. After all, the idea of  a line unbroken for ages is fundamentally 
inconsistent with a commitment to persuasion by speech.  
A serious problem without any doubt lay in Matsumoto’s personal character, with his 
stubbornness, self-conceit, and tunnel vision. It was unfortunate that such a person was a leader of  
constitutional reform in the new era.97 However, there was a more common serious problem in the 
Matsumoto Committee. When they believed that the Meiji Constitution was flexible enough to 
execute the requirements of  the Potsdam Declaration, Matsumoto and most members had 
misunderstood the meaning of  the Potsdam Declaration. It was not as a contract between equals. 
Japan had no legitimate right to interpret its meaning.98 Matsumoto and his members should have 
recalled the facts that the Prince Higashikuni cabinet could not withstand GHQ’s freedom directive, 
that the directive of  five major reforms would bring fundamental transformation of  society, that the 
order on separation of  Shinto and state inevitably influenced the spiritual foundation of  authority of  
                                                 
95 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 618-619. 
96 See Irie, Keii, 64; Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 578. 
97 Prime Minister Shidehara was worried that if  Matsumoto was the minister competent to constitutional 
amendment, deliberation in the Diet would come to a pretty pass. See Irie, Keii, 21. 
98 See, e.g., Potsdam Declaration not a contract (9/5/45) Acting Secretary of  State Dean Acheson to President 
Truman in RM033. 
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the tenno,99  and above all that the tenno was no longer a living god.100  Moreover, the Potsdam 
Declaration also required that: “Freedom of  speech, of  religion, and of  thought, as well as respect 
for the fundamental human rights shall be established.”101 The Meiji Constitution did not provide for 
full protection of  the rights and liberties of  the people, let alone its practice. The committee members 
seemed satisfactory when the revised constitution provided that civil rights and civil liberties should 
be protected within law, which would be enacted by the more democratized Diet.102 However, they 
never came to realize that true rights and liberties are constitutionally guaranteed against even the 
democratic majority. 103  Furthermore, the requirement of  the Potsdam Declaration, which 
Matsumoto and his members had read on his terms, stated that the Japanese people, not the 
Japanese government, should freely express their will about the political structure as a nation. 
Matsumoto and his fellows confused the people with the government; the two are not necessarily the 
same.104 
 Retrospectively, the rejection of  Nomura’s proposal at the Matsumoto Committee was one 
of  the turning points in Japanese history. Nomura, in fact, presented an eminently detailed proposal 
to the committee at the end of  December 1945. The Potsdam Declaration, as Nomura understood it, 
allowed the Japanese people to make a final decision on their governmental system by the free 
expression of  their will, as long as they tried to realize democracy in Japan. Accordingly, the tenno 
                                                 
99 See Kokka Shinto ni taisuru seifu no hosho, shien, hozen, oyobi koufu no haishi ni kansuru oboegaki 
(Abolition of Government Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of  State Shinto) 
(SCAPIN 448) (12/15/45) SCAP to Japanese government in RM047. See also, Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 387-389. 
100 On January 1, 1946, the tenno denied “the false conception that the Emperor is divine”. Dispelling false 
conceptions (“Ningen sengen”) (1/1/46) in RM096. See also, Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 885-898. Sato says that 
during the deliberations of  the committee, members were more or less aware of  the problem of  the tenno’s 
deity and thus they discussed changing the term “sacred” of  Article 3 of  the Meiji Constitution. See Sato, 
Seiritsushi, 2: 889. If  they were ready to deny the tenno’s deity, however, why did the kokutai ideology so deeply 
captivate them? The founding myth and the notion of “a line unbroken for ages eternal” were the most 
important components of  kokutai ideology. 
101 The Potsdam Declaration, art. 10. 
102 In this respect, there was no difference between Plans A and B. See infra. 
103  Judicial review or a constitutional court was easily rejected because in the members’ judgment, such 
institutions did not work well in other countries. See Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 371. However, they lacked accurate 
knowledge about the U.S. Supreme Court. Whatever the members believed about judicial review, after World 
War II, indeed, the world has experienced a judicial review revolution. See Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review 
in the Contemporary World (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). 
104 See Tanaka, Oboegaki, 12. 
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system would have to undergo a fundamental transformation. Nomura thus proposed that a 
presidential system, or a publicly elected prime minister system, instead of  traditional 
parliamentarism, should be established because strict separation of  powers would bring full 
protection to rights and liberties for common citizens and realize politics in the people’s interest. In 
addition, he gave much thought to the renovation of  the judiciary system --- he proposed the 
introduction of  a jury system for the sake of  democratization of  the constitution. Along with the 
nationalization of  land and important industries, social rights such as the rights to work, education, 
rest, and welfare were also proposed in Nomura’s report. 105  If  the Matsumoto Committee had 
adopted some aspect of  Nomura’s proposal, the process of  amending the Meiji Constitution would 
have been very different from what actually occurred. Unfortunately, Nomura’s opinion seemed to 
Matsumoto and other members of  the committee too radical to be taken seriously.106  
Instead, Matsumoto and most members had been convinced by legal formalism and 
technique. Thus, rather than adopting a method of  comparative constitutional analysis, the research 
on the Meiji Constitution by the Matsumoto Committee was done provision-by-provision.107 By its 
nature, this method could not produce fundamentally new outcomes. With such a method the 
members could not go beyond the horizon of  the Meiji Constitution, which meant to them 
everything. From the very beginning, their work was doomed to fail. It is not surprising that the 
government draft of  constitutional amendments was so conservative that it got a very poor 
evaluation from not only GHQ but also the common citizens. We can say that “imposition” of  the 
postwar constitution was in large part self-inducement by the Japanese government.  
We can draw lessons from the work of  the Matsumoto Committee: A great constitutional 
scholar is not necessarily a good constitutional designer and it may be very difficult for elites in one 
regime to find new values outside the regime and polish them to create a new regime. The members 
                                                 
105 Nomura Junji, “Report on Constitutional Amendment,” in Irie, Keii, 119-190. Sato Tatsuo estimated that 
the perspective on the circumstances Nomura’s report presented was mostly accurate and its policy proposals 
were highly reformative. See Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 326. 
106 See Irie, Keii, 35; Sato, Seiritsushi, 1: 326.  
107 See Tanak, Oboegaki, 212-214. 
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of  the committee often mentioned the difference between real politics and the work of  amending the 
constitution. Historically, however, a constitution is usually tightly connected to politically 
remarkable achievements. 108  In this sense, writing a constitution is inevitably political, whether 
framers like it or not. The members of  the Matsumoto Committee might be good interpreters, but 
they were definitely poor grand-designers for the future.109 Unfortunately, Matsumoto and most 
members, who belonged to the top elite in the old established regime, failed to develop a good 
political sense to identify and solve issues in the new era. 
 
5. The Japanese Government’s Failure: The Lack of  Passion and Ideals 
The Committee for the Investigation of  Constitutional Problems (Matsumoto Committee) 
continued its work for preparation of  amendment to the Meiji Constitution. Unlike the drafts of  the 
Kenpo Kenkyukai (Constitutional Research Group) and Takano Iwasaburo,110 what the Matsumoto 
Committee prepared was the minimum possible amendments and was thus extremely status-quo 
oriented. Matsumoto’s explanation on the general directions of  his committee’s work in the Imperial 
Diet hinted at its conservativeness, which induced severe criticism regarding his committee in 
particular and the Shidehara cabinet in general.111  
When Matsumoto reported the constitutional revision plans as a result of  his committee’s 
work at the cabinet meeting at the end of  January 1946, a critically important event occurred on 
                                                 
108 See Jon Elster, “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process,” 45 Duke L.J. 364 (1995). For 
constitutional writing in the United States, see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1991); Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 
109 This fact may derive from the scholarly tradition of positivism in Japan. See Tanaka, Oboegaki 205-231. 
While positivism was, to some degree, effective for protecting democracy under tenno sovereignty, it did not 
function well when creativity was tested in the age of  reform. See also Tanaka Hideo, “The Conflict between 
Two Legal Traditions in Making the Constitution of  Japan,” in Ward & Sakamoto, eds., Democratizing Japan, 
107-132. 
110 For the details of  Takano Iwasaburo and the Kenpo Kenkyukai, see Chapter 3 section 2. 
111 For example, a long article of  the Tokyo Shinbun criticized the secretiveness and delay of  the committee’s 
work and argued that the minimum amendments the committee sought would not be suitable under the 
drastically changing circumstances. The article suggested the tenno as the source of  honor as a result of  total 
constitutional revision. “Kaname ha tennosei (A Key Is the Tenno System),” Tokyo Shinbun, article, December 
26, 1945in Shoron Shuroku, 102-105. 
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February 1. The Mainichi Shinbun suddenly reported a governmental constitutional revision plan.112 
What the paper reported was actually Miyasawa Plan A, which Miyasawa Toshiyoshi framed in 
early January and was more liberal than the real plan of  the government.113 The secrets of  the work 
of  the committee were so well maintained that the scoop was truly shocking for the insiders.114 
Matsumoto explained at the cabinet meeting that the draft reported in the Mainichi Shinbun was not 
a governmental plan but merely one draft that was framed in the process of  research and that the 
scoop was not the government’s fault.115 Narahashi, the secretary general, issued a press release 
declaring that the draft that appeared in the Mainichi Shinbun had nothing to do with the Matsumoto 
Committee’s work. 116  Further, Matsumoto himself  announced at a press conference that the 
government would continue to work out constitutional revision by depending upon Plan A and 
referring to Plan B only for explanation, both of  which were irrelevant to the Mainichi draft.117 
Matsumoto went on to defend his committee’s work to argue that he felt perplexed with criticism 
that retention of  Articles 1 though 4 of  the Meiji Constitution was conservative. Because Article 4 
provided that the tenno’s sovereign power should be exercised according to the provisions of  the 
constitution, in his opinion, democratization of  constitutional provisions would change the content 
of  sovereign power and then achieve democratization of  the constitution. Retention of  these articles 
should not be confused with the principle of  monarchical sovereignty. Substance should be more 
important than appearance. It was all right to argue as part of  a legal or political discussion from 
whom sovereignty derived, monarch, state, or the people but, he believed, it was wrong to write such 
a thing as a constitutional provision. Provisions in the amended constitution should be the minimum 
possible. The government tried hard to fully realize the requirements of  the Potsdam Declaration 
                                                 
112 See “Kenpo kaisei chousakai no shian (The Provisional Draft of  the Committee for the Investigation of 
Constitutional Problems),” Mainichi Shinbun, article, February 1, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 174-178. 
113 For the Miyasawa A Plan, see Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 487-499. 
114 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 647. 
115 For the cabinet meeting of  February 1, see Irie, Keii, 77-79. 
116 See “Kenpo kaiseian raishuchu ni kakugi kettei (The Cabinet will Decide a Constitutional Amendment 
Draft in Next Week),” Asahi Shinbun, article, February 2, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 184-185, 185. 
117 See “Kenpo kaiseian raishuchu ni kakugi kettei,” in Shoron Shuroku, 184. 
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and, he firmly believed, it would surly satisfy the high expectations of  the people.118 It is difficult to 
understand what Matsumoto said in this conference because constitutional writing is nothing but a 
declaration of  ideals and fundamental principles as a state. It is inevitably a political decision in 
nature. Matsumoto and his colleagues did make a political choice to retain the kokutai, which was 
expressed as tenno sovereignty in legal form. They trivialized the importance of  constitutional text 
when they contended that legal reform was enough to guarantee a liberalized and democratized 
political process. In any event, Matsumoto here again showed that he would not modestly listen to 
criticisms.   
 The Mainichi Shinbun’s scoop also surprised the public. The draft was more conservative than 
people had expected from what the media reported, particularly the four principles Matsumoto 
declared on December 18, 1945. The Mainichi Shinbun itself  commented that “We think most people 
will feel disappointed that it is so conservative and does nothing more than preserve the status 
quo.”119 It added that a formal and ceremonial tenno system would be more desirable and that the 
principle of  direct governance by the tenno should be abolished to avoid its abuse in the future.120 
Mizutani Chozaburo of  the Socialist Party raised a serious question that the provisional draft would 
satisfy the requirements set forth by the Potsdam Declaration. So long as the principle that the tenno 
superintended sovereign power was unchanged, he pointed out, there was a good opportunity for 
politically powerful men to carry out undemocratic politics by utilizing the tenno’s authority.121 Even 
Kita Reikichi of  the Liberal Party, one of  the conservative parties, criticized the government plan for 
lacking clarification of  sovereignty.122 Furthermore, Suzuki Yasuzo, one of  the central persons in the 
                                                 
118 See “Kenpo kaiseian raishuchu ni kakugi kettei,” in Shoron Shuroku, 184-185. 
119 Mainichi Shinbun, February 1, 1946 in Koseki, Tanjyo, 98. Koseki, Birth, 61, translated by Moore. 
120 “Kenpo kaisei shian ni taisuru gigi (Questions to the Provisional Draft of  Constitutional Amendment),” 
Mainichi Shinbun, editorial, February 1, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 178-179. 
121 Mizutani Chozaburo, “Ikkouni kawaranu tennosei (The Never Changed Tenno System),” Mainichi Shinbun, 
February 2, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 182-183. Shiga Yoshio of  the Communist Party also criticized the draft 
because it attempted to maintain the traditional tenno system and such a system would obstruct democratic 
rebuilding of  the nation. Siga Yoshio, “Minshu samatagu amakudari (A Top-down Constitution to Obstruct 
Democratization),” Mainichi Shinbun, February 2, 1946, ibid., 183. 
122  Kita Reikichi, “Shinposei nashi (No Progressiveness),” Mainichi Shinbun, February 2, 1946, in Shoron 
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Kenpo Kenkyukai (the Constitutional Research Group), stated about the draft that the existence of  the 
holder of  sovereign power who should not assume any responsibility would involve a serious danger 
that undemocratic despotism might be practiced under the name of  the tenno and thus the 
government officials who were in charge of  constitutional revision should drop such provisions of  
the draft for the people and for the welfare of  the tenno family. Suzuki continued to criticize the draft 
in that it still used the term of  subjects, which seemed to him outdated and that it lacked equal 
protection and so on. In sum, he pointed out the limits of  work by a small number of  people and 
instead argued for a constitutional convention by the people. 123  The Asahi Shinbun rejected the 
reactionary manner of  the Shidehara cabinet and required the government to make minority 
opinions public to enrich public deliberation among various classes because constitutional revision 
was not just a legal problem or narrow political matter but related to the whole state life of  the 
people.124  
 The Mainichi’s report caused dissatisfaction and apprehensions among the Japanese people 
about governmental work on constitutional revision. An opinion poll showed that while only 16 
percent of  people supported the tenno system of  the Meiji Constitution, 45 percent supported the 
tenno as the center of  morality outside the political sphere and 28 percent were favorable to joint 
sovereignty between the tenno and the parliament.125 The majority of  the people wanted a more or 
less drastic change in the institution of  the tenno although they overwhelmingly supported some kind 
of  tenno system itself. Matsumoto and his fellow members obviously belonged to a minority and did 
not grip the people’s mind of  the day. The unresponsive attitude of  the governmental committee 
caused a critical turn in the course of  constitutional making in postwar Japan.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Shuroku, 183-184. 
123 Suzuki Yasuzo, “Kenpo shian koshitsu nimo kakon (The Provisional Draft of  the Amended Constitution 
May Sow the Seeds of  Trouble for the Tenno Family), Mainichi Shinbun, February 3, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 
187-188. 
124 “Kenpo kaisei no tetsuduki wo tadasu (Ask the Government about Procedure of  Constitutional Revision), 
Asahi Shinbun, editorial, February 3, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 185-186.  
125 “Kenpo kaisei to yoron (Constitutional Revision and Public Opinion),” Mainichi Shinbun, article, February 4, 
1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 188-189. Those who were opposed to the tenno system numbered less than 9 percent. 
Ibid. 
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On February 4, the cabinet meeting ended discussion on amendments to the constitution. 
Surprisingly, the cabinet did not reach an official decision on the draft; more precisely did not try to 
conclude to clarify the cabinet’s position. The Asahi Shinbun reported that disagreement over the 
fundamental issue of  the tenno institution prevented the cabinet from deciding its official draft and 
that Matsumoto reported to the tenno his private provisional plan of  constitutional amendment on 
February 7. The article criticized the cabinet for having lacked a serious attitude toward solving a 
politically important issue by pointing out that there had been no full-scale discussion over Articles 1 
through 4 of  the Meiji Constitution.126 The cabinet members thought that the provisional draft of  
Matsumoto would be a starting point of  their negotiations with GHQ and that after revisions 
through negotiation, they would gradually frame the final draft of  the government.127 The draft was 
thus privately provisional. On February 8, Matsumoto submitted to GHQ a draft that had not 
officially been approved by the cabinet as a whole.128 
We should remember that the Committee for the Investigation of  Constitutional Problems 
was established with no official authority but with only a private understanding of  the cabinet.129 
From the beginning to the end, the governmental work was performed privately.130 The popular call 
of  the Matsumoto Committee well presented the private nature of  the governmental enterprise of  
constitutional amendment. Matsumoto and his colleagues of  course believed that they represented 
the public. In reality, however, they replaced it with their own private thoughts; this self-indulgent 
concept of  “publicness” was so hollow that they would soon experience a second defeat at GHQ. 
Constitutional writing as highest politics accompanied with passions and ideals for rebuilding a 
reinvigorated nation would never succeed by being handled in such a private manner.131 For the 
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passions and ideals in building up a new nation. Mainichi Shinbun, February 2, 1946 in Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 661-
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Matsumoto Committee, the constitution had been something like a commercial code and, from start 
to finish, had an extremely trivial significance in national politics. 
 
6. An Old Liberal in a New Era: Minobe Tatsukichi and Fading Glory 
 As discussed above, the Committee for the Investigation of  Constitutional Problems 
(Matsumoto Committee) had most outstanding constitutional scholars of  the time as its members 
but failed to frame a constitutional revision draft that was appropriate for the reconstruction of  the 
state. This triggers serious inquiry of  why distinguished constitutionalists could not present an 
innovative idea for the new era by using their knowledge and insight. In this section, we will 
examine the constitutional thought of  Minobe Tatsukichi as a representative of  outstanding 
academics in prewar Japan. He was truly a liberal champion under the Meiji constitutional regime. 
None could more ingeniously and more enthusiastically advocate liberal democratic causes than 
Minobe did in the Meiji constitutional framework. We will consider particularly how this liberal 
giant responded to the reality the defeat in the war had caused. No matter how exquisite his 
interpretation was, Minobe’s idea of  constitutionalism well indicated the limits of  an old way of  
thinking in creating a new political order. 
 Under the Meiji Constitution, Minobe advocated a theory that the tenno should be 
understood as one of  the governmental institutions in prewar Japan.132 By excluding the idea of  the 
kokutai, the national polity or national character, from constitutional analysis and putting it into the 
ethical and moral sphere, he tried to rationalize political power originally based upon the ideology of  
one line unbroken for ages eternal. Despite the fact that the tenno was supposed to be above 
constitutional control, Minobe presented a theoretical foundation for a democratic operation of  the 
Meiji Constitution. His constitutional theory focused on how the Imperial Diet could be 
democratized and how the parliamentary government system could be organized against the original 
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132 For Minobe’s theory on the Meiji Constitution, see Chapter 1 section 8. 
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intent.  
Minobe’s thesis was most influential among intellectuals and higher officials in the 1920s. 
However, it seemed to some of  his contemporaries that his interpretation of  the Meiji Constitution 
was so liberal that it denied the kokutai, the essential nature of  the Japanese state. Minobe became a 
victim of  the fanatic movement that raged during the 1930s. He was accused of  repudiating the 
sovereignty of  the tenno. As a result, he was forced to resign from the House of  Peers and his books 
were banned. 
When the war ended, Minobe returned to public activity.133 He joined the Matsumoto 
Committee as an adviser, which caused no question at all. He was widely regarded not only as one 
of  the most distinguished professors of  constitutional law, but also as the most eminent liberal 
scholar. That is why people wanted to listen to what Minobe was going to say about the future of  the 
constitution.  
 Interestingly, Minobe himself  opposed any immediate constitutional amendment after World 
War II, because he believed that the Meiji Constitution was by nature liberal democratic enough to 
achieve postwar reforms successfully. The militaristic clique had distorted the spirit of  the Meiji 
Constitution. A liberal interpretation of  the Meiji Constitution, he argued, could make democratic 
politics workable in postwar Japan. Under such an extraordinary condition as the occupation, 
moreover, it was wise and desirable to eschew amending the constitution.134 In sum, constitutional 
text was not profoundly problematic for him.135 If  his constitutional interpretation had been fully 
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realized, constitutional revision would have been unnecessary. For Minobe, rather, democratic 
reform of  the Diet was the most urgent problem of  the day. When he argued so, he, as the elite, 
interpreted the Potsdam Declaration as free determination of  the Japanese government. Thus he 
believed that the principle of  tenno sovereignty would be retained in the postwar era.136 
When he discussed the problems on constitutional revision in the Asahi Shinbun for three 
consecutive days in late October 1945, Minobe was reluctant to commit himself  to constitutional 
reform. Or he was at least very discreet. To realize the democratization of  the constitution, he 
argued, its formal amendment would not be absolutely necessary because democratization of  the 
constitution did not necessarily mean to abolish the tenno system or change the principle of  the 
tenno’s direct government with sovereignty.  
His hesitation to amend the constitution came from apprehension of  abolition of  the tenno 
institution in large part but also from prudential judgment in some part. Minobe believed that the 
constitution was the fundamental law of  the nation and that therefore its revision should not be 
imprudently discussed. He regarded the fundamental law as “fuma no taiten (the immortal great 
code),” which the Meiji Constitution was called. To make a new immortal constitution, Japan 
should wait until exceptional circumstances as the occupation ended. For Minobe, that time had not 
yet come. For the time being, the government should try to do its best to democratize Japan without 
amending the constitution.137 It is said, however, that most successful constitutions in the world tend 
to be established during political and social turmoil.138  
Although he kept his extremely cautious stance, Minobe acknowledged in late October 
1946 that all the provisions of  the Meiji Constitution should ultimately be reconsidered. 139  He 
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pointed out conceivable issues for discussion. Among these were the dual system of  the written 
constitution---the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial House Law, which made up a substantial part 
of  the constitution, but was beyond the control of  the Imperial Diet.140 The prerogatives of  the tenno 
and powers vested in the Diet were also mentioned as other issues to be taken seriously. Thus, 
Minobe was not necessarily a preservationist of  the status quo. On the contrary, he had been an 
enthusiastic reformist from the prewar period. That was why Minobe’s hesitant position for 
constitutional reform evoked general astonishment.  
What exactly did Minobe then mean by the immediately unnecessary formal revision of  the 
Meiji Constitution? He argued that meanings of  a constitution should be distinguished into the 
formal and the substantial. The meanings of  democracy should also be distinguished into the legal 
(formal) and the political (substantial). The substantial meaning of  a constitution concerns the 
fundamental law of  a state. A constitution in this sense is not always the same as a code that is called 
a constitution. Minobe argued that because the Meiji Constitution, which had a relatively few 
number of  articles, was very simple, Japan was substantially ruled by many other important statutes, 
orders and political practices in addition to the Meiji Constitution.141 If  the required democratization 
of  the constitution were understood in the substantial sense, formal amendment to the constitution 
would not be necessary.  
 The same thinking was applicable to the idea of  democracy. While the formal meaning of  
democracy presupposes popular sovereignty, democracy substantially requires the government to 
follow the popular will regardless of  forms of  government. Although democracy in the legal sense 
cannot be compatible with monarchy, democracy in the political sense can be realized even under 
monarchy if  a monarch governs the people by following their will. What Minobe had in mind here 
was the British monarchy. The United States and Japan, in Minobe’s view, were not based upon a 
common ground because American democracy adopts both legally and politically a republican 
                                                 
140 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 74. 
141 Minobe, “Kenpo kaisei mondai (1),” Asahi Shinbun, October 20, 1945. 
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system as well as strict separation of  powers. “It will be absolutely impossible,” Minobe argued, “to 
realize the American mode of  democracy without any reservation in Japan, unless the Constitution 
is radically reformed.”142 On the other hand, Minobe asserted, “the British mode of  democracy is by 
no means impossible under the current Constitution.”143 Minobe pointed out the similarities between 
the Meiji Constitution and the British constitution. He even argued that because the institutions that 
some people regarded as obstacles to democracy, such as the House of  Peers and the Privy Council, 
derived from the British system, it would not be impossible to execute democratized politics by 
learning the British practices. Minobe believed that the Meiji Constitution with few articles favored 
liberal democracy.  
 In this respect, Minobe was by no means unique among the Japanese intellectuals at that 
time. Most of  them who wanted to maintain the kokutai asserted, by using the example of  the United 
Kingdom, that the tenno system was not an obstacle to the democratization of  Japan. We should be 
cautious about this comparison, however, because when Minobe wrote the essay in October 1945, 
the tenno was still “sacred and inviolable”144 and a living god. The tenno did not declare himself  a 
human being until January 1, 1946. He was considered the only source of  all authority in 
government. In the United Kingdom, by sharp contrast, a monarch was under both law and God. 
Parliamentary sovereignty, moreover, is the most important factor in the British constitutional 
monarchy. Parliament is competent to control the status of  the monarchy.145 The real question, thus, 
was not a mere superficial comparison. It was, rather, how ready Minobe and other advocates were 
to accept the legal, political, and social foundations of  the British constitutional monarchy.146 
 How did Minobe then conceptualize democratization of  politics, which was placed at the 
center of  reconstruction of  political order in the postwar era? He refused democracy as poplar 
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sovereignty, particularly from contractual theories.147 He regarded popular sovereignty as idealistic 
formalism because the people themselves could not exert sovereign power in reality. In Minobe’s 
analysis, a minority always exercised sovereignty in the name of  the people and thus popular 
sovereignty often caused dictatorship.148  
What he defended was democratization under the tenno system. Without the tenno 
institution, he feared, the unity of  the state would have disappeared.149 That could even have drawn 
the state into the vortex of  a disturbance.150 Democracy under the tenno system Minobe conceived 
assumed a form in which the tenno would regard the people’s mind as his own mind and would 
administer the state affairs by conforming to the popular will.151 Then, how would the tenno govern 
the state with the popular will in rejecting his own arbitrariness and the advice of  part of  the military 
and bureaucrats? Minobe advocated that a parliament had to be a real representative organ of  the 
people. To be so, the weak Imperial Diet should be changed to a more powerful institution.152 The 
most important issue was how to organize a new Diet. Minobe had argued in the prewar period for a 
proportional representation system in the House of  Representatives. He understood that 
development of  parliamentarism necessarily led to political party politics. He had supplied party 
politics with theoretical supports but never missed its evils. Administration of  the political party 
needed a vast amount of  money, which had caused corruption. He saw that the corruption had 
derived from a defective election system. Regulation on campaign finance had been emasculated, the 
election law had ignored the existence of  political parties and presupposed individual candidates 
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alone, and people could exercise only weak control over political parties because an election that was 
held just every four years was difficult to reflect poplar will promptly and accurately.153  Then, 
Minobe continued to analyze more profound problems in contemporary mass democracy. First of  all, 
he pointed out, majority rule involved an intrinsic difficulty because people were not equal in reality. 
Secondly, common citizens lacked adequate knowledge and judgment about political matters. Finally, 
because such citizens failed to make an independent decision, they tended to be influenced by 
irrational and unreasonable factors such as interference of  polices, agitation, favoritism, and 
bribery.154  
Interestingly, however, Minobe did not take an elitist approach to the weaknesses of  mass 
democracy. Rather, he proposed institutional reform to respond to them. He believed that proper 
reform in an electoral system might alleviate, albeit not cure, the evils of  the existing democratic 
politics. Even in the prewar period, he enumerated reformed systems such as elections based upon 
competition among political parties, not individual candidates, abolition of  electoral districts and 
establishment of  one national district, and annual elections to increase people’s effective control over 
political parties, and concretely a proportional representation election system.155 In addition, Minobe 
proposed abolishing the House of  Peers he once described as the worst part of  the Meiji 
Constitution156 but maintain bicameralism to promote deliberation and establish an upper house of  
both occupational and regional representation157 in the postwar democratic process.158  
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In sum, Minobe considered that contemporary democratic politics took the form of  party 
politics and that democratic politics by universal suffrage involved intrinsic difficulties, but that they 
might be controlled by innovative institutional arrangements. Thus, he clearly presented a position in 
which careful institutional designing could guide people’s preferences in a more appropriate 
direction. Doubtlessly, what Minobe raised is an important question even today. However, the real 
question was whether he set forth an appropriate agenda when he conceived a postwar political order. 
Was the House of  Representatives really represented by the people in the prewar period? Did prewar 
Japanese politics experience the intrinsic evil of  democracy, the tyranny of  the majority? Instead, a 
minority abused political power. Thus the real issue was still how majority of  the Japanese people 
could gain political power in the political process after the wartime defeat. Minobe felt that he had to 
respond to the negative effects of  the only partially democratic political process before majority rule 
was established in prewar Japan.  
Such a reformative attitude seemed to disappear from Minobe, however, when the 
government published the outline of  a revised constitution, which provided a symbolic tenno system. 
He strongly opposed a tenno institution as a ceremonial adornment or a symbol of  the national 
unity.159 Minobe believed that the tenno as sovereign would be what the Japanese people all wanted to 
have and was indispensable to retaining the unity of  the state.160 In his opinion, the tenno should hold 
the powers to give sanction to laws and to appoint directly or indirectly public officials, because such 
powers made a monarch authentic. Without them, in contrast, a monarch would have existed 
nominally but lost reality as a monarch. Minobe criticized the notion that the symbolic tenno system 
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would radically reform the kokutai of  Japan, overturn the historical belief  of  the Japanese people and 
destroy the unity of  the nation.161 For him, form was important because the inner workings of  
human nature actually relied upon form. A form of  decision by the Diet or an order by the prime 
minister could not be as authoritative as an order from of  the tenno.162 Minobe asserted that the tenno 
system meant the institution of  the tenno as sovereign of  the state and that maintenance of  the tenno 
system in such a form was the general will of  the people, a foundation of  the unification of  the 
nation and a ground to realize democracy in a real sense. The hollow symbolic tenno institution was 
rejected as nothing but empty idealism that failed to understand the psychology of  the people.163 
In this way, Minobe refused to accept the symbolic tenno institution and attempted to 
defend the system in which the tenno was sovereign. In fact, Minobe’s repulsion toward the symbolic 
tenno system was prepared in his constitutional theory. This is well reflected in his treatment of  the 
kokutai. Minobe defined the kokutai as historical and ethical characteristics of  the state. 164  He 
understood that Article 1 of  the Meiji Constitution165 not only declared that the empire of  Japan was 
a monarchy but also clarified its historical foundation and eternality and thus showed that Japan had 
adopted the unique system incomparable in the world. As we saw, 166  unlike the majority of  
constitutional theorists, Minobe excluded the idea of  the kokutai from constitutional analysis. This 
exclusion had dual effects. One the one hand, his constitutional theory to a considerable extent 
prevented the constitution from becoming an instrument for ruling the people under the absolute 
tenno system. Constitutionalism and parliamentarism could play a role, albeit limited, in the political 
process because his theory did not have to pay attention to the kokutai. On the other hand, however, 
understanding of  the kokutai as the historical and ethical characteristics of  the state could easily lead 
to Japanese exceptionalism. It is even truer when in rejecting both conceptual idealism and pure 
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theory of  law, Minobe believed that social, political and ethical value judgment was the most 
important element of  discovering what is law.167 There was a danger that the value presupposed 
beyond constitutional theory might become an unmovable premise.  
Indeed, Minobe’s conception of  the kokutai was situated outside the constitution and played 
a role in supporting the constitutional order. For example, Minobe severely criticized the Chian Iji Ho 
(Peace Preservation Law) because it attempted to punish thought with penalty and even the attempt 
conflicted with the spirit of  the constitution. So long as thought stayed as thought, it should be free 
and legally protected.168 Further, surprisingly, Minobe pointed out something similar to the clear and 
present danger test.169 His position was undoubtedly extremely liberal among constitutional theorists. 
In his view, however, the reason why the law was bad partially depended upon the manner of  
legislation. Minobe did not disagree on punishing conduct to overthrow the kokutai. There were 
already legal regulations against such conduct: the Penal Code, the Publishing Law, the Newspaper 
Law, the Chian Keisatsu Ho (Peace Police Law). The law seemed to Minobe redundant. The law also 
juxtaposed the overthrow of  the throne in a line unbroken for ages eternal and denial of  private 
property. Unlike the kokutai, private property might change with the transformation of  society. 
Because a property system was a part of  economic policy, the people could discuss freely which kind 
of  system was appropriate. Because the kokutai was distinctively Japanese, to Minobe, it should not 
have been confused with what is not proper to Japan and everlasting. Most importantly, Minobe’s 
conception of  the kokutai vividly showed its limits when it came to the Constitution of  Japan. While 
the symbolic tenno system changed the legal conception of  the kokutai---the tenno should superintend 
the sovereign power---, he asserted, the postwar constitution kept intact the kokutai as the historical 
and ethical characteristics of  the state because of  the unchangeable retention of  the tenno institution 
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as a hereditary monarchy.170    
When he argued that constitutional revision should not be hastily carried out, Minobe 
recognized much room for liberal democratization in the Meiji Constitution. In fact, the work of  the 
Matsumoto Committee, of  which Minobe was an advisor, is well understood as a materialization of  
his tenno organ theory. Yet the fate the Meiji constitutional regime followed was completely different 
from what he was willing to defend. Once he triumphantly wrote in 1932 that the parliamentary 
government system as a political practice had recently become a constitutional convention, which 
was a betrayal of  the framers’ intention.171 Soon after he wrote that, however, political party politics 
came to an end with the May Fifteenth Incident. About three years later, his books were banned as 
the result of  the tenno organ theory incident. After the war, when he republished the same book, 
Minobe could not help writing that “once the parliamentary government system had been 
established as a political practice, fall in the authority of  political parties and rise of  the military in 
politics caused a revival of  a bureaucrat cabinet, particularly a military officer cabinet, and Japan 
was led to the Pacific War.”172   
 What, then, were Minobe’s diagnosis and concrete prescription for the Meiji Constitution? 
From his perspective, the Meiji Constitution could have properly realized parliamentarism and 
constitutionalism to a considerable degree. He frankly admitted that the Japanese constitution, in a 
substantial sense, had been “despotic and militaristic and removed from the spirit of  democracy or 
liberalism”173 for the last dozen years. Minobe, however, attempted to defend the Meiji Constitution 
itself. For him, the text had nothing to do with the collapse. He implied that the ongoing criticism 
about the conservative character of  the Japanese Constitution in the Allied countries was beside the 
point. He contended that “foreigners who are not familiar with the Japanese constitution easily 
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confound the malpractice of  the constitution with its defect itself.”174 The constitution did not cause 
the recent suppression of  freedom of  the people. Improper political practices, in Minobe’s view, 
distorted the spirit of  the Meiji Constitution, which was supposed to be an ultimate reason of  the 
failure.  
 However, there are very few, if  any, constitutions in the world that specifically consist of  
clauses that suppress the rights and liberties of  the people. Rather, an intention to be oppressive is 
often disguised in a democratic constitution. We thus should pay heed to the relationship between 
the articles of  a constitution and a system of  governance in the real legal and political process. 
 Minobe pointed out four reasons that led to the disastrous anti-democratic situation in 
Japan: 1) the politics of  a military clique, 2) paralysis of  the Imperial Diet, particularly of  the House 
of  Representatives, 3) the extreme oppression of  freedom of  the people, such as freedom of  speech, 
freedom of  religion, and academic freedom, and 4) coercion by the intolerant and mystical idea of  
the kokutai.  
 First, Minobe argued that the politics of  a military clique had nothing to do with the text of  
the Meiji Constitution. Militarism in prewar Japan was accelerated by the rule that ministers of  the 
army and navy must be a general or lieutenant general and admiral or vice admiral on active service. 
He stated, however, this was a law on bureaucratic organization, not the constitution itself. In 
Minobe’s optimistic opinion, furthermore, now that the Japanese army and navy had been abolished, 
it was unnecessary to amend the constitution by removing the militaristic trend of  politics.175 
 Secondly, Minobe discussed the failure of  the Imperial Diet. He basically repeated the first 
point. Intimidation and violence by the military clique had led to a totalitarian system. Political 
parties had been forced to disband in order to form the yokusan taisei (the imperial rule assistance 
regime). No real elections had been held. As a result, the Diet could not perform its function of  
checking the reckless behavior of  the government by reflecting the voice of  the people. In a 
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comparative constitutional perspective, the Imperial Diet was weak in its powers. Yet such 
difficulties were not serious enough to respond to constitutionally. Minobe claimed here again that 
constitutional reform was unnecessary. As other countries, he believed, Japanese politics had 
adopted constitutionalism with the Meiji Constitution. According to Minobe, democracy, liberalism, 
and legalism were the principles the constitution had adopted. Mistaken interpretations on the 
prerogatives of  the tenno prevailed for over a decade.176 If  the Meiji Constitution, as he understood it, 
was based upon liberal democracy, however, Minobe did not necessarily argue for “democratization 
of  the Constitution.” Rather, it might be more reasonable to think that something was wrong with 
the text. 
 Thirdly, Minobe contended that the suppression of  civil liberties and civil rights was derived 
from oppressive legislation and abuse of  powers by the police and administrative authorities, but not 
from the constitution. Prompt abolition and change of  statutes and orders and self-restraint of  the 
police and administrative authorities would remove the evils inflicted upon the people. From this 
viewpoint, he accused the government of  having been unwilling to reform the administrative court 
system to extend the protection of  liberties of  the people.177 More seriously, however, Minobe failed 
to realize that even a democratic parliament cannot regulate some areas of  human existence. In fact, 
Minobe believed that as far as the rights and duties of  the subjects were concerned, a simple provision 
for each right and duty would suffice in a constitution.178 The idea of  fundamental rights was 
irrelevant for Minobe. Guarantee of  rights by a majority in the parliament had been a basic thesis for 
him. 
 Whereas he argued in favor of  the tenno system with sovereignty by following the model of  
the United Kingdom, he did not discuss much about the Anglo-American legal system, where the 
judiciary has played a pivotal role in protecting the liberties and rights of  the people. At that time, to 
remake the Japanese judicial system, which was based on the German system, other systems should 
                                                 
176 Minobe, “Kenpo kaisei mondai (2),” Asahi Shinbun, October 21, 1945.  
177 Minobe, “Kenpo kaisei mondai (2),” Asahi Shinbun, October 21, 1945. 
178 Irie, Keii, 25 (emphasis added). 
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have been widely referred to. The American judicial system particularly should have been taken 
seriously, not only because Japan was occupied mainly by the United States, but also because 
judicial review, which had been distinctively developed there, was a unique institution for liberal 
democracy. From Minobe’s perspective, constitutional control by the judiciary was regarded as a 
hindrance to realizing the majoritarian political process under the system in which judge decided in 
the name of  the tenno.179 How could he have reconciled his quest for majoritarian democracy with 
his awareness about the irrationality of  mass democracy based upon universal suffrage? He did not 
raise such a question. He did not come to understand the necessity to create a certain space out of  
reach of  a majority of  the people to keep liberal democracy well workable. 
 The fourth point was that the prevalence of  the intolerant and mystical idea of  the kokutai 
made it virtually impossible to discuss politics freely even in an academic environment, let alone to 
criticize the government. Minobe admitted that this idea of  the kokutai suppressed academic freedom 
and freedom of  speech. Indeed, he was an eyewitness to the infringement of  fundamental rights. He 
himself  was a victim of  ultra-nationalism. 
 However, Minobe once again maintained that the text of  the constitution had nothing to do 
with the suppression of  liberties. The Meiji Constitution, he said, did not provide any good reasons 
for the mysterious theory of  the kokutai.180 In his interpretation, the Meiji Constitution adopted the 
principle of  constitutional government and its founding spirits were democracy, liberalism, and 
legalism.181 In rejecting the false theory of  the kokutai and operating the constitution by a proper 
interpretation, Minobe expressed a bright prospect of  accomplishing democratization of  the 
constitution. Constitutional amendments, therefore, were not vital to exclude the false theory. “If  
academic freedom and freedom of  speech are completely protected,” he argued, “such a fallacy will 
                                                 
179 See the Constitution of the Empire of  Japan, art. 57. Minobe denied judicial review on substantiality of  
statutes under the Meiji Constitution. See Minobe, Kenpo satsuyo, 567-571. In the postwar era, he was also 
negative about judicial review, which was provided for in the government draft of  constitutional revision. See 
Minobe, “Kenpo kaisei no kihonmondai,” Sekai Bunka, 63. 
180 When he criticized the mysterious theory of  the kokutai, Minobe surely implied that it was what Hozumi 
Yatsuka and Uesugi Shinkichi had advocated. See Ienaga, Minobe Tatsukichi no shisoshiteki kenkyu, 342. 
181 See Minobe, Kihonshugi, 101-107. 
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naturally lose its influence.”182  
 Therefore, Minobe thoroughly refused to regard the constitutional text as the cause of  the 
breakdown of  the Meiji constitutional system. It seemed to him flexible enough to have sufficient 
room for the liberal democratization of  politics. If  one interpretation that was false but duly 
constitutional had caused the collapse of  the constitutional order, however, it might be reasonable to 
think that there were some problems with the text. If  the Meiji Constitution had elasticity as Minobe 
often claimed, it might be as widely open to the opposite direction as to the direction in which he 
wanted to interpret it. It was too optimistic for him to say that because the military no longer existed, 
it would be all right from then on. As democracy develops, the tyranny of  the majority becomes a 
more and more real threat.  
 This is a problem of  what is called constitutional guarantee. Minobe argued for supremacy 
of  the constitution: All inferior legal norms had to conform to the constitution. 183  However, 
acknowledgment of  supremacy of  the constitution does not necessarily mean stability of  the 
constitutional order. In the real world, the constitution is always exposed to danger that political 
power might be abused and legislation might deviate. Minobe showed a very cool recognition of  
constitutional guarantee. He contended that because the constitutional organs were equally supreme 
in the state, they were not subject to other organs’ supervision. Even if  one organ acted 
unconstitutionally, there were no legal methods but to urge the organ to reconsider the matter by 
political pressures as checking among organs and public opinion. Particularly, he recognized that 
when the government and the Diet jointly took an unconstitutional measure, constitutional order 
might be significantly distorted. Thus, while, in theory, the constitution was the supreme will of  the 
state and both the government and the Diet were controlled by it and obligated to respect and 
uphold it, in reality, the constitution might be inevitably distorted by actions of  the government and 
                                                 
182 Minobe, “Kenpo kaisei mondai (2),” Asahi Shinbun, October 21, 1945. 
183 Unlike many constitutional theorists, Minobe maintained that even the Imperial House Law derived its 
legitimacy from the Meiji Constitution. See Minobe, Kihonshugi, 77-79; Minobe, Kenpo satsuyo, 107.  
 171 
the Diet.184 
 In this way, Minobe was realistic enough to calmly recognize that constitutional powers are 
possibly abused and there was no legal way to control it. It is always true that political institutions 
cannot work well without full commitment to their basic values by the people who run them. His 
cool recognition was, however, a reflection of  his optimism that theoretically correct recognition 
would also eventually obtain correctness in practice.185 Even after his academic career suffered from 
serious damage in the tenno organ theory incident, Minobe maintained his optimism because he 
firmly believed that correctness of  his theory would be widely accepted after all.186 
 Remarkably in this respect, Minobe was well understood as a believer and practicer of  the 
marketplace of  ideas. 187  That was why Minobe severely criticized the Chian Iji Ho (Peace 
Preservation Law).  
Healthy development of  society and culture depends upon only the conditions that 
various different causes and ideas stand side by side and compete with one another 
to polish and deepen them. Competition among various ideas is never troublesome 
but rather desirable for development of  culture. The competition must be fair. It is 
no more right that power holders use their power to suppress causes and ideas they 
disagree on than that the powerless resort to violence to realize their causes and 
ideas. We determinedly refuse these two. However, the Chian Iji Ho (Peace 
Preservation Law) indeed attempts to do this wrongness.188  
 
Minobe also practiced the theory of  the marketplace of  ideas. He in fact welcomed 
competition of  ideas. When he learned that Yamamoto Senji, a representative of  a 
proletariat party, had been assassinated, Minobe vehemently rejected the recent tendency to 
                                                 
184 See Minobe, Kenpo satsuyo, 101. 
185 See Nagao Ryuichi, “Minobe Tatsukichi no hotetsugaku (Jurisprudence of  Minobe Tatsukichi),” Nihon 
kenpo shisoshi (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1996). 
186 Minobe’s mixture of  recognition and practice drew severe criticism from his student, Miyasawa Toshiyoshi. 
See Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, “Kokumin daihyo no gainen (The Concept of  Representation of  the People),” 
Kenpo no genri (Principles of  the Constitution) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967). See also, Higuchi Yoichi, Kindai 
kenpogaku ni totteno ronri to kachi (Logics and Values for Modern Constitutional Theory) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 
1994). 
187 For the marketplace of  ideas, see Stanley Ingber, “The Marketplace of  Ideas,” 1984 Duke L.J. 1; Frederick 
Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 15-34; C. Edwin 
Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of  Speech (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
188 Minobe, “Chian Iji Ho hihan,” Gendai kensei hyoron, 213. 
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resort to violence. Although, from Minobe’s perspective, Yamamoto’s idea was too radical to 
gain the support of  a majority of  the people, the small proletariat party had brought fresh air 
to the political world and somewhat mitigated the wrongs derived from the corruption of  the 
existing parties. Whether agreeable or not, arguments from Yamamoto’s sincere belief  
should have been worth listening to as an example one may profit by. Minobe lamented 
Yamamoto’s death as a great loss for not only the far leftist and proletariat parties but also 
for the entire Diet and the political world.189 
 Minobe believed in competition of  ideas and practiced it. However, does competition 
actually reveal a true idea? What is a criterion for trueness? Can we distinguish truth from falsehood 
about human ideas? Does quantity matter after all? More fundamentally, is there really free 
competition of  ideas? If  free competition means something, it is only when competitors are situated 
at a more or less similar starting point. We have already lived in the specific circumstances, they are 
the given conditions under which we form and accept our ideas. When Minobe argued for free 
competition of  causes, how seriously did he suppose that communism would win in competition 
with his liberal but tenno-centered thought and then it would eventually be widely accepted? 
 Putting aside these questions, let us assume that coexistence of  various ideas rather than 
their unification may lead to a better decision. The most difficult problem here is related to certainty 
of  a condition of  whether freedom of  thought and freedom of  speech are fully protected. What 
Oliver W. Holmes said just before his famous formula of  the marketplace of  ideas seemed more 
approximate to our real experience.  
Persecution for the expression of  opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If  you 
have no doubt of  your premises or your power and want a certain result with all 
your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. 
To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, 
as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-
heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises.190  
 
                                                 
189 Minobe, “Yamamoto daigishi no oshi wo tamu,” Gendai kensei hyoron, 311-315. 
190 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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That is why constitutional scholarship has hard groped for how free speech can be better protected. 
To support Minobe’s optimistic belief, it seemed indispensable to explore the conditions under which 
freedom of  expression would be fully guaranteed in the postwar regime. By the tenno organ theory 
incident, Minobe himself  had witnessed that the Meiji constitutional system was not at all effective 
in protecting free speech. Unfortunately, nonetheless, Minobe did not discuss how to protect 
freedom of  speech fully.  
In fact, the Meiji Constitution could not offer a strong basis for protecting freedom of  
speech. In the Meiji constitutional system, the Imperial Diet could regulate speech and expression in 
any way through legislation. Liberties were guaranteed within the limits of  law, that is, against the 
administrative departments.191 However, reservation of  laws was critically dangerous for free speech 
in Minobe’s majoritarian democratic thought. Even worse, the Imperial Diet was neither a legislative 
institution nor an organ representative of  the people in the authentic meaning of  the word.192 As 
discussed above, furthermore, Minobe was opposed to judicial review.193 As a legal practice, the 
judiciary was not allowed to exercise the power of  judicial review. A positivistic idea dominated the 
practice of  law. Minobe could not articulate the conditions under which freedom of  speech would be 
                                                 
191 Article 29 of  the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan read: “Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of  law, 
enjoy the liberty of  speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.” See Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, 
Kenpo (Tokyo: Yushikaku, 1973), 38. 
192 The tenno held the prerogative to legislation to which the Imperial Diet merely gave consent. See the 
Constitution of the Empire of  Japan, art. 5. The Imperial Diet consists of  the House of  Peers, which was 
regarded as the bulwark against democratization, and the House of  Representatives, which was elected by 
universal male suffrage in 1925 and thus had no women representatives at all. See ibid., arts. 33-35. 
193 Minobe made reference to the possibility of  establishing kenpo saiban (a constitutional court). He suggested 
examining a constitutional court system “as a means to resolve disputes between two Houses of  Parliament 
and between the Parliament and the Cabinet on constitutional interpretation.” Minobe, “Kenpo kaisei mondai 
(3),” Asahi Shinbun, October 22, 1945. He appeared to conceive the constitutional court as a tribunal of  
conflicts in competence between governmental institutions. Yet Minobe found the institutionalization of 
constitutional justice extremely difficult. It was thus unwise for him to hasten to reach a conclusion. In January 
1946, Minobe said that establishment of  a constitutional court was an available option. See Minobe, 
“Minshushugi to waga gikaiseido,” 31. But one month later, he argued that it would be unnecessary to set up a 
special institution as a constitutional court to decide constitutional disputes, which would only rarely occur 
and the minister of  state should resolve politically. See Minobe, “Minshushugi seiji to kenpo,” Shoron Shuroku, 
384-385. After the government draft of  constitutional revision was published, Minobe expressed doubt over the 
appropriateness on judicial review, which is now widely regarded as one of  the most important devices in 
liberal democracy for protecting the liberties of  the people. See Minobe, “Kenpo kaisei no kihon mondai,” 
Sekai Bunka, 63. Minobe could not accept denial of  democratic legislation by the judiciary, which directly lacks 
democratic legitimacy. 
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firmly secured in postwar Japan. The idea of  a constitutional court as the guardian of  fundamental 
rights was, after all, foreign to Minobe’s majoritarianism. Minobe, who was highly sensitive to the 
evils involved in the political process under mass democracy, failed to conceive the existence of  the 
rights of  which even the full democratic process cannot deprive people.     
 At the end of  his second article on constitutional reform in the Asahi Shinbun, Minobe 
repeated his position by opposing an opinion that the constitution should be reformed so that the 
totalitarian trend could never happen again. “Whatever provisions might be made in the 
Constitution, if  persons with militaristic powers suppress the people, such provisions will be unable 
to be realized. Such provisions, after all, are mere dead letters.” “When the Diet fully exercises 
powers vested in it and free speech is perfectly guaranteed,” Minobe optimistically believed, “the 
current Constitution will prevent such anti-democratic trends from developing.”194 Yes, all codes of  
the fundamental law are nothing but written documents. However, Minobe failed to understand that 
constitutional text has an educational function. Commitment to liberal democratic values he 
contended were necessary for sustaining a constitutional order cannot grow spontaneously. Civic 
education is what is needed most. Unfortunately, Minobe as a constitutional theorist did not offer a 
perspective on how to educate citizens to bear political responsibility. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We have discussed how the Japanese government failed to respond appropriately to the 
reality that defeat in the war had caused. Long isolation from the world cost the governing elite 
sound political judgment. More importantly, they had all been so infatuated by the kokutai ideology 
that they could not conceive of  a new political order independently of  it. When liberal 
democratization of  politics was required, a crucial thing should have been to present an idea of  how 
to create a majoritarian political process and to constitute individual freedom in it. To the governing 
elites, the tenno organ theory seemed a legitimate prescription for liberal democratization in postwar 
                                                 
194 Minobe, “Kenpo kaisei mondai (2),” Asahi Shinbun, October 21, 1945. 
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Japan. Thus they felt that it was sufficient to recover and constitutionalize the tenno organ theory 
that was banned in the fanatic ultra-nationalist movement. That was what the work of  the 
Matsumoto Committee was all about. 
However, the governing elite could not realize that the Meiji constitutional system did not 
ultimately coexist with the spiritual freedoms of  individuals. The kokutai ideology occupied even 
their inner freedom by monopolizing value judgments. They were close to the power center and thus 
they could easily identify themselves with the orthodox value of  the established regime. Therefore 
they failed to recognize correctly the defects the Meiji constitutional system had and to submit a 
solution for them. Minobe Tatsukichi is surely regarded as a representative of  the governing elite. He 
was the most suitable to represent the Meiji constitutional world for his distinguished though 
victimized academic career.  
If  new constitutional ideas had been presented at all, that would have come from 
marginalized people. On the periphery of  the regime, in fact, private citizens did gather with an 
innovative idea of  popular sovereignty. They framed a new constitutional plan for postwar Japan. 
On the governmental level, moreover, since the scoop of  the Matsumoto Committee’s draft, 
leadership had moved from the Japanese government to GHQ, who was also surprised by the 
extremely conservative plan the Mainichi Shinbun broke.  
Before we turn our eyes to citizens’ ideas of  constitutional government, here we will set the 
clock a little bit ahead to examine Minobe’s reaction to the Constitution of  Japan. Good or bad, he 
as a liberal giant embodied the limits of  the Meiji constitutional system in the new era. 
Minobe as a councilor of  the Privy Council participated in deliberating on the government 
draft of  the revised constitution. He alone opposed the draft. After the Imperial Diet adopted the 
partially modified constitution, it was sent back to the Privy Council and this time he was absent.195 
For him, the end of  the war should have meant return to normalcy. It was quite natural for him to 
                                                 
195 For the process of  deliberation in the Privy Council, see Irie, Keii, 320-342, 427-428; Sato, Seiritsushi, 3: 374-
446, 4: 985-1004. 
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think that revision of  the Meiji Constitution was unnecessary. If  necessary, that would have been a 
codification of  his tenno organ theory.196  To him, the postwar did not mean a new beginning. 
However, Minobe recognized that a revolution happened because there was a profound discrepancy 
between the amendment process of  the Meiji Constitution and the principle of  popular sovereignty 
the postwar constitution declared. However liberal he might be otherwise, Minobe had never 
doubted the sovereignty of  the tenno. He interpreted Article 1 of  the Meiji Constitution as the 
foundation of  immovability of  tenno sovereignty. Reign and governance of  the tenno in one line 
unbroken for ages eternal not only showed a historical fact but also declared immortality in the 
everlasting future.197 Thus the principle of  popular sovereignty was outside his constitutional theory. 
How did Minobe understand the process of  making the Constitution of  Japan? 
 In Minobe’s academic recognition, the acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration was crucially 
important. Building a postwar political order had to satisfy the terms set forth by the declaration. If  a 
new constitution was required to be determined by the freely expressed will of  the people, he argued, 
a new constitution was supposed to be a mintei kenpo (constitution established by the people) from 
the very beginning.198 Minobe understood that the Meiji Constitution was virtually abolished when 
Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, which was interpreted to require the establishment of  
popular sovereignty. The question came down to how to obtain the freely expressed will of  the 
people. In his view, the Imperial Diet was constitutionally regarded as an organ of  representing the 
people. Thus, Minobe regarded the ninetieth Imperial Diet as a constitutional convention by the fact 
the Diet, one house of  which was democratically elected, was allowed to freely discuss and even 
modify the government draft. He recognized that it was the Japanese people, not the tenno who 
established the Constitution of  Japan. How did they gain constituting power, then? Minobe also 
                                                 
196 The work of  the Committee for the Investigation of Constitutional Problems (Matsumoto Committee) was 
best understood as a codification of  the tenno organ theory. See Matsuo Takayoshi, “Kyushihaitaisei no shuen 
(The End of the Old Regime),” Shuppatsu, 19-20; Fukunaga Fumio, Senryoka chudoseiken no keisei to hokai 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), 57. 
197 Minobe, Kenpo satsuyo, 119-120. 
198 Minobe, Kihongenri, 33. 
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attributed that to acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration. The terms set forth by the declaration 
imposed absolute restraints upon the Japanese government. The principle of  popular sovereignty 
was the most important among them. Thus, the fundamental political order had already changed. In 
his opinion, the Meiji Constitution provisionally continued to exist with its formal effectiveness until 
the new constitution was established.199 The enactment of  the Constitution of  Japan was nothing but 
revolution for him retrospectively.200 The Japanese people as sovereign were granted the unlimited 
power to revise the Meiji Constitution as they wished. The Constitution of  Japan was not a product 
of  the amendment of  the Meiji Constitution but a result of  unconstitutional revolutionary conduct. 
The revolutionary constitutional transformation occurred to satisfy the demands of  the victorious 
countries to the defeated country.201 
 In Minobe’s eyes, however, this revolutionary constitutional transformation did not change 
the kokutai as the historical and ethical characteristics of  the state. Because he interpreted that even 
the prerogatives of  the tenno had to be exerted according to the popular will, for Minobe there was 
nothing new about the governance of  political affairs of  the nation based upon “a sacred trust of  the 
people”.202 The state as a corporation of  which the people are an organ had never changed.203 Even 
though he regarded the constitutional change as revolutionary, Minobe trivialized the newness of  the 
postwar constitution. 
Minobe was unable to arrive at a conclusion as to why the democratic Diet and the 
movement for parliamentary government, which he tried to realize by presenting his constitutional 
interpretations in prewar Japan, were too weak to resist abusive militaristic politics. The Meiji 
Constitution might have a structural problem. Minobe failed to appreciate the tension liberal 
                                                 
199  Minobe Tatsukichi, Shinkenpo chikujyo kaisetsu (The Explanation of  the New Constitution Article by Article) 
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democracy must inevitably confront: on the one hand, democratic decision-making based upon 
majoritarianism and on the other, the protection of  the fundamental rights of  the people. Ironically, 
the constitutional text was marginalized in the world of  Minobe, who was an exquisite interpreter. 
To him, interpretation of  the constitution was more important than the constitution itself. No matter 
how defective the text might be, Minobe was confident that he was capable of  offering an 
appropriate theory from a liberal democratic point of  view. If  a constitution is the fundamental law 
of  a nation, however, it should be more than a collection of  legal rules. A constitution should be the 
expression of  an ideal as a nation. The spirit of  the constitution must be understood easily by the 
people, who are the most important constituents of  the nation. Criticizing colloquialism of  the 
postwar constitution as lacking simplicity, clarity and refinement in comparison with the style of  the 
Meiji Constitution, 204  Minobe took an elitist attitude of  monopolizing meanings of  the text. 
However, a constitution itself  has not only an educational function but also an inevitable open-ended 
nature, by which the people will fill the constitution with their hope as to what kind of  nation they 
as sovereign want to have. 
 Minobe’s attempt to reform the existing systems by following his theory that the tenno is one 
organ of  the state---which might have been liberal and progressive in the old era---worked as an 
obstacle to more thorough democratization in the new era. While he was an excellent interpreter of  
the Meiji Constitution, Minobe was poor at creating an institution appropriate in the fundamentally 
new world.205 In fact, as soon as the Constitution of  Japan was established, Minobe started to be an 
interpreter once again. Putting criticism of  the symbolic tenno system aside, Minobe energetically 
wrote four books on the postwar constitution during one and a half  years after its promulgation on 
November 3, 1946 and before he died at the age of  seventy-six on May 23, 1948. Interestingly, 
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furthermore, Minobe omitted a description of  constitutionalism as one of  main features of  the Meiji 
constitutional system from his last book, Nihonkoku Kenpo Genron (The Principles of  the Constitution of  
Japan).206 Its omission in his postwar book has puzzled us, when we recall that he enthusiastically 
advocated as prominent characteristics of  the Meiji constitutional regime constitutionalism based 
upon two ideas, democracy and liberalism in the prewar period.207 Did Minobe identify himself  with 
the postwar constitution this time and evaluate the prewar constitutional practices from the new 
standard? Nagao Ryuichi has pointed out that this reflects the fact that Minobe himself  realized that 
both the retention of  the kokutai and democratization were not consistent with each other.208  
 Under the Meiji constitutional system, without any doubt, Minobe was an extremely liberal 
democratic theorist. In the postwar era, however, he failed to offer an appropriate model of  
constituting a political order. It was as though Minobe, who, through his tenno organ theory, was an 
intellectual leader of  the day in prewar Japan, suddenly found himself  behind the times. The 
Constitution of  Japan has been far more liberal democratic than Minobe’s excellent interpretive 
theory of  the Meiji Constitution. Popular sovereignty has been explicitly principled with the 
symbolic tenno institution. 
 The external imposition theory and the internal continuity theory are both apt to obscure the 
meaning of  the reality the lost war had brought to Japan. Whether one likes it or not, Japan was 
defeated in the war and accepted the international obligation of  liberal democratization. Minobe’s 
inability to adapt his organ theory to the new situation vividly shows that something fundamentally 
new was happening in the postwar era. The third way of  theorizing the constitutional experience 
takes seriously the meaning of  the defeat for the Japanese people and the novelty of  the postwar 
period.  
                                                 
206 Minobe mentioned as main features of  the Meiji Constitution tenno sovereignty, the prerogative-centered 
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 In discussing Minobe’s constitutional revolution, we do not wish to advance too far. It is time 
for us to return to a discussion of  the process of  constitutional writing immediately after the war. 
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Chapter 3 
The Making of  the Postwar Constitution: The First Public Deliberations on Constituting Freedom 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Constitutional Ideas among the Japanese People: The Seed of  Popular Sovereignty  
3. GHQ’s Leadership: Popular Sovereignty with a Symbolic Tenno System 
4. The Response of  the Japanese Government to GHQ’s Draft: A Second Defeat and Attempted 
Japanization 






 After the wartime defeat, the Japanese people became liberated from the long suppressive 
rule of  ultra-nationalism. At the same time they had to face the important task of  reconstructing the 
political order. The goal of  the task was clearly focused on as the liberal democratization of  politics. 
As we discussed in the last chapter, the Japanese government, obsessed with retention of  the kokutai, 
failed to draw a grand design of  constitutionalism appropriate for the new era. However, the 
governmental failure did not necessarily mean that the whole Japanese people also failed to present a 
new idea of  constitutional government. In fact, some intellectuals on the periphery of  the power 
structure in prewar Japan submitted an extremely liberal democratic conception of  popular 
sovereignty with a ritualistic tenno system as a postwar constitutional plan. 
 Meanwhile, in order to keep leadership in the occupational mission, MacArthur and GHQ 
had to create a fait accompli by showing to the world that Japan would not disturb world peace 
again. Against the background of  hash criticism of  the Japanese government among the Allied 
countries, the conservative constitutional revision plan by the Matsumoto Committee was going to 
do serious harm to MacArthur’s occupational policy. Indeed, they could not ignore both domestic 
and international public opinion that the tenno should be tried as a war criminal. They needed a 
much more liberal democratic constitution of  Japan than the draft of  the Matsumoto Committee. 
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After the Mainichi Shinbun scoop, therefore, MacArthur decided to frame a constitutional draft by 
the Government Section of  GHQ and present it to the Japanese government. In the process of  
drafting their constitutional plan, they referred to the constitutional revision plans of  private 
Japanese groups and political parties.  
 Therefore, postwar constitutional making entered a rather complicated phase. The 
Government Section prepared a constitutional draft of  liberal democracy with the principle of  
popular sovereignty, the symbolic tenno system and renunciation of  war. The Japanese government, 
infatuated with kokutai ideology, finally realized that the proposed draft would be the only way to 
keep the tenno institution. The governing elite reluctantly decided to accept it in essence and to 
japanize it as far as possible. However, common citizens did not necessarily share the same interests. 
When the Japanese government announced the constitutional revision draft, they overwhelmingly 
welcomed it. They positively came to think of  the new constitution as one connected with a free, 
peaceful, and bright life. 
 The process of  making the postwar constitution indicates three innovative features of  
Japanese politics. First, the people actually participated in deliberation on the constitution. With 
universal suffrage, women and leftists occupied seats in the House of  Representatives and 
participated in constituting political order for the first time in Japanese history. Second, the contents 
of  public deliberation were due respect for fundamental human rights, popular sovereignty and 
thorough pacifism, which were all unprecedentedly novel for Japanese politics. Third and finally, the 
style of  constitutional writing has become more democratic than ever before, using colloquial 
Japanese easy for common citizens to understand. All three characteristics of  the postwar 
constitution deserve special attention in terms of  the liberal democratization of  politics. It can be 
said that with them, the new constitution brought a constitutional revolution to postwar Japan. It is 
true that there was no enormous popular mobilization for liberal democratic values. Undeniably, the 
constitutional making occurred under the Allied occupation. However, it is also true that the first 
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public deliberations on the constitution of  freedom were actually carried out among the Japanese 
people. The postwar constitution with these three distinctive features broke off  from the past to a 
significant extent. 
 This chapter will precisely examine the constitutional framing in postwar Japan. Both the 
external imposition theory and the internal continuity theory fail to appreciate the distinctiveness of  
the postwar constitutional experience for the Japanese people as a whole. On the one hand, the 
external imposition theorists emphasize that MacArthur and GHQ imposed the postwar constitution 
upon the Japanese government and thus the constitution is exogenous in essence. However, they do 
not pay much attention to the people on the periphery of  the established power center. No matter 
how small and limited they might have been, they certainly struggled to solve the institutional 
problems that inhered in the Meiji constitutional system. Women and leftists along side traditional 
conservative men participated in deliberations on creating a new constitutional order for the first 
time in Japanese history. The imposition theory tends to ignore the efforts, both liberal and 
conservative, on the Japanese side. On the other hand, the internal continuity theory argues for 
restoration of  the true tradition of  the governmental style. However, the postwar constitutional 
making has revealed the transformation of  the nature of  authority. The first public deliberations 
turned traditional authority into an object of  discussion, examination, and choice. Publicly 
deliberated authority is totally different from authority based upon mere tradition. The postwar 
constitution showed the break with the past. Thus, my argument of  the postwar constitution as an 
unfinished constitutional revolution presents a more subtle theorization of  the constitutional 
experience that well reflects the intricate interactions between the Japanese government, the 
Japanese people, and GHQ. 
In this chapter, first, we will consider constitutional initiatives on the part of  the Japanese 
people. The Kenpo Kenkyukai (the Constitutional Research Group) especially deserves careful 
examination because it framed a constitutional draft of  popular sovereignty and a ceremonial tenno 
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institution, which had a great influence on GHQ’s work.1 Next, we will turn our eyes to the GHQ 
leadership in preparing a constitutional revision plan. It sufficiently expressed liberal 
democratization of  politics. Then, we will discuss the reaction of  the Japanese government to 
GHQ’s proposal. An astonished Matsumoto attempted to resist in vain. However, the government 
members gradually came to understand that acceptance of  the GHQ draft would be the only 
possible way of  retaining the tenno himself  and the institution. Thus they changed a strategy to 
japanization of  the GHQ draft. The determined Government Section refused most attempts but they 
succeeded in not unimportant areas. Finally, the ninetieth Imperial Diet became a quasi- 
constitutional convention. Along with traditional conservative men, women and leftists participated 
in public deliberations there. We will examine detailed discussions on constituting a new political 
order in the constitutional convention. Our concern will lie in how the participants conceptualized 
the liberal democratization of  politics in postwar Japan. The examination of  the process of  making 
the postwar constitution will reveal its revolutionary character.   
 
2. Constitutional Ideas among the Japanese People: The Seed of  Popular Sovereignty 
 In general, most Japanese people were passive during the constitutional making period. After 
defeat in the war, they found themselves both liberated and prostrated. Actually, they were starving 
to death. The most crucial thing for them at that time was how to obtain food. Thus, they basically 
had little time to think about the future of  the nation. However, some intellectuals who were more or 
less on the periphery of  the power structure in the Meiji constitutional regime, along with certain 
political parties, came up with several private drafts of  a new constitution. Some of  these private 
drafts were reformative enough to attract a great deal of  public attention and have great influence on 
                                                 
1 In fact, the members of  the Government Section of  GHQ consulted the draft framed by the Kenpo Kenkyukai. 
Milo E. Rowell analyzed its contents in his report to the chief, Courtney Whitney. “Comments on 
Constitutional Revision Proposed by Private Group,” Takayanagi Kenzo, Otomo Yuichiro and Tanaka Hido, 
eds., Nihonkoku kenpo seitei no katei (The Making of  the Constitution of  Japan) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1972), 1: 26-40 
(hereinafter cited as Takayanagi, Seitei Katei). See also Charles L. Kades, “The American Role in Revising 
Japan’s Imperial Constitution,” Political Science Quarterly 104: 2 (1989), 215-247, 227. For the details, see this 
Chapter section 3. 
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the GHQ draft.2 
 The most important private draft of  a new constitution was framed by the Kenpo Kenkyukai 
(the Constitutional Research Group). This draft proposed popular sovereignty and the tenno with 
only ceremonial roles, which shows the indigenous source of  the principle of  popular sovereignty 
with the symbolic tenno system the Constitution of  Japan has finally provided for.3  
Takano Iwasaburo (1871-1949) was the central person in the research group. Takano 
became interested in labor problems through the influence of  his brother, Takano Fusataro.4 He 
resigned from his position as professor of  statistics at the Tokyo Imperial University5 and established 
the Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyusho (Ohara Institute of  Social Problems). As director he managed to 
do important research on social problems. When the war ended, Takano was seventy-four years old 
but he was energetic, on the one hand, in organizing the Nihon Bunkajin Renmei (League of  Japanese 
Men of  Culture) to build a democratic society and culture and, on the other, in taking the initiative 
in establishing the Socialist Party. Takano believed that it was necessary for nongovernmental private 
                                                 
2 The members of  the Public Administration Division of the Government Section paid attention to the drafts 
by private groups and political parties. Charles L. Kades, who was Deputy Chief  of  the Government Section, 
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo from August 1945 to December 
1948, writes that “Japanese sources were most useful” in making the GHQ’s draft. He mentions particularly 
two groups named Kenpo Kenkyukai (Constitutional Research Group) headed by Takano Iwasaburo and Kenpo 
Kondankai (Constitution Discussion Group) by Ozaki Yukio, who had been a liberal representative from the 
first general election. Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution,” 227, 219 -220.  
In fact, the members of  the Public Administration Division highly evaluated the draft of  Kenpo 
Kenkyukai from a liberal democratic point of  view. On January 11, 1946, Milo Rowell described the popular 
sovereignty provision of the draft by the research group as outstandingly liberal and declared that the proposed 
constitution as a whole was democratic and acceptable despite the omission of several essential provisions. See 
Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 26-40. 
3 See McNelly, “The Role of  Monarchy in the Political Modernization of  Japan,” The Origins of  Japan’s 
Democratic Constitution, 99. 
4 Takano Fusataro, who stayed in the United States for eleven years and got several jobs, came to know Samuel 
Gompers personally. In July, 1879, Gompers authorized and legally commissioned Takano to act as General 
Organizer for Japan. After he returned to Japan, Takano engaged in the labor union movement and later in a 
consumer cooperation movement. He was an enthusiastic unionist but not a socialist. His devotion to 
unionism was spontaneous in its nature. Yet the Chian Iji Ho (Peace Preservation Act) of  1925, which made all 
labor unions illegal, prevented his movement from developing. See Takano Iwasaburo, “Torawaretaru minshu 
(The Captured Mass),” in Kappa no he (Tokyo: Sosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1961). “Torawaretaru minshu” 
was originally published in the magazine Shinse of  February 1946 issue with his Kaisei Kenpo Shian Yoko 
(Outline of  a Private Draft of  the Constitutional Revision). 
5  Takano accepted the government’s appointment as labor representative at the First International Labor 
Conference but the unions did not agree to Takano’s appointment. He felt responsibility as a public citizen. He 
resigned from his professorship at the Tokyo Imperial University. “Takano Iwasaburo sensei nenpu and 
chosaku mokuroku (Takano Iwasaburo’s Biographical Note and List of  Writings),” in Kappa no he, 382-383.   
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individuals to study and prepare constitutional reform. Thus, he started the activities of  the Kenpo 
Kenkyukai in October 1945. 
 The Constitutional Research Group had no relationship with orthodox constitutional 
scholarship. Suzuki Yasuzo, another important figure in the group, had studied constitutional history 
without a professorship in any university. He indeed had no legal education at a university. 6 He 
devoted himself  to education for the proletariat, and thus was jailed in violation of  the Chian Iji Ho. 
After his release, he became interested in Japanese and comparative constitutional history and wrote 
three books. For one of  them he was interrogated for violation of  the Publishing Law. After the war, 
Suzuki argued in the media about the necessity of  establishing a new constitution.7 He argued that 
beyond the passive attitude of  execution of  the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese people should 
positively discuss revision of  the constitution from a democratic point of  view to secure civil rights 
and civil liberties.8  
 Other members who frequently attended the meetings were Murofushi Takanobu, a 
journalist; Sugimori Kojiro, a critic and professor of  philosophy at Waseda University; Morito 
Tatsuo, a former professor of  economics at the Tokyo Imperial University and future minister of  
education in the Katayama cabinet, the first under the Constitution of  Japan; and Iwabuchi Tatsuo, 
a political commentator, adviser to Konoe, who was known as a behind-the-scenes operator in the 
political world in prewar Japan. The group was a liberal coalition covering people from moderate 
conservatives to leftists, who formed its core.  
 On November 5, 1945, the Constitutional Research Group started its meetings. After three 
general discussions, Suzuki prepared the first draft along the members’ common trend. According to 
this draft, instead of  amendment, a new constitution should be established by the Japanese people 
                                                 
6 Suzuki first attended the department of  letters and transferred to the department of  economics at the Kyoto 
Imperial University, but finally had to leave because he was guilty of  violating the Chian Iji Ho. 
7 Suzuki Yasuzo, Kenpo seitei zengo (A Report of  the Age of  Convulsion over the New Constitution) (Tokyo: 
Aoki Shoten, 1977), 71-74. 
8 See Suzuki Yasuzo, “Kenpo kaisei (Constitutional Revision) 1-3,” Tokyo Shinbun, October 16, 17, & 18, 1945 
in Shoron Shuroku, 12-17. 
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themselves. The draft understood the Meiji Constitution as based upon the most feudalistic 
absolutistic monarchism because of  its principles of  kintei kenpo (the constitution bestowed upon 
subjects by the benevolent tenno), divine right, intensified prerogatives, and the autonomy of  the 
tenno household. Partial amendment to the constitution with such features was not appropriate for a 
new democratic Japan as fundamental law. Rather, the Meiji Constitution should be abolished. It is 
noteworthy that the draft laid claim to calling a constitutional convention of  the people to frame a 
new constitution.9 
 In democracies, the first draft of  the group asserted, sovereignty derives from, belongs to, and 
is exercised by the people. The draft then asked a crucially important question: whether a new 
constitution for Japan would adopt a republican form of  government that is natural for a democracy. 
Although the members of  the group believed a republican system to be desirable, they thought that it 
was appropriate, at this transitional stage, to establish first a constitutional monarchy that favors 
democracy.  
In such a system, the following principles had to be adopted:10 
1) The sovereignty of  Japan as a state derives from or belongs to the Japanese people. 
2) The tenno shall hold administrative power with mandate, approval, or recommendation 
(suitai) from the Japanese people. 
3) Legislative power shall be vested in a parliament, consisting of  representatives of  the 
Japanese people. 
4) Judges (shihokan) elected by the Japanese people shall exercise judicial power based only 
upon law.11 
 
Therefore, the former system in which the tenno held and exercised sovereignty would be replaced 
with a more democratic tenno system. Although the tenno system would be still hereditary in the new 
constitutional scheme, the members of  the group proposed a means to secure democratic control 
over the tenno: succession of  the throne would be confirmed by parliament and the tenno would, 
under oath, swear to parliament that he would abide by the constitution. To avoid emasculation of  
                                                 
9 Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 77. 
10 Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 79. 
11 Later, the idea of  popularly elected judges was limited only to judges of  Daishinin (the former name of the 
highest court in Japan) because of  the complicated process of  election of  all judges. See Suzuki, Kenpo seitei 
zengo, 84-85. 
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the constitution by abuse of  the tenno system on the part of  undemocratic forces, furthermore, the 
members raised three conditions under which that the tenno system would be operated: 1) Complete 
separation of  politics from religion, particularly Shinto, which had been established under the old 
constitutional structure. People should not be forced to attend service. Shinto would become a truly 
private religion of  the tenno family. 2) The estate of  the tenno family would be rationally reduced. 3) 
The tenno household system would be completely reformed so that chamberlains and attendants 
would never intervene in politics. They would become responsible to the people to avoid abuse of  
their power.12  
The draft therefore presented a picture of  a political regime that was very different from the 
one envisaged by the Matsumoto Committee.13 Although both drafts maintained the tenno system, 
their foundation, function, and manner would be definitely dissimilar. While the idea of  a line 
unbroken for ages eternal could not be reconciled with rational justification, the popular foundation 
of  hereditary monarchy that might seem peculiar could be consistent with persuasion by reason. 
Although the text of  the first draft does not clarify that their amended constitution would allow 
female tenno family members to succeed to the throne, we can here find a good footing for inclusion 
of  the tenno into a constitutional system.   
The first draft also contained innovative provisions about fundamental human rights.14 The 
concept of  “the subjects” would be replaced by “the people,” which is more suitable in a democracy. 
Then, the draft would abolish the idea of  reservation of  laws.15 The idea is essentially dangerous for 
protecting the rights and liberties because while the parliament is basically a majoritarian institution, 
                                                 
12 Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 77-80. 
13 For the draft of  the Matsumoto Committee, see Chapter 2 section 4. 
14 Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 80-81. 
15 The concept of  the reservation of laws plays a dual role. On the one hand, liberties and rights cannot be 
restricted without a statute, which means that administrative power by itself  cannot restrict liberties and rights 
of  the people formally. Because the guarantee of  rights is limited only “within the limits of  the law,” on the 
other hand, rights can be restricted in any way as long as such restrictions are enacted in the form of  law and 
executed by following legal procedures. 
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rights are meaningful if  they trump decisions made by a majority.16 It was much easier for an alleged 
majority to restrict rights of  the people in prewar Japan because the Imperial Diet was not a truly 
majoritarian institution. The Chian Iji Ho was a typical sample of  how reservation of  laws worked in 
a non-majoritarian governmental system. Precious rights such as freedom of  thought and of  speech 
were without any difficulty suppressed in the name of  statute. When reservation of  laws is 
repudiated, how to protect rights is deeply problematic in a political system based upon majority rule. 
Unfortunately, the draft failed to raise any issue of  this kind and to provide for measures for securing 
the protection of  rights. Control of  constitutionality as above legality should be conceptualized when 
reservation of  laws was rejected. Such conceptualization needed a tool for controlling 
unconstitutional invasions of  rights and liberties by the government. Introduction of  the tool to a 
constitution would be another challenge for Japanese people at that time. Anyway, in marked 
contrast with discussions in the Matsumoto Committee, the members of  the Constitutional Research 
Group well recognized an important part of  the problems of  reservation of  laws because they were 
situated on the periphery of  the Meiji constitutional regime and some of  them had actually 
experienced suppression of  their academic work for violation of  the kokutai ideology.17  
In addition, this draft provided for more detailed rights such as freedom and protection of  
arts, scholarship, and education, equality of  gender and race, and affirmative rights such as the right 
to work, be employed, and rest, and welfare rights, along with the right to establish a new 
government.18 
 The draft also provided for a new government structure. Its major features were the 
                                                 
16 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977, 1978); 
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
17  When he was an associate professor of  economics at the Tokyo Imperial University, Morito Tatsuo 
published a paper on the social thought of  Kropotkin. He was accused and convicted of  sedition provided for 
in the Newspaper Law and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment without labor in 1920. The faculty of  
economics at the university voted for the dismissal of  Morito. He found a place for his activities at Takano’s 
Ohara Institute. For suppression of academic freedom in prewar Japan, see Ienaga Saburo, Rekishi no nakano 
kenpo (Constitutions in History) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Suppankai, 1977), 1: 156-174. 
18 The right to establish a new government was omitted later, because the Group regarded consensus among 
the members as important. 
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following: 1) A thorough democratization of  parliament. While the first house should be based upon 
equal and universal election, the second house should adopt occupation and class representation by 
public election. The first house should be superior to the second. The parliament as representative of  
the general will of  the people should hold the power to legislate and supervise the administrative 
departments. The parliament should have full control over laws, budgets, taxes, and tenno household 
expenses. 2) The parliamentary government system. Cabinet should be collectively responsible to the 
parliament and its continuity should depend upon the confidence of  the parliament. 3) Public 
election of  judges and the jury system. 4) Abolition of  the House of  Peers and the Privy Council. 5) 
Democratization of  the national economy. 6) Referenda on constitutional amendment and 
nationally important issues.19 
 The Constitutional Research Group continued to discuss a desirable new constitution, using 
the first draft by Suzuki as a springboard, on November 28, 1945. Morito Tatsuo argued for revision 
of  the Meiji Constitution rather than framing a totally new constitution. “Substance apart, the 
procedure must, in form, be based upon the amendment of  the current Meiji Constitution. 
Following the principle that a bad law is still a law, the Meiji Constitution at first will be amended. 
On the basis of  that amendment, then, a new constitution will be established. In short, two-time 
constitutional changes are necessary.”20 
 Morito proposed to add to the draft a provision for convening a new constitutional 
convention ten years later to frame a more democratic constitution. The present revision of  the Meiji 
Constitution, he believed, was not truly democratic nor did it truly reflect the new will of  the people. 
The members of  the research group agreed on the strategy Morito proposed. Because freedom of  
thought had been suppressed for a long time, they believed that the people could not make a political 
decision in a proper way at that time. It was quite natural to assume, therefore, that as a result of  the 
democratic education provided by the revision, the Japanese people would be able to act as wisely as 
                                                 
19 Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 81-82. 
20 Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 83. 
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popular sovereignty requires, and would establish a completely new democratic constitution by 
themselves. 21  The idea of  two-step constitutional reform was unique, realistic, and pragmatic 
immediately after the wartime defeat. The members were optimistic enough to believe that 
democratization of  Japan would be thorough and complete with time.    
 In addition, based on the idea of  popular sovereignty, the provisions of  the first draft about 
the tenno were further democratized. Murofushi argued that the tenno system as a political institution 
should be completely abolished and that instead the tenno should remain only as the highest rank of  
state honors or a ceremonial representative. In his view, the tenno should be an authority to seal 
documents the parliament and cabinet had made. 22  Morito also expressed the same kind of  
formalization of  the tenno. Although the tenno as the head of  the religious family should be the 
object of  respect and affection of  the people, according to the principle that the tenno reigns but does 
not rule, substantial parts of  politics should be delegated to various constitutional bodies and the 
tenno should formally be the head of  state. In Morito’s conception, however, the tenno as the head of  
state should represent the state, appoint diplomats and sign treaties.23  
Thus the second draft included a more democratized tenno system than the first. The second 
draft deprived the tenno of  any political power.24 Although the tenno would formally remain the head 
of  the state, the tenno who would be regarded as the source of  honors should conduct only national 
ceremonies. The second draft clearly denied the principle of  the tenno’s direct governance and 
provided that the tenno should have no responsibility whatsoever for state affairs and that the cabinet 
should assume responsibility for them. Interestingly, the second draft carried two alternative 
opinions: on the one hand, abolition of  the tenno system to remove fear that militaristic and 
bureaucratic despotism might be realized under the name of  the tenno or the kokutai;25 on the other, 
                                                 
21 Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 85. 
22 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 798. 
23 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 798-799. 
24 See Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 84. 
25 A conception of  republic was advocated by Takano Iwasaburo. I will soon discuss Takano’s plan more 
thoroughly. 
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the tenno’s enjoyment of  the administrative power rather than conduct of  only national ceremonies.26 
Other considerable changes from the first draft were that public election should be applied only to 
justices of  the highest court and that the prosecutor general should be publicly elected and the 
prosecutors’ office should be independent of  the administrative department. In addition, a 
constitutional convention of  the people would be held in ten years to establish a more democratic 
new constitution.27 
 In this way, the Constitutional Research Group developed the second draft, which was sent 
to certain intellectuals on December 1, 1945. This draft placed special emphasis upon the 
unconditional and detailed provisions of  human rights, particularly academic freedom and freedom 
of  speech and of  religion, together with a ceremonial tenno system based upon the principle of  
popular sovereignty.28 
 Suzuki prepared the third draft, which was slightly different from the second, by following 
the previous discussions in mid December. Important changes included replacement of  the right to 
establish a new government with the rights related to direct democracy such as initiative and 
referendum, and additions of  dissolution of  the House of  Representatives by referendum and 
resignation of  the cabinet by recall.29 After further deliberation and little change, the Constitutional 
Research Group published the final version. On December 26, 1945, members submitted the Kenpo 
Soan Yoko (Gist of  the Draft of  the Constitution) both to the Japanese government and to GHQ. The 
major newspapers reported the draft to the public on December 28.30 This attracted wide attention 
not only because it was the first published private draft about a new constitutional scheme for 
                                                 
26 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 800-801. 
27 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 803. 
28 See Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 93-98. 
29 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 809-814. 
30 At that time, GHQ censored Japanese media. For the censorship GHQ thoroughly executed, see Yamamoto 
Taketoshi, Senryoki media bunseki (An Analysis of Media during the Occupation) (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku 
Shuppankyoku, 1996); Ariyama Teruo, Senryoki media shi kenkyu: Jiyu to kisei 1945 (A Study of History of the 
Media during the Occupation: Freedom and Regulation 1945) (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 1996); Dower, Embracing 
Defeat, 405-440. 
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postwar Japan, but also because it was novel and original in its content.31 In the interview with the 
Mainichi Shinbun on December 29, Suzuki explained the aim and intention of  the proposed draft of  
the research group as the principle that the tenno should reign but should not rule.32 Suzuki also 
presented a rather long explanation of  the group’s draft to give people guidance on constitutional 
reform in the Tokyo Shinbun. Suzuki concluded his article by pointing out that building a democratic 
Japan had dual aspects: one was to abolish feudalistic vestiges in political, economic, and social 
systems; the other was to create new political and economic institutions with which the laissez-faire 
principle would be replaced. Thus, constitutional revision should reflect these two aspects by 
guaranteeing both classical freedoms and affirmative rights.33   
 Unlike the Matsumoto Committee, the Constitutional Research Group had carefully studied 
not only various private constitutional drafts during the Jiyu Minken Undo but also foreign 
constitutions such as the U.S. Constitution, the French Constitution of  1791, the Soviet Constitution 
and particularly the Weimar Constitution.34 The research group also worked well as a collaborative 
association to compose the draft of  constitutional amendment. Deliberation among the members 
made their draft clearer and more focused. This was also in marked contrast to the Matsumoto 
Committee, in which only a few members actually worked and particularly the chairman 
Matsumoto assumed strong leadership.35 The research group attached great significance not only to 
consensus among the members, as mentioned above, but also to the simplicity of  the draft of  an 
amended constitution. The members of  the research group believed that it was essential that the 
Japanese government adopt the main points of  their proposal.36 In this sense, the research group was 
eminently pragmatic. 
                                                 
31 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 784. 
32 See “Kenpo minkan soan no ito (The Intention of  the Private Constitutional Draft),” Mainichi Shinbun, 
article, December 29, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 106-107. 
33 See Suzuki Yasuzo, “Shin kenpo soan (The Draft of  a New Constitution),” Tokyo Shinbun, January 5, 6, & 7, 
1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 115-121. 
34 See Suzuki’s interview, “Kenpo minkan soan no ito.” 
35 For the style of  work and its problems of  the Matsumoto Committee, see Chapter 2 section 5. 
36 See Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zenya, 98. 
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 This pragmatic characteristic of  the Constitutional Research Group derived from the fact 
that it gathered people with different disciplines and had no orthodox constitutional scholar. The 
research group could approach constitutional reform with much broader outlooks of  non-specialists 
than the Matsumoto Committee, which consisted only of  those who were directly related to law, 
especially constitutional law. For example, Morito Tatsuo, an economist, an important member of  
the Socialist Party, and future minister of  education, recommended readers to see constitutional 
revision in a broader perspective.37 He claimed priority of  politics based upon rational discussion and 
criticized idealistic approaches. Morito and his colleagues could not ignore the historical conditions 
under which the Japanese state was situated. 
Morito clearly understood what had to be done when constitutional revision was required. 
Correction of  the wording of  constitutional provisions or making them internally consistent was, he 
pointed out, not essentially important in constitutional reform. What was more important was 
secularization of  the constitution. When the constitution was about be revised, he argued, the first 
duty was to sweep away the religious and mysterious atmosphere that surrounded the Meiji 
Constitution and to separate politics from religion in order to make a constitution the secularized 
and rationalized fundamental law of  the state. Only through such revision, in his view, would the 
constitution become an object of  rational discussion. Second, in his opinion, autonomous politics by 
the people should be established by reforming the constitution.38  
In his view, such constitutional revision could not be realized without connection with the 
tenno system. Morito refused as prejudices both an attempt to fit democracy to the fixed concept of  
the kokutai and an understanding that democracy was equal to republicanism and thus realization of  
democracy necessarily meant overthrow of  the tenno system. He argued that the draft of  
constitutional revision by the Constitutional Research Group had tried to compromise between the 
irrational national sentiment that was still deep-rooted and rational needs of  real politics by reducing 
                                                 
37 See Morito Tatsuo, “Kenpo kaisei no kadai (Problems of  Constitutional Revision),” Tokyo Shinbun, January 
9, 10, 11, 12, & 13, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 112-127. 
38 See Morito, “Kenpo kaisei no kadai,” 124. 
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the tenno system from a belief  item over which fanatic struggles developed to an object of  rational 
real politics. 39  His position can be understood as an attempt to take the tenno system into a 
constitutional scheme. To make a constitution an object of  rational discussion after the war, Morito 
also added, guaranteeing the eighteenth century’s classical liberal rights was not enough and further 
protection of  the twentieth century’s social rights was needed, as Suzuki also pointed out. Thus 
Morito urged readers to pay attention to constitutional practices in foreign countries.40  
Then Morito raised a crucially important issue about constitutional writing. The substance 
of  a constitution, he pointed out, following Ferdinand Lassalle, lay not in a mere written paper but 
in an expression of  actual power relations behind the text.41 Thus success of  constitutional revision 
would depend upon reform in power relations. He saw the rapid change in power relations GHQ’s 
reform policy had caused. 42  Constitutional revision was being discussed and conducted in this 
changing circumstance. But the relation between the ruling and the ruled had not been substantially 
transformed yet. Although a compromise between new and old forces was necessary in the 
transitional stage, Morito appealed to readers to realize that more equal political, economic, and 
social power relations should be realized by enhancing political and social consciousness. He once 
again placed emphasis on the priority of  politics in postwar reform.43  
In this way, Morito calmly recognized that a constitution was more or less a reflection of  
political achievements. Thus he gave priority to politics over constitutional text. We can observe here 
that there was much room for developing the governmental process by politics based upon rational 
discussion. He, as one of  central persons in the Constitutional Research Group, represented a wider, 
more pragmatic and realistic viewpoint on constitutional matters.  
 Although the Japanese government disregarded it,44 GHQ paid close attention to the draft of  
                                                 
39 See Morito, “Kenpo kaisei no kadai,” 124. 
40 See Morito, “Kenpo kaisei no kadai,” 125. 
41 See Morito, “Kenpo kaisei no kadai,” 125. 
42 See Morito, “Kenpo kaisei no kadai,” 126. 
43 See Morito, “Kenpo kaisei no kadai,” 126-127. 
44 Takano and Prime Minister Shidehara were classmates at the Tokyo Imperial University. Takano explained 
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the Constitutional Research Group. GHQ’s Allied Translation and Interpreters Section finished a 
translation of  the draft as early as December 31. George Atcheson sent to the Secretary of  State a 
report of  the draft with its translated full text on January 2, 1946. After he pointed out popular 
sovereignty with the tenno as the ritualistic and ceremonial head only, Atcheson observed that “It 
should be realized that the draft represents the views of  private persons of  outstandingly liberal 
reputation and that the group has received no recognition from the Government, whose proposals, 
according to all indications, will be very conservative in nature.”45 The Government Section, which 
would soon lead work of  constitutional reform, also submitted a thorough examination report to 
MacArthur, on January 11. In its report, Lieutenant Colonel Milo E. Rowell pointed out 
outstanding liberal provisions of  the draft as follows:46  
a. The sovereignty of  the people is acknowledged. 
b. Discrimination by birth, status, sex, race and nationality are prohibited. The peerage is 
abolished. 
c. Workers’ benefits required include one 8-hour day, holidays with pay, free hospitalization 
and old-age pensions. 
d. A referendum permitting the people to express their will directly on legislation is provided. 
e. Control of  all finances including expenditures of  the Imperial family is placed in the Diet. 
Carry-over budgets are prohibited. Audits are required and the President of  the Audit Bureau 
is to be elected. 
f. The right to possess property is limited by the requirement that it be useful to the public 
welfare. 
g. Land must be used for the best public interest. 
h. A new Constitution must be enacted in 10 years. 
 
Although several issues such as criminal procedure and judicial review had to be further considered, 
Rowell concluded that the constitutional plan the draft had presented was “democratic and 
acceptable.”47 Colonel Charles L. Kades, deputy chief  of  the Government Section, clarified that 
when the members of  the Government Section prepared it own draft of  constitutional revision, they 
referred to various indigenous drafts such as those by political parties, the Constitutional Research 
                                                                                                                                                             
to Shidehara the conception of  the tenno conducting national ceremonies that the group’s draft had proposed. 
Shidehara disagreed with Takano that an institution dealing only with ceremonies was a problem and that 
such a conception went too far. See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 825. 
45 Proposals of  Kempô Kenkyôkai (12/27/45) Takano Iwasaburô and others in RM094.   
46 See “Comments on Constitutional Revision Proposed by Private Group,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 26-40. 
47 “Comments on Constitutional Revision Proposed by Private Group,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 36. 
 197 
Group, and the Kenpo Kondankai (Constitutional Discussion Group), which “were most useful.” 48 
Because, as we will see later, GHQ’s draft provided a symbolic tenno system, which resembled the 
ceremonial tenno system the Constitutional Research Group proposed, along with Rowell’s high 
evaluation and Kades’ insider witness, it is quite reasonable to infer that this private draft had a great 
influence upon GHQ’s work on constitutional reform.49  
 Another important constitutional revision plan came from Takano Iwasaburo. As mentioned 
above, the Constitutional Research Group was headed by Takano. On November 28, 1945, Takano 
presented to the group his own draft of  a new constitution for a republic: The Nihon Kyowa-koku 
Kenpo Shian Yoko (the Gist of  a Private Draft of  the Constitution of  the Republic of  Japan). The 
majority of  the members agreed with him that the republican form of  government would be 
theoretically desirable. By considering the political circumstances of  the day, however, they believed 
that it was premature to make and publish a republican constitutional draft. 50  Takano was 
dissatisfied with the compromising attitude among his fellow members of  the group, because he as a 
spontaneous democrat believed that a more democratized and liberal way of  thinking should have 
developed in a new era when long suppression had ceased. To him, a renovated Japan should have 
been nothing but a republic. His proposal thus contained a presidential system instead of  the tenno 
system. Because he had presided over the Constitutional Research Group, however, Takano 
hesitated to publish his personal proposal at that time. 51  He finally made his conception of  a 
republican government public at a press conference on January 25, 194652 and his constitutional 
draft appeared in the journal Shinsei in February 1946.53 
                                                 
48 Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan’s Imperial Constitution,” 227. 
49 Sato Tatsuo expressed the same inference. See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 843. 
50 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 800. 
51 See Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 90. 
52 “Takano hakase no shinkenpo soan (The Draft of  a New Constitution by Dr. Hakano),” article, Yomiuri 
Hochi Shinbun, January 26, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 169-170.  
53  Takano Iwasaburo, “Torawaretaru Minshu (The Captured Mass),” Shinsei, February, 1946 reprinted in 
Kappa no He, 38-58.  
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  Along with the constitutional draft, Takano wrote of  his feelings toward his fellow 
countrymen. He saw the Japanese people as captivated by the old ideology. 54  He could not 
understand why his fellow citizens failed to think freely after their liberation from the long 
suppression by despotic rule.55 Because he was born in 1871 well before the Meiji Constitution was 
promulgated and grew up in the liberal atmosphere of  the Jiyu Minken Undo, Takano knew that there 
were options other than one line unbroken for ages eternal.56 For younger generations, however, the 
Meiji Constitution was a matter of  an accomplished fact and the Taisho Democracy was the most 
liberal period they experienced. Thus, even liberals such as Minobe Tatsukichi were apt to see 
problems within its framework and failed to think beyond it as liberally and democratically as 
possible.57 
 Theoretically, Takano argued, the idea of  popular sovereignty was inconsistent with the tenno 
system. But he saw a lot of  compromised opinions on the tenno system. Takano took for example the 
article of  Yokota Kisaburo, who was a professor of  international law at the Tokyo Imperial 
University and future chief  justice of  the Supreme Court. Yokota clarified that neither state 
corporation theory nor king-in-parliament could solve an ultimate question and that thorough 
democracy meant popular sovereignty. If  Japan truly wanted to establish democracy, Yokota 
admitted, it should start by recognizing the sovereignty of  the people. Takano completely agreed on 
Yokota’s lucid analysis so far. But he disagreed on what Yokota presented as a compromise. Yokota 
believed that democracy could be realized even under the tenno system, in which the tenno would no 
                                                 
54 “Torawaretaru Minshu (the captured people)” is the title of  his article. 
55 Takano wrote: “Ours is a time of  rapid change. The old ways have suddenly disappeared, and the new age of  
democracy had spread over the whole country. Why must we say we are so satisfied with this new age of  
democracy? In spite of  everything, the majority of  the people of  our country still have not understood the true 
meaning of  democracy. Their clinging as before to the notion of  a kind of  superstitious worship is something 
that, to someone like me who embraces a view of  democratic government as developing naturally, is weird and 
painfully difficult to understand. It is for that reason that I must proclaim that the masses are imprisoned.” 
Takano, “Torawaretaru Minshu,” Kappa no He, 43-45 (translation by Moore in Koseki, Birth, 38). 
56 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 64. 
57 See Ienaga, Minobe Tatsukichi no Shisoshiteki Kenkyu, 341-342. See also, Takahashi Hikohiro, Keisei, 232-235. 
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longer hold sovereign power but occupy the status of  ritualistic institution. 58  Yokota actually 
supported the plan of  the Constitutional Research Group. Thus Takano had to express 
dissatisfaction with Yokota’s halfway argument as with his fellow members’.59 
Because it was too formal, in Takano’s view, the ritualistic tenno system could not satisfy 
those who had always proclaimed the majesty of  the tenno family. These people might feel that the 
tenno as a ceremonial institution was meaningless and that such a tenno system degraded the status 
of  the traditional tenno. Royalists might rouse themselves to resistance. Further, if, as some people 
believed, under the current circumstances, the revision of  the Meiji Constitution was able to adopt 
the principle of  popular sovereignty, Takano wondered whether it was necessary to retain the tenno 
system as nothing but a ritualistic organ.60 Takano’s real fear was that the tenno system once again 
would be abused by the military cliques and bureaucrats.61 If  the tenno system remained even with 
the principle of  popular sovereignty, there would be opportunities for the remnants of  the 
reactionary forces to make a second attempt to seize political power with the tenno at the head.  
 However, most Japanese people were reluctant to abolish the tenno system. In Takano’s view, 
those who fostered a lingering attachment for the tenno and did not make a dash forward to adopt 
pure democracy still placed some trust in the tenno system and had only tenuous confidence in 
democracy. Takano refused such sentiments. At the beginning of  the liberated new era in Japan, he 
argued, the Japanese people should rather overcome any difficulties and seek a truly new way to 
learn to govern themselves. Therefore, according to Takano, it was high time for them to abolish the 
tenno system and to remove the danger of  reviving reactionary forces in order to establish democracy 
based upon popular sovereignty in Japan. Under the ideal of  full popular democracy, Takano 
                                                 
58 See Yokota Kisaburo, Mainichi Shinbun, January 9, 1946. 
59 See Takano, “Torawaretaru Minshu,” Kappa no He, 46-48. 
60 Takano, “Torawaretaru Minshu,” Kappa no He, 49. 
61 Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 94. 
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implored, the Japanese people should have a complete change of  heart, and make a great effort to 
educate themselves as holders of  sovereign power.62 
 Referring to the Constitutions of  the United States, the Soviet Union, Switzerland, and 
Weimar Germany,63 Takano drafted a constitution for a liberal democracy, leading toward a welfare 
state. In his view, the issue of  this constitutional reform should not be limited to the tenno system. 
Development of  capitalism in Japan had already brought about unfairness such as monopolies and 
exploitation. The liberation of  the Japanese people in the new era must go beyond the political arena 
and cover the economic and cultural aspects of  life as well. Takano thus understood a constitution in 
a broad sense. “The modern constitution is the fundamental principle as the standard for the 
people’s life in the three dimensions of  politics, economy, and culture, and must be useful in fully 
and smoothly developing our democratic politics in the present and the future.”64 
 At the very beginning of  his draft, Takano declared the fundamental principle that the 
president instead of  the tenno should be the head of  the state in the republic of  Japan. Sovereignty 
should belong to the people, who shall elect the president. The people should enjoy classical rights 
without reservation of  laws and social rights such as rights to life, education, and culture. In addition, 
two chapters of  economy and labor and of  culture and science were included for declaring national 
policies. Referenda should be also introduced.65 
 However elaborate a constitution might be, Takano argued, it should contain only the central 
framework for the life of  the Japanese people. He recognized that it was thus necessary and 
important to construct this framework. At the end of  his proposed constitution, Takano clarified his 
                                                 
62 Takano, “Torawaretaru Minshu,” Kappa no He, 50. 
63 The reference was omitted in Shinsei’s version. See Koseki, Tanjyo, 63 n.33. 
64 Takano, “Torawaretaru Minshu,” Kappa no He, 52. 
65 Takano Iwasaburo, “Kaisei kenpo shian yoko (the Outline of  Private Draft of  the Revised Constitution),” 
Kappa no He, 53-58. According to Takahashi Hikohiro, Takano understood constitutional reform after the war 
as a change of constitutional development in Japan. See Takahashi Hikohiro, Keisei, 235-237. 
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intention to make such a framework public.66 Unfortunately, Takano, who died in April 1949, missed 
an opportunity to express his own detailed constitutional scheme for a democratic Japan. 
 Although it is uncertain that Takano’s draft of  the revised constitution had any specific 
influence upon GHQ’s work,67 it is fair to say that Takano’s plan was important not only because 
Takano announced his new constitution draft before the Government Section started its work but 
also because the draft showed to the Japanese people that abolition of  the tenno system was one 
actual option for the people to create a new Japan. It was true that the communist party had already 
clarified its basic principle of  abolishing the tenno system and of  establishing a republican 
government for a new constitution.68 However, Takano’s plan meant that abolition of  the tenno 
system was not monopolized by the communists. It was clear evidence that there was an indigenous 
effort to transform the Japanese state fundamentally.   
Therefore, we cannot ignore the theoretical achievements of  the drafts of  the Constitutional 
Research Group and of  Takano. We should remember that the established intellectuals, including 
eminent liberals such as Minobe, were obsessed with outdated ideology. Popular sovereignty with a 
ritualistic tenno system was a unique device, not to mention a conception of  a republican form of  
government. The former was at least practically significant for the situation in Japan at that time. 
Takano with Suzuki also urged the public to support a voluntary constitutional convention for 
establishing a new democratic constitution. This convention was not a means of  petition to the 
government but a meeting of  the people themselves for demanding the creation of  a fundamental 
principle of  their life. Takano conceived such a convention as a national democratic common cause 
                                                 
66 Takano mentioned Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s “A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of  Great 
Britain.” See Takano, “Torawaretaru Minshu,” Kappa no He, 58. 
67  Sato Tatsuo has introduced GHQ’s document written by the Civil Historical Section: “History of  
Nonmilitary Activities of  the Occupation of Japan 1945 through Dec. 1951, vol. III; Political and Legal-Part 
B; Constitutional Revision”. It mentioned the draft of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai and explained features of  the draft. 
Sato pointed out its confusion between the draft of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai and Takano’s plan because it described 
the president and the tenno together. Sato Tatsuo, Seiritsushi, 2: 846. 
68 Asahi Shinbun, November 12, 1945 in Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 772-773. The Mainichi Shinbun reported the same 
content on January 30 1946. See “Kyosanto no kenpo kaisei hoto (The Ways to Revise the Constitution by the 
Communist Party),” Mainichi Shinbun, article, January 30, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 172-173. 
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among socialists, communists, labor unions, cultural associations, and media. 69  Calling a 
constitutional convention and the two-stage amendment strategy the Constitutional Research Group 
proposed are also worth noting. Whatever might have been the outcome of  a convention or 
referendum ten years later, the commitment of  the Japanese people to the values of  public 
deliberation and democracy would have made the Constitution more meaningful in their lives.70 
Unfortunately, neither constitutional convention nor a referendum in ten years was realized in the 
real postwar politics. Unlike the Matsumoto Committee, however, both the Constitutional Research 
Group and Takano paid close attention to the people as sovereign. Here we can recognize the birth 
of  the idea of  popular sovereignty in postwar Japan. 
The constitutional revision plan of  the Shakaito (Socialist Party) is also important from the 
viewpoint of  the later course of  events. At its reorganization, the Socialist Party immediately started 
to do research on constitutional revision. On December 4, 1945, the national executive committee 
declared the basic principles of  the tenno system: 1) to adopt the theory of  state corporation and 
retain the tenno system; 2) to reduce the prerogatives of  the tenno; 3) to make progress to realize 
democracy and socialism under the democratized tenno system.71 On January 16, the committee 
further decided that considering the circumstances of  the nation and feeling of  the people, the 
problems they had to solve were to abridge the powers of  the tenno and to sweep away feudalistic 
residuals around the tenno. In such a basic structure, the tenno would hold abridged powers such as a 
ceremonial role in international negotiation and the formal source of  honor. The power to make the 
government would be given to a majority party in the parliament. And most of  the powers the tenno 
enjoyed in the Meiji constitutional system would reside in the parliament.  
                                                 
69 “Takano hakase no shinkenpo soan (The Draft of  a New Constitution by Dr. Takano),” Yomiuri Hochi 
Shinbun, article, January 26, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 170. 
70 It was very doubtful whether a majority of  the Japanese people would agree to abolish the tenno system. Less 
than 9 percent of  people were opposed to the tenno system. See “Kenpo kaisei to yoron (Constitutional 
Revision and Public Opinion),” Mainichi Shinbun, article, February 4, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 188-189. 
71 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 778. 
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On February 23, the party published the outline of  a new constitution. The outline first 
described three criteria---course, method, and aim---for making a new constitution. The course was 
that of  establishment of  democratic politics and carrying out resolutely policy toward a socialist 
economy. As a method, the outline sought extension of  a special session of  the Imperial Diet after 
the upcoming general election to be a constitutional convention. It aimed to dismiss the traditional 
view of  a power state and promote the interests and welfare of  the people to build a peace state.72 
Because the Socialist Party involved an inner struggle between the right and left factions, its 
constitutional plan showed a compromising attitude toward the tenno system by reflecting the 
struggle. It provided that “Sovereignty shall reside in the State (a cooperative body of  the people 
including the tenno). Governing powers shall be divided, the more important part shall be assigned to 
the National Diet and one part shall be assigned to the tenno (broadly limiting the tenno’s 
prerogatives). The tenno shall be retained.”73 In the outline, the tenno would hold rather formal 
powers on the exercise of  which the tenno would have no veto power. Other features of  the outline 
are as follows. The Diet would be more powerful and the House of  Representatives elected as 
proportional by the people would be superior to the House of  Councilors elected by occupational 
groups. A parliamentary system would be introduced with a system of  national recall of  the cabinet. 
Reservation of  law would be abolished and social rights including the right to life as well as classical 
rights would be protected. Emphasis was placed upon equality when it provided not only that the 
people would be all equal and that all discriminations based upon gender and status should be 
abolished but also that peers, ranks, and orders of  merit all should be abolished. The outline also 
provided for independence of  the judiciary and abolition of  administrative court and of  death 
penalty but no judicial review. In sum, although the principle of  popular sovereignty was not clearly 
declared and the tenno enjoyed more powers, the outline by the Socialist Party was relatively similar 
                                                 
72 For the text of  the outline of  a new constitution by the Socialist Party, see Sato, Seirisushi, 2: 779-782. 
73 For translation, I referred to Koseki, Birth, translated by Moore, 39-40. 
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to the draft of  the Constitutional Research Group. That was because Takano and Morito played an 
important role in the party as well. 
As for other party plans, while the communist party proposed a republican form of  
government, 74  the Jiyuto (Japan Liberal Party) and Shinpoto (Progressive Party) published 
considerably conservative constitutional revision drafts. When the Liberal Party proposed its 
constitutional revision plan, the president, Hatoyama Ichiro, released a press talk of  its position of  
constitutional revision on January 21, 1946. He expressed the maintenance of  the kokutai and their 
hope to establish politics based upon real constitutional monarchy along with further protection of  
the rights of  the people.75 However, there was no essential difference between the text of  the draft 
and the Meiji Constitution. The draft provided that “The possessor of  sovereignty shall be the 
Japanese state. The tenno shall be the superintendent of  sovereignty. The tenno shall be of  a line 
unbroken for ages eternal. The tenno shall have no responsibility either legally or politically.”76 It is 
true that the draft reduced the tenno’s prerogatives broadly, established a more powerful parliament, 
introduced a parliamentary cabinet system, and provided for a more independent judiciary system.77 
However, the draft replaced simple reservation of  law with prohibition of  arbitrary restriction of  
freedom of  thought, speech, religion, scholarship, and arts by law and still offered no 
conceptualization of  the constitutionality of  rights and liberties. As long as the principle of  a line 
unbroken for ages eternal and of  direct governance of  the tenno, moreover, constitutionalism would 
suffer from serious damage because constitutionalism required governmental activities to be limited 
and controlled by written documents.78  
                                                 
74 For the text of  Nihon Jinmin Kyowakoku Kenpo (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of  Japan) on June 
29, 1946, see Suzuki, Kenpo seitei zengo, 248-260. 
75 Hatoyama Ichiro, “Shin no rikken kunshu seiji no kakuritsu wo kisu,” Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun, January 22, 
1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 163. 
76 For the full text, see Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 737-740. For translation, I referred to Koseki, Birth, translated by 
Moore, 44. 
77 For its legislative history, see Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 741-770. 
78  For example, Mainichi Shinbun criticized the constitutional revision plan of  the Liberal Party as too 
conservative and basically similar to the Meiji Constitution. See “Jiyuto no kenpo kaseian (The Draft of  
Constitutional Revision by the Liberal Party),” Mainichi Shinbun, editorial, January 23, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 
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The proposal of  constitutional revision by the Progressive Party was more conservative 
than that by the Liberal Party. In its basic policy, the proposal declared that retainment of  the kokutai 
was the party’s basic platform and that thus the party determinedly rejected both a republican form 
of  government and a ritualistic tenno system.79 Although the prerogatives of  the tenno should be 
exercised with resolution of  the Imperial Diet and the Supreme Court should enjoy the power of  
judicial review, the concept of  the kokutai was untouched so that the fundamental structure of  the 
Meiji constitutional system could be kept intact. In fact, preservation of  law on rights of  subjects was 
maintained.80  
As for other important private drafts of  constitutional revision, the draft of  the Kenpo 
Kondankai (Constitution Discussion Group) is noteworthy. Ozaki Yukio, a liberal representative 
nicknamed the god of  constitutional government, and Iwanami Shigeo, a famous academic 
publisher, were central persons of  the Constitution Discussion Group. However, Inada Masatsugu, a 
constitutional historian, with Unno Shinkichi, a lawyer and one of  the drafting committee members 
of  the Socialists, played a pivotal role in preparing the draft of  constitutional revision. The draft 
basically followed the British model of  constitutional monarchy and introduced as a base of  the 
proposed constitution the concept of  joint sovereignty of  the tenno and the people, which was related 
to the plan of  the Socialist Party. The revised constitution would include important parts of  the 
tenno’s house law, which would be a statute. It also rejected reservation of  law for rights of  the people, 
declaration of  which came before the chapter of  the tenno. The judiciary might review 
constitutionality of  law. Policies of  the social state were also declared as constitutional principles.81 
This draft was published on March 5, 1946, only one day before the governmental outline of  the 
revised constitution based upon GHQ’s plan was made public.82 
                                                                                                                                                             
164-166. See also, Koseki, Tanjyo, 74-76. 
79 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 774-775. 
80 For the full text, see Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 775-778. See also, Koseki, Tanjyo, 76. 
81 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 853-860. 
82 Charles Kades explained that the draft of  the Kenpo Kondankai was one of  the most useful sources when he 
and his colleagues at the Government Section of GHQ prepared their own constitutional draft. See Kades, 
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Unlike the Matsumoto Committee and the conservative parties, there were innovative plans 
among private citizens about the principle of  popular sovereignty and the concept of  the tenno as a 
ritualistic institution. The Japanese people did actually listen to public discussion on new 
conceptions of  political power and the state.83 We can trace indigenous efforts to make relative a line 
unbroken for ages eternal. However limited these efforts might be, some people surely made a 
positive commitment to a renovated political practice as public deliberation. If  the private plans had 
been successful at that time, the constitution would have independently become a common baseline 
for the political process between the governed and the governing elite. In any event, because there 
was good soil more or less ready, most Japanese people welcomed and cherished the basic idea of  a 
revised constitution, when the government plan based upon the GHQ model was published and 
made into an actual constitution later.  
 
3. GHQ’s Leadership: Popular Sovereignty with a Symbolic Tenno System 
                                                                                                                                                             
“The American Role in Revising Japan’s Imperial Constitution,” 227. As mentioned in text, however, this draft 
was published one day before the Japanese government announced its outline of  constitutional revision, the 
origin of  which was the so-called MacArthur constitution. Thus they probably referred to the draft at a much 
later course of  the work. 
83 For example, an editorial of  the Tokyo Shinbun discussed a progressive institution of  dissolution of  the House 
of  Representatives by national referendum the Kenpo Kenkyukai’s draft proposed. See “Gikaiken to minken 
(The Power of  the Diet and the Popular Right to Participate in Politics),” editorial, Tokyo Shinbun, January 22, 
1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 162-163. 
The Nihon Sangyo Keizai Shinbun rather lengthily analyzed public opinions on the tenno system. The 
article pointed out three general trends of  opinions. First, conservatives argued that Japan had been a country 
in which the tenno and the people had been together and thus that it did not matter whether sovereignty 
belonged to the tenno or the people. They also argued for minimum revision of  the constitution. The 
government and the Progressive Party and the Liberal Party took this position. The second argument was that 
while democracy was essentially inconsistent with the tenno system, popular sentiment should be also 
respected and thus that the tenno institution should be retained but its prerogatives should be largely reduced. 
This was the stance the Socialist Party and the Kenpo Kenkyukai had taken. Third, the most radical discussion 
argued that the tenno system could not coexist with democracy and its abolition alone would serve democratic 
politics. The communists clearly took this position. The article continued to state that while the first opinion 
was shared by the ruling class, intellectuals and students and young generation supported the second position. 
“Tennosei taihei zenya no arashi (The Emperor System and the Storm before a Calm),” article, Nihon Sangyo 
Keizai Shinbun, January 1& 3, 1946 in ibid., 108-114, 110-112.  
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The United States government understood that the Potsdam Declaration demanded reform 
of  the Meiji Constitution. 84  On January 7, 1946, the interdepartmental State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) in Washington, D.C. approved a document entitled “Reform of  
the Japanese Government System” (SWNCC-228) and forwarded it to the Supreme Commander for 
the Allied Powers in Tokyo on January 11. SWNCC-228 is a document that shows “culmination of  
State Department plans for constitutional and governmental changes in postwar Japan that extend 
back to at least mid-1943.”85  
 This document discussed the general objectives to be accomplished in political reform in 
postwar Japan. The occupation was indirect or through the Japanese government 86 and thus the 
Supreme Commander had to indicate that the Japanese government needed drastic reform of  its 
governmental system. The document attempted to provide the Supreme Commander with general 
guidance for his supervision. The basic items included the following:  
(1) A government responsible to an electorate based upon wide representative 
suffrage; 
                                                 
84 For the preparation for occupation of  postwar Japan by the Allied Powers, effectively the US, see Robert E. 
Ward, “Presurrender Planning: Treatment of  the Emperor and Constitutional Changes,” Ward & Sakamoto, 
Democratizing Japan, 1-41; Hellegers, We the Japanese People, vol. 1.  
85 Ward, “Presurrender Planning,” in Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 29. 
86 SWNCC-150 provided for the relation between SCAP and the Japanese government as the following. “The 
authority of  the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will 
possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the 
conduct of  the occupation and the control of  Japan.” “In view of the present character of  Japanese society 
and the desire of  the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of  its forces and 
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Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of  government 
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Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of  the Supreme 
Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the Supreme 
Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to 
evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of  United States objectives. The policy is to use the 
existing form of  Government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of  Government initiated by the 
Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be 
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occupation.” SWNCC-150, August 29, 1945, Part II Allied Authority, 2. Relationship to Japanese 
Government, in RM030. 
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(2) An executive branch of  government deriving its authority from and responsible to 
the electorate or to a fully representative legislative body; 
(3) A legislative body, fully representative of  the electorate, with full power to reduce, 
increase or reject any items in the budget or to suggest new items; 
(4) No budget shall become effective without the express approval of  the legislative 
body; 
(5) Guarantee of  fundamental civil rights to Japanese subjects and to all persons 
within Japanese jurisdiction; 
(6) The popular election or local appointment of  as many of  the prefectural officials 
as practicable; 
(7) The drafting and adoption of  constitutional amendments or of  a constitution in a 
manner which will express the free will of  the Japanese people.87 
 
A fundamental problem was of  course the treatment of  the tenno system. The United States 
government considered the tenno system with its various prerogatives in the Meiji constitutional 
system to be inconsistent with the democratization of  Japan. “Though the ultimate form of  
government in Japan is to be established by the freely expressed will of  the Japanese,” the document 
contended, “the retention of  the Emperor institution in its present form is not considered consistent 
with the foregoing general objectives.”88 “The Japanese,” therefore, “should be encouraged to abolish 
the Emperor Institution or to reform it along more democratic lines.”89 The document also supposed 
responses when the Japanese people decided to retain the tenno system. In that case, the Supreme 
Commander further indicated that the Japanese government should adopt more democratized 
governmental institutions as additional safeguards.90 However, the document was very careful not to 
impose the political reforms it listed upon the Japanese people, because “the knowledge that [the 
                                                 
87 “Reform of  the Japanese Government System,” SWNCC-228, “a” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 412-14. 
88 “Reform of  the Japanese Government System,” SWNCC-228, “b” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 414. 
89 “Reform of  the Japanese Government System,” SWNCC-228, “d” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 414. 
90 The concrete indicated reforms were as follows:  
(1) That the Ministers of  State, chosen with the advice and consent of  the representative legislative 
body, shall form a Cabinet collectively responsible to the legislative body; 
(2) That when a cabinet loses the confidence of  the representative legislative body, it must either 
resign or appeal to the electorate; 
(3) The Emperor shall act in all important matters only on the advice of  the Cabinet; 
(4) The Emperor shall be deprived of all military authority such as that provided in Articles XI, XII, 
XIII, and XIV of  Chapter I of  the Constitution; 
(5) The Cabinet shall advise and assist the Emperor; 
(6) The entire income of the Imperial Household shall be turned into the public treasury and the 
expenses of  the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by the legislature in the annual budget. 
“Reform of the Japanese Government System,” SWNCC-228, “d” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 416. 
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reforms] had been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility to [reforms’] 
acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future.”91 The Supreme Commander should 
order the Japanese government to execute the listed reforms, the document claimed, “[o]nly as a last 
resort”. 
 General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, was basically 
of  the same opinion. Long before he received SWNCC-228, MacArthur had already suggested the 
necessity of  amending the Meiji Constitution by depending upon the original directive that 
authorized him to supervise the occupation.92 Because the Allied Powers’ occupation was indirect,93 
after MacArthur’s suggestion, he and his staff  at GHQ generally respected the Japanese initiatives 
and waited for the conclusion of  the Matsumoto Committee’s work. In fact, MacArthur had 
prohibited his staff  from contacting the Japanese concerned after the Konoe affair.94 Although the 
Government Section of  GHQ had made preliminary studies of  the Meiji constitution system,95 
however, they were not ready at all to take over the work of  constitutional revision.  
 As preliminary study, the Government Section of  GHQ analyzed the Meiji Constitution. 
Mile E. Rowell, Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) and a member of  the Public Administration 
Branch of  the Government Section, made a report of  the Meiji constitutional regime on December 6, 
1945. In the report, he pointed out “many abuses of  authority which permitted militarists to obtain 
                                                 
91 “Reform of  the Japanese Government System,” SWNCC-228, “d” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 416. 
92 SWNCC-150, August 29, 1945 in RM030. One of  the ultimate objects of  the occupation was “To bring 
about the eventual establishment of  a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of  
other states and will support the objectives of  the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of  the 
Charter of  the United Nations.” “The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as 
may be to principles of  democratic self-government, but it is not the responsibility of  the Allied Powers to 
impose upon Japan any form of  government not supported by the freely expressed will of  the people.” One of 
the principal means for achieving the objectives was “The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a 
desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, 
assembly, speech, and the press.  They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative 
organizations.” SWNCC-150, Part I Ultimate Objectives.   
93 For the GHQ’s occupation, see Takemae Eiji, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of  Japan and Its Legacy (New 
York: Continuum, 2002). See also, Takemae Eiji, GHQ no hitobibto: Keireki to seisaku (The People in GHQ: Profiles 
and Policies) (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2002); Takemae Eiji, Senryo sengoshi (Occupied Postwar History) (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 2002). 
94 See Chapter 2 section 3. 
95 “Report of  Preliminary Studies and Recommendations of  Japanese Constitution” written by Milo E. Rowell. 
See Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 2-24. 
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control of  the government and subvert it to their ends during the past two decades.”96 In Rowell’s 
view, the following defects in the constitutional system had caused the abuses.97  
a. Lack of  effective rights of  individual citizens. 
b. Extra-constitutional bodies having access to the Emperor which are not responsible to the 
will of  the people. 
c. Direct control by the Emperor of  the strength, organization and budget of  the armed 
forces. 
d. Control of  the courts by the procurator as the representative of  the Emperor's will rather 
than the judge holding such position. 
e. Lack of  control of  all functions of  government by a constitution. 
f. A government not responsible to the will of  the people. 
g. Exercise of  legislative functions by the executive branch. 
h. Lack of  authority in the people to amend or alter the constitution. 
i. Centralized authority over local governments. 
 
Rowell concluded the report by suggesting the necessity of  constitutional revision and attaching 
there appendices of  detailed analyses and recommended provisions on bill of  rights, responsible 
government, and local responsibility. However, he was careful enough to say that these 
recommendations were “tentative only’” and “not inflexible.”98 
Rowell regarded reservation of  law as a serious problem in the Meiji constitutional system. 
To encourage democratic tendencies and modify authoritarian tendencies, he believed, it was 
necessary for the revised constitution to protect freedom of  religious worship, opinion, speech, press 
and assembly, along with personal freedom, particularly the rights of  the accused. An independent 
judiciary was supposed to play an important role in protecting such freedoms and rights.99 As for the 
governmental system, Rowell emphasized political responsibilities to the people. He especially 
denounced extra-constitutional agencies that were responsible to only the tenno and directly 
irresponsible to the people. Although a total constitutional change in government institutions was 
believed to be necessary for the less feudalistic and authoritarian and more democratic political 
                                                 
96 “Report of  Preliminary Studies and Recommendations of  Japanese Constitution,” in Takayanagi, Seitei 
Katei, 1: 2.  
97 “Report of  Preliminary Studies and Recommendations of  Japanese Constitution,” in Takayanagi, Seitei 
Katei, 1: 2-4. 
98 “Report of  Preliminary Studies and Recommendations of  Japanese Constitution,” in Takayanagi, Seitei 
Katei, 1: 2, 4. 
99 “Annex ‘A’ Bill of  Rights,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 6-10.  
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process, Rowell presupposed that the tenno system would continue to exist and that the tenno would 
be more powerful than in the actual postwar constitution, when he wrote “That direct access to the 
Emperor be expressly given to a limited number of  government officials who are directly responsible 
to the people.”100 The report added that the decentralization of  authorities to local and prefectual 
governmental organizations would also reinforce democratic tendencies in Japan.101  
This preliminary study is important evidence that GHQ, on the one hand, thought that 
constitutional revision would be necessary to fulfill the requirements the Potsdam Declaration had 
set forth and, on the other hand, assumed retention of  the tenno system. As importantly, a crucial 
picture was still unclear on the relationship between the retained tenno system and a fully 
democratized political process in which the people would actively participate. Popular sovereignty 
had not yet emerged as a central idea of  constitutional revision among the Government Section.  
As discussed above, the Government Section also paid careful attention to the trends of  the 
discussions about constitutional reform by the Japanese people. The private draft of  the Kenpo 
Kenkyukai (Constitutional Research Group) particularly attracted their attention. On January 11, 
1946, Rowell again framed a thorough report on the draft of  the proposed constitutional revision. 
The document found the draft “outstanding liberal” because it provided, among other things, the 
sovereignty of  the people.102 Although there were expressed dissatisfactions on its lack of  rights in 
criminal procedure103 and a concept of  the supreme law of  the land and of  judicial review, 104 the 
document was generally favorable on the draft and concluded that it was “democratic and 
                                                 
100 “Annex ‘B’ Responsive Government,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 10-20, 16. 
101 “Annex ‘C’ Local Responsibility,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 20-24.  
102 “Comments on Constitutional Revision Proposed by Private Group,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 26-40, 
36. 
103 “Comments on Constitutional Revision Proposed by Private Group,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 38. 
104 “Comments on Constitutional Revision Proposed by Private Group,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 38. 
Most of  the lawyers in the Government Section were New Dealers. They did not support judicial activism. 
They were very careful not to use the phase “due process of  law.” They were familiar with the severe conflict 
between President Franklin Roosevelt and the Old Supreme Court of  the United States. Rowell graduated 
from Stanford University Law School and was an attorney. Tanaka, Oboegaki, 73. 
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acceptable.” 105 Because this document was signed by Courtney Whitney, Brigadier General, U. S. 
Army and Chief  of  the Government Section, it is reasonable to infer that the staff  in the 
Government Section shared with Rowell knowledge about the proposed constitutional revision of  
the Kenpo Kenkyukai.106 Through the analysis of  this constitutional revision plan, the Government 
Section clearly understood that there was reason to believe that the principle of  popular sovereignty 
would be accepted and be developed among the Japanese people and found a possible way that the 
tenno system could be connected with the principle.   
However, except for these two documents framed by Rowell, the Government Section of  
GHQ had no substantial preparation to undertake constitutional reform.107 As of  January 1946, they 
did not expect that they would make a draft of  the Constitution of  Japan by themselves. Why did 
they then decide rather suddenly to make their own draft of  a new Japanese constitution, instead of  
waiting for more by work of  the Japanese government? Was adoption of  the own draft and its 
presentation to the Japanese government an order? If  so, was it “as a last resort”?108  
  Three important incidents---the visit of  the FEAC (FEC), the Mainichi scoop of  the 
Matsumoto Committee’s draft, and the report of  possible abdication of  the tenno---occurred between 
mid-January and February 1946. One was the visit to Tokyo of  the members of  the Far Eastern 
Advisory Commission. On January 17, they met the members of  the Government Section of  GHQ. 
At the meeting,109 Tomas Confesor, representative of  the Philippines, asked whether the Government 
Section was considering reform of  the Japanese Constitution. Charles Kades, the Chief  of  the Public 
Administration Branch of  the Government Section, replied that the Government Section was not 
working on it. He explained that constitutional reform was a long-run issue involving a fundamental 
                                                 
105 “Comments on Constitutional Revision Proposed by Private Group,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 36. 
106 In fact, Kades stated that the draft of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai was a useful source when the Government 
Section prepared their draft of  the revised constitution. See Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan’s 
Imperial Constitution,” 227.   
107 From interviews with Kades and Rowell, Tanaka Hideo judges that the Government Section was busy with 
other things such as making a list of  people who had been ousted from public offices, and problems about the 
reform of  election law and so on for January 1946. Tanaka, Oboegaki, 67-69. 
108 “Reform of  the Japanese Government System,” SWNCC-228, “d” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 416.  
109 “A Meeting between Government Section and the FEC,” Hussy Papers, reel no. 5 in RM053. 
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change in the governmental structure of  Japan, and that it was within the limits of  the authorities of  
the Far Eastern Commission.110 
In fact, the FEC was established by the Moscow Agreement of  December 27, 1945, first of  
all, “To formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by 
Japan of  its obligations under the Terms of  Surrender may be accomplished.”111 It might also check 
actions taken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The agreement provided that the 
FEC should be entitled “To review, on the request of  any member, any directive issued to the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander 
involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of  the Commission.”112 However, the agreement 
carried a compromised provision that the U.S. government might issue interim directives to 
MacArthur for urgent matters that were not decided yet by the commission under the condition that 
“any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the 
regime of  control, or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, will be issued 
only following consultation and following the attainment of  agreement in the Far Eastern 
Commission.”113 Literal understanding of  the terms of  the commission might place GHQ out of  
constitutional revision.114 
                                                 
110 See Tanaka, Oboegaki, 50-60; Koseki, Tanjyo, 115-119.  
 The FEAC was the predecessor of  the Far Eastern Committee and “the inter-Allied agency initially 
charged with making recommendations on the implementation of  the Japanese surrender terms.” Ward, 
“Origins of  the Present Japanese Constitution,” American Political Science Review, 50: 980, 987 n. 16. At that 
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for Japan,” A. III. 3 in RM049.    
114 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 107-108. 
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 Yet the reactions of  GHQ seem puzzling. MacArthur himself  had been strongly against the 
decision made at the Moscow conference to establish the Far Eastern Commission in order to decide 
and implement the policies of  the occupation of  Japan.115 On January 30, however, MacArthur told 
the visiting members of  FEC (FEAC) that the matter of  constitutional reform “had been taken out 
of his hands by the Moscow Agreement” and that “insofar as his own part in this work was 
concerned, [he] had ceased to take any action whatever.”116 He added that he had issued no orders or 
directives on constitutional revision, but that he had limited himself  merely to suggestions. Then he 
expressed his belief  about constitutional reform.117 
It is his hope that whatever may be done about constitutional reform in Japan, this will be 
done in such a way as to permit the Japanese to look upon the resulting document as a 
Japanese product, for he feels that only in this way can the work be permanent. It is his 
belief, that it is his conviction, that a constitution, no matter how good, no matter how well 
written, forced upon the Japanese by bayonet will last just as long as bayonets are present, 
and that he is certain that the moment force is withdrawn and the Japanese are left to their 
own devices they will get rid of  that constitution and get something in its place that will be 
as far from the discarded document as they can get, merely for the purpose of  asserting and 
maintaining their independence of  ideas that they have been forced to accept. 
                                                 
115 Other Allied countries such as the USSR, UK, China, Australia, and so on were dissatisfied with the lenient 
occupation policy toward Japan that the United States had adopted. In the Moscow Agreement, the UK and 
USSR succeeded in setting up a more powerful agency, the FEC, which was empowered “to formulate the 
policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of  its obligations under the 
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At least superficially, thus, MacArthur and his staff  of  the Government Section pretended to be 
indifferent to the constitutional revision. In reality, however, the very interest the FEC (FEAC) had 
shown had stimulated GHQ to reconsider its authority to deal with constitutional reform.118  
On February 1, indeed, Courtney Whitney wrote a memorandum for MacArthur about 
constitutional reform. In this memo, Whitney examined the extent of  the Supreme Commander’s 
power to “deal with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure.”119 His opinion 
was that “in absence of  any policy decision by the Far Eastern Commission on the subject,” the 
Supreme Commander legitimately had authority over constitutional reform.120 At first, Whitney 
considered MacArthur’s authority from the Allied Powers and concluded that his “authority to 
effectuate constitutional reform designed to develop a form of  government responsible to the 
people” was “implicit in the terms of  [his] designation by the Allied Powers as Supreme Commander 
for the purpose of  enforcing the surrender terms.”121 Then Whitney moved to an examination of  
SCAP’s relation to Joint Chiefs of  Staff. In Whitney’s judgment, it was clear that MacArthur could 
not “accomplish these aspects of  [his] mission without effecting fundamental changes in the 
Japanese constitutional structure.” “Since the development of  a democratic Japan [had] been 
explicitly made a part of  [his] mission,” Whitney continued, MacArthur had “ample authority from 
the Joint Chiefs of  Staff  to approve or order constitutional reform designed to achieve the desired 
results.”122 Thus, a conflict over jurisdiction might occur with the FEC. In Whitney’s view, before the 
FEC officially started its activities, MacArthur had “unrestricted authority to take any action [he 
deems] proper in effecting changes in the Japanese constitutional structure.” 123  Whitney then 
discussed the relationship in power between the Supreme Commander and the Far Eastern 
Commission and the Allied Council for Japan in the following way: “Should the FEC issue a policy 
                                                 
118 See Tanaka, Oboegaki, 58-60; Koseki, Tanjyo, 117-119. 
119 Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 90. 
120 Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 92 (emphasis added). 
121 Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 92. 
122 Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 94. 
123 Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 96. Whitney points out the only restriction, that is, removal of  the Emperor, in 
which case the Supreme Commander is “required to consult with the Joint Chiefs of  Staff.” 
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directive dealing with the matter of  constitutional reform, then and in such event the issuance of  any 
constitutional reform directive (order) upon the Japanese government would be subject to objection 
by any member of  the Allied Council for Japan and [Supreme Commander's] decision would not be 
controlling.” 124  MacArthur and his staff  now were theoretically justified in dealing with 
constitutional reform in Japan. However, timing was crucial for GHQ’s enterprise because 
MacArthur would lose a free hand in decision-making and subject himself  to review after the Far 
Eastern Commission officially inaugurated its function. 
 Coincidentally, the second important event happened on the same day. As we saw above,125 
the Mainichi Shinbun, one of  the major newspapers, published a provisional draft of  a constitution 
that was virtually the same as one of  drafts Miyasawa prepared for consideration in the Matsumoto 
Committee. This publication totally changed the process of  making the constitution. 
 The Matsumoto Committee had failed to understand fully what the Potsdam Declaration 
had required the Japanese government to do and thus to propose a constitutional system in which 
the tenno system would be rationally founded. In terms of  discussion, the committee had decided to 
isolate itself  from the outside world. The committee neither listened to what the Japanese people 
said, nor tried to have contact with GHQ, unlike the Konoe group. 126  The secrecy was well 
maintained. The anxious and irritated GHQ had urged the Japanese government to submit a result 
of the work on constitutional reform as early as possible. On the basis of  Matsumoto’s explanation 
of  the four principles for revising the Meiji Constitution in the Imperial Diet,127 GHQ had expected 
                                                 
124 Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 96-98 (underline in original). 
125 See Chapter 2 section 5. 
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that the draft of  the committee would be conservative. However, the Mainichi scoop astonished GHQ 
as well as the Japanese people. The reported governmental draft was much more conservative than 
their expectation. GHQ became more eager to know the content of  the governmental work on 
constitutional revision than ever before.128 
 The Government Section quickly responded to the Mainichi scoop. As early as February 2, 
Whitney wrote a memo to MacArthur with a translation of  the Mainichi article. Whitney reported 
that the draft was ‘”extremely conservative in character” and left ‘”substantially unchanged the 
status of  the Emperor with all rights of  sovereignty vested in him” and that it was “poorly received 
by the press and the public.”129 The translated draft reported as a provisional governmental plan was 
thoroughly examined provision-by-provision with comments from a liberal democratic point of  
view.130 This memo shows that the chief  of  the Government Section had already intended to frame a 
constitutional draft by themselves and orient the Japanese government to follow it. In fact, Whitney 
thought that it was “better strategy to orient them before the formal submission of  a draft than to 
wait and force them to again start from scratch once an unacceptable draft had been submitted to 
which they were committed.”131  
In any event, the Government Section considered the reported draft to be too conservative 
to accept as an official draft of  the Japanese government, although the real final draft of  the 
committee was based upon another draft prepared by Matsumoto himself, which was actually more 
conservative than the draft that was revealed in the Mainichi Shinbun. International opinion would 
understand that the publication of  such a conservative constitutional draft was to serve as a symbol 
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of the failure of  the lenient occupational policy of  the Supreme Commander towards Japan. As 
discussed above, the Far Eastern Commission would inaugurate its official functions imminently.  
As Koseki Shoichi has recently pointed out,132 the third factor causing GHQ to hasten to 
write their own constitutional draft and make the new constitution was related to the maintenance 
of  the tenno system. There were severe international criticisms of  the tenno as a war criminal after 
defeat in the war.133 Many Japanese people thought that the tenno should take some responsibility for 
the disaster. Of  course it was not political or legal, but moral in nature. Abdication had been a real 
issue.134 Prince Higashikuni, Hirohito’s uncle by marriage, secretly discussed abdication with the 
tenno when he headed the cabinet. And the abdication matter was indeed publicly argued in the 
media. On October 21, 1945, Konoe Fumimaro told a reporter of  the Associated Press that a new 
constitution he was working on might include a procedure of  abdication.135 Three days later, Konoe 
corrected the report to deny future abdication of  the tenno and say that the tenno’s interest in 
abdication meant that the tenno has been very interested in the stiffening American public opinion, 
after he received an objection from the Shidehara cabinet.136 On December 21, the Yomiuri Hochi 
Shinbun carried an article by a reporter of  the New York Herald Tribune that the tenno’s aides had 
discussed abdication and MacArthur had said nothing about war criminalization of  the tenno.137 On 
February 27, further, the Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun again reported an article of  the Associate Press 
about abdication rather minutely. According to the article, a high official at the Ministry of  Imperial 
Household told an AP reporter that the tenno himself  wanted to step down at the proper time but his 
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(Conflicting Images of  the Emperor: Around 1945) (Iwanami Shoten, 1978, 2001). 
134 For the abdication matter, particularly on how the tenno and GHQ evaded moral responsibility, see Dower, 
Embracing Defeat, chap. 11 Imperial Democracy: Evading Responsibility, 319-345. 
135 “Tenno taii no jyoko sonyu mo arieru (A Provision of Abdication from the Throne might be Included),” 
Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun, article, October 23, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 45. 
136 “Konoeko shini wo benmei (Prince Konoe Explained His Real Intention),” Asahi Shinbun, article, October 
25, 1945 in Shoron Shuroku, 47-48. 
137 “Sokkinsha ga taiiron (Aides Discuss the Abdication),” Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun, article, December 21, 1945 
in Shoron Shuroku, 92. 
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aides said that it would be unnecessary for the tenno to abdicate from the throne because 
responsibility of  the war should be assumed by his cabinet members. And the article also mentioned 
a speculation that if  he abdicated, his son, crown prince Akihito would succeed to the throne and his 
brother Takamatsunomiya would become a regent until Akihito came of  age. Finally, the article 
presented that there were conflicting two views among the aides on a future tenno system: something 
like the British monarchy, and setting up a moral leader of  the state without any political powers. It 
concluded by stating that the Prime Minister Shidehara and the Minister of  the Imperial Household 
Matsudaira reportedly were opposed to the abdication now.138 
The media coverage on the abdication had annoyed MacArthur and his staff. MacArthur 
had already decided that the tenno was excluded from trial as a war criminal. On November 29, 1945, 
the Joint Chiefs of  Staff  sent to MacArthur the terms of  SWNCC-55/6 and directed him to gather 
information and evidence regarding the tenno’s possible war criminality. 139  Although the U.S. 
government also had decided to preserve and use the tenno to make their occupational policy easily 
executed, they could not completely rule out the possibility that the already heated domestic and 
international public opinion would burst out demanding the tenno be tried as a war criminal. On 
January 25, 1946, MacArthur replied to Eisenhower by saying that “No specific and tangible 
evidence has been uncovered with regard to [the tenno’s] exact activities which might connect him in 
varying degree with the political decisions of  the Japanese Empire during the last decade.”140 Then 
MacArthur added that the tenno’s indictment would “unquestionably cause a tremendous confusion 
among the Japanese people, the repercussions of  which cannot be overestimated”141 and as a result, 
a fundamental change in occupational policy would be necessary for responding to active or negative 
resistance of  the Japanese people and maintaining order. He estimated “a minimum of  a million 
                                                 
138 “Gotaii womegutte (Over the Abdication),” Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun, article, February 27, 1946 in Shoron 
Shuroku, 206-208. 
139 See Ward, “Presurrender Planning,” in Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 15. 
140 General of  the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief  of  Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower), FRUS, 
1946 VIII, 395-397 in RM054. 
141 General of  the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief  of  Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower) in 
RM054. 
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troops would be required which would have to be maintained for an indefinite number of  years.”142 
Further, he warned that after failure of  democratization and military suppression of  chaotic disorder, 
“some form of  intense regimentation probably along communistic line would arise from the 
mutilated masses.”143 However, such stations were impossible because top military officers had been 
already “under the strongest political and public pressure to repatriate and demobilize American’s 
armed forces with the greatest possible speed.”144 On the U.S. governmental level, the issue was 
solved for retaining and using the tenno for smooth occupational operations. The remaining task was 
how to lead the heated public opinion to give the tenno system a soft-landing in the new political 
order of  postwar Japan. For this purpose, the work of  the Matsumoto Committee was absolutely 
unsatisfactory for MacArthur and his staff. 145  The publication of  the too conservative plan of  
constitutional revision would spoil all efforts by MacArthur to save the tenno.146 This was the third 
factor of  acceleration in making a more democratized constitutional plan on the part of  GHQ. 
 On February 3, 1946, as the consequence of  the circumstances mentioned above, therefore, 
MacArthur decided to make a draft of  a constitution for a new Japan and to orient the Japanese 
government to adopt the draft by following GHQ’s outline. MacArthur informed Whitney, Chief  of  
the Government Section, of  his decision and presented three basic points that were to be necessary 
in the constitutional revision.147 This “musts” list is often called “MacArthur’s Notes.” The first item 
                                                 
142 General of  the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief  of  Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower) in 
RM054. In the same memo, MacArthur contended that the tenno was “a symbol which unites all Japanese” and 
that “Destroy him and the nation [would] disintegrate.” He added that “Practically all Japanese venerate [the 
tenno] as the social head of the state and believe[ed] rightly or wrongly that the Potsdam agreements were 
intended to maintain him as the Emperor of  Japan.” Ibid (emphasis added). 
143 General of  the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief  of  Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower) in 
RM054. 
144 Ward, “Presurrender Planning,” in Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 16. 
145 The fact that the tenno did not abdicate but continued to be on the throne has diluted a distinguishably new 
value of  the postwar constitution. I will return to this point later. 
146 The tenno himself  knew well about the state of  things. See Kinoshita Michio, Sokkin Nikki (Tokyo: Bungei 
Shunjyu, 1990). 
147 The full text of  "MacArthur Notes" is the following: 
I 
Emperor is at the head of the state. 
His succession is dynastic. 
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of  the notes was that the tenno system itself  would remain, although the duties and powers of  the 
tenno had to be based upon the basic will of  the Japanese people expressed in the constitution. The 
symbolic tenno system with the principle of  popular sovereignty was now ready for introduction in 
the new constitution. It is noteworthy, however, that there was no direct mention of  the principle of  
popular sovereignty in the notes, unlike the draft of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai.148 The second point was 
related to the most prominent issue, namely, the renunciation of  war and armed forces. Although 
there has been a long controversy over who is attributed to the renunciation, MacArthur or 
Shidehara,149 in any event, this was the origin of  the peace constitution in which the Japanese people 
declared the absolute renunciation of  war and rejection of  any armed forces.150 Finally and third, the 
notes suggested abolishing the old feudal system. In fact, equality has become one of  the 
fundamental concepts of  Japanese constitutionalism. However, MacArthur contradicted himself  
when he, on the one hand, had decided to retain the tenno system for smooth operations of  the 
                                                                                                                                                             
His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsive to the 
basic will of  the people as provided therein. 
II 
War as a sovereign right of  the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for 
settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are 
now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. 
No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of  belligerency will ever 
be conferred upon any Japanese force. 
III 
The feudal system of  Japan will cease. 
No rights of  peerage except those of  the Imperial family will extend beyond the lines of  those now 
existent. 
No patent of  nobility will from this time forth embody within itself  any National or Civil power of  
government. 
Pattern budget after British system. 
“Three basic points stated by Supreme Commander to be 'Musts' in constitutional revision. Government 
Section paper prepared about 4 Feb. 1946,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 98-100. 
148 See this Chapter section 2. 
149 Of  who was an originator of  the denunciation of  war, there are the Shidehara Theory, the MacArthur 
Theory, the Kades Theory, and the Whitney-Kades Theory. See Koseki, Tanjyo, 131-137. See also, Theodore 
McNelly, “General MacArthur and the Constitutional Disarmament of  Japan,” “General MacArthur’s 
Pacifism,” and “Japan’s ‘Peace Constitution’ and World Politics,” The Origins of  Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 
105-169. 
150 The Japanese actually conceived of Japan as a culture state without armed forces. Unfortunately, however, 
this intellectual break-through was not codified as a constitutional draft. An early draft of  the Kenpo Kondankai 
(Constitution Discussion Group headed by Ozaki Yukio) did include such a provision. See Koseki, Tanjyo, 76-
79. 
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occupation and, on the other, order abolition of  feudalism, the most influential legacy of  which was 
and is beyond doubt the tenno system itself.   
In fact, these principles MacArthur’s Notes raised constituted the basic structure of  the 
Constitution of  Japan. It is surprising, however, that the Notes failed to point out strengthening the 
liberties and rights of  the people, which was one of  the most important purposes of  the occupation 
of  Japan. Reservation of  law was a most serious problem for protecting liberties and rights in prewar 
Japan. 
 The following day, Whitney called a meeting and told his staff  that “General MacArthur has 
entrusted the Government Section with the historically significant task of  drafting a new 
Constitution for the Japanese people.”151 Whitney presented the three principles of  MacArthur that 
had to become basic elements of  a draft of  a new constitution.152 They then had an open discussion 
in which they confirmed the points to which they should pay close attention in drafting a 
constitution. 1) The draft would follow the existing Japanese Constitution’s structure and 
headings. 153  This agreement would be a main cause of  seeming continuity between the two 
constitutions, which has made it difficult to acknowledge revolutionary characteristics of  the new 
constitution. 2) The proposed constitution should have “explicit controls” of  political power, “if  
deemed necessary to protect the fundamental rights of  the people.”154 The item shows that what the 
members of  the Government Section cared most about was protection of  liberties and rights of  the 
people. This supplemented a pivotal deficiency in MacArthur’s Notes. 3) The draft should 
emphasize “sovereignty squarely in the hands of  the people”. The role the tenno would play would 
                                                 
151 “Summary Report on Meeting of  the Government Section, 4 February, 1946,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 
102. See also Tanaka, Oboegaki, 61-76; Koseki, Tanjyo, 124-131. 
152 MacArthur’s Notes and the principles Whitney presented were not completely identical. See editors’ note, 
in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 103. 
153 “Summary Report on Meeting of  the Government Section, 4 February, 1946,” Points in Open Discussion, 
par. 1 in Takayagagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 104. 
154 “Summary Report on Meeting of  the Government Section, 4 February, 1946,” Points in Open Discussion, 
par. 2 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 104. 
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be “that of  a social monarch, merely.”155 The members now clearly viewed popular sovereignty at the 
center of  the proposed constitution with connected to a tenno institution that would play only a 
social role. 4) The principles of  the United Nations Charter should be “implicit in [their] thinking as 
[they] draft the Constitution.”156 
 The Government Section then divided itself  to organize a steering committee and several 
subcommittees, each of  which prepared a preliminary draft on an assigned chapter.157 After that, the 
steering committee and each subcommittee met to compose the second draft. Finally, the steering 
committee checked all provisions and completed the draft of  the constitution. All this work was 
accomplished in eight days, February 5 through 12.158 When they wrote their drafts, they used as 
referencing sources several Japanese drafts of  the revised constitution, about a dozen other countries’ 
constitutions, state constitutions, and SWNCC 228 and so on. Kades, an important member of  the 
Steering Committee, emphasizes that they paid attention to “Japanese liberal traditions, which had 
persisted throughout more than six decades”.159 
 The final draft was complete on February 13, when it was handed to the Japanese 
government. Let us briefly look at its characteristics. 1) Preamble: The preamble solemnly declared 
the political philosophies of  a new Japan. Most importantly, it was the Japanese people that 
established the constitution. The principle of  popular sovereignty was materialized in “the universal 
principle that government is a sacred trust the authority for which is derived from the people, the 
powers of  which are exercised by the representatives of  the people, and the benefits of  which are 
                                                 
155 “Summary Report on Meeting of  the Government Section, 4 February, 1946,” Points in Open Discussion, 
par. 3 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 104. 
156 “Summary Report on Meeting of  the Government Section, 4 February, 1946,” Points in Open Discussion, 
par. 4 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 104-105. 
157 The subcommittees were Legislative, Executive, Civil Rights, Judiciary, Local Government, and Finance 
Committees and Committee on the Emperor, Treaties and Enabling Provisions. See “Memorandum setting 
forth organization of Public Administration Division of Government Section into Committees for preparation 
of  draft constitution,” in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 110-112. 
158  The Government Section maintained absolute secrecy in all aspects of  the work of  drafting the new 
constitution. See “Summary Report on Meeting of  the Government Section, 4 February, 1946,” Working 
Arrangements, 1 & 3 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 106. For the work of  the Government Section, see 
Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 116-264; Tanaka, Oboegaki, 130-169; Koseki, Tanjyo, 137-151; Hellengers, We the 
Japanese People, 2: 518-526; Moore & Robinson, Partners for Democracy, 93-110.  
159 Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan’s Imperial Constitution,” 227. 
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enjoyed by the people”.160 A profound commitment to pacifism also led to recognition of  all peoples’ 
“right to live in peace, free from fear and want.”161 2) The tenno: the symbolic tenno institution was 
now officially introduced into a constitutional scheme. The tenno should be “the symbol of  the State 
and of  the Unity of  the People, deriving his position from the sovereign will of  the People, and from 
no other source”162and “have no governmental powers”.163 The proposed constitution obviously 
denied the idea of  a line unbroken for ages eternal and placed the tenno upon nothing but a solid 
basis of  the popular will. It would also make a new imperial household law a genuine statute.164 
Although the state functions the tenno should be planned to discharge with the advice and consent of  
the cabinet were constitutionally provided, a political function to dissolve the Diet was included.165 
In this respect, the GHQ draft pictured a more political image of  the tenno than the Kenpo Kenkyukai 
draft, which provided for only its ceremonial functions. 3) Positive pacifism: Chapter II consisted of  
one article of  denunciation of  war and armed forces.166 This chapter differentiated the GHQ draft 
from the Meiji Constitution in organization and from any other drafts Japanese people prepared. 4) 
Rights: Protection of  rights of  the people now became free from the limitation of  laws but instead 
                                                 
160 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, preamble, par. 1 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 266. 
161 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, preamble, par. 2 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 266. 
162 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, preamble, art. 1 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 268. 
163 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, art. 3 par. 2 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 268. 
164 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, art. 2 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 268. 
165  The tenno, on behalf  of  the people, should perform, with the advice and consent of  the cabinet, the 
following state functions:  
“Affix his official seal to and proclaim all laws enacted by the Diet, all Cabinet orders, all 
amendments to this Constitution, and all treaties and international conventions; 
Convoke sessions of  the Diet; 
Dissolve the Diet; 
Proclaim general elections; 
Attest the appointment or commission and resignation or dismissal of  Ministers of  State, 
ambassadors and those other state officials whose appointment or commission and resignation or 
dismissal may by law be attested in this manner; 
Attest grants of  amnesty, pardons, commutation of  punishment, reprieves and rehabilitation; 
Award honors; 
Receive ambassadors and ministers of  foreign States; and 
Perform appropriate ceremonial functions.” 
The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, art. 6 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 270. 
166 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, art. 8 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 272. 
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came under an obligation to serve “the common good.”167  This would be a source of  judicial 
passivism in the postwar constitutional regime. Enumeration covered not only classical negative 
freedoms such as freedom of  thought, religion, expression, and association, and personal liberties, 
but also newly recognized social rights such as rights to work, and to organize, bargain and act 
collectively.168 However, the right to life the Kenpo Kenkyukai raised was not protected in this draft. 5) 
The parliamentary government system: The cabinet was collectively responsible to the unicameral 
Diet. The Diet might pass a resolution of  non-confidence, in response to which the cabinet should 
resign or order the Diet to dissolve.169 6) The independent judiciary: The Supreme Court should 
determine the constitutionality of  any legal norms but its judgment of  the constitutionality of  legal 
norms on matters other than cases concerning the rights of  the people was subject to the Diet’s 
review. And in this review, the Diet might override decisions of  the Supreme Court by a concurring 
vote of  two-thirds of  all the members.170 This well shows that GHQ lawyers were New Dealers who 
admitted judicial activism on civil rights and civil liberties but were extremely skeptical about it on 
democratic decisional matters.171 7) Guarantee of  local government and declaration of  supreme law 
were distinctive in this draft. 172  8) The Diet would initiate amendment to the constitution and 
referendum should be necessary.173    
The GHQ work of  the proposed constitution gives us a hint of  what constitution-writing 
means in the post-civil revolution era. Unlike the work of  the Matsumoto Committee, in which the 
drafts had been more or less written by a single person, the process of  drafting the constitution by the 
                                                 
167 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, art. 11 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 272.  
168 As Rowell believed from his analysis of  the Meiji constitutional system, personal liberties of  the suspected 
and accused were minutely protected in this draft as a reflection of  poor practices in this field. See the GHQ 
Draft, Constitution of Japan, arts. 30-39 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 278-282. See also “Report of  
Preliminary Studies and Recommendations of  Japanese Constitution, Annex ‘A’ Bill of  Rights,” prepared by 
Milo Rowell, ibid., 1: 6-10. 
169 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, arts. 41, 57, & 61 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 282, 286-288.  
170 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, art. 73 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 294. 
171 See United States v. Carolene Products, U.S. (1938). See also, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A 
Theory of  Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
172 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, arts. 86-88, & 90-91 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 300, 302. 
173 The GHQ Draft, Constitution of  Japan, art. 89 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 300. 
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Government Section was full of  discussion and collaboration. The American style of  making a 
constitution was that the people who actually wrote the draft shared the basic principles of  a liberal 
democracy with each other. In fact, the members of  drafting committees were men and women and 
lawyers and non-lawyers with various backgrounds.174  Although they were guided by the basic 
principles of  constitutional writing that MacArthur and Whitney established, their concrete images 
of  what is a good governmental structure differed.175 Thus deliberation was necessary for working 
together. The Japanese people who participated in the drafting process, by sharp contrast, were 
homogenous in gender and education and oriented by no significant principle except the old kokutai 
ideology.176 They needed no serious discussion on what the government serves. These contrasts 
characterize the constitution in Japan ultimately as an instrument of  the elite for ruling the people. 
Up to that time, unfortunately, a constitution as an expression of  the peoples’ ideals had been 
essentially irrelevant to the governing elites in Japan. 
 On February 13, 1946, in the meeting with Foreign Minster Yoshida Shigeru and Minister of  
State Matsumoto Joji, Whitney and three members of  his staff  rejected the draft of  the Matsumoto 
Committee177 because it was “wholly unacceptable to the Supreme Commander as a document of  
freedom and democracy.”178 The day before, in fact, the Government Section prepared comments on 
the document “Gist of  the Revision of  the Constitution.”179 They understood that the gist had been 
informally submitted by the Japanese side.180 The memo the Government Section prepared gave an 
extremely low evaluation to the gist of  the Matsumoto Committee. It concluded that the proposed 
                                                 
174 For the members of  drafting committees, see Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan’s Imperial 
Constitution,” 225-226; Tanaka, Oboegaki, 69-76. 
175 Tanaka has pointed out a conflict in the view of  rights between the Steering Committee consisting of  only 
lawyers and the Civil Rights Committee composed of  only non-lawyers. While the former saw protection of  
rights through judicial review, the latter was more idealistic in trying to transform Japanese society by 
appealing to high values of  civil rights and civil liberties. Tanaka, Oboegaki, 130-150. 
176 Koseki, Tanjyo, 127-128, 172.  
177 “Comments on the Document ‘Gist of  the Revision of the Constitution’,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 80-90. 
178 “Record of  Events on 13 February 1946,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 322. 
179 For the contents and explanation of  the Kenpo Kaisei Yoko (Gist of  the Revision of the Constitution), see 
Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 686-711. 
180 “Memorandum for : Chief, Government Section,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 78-80, 78. 
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constitutional revision failed to “fulfill the objectives set forth in the Potsdam Declaration”.181 
Interestingly, this memo clearly interpreted that Article 12 of  the Potsdam Declaration182 required 
Japan to establish the principle of  popular sovereignty according to which the government would be 
organized.183 Because the gist did not basically change provisions of  the tenno from those of  the Meiji 
Constitution,184 the memo understood, the constitutional revision of  the Matsumoto Committee was 
fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of  popular sovereignty.185 Thus the cabinet should have 
been collectively responsible only to a Diet fully representative of  the people.186 The cabinet should 
have been the solo executive organ having access to the tenno and thus the tenno could act in all state 
matters only by following the advice of  the cabinet.187 The memo further pointed out that a bill of  
rights should have been guaranteed without reservation of  law and extended to all people who live in 
Japan.188 These comments the memo made were naturally along the views that formed the basis of  
the GHQ draft of  the revised constitution. In sum, the plan Matsumoto submitted was regarded as 
too conservative to realize a liberal democratic government in postwar Japan. At that point, the 
members of  the Government Section had recognized the coexistence of  popular sovereignty and the 
tenno institution. They were ready to require Japan to adopt such a mixed system. 
After he denounced the Matsumoto plan based upon an inner analysis, Whitney personally 
presented to the Japanese representatives fifteen mimeographed copies of  the GHQ draft of  the 
                                                 
181 “Memorandum for: Chief, Government Section,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 78. 
182 Article 12 of  the Potsdam Declaration reads: “The occupying forces of  the Allies shall be withdrawn from 
Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with 
the freely will of  the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.” 
183 “Comments on the Document ‘Gist of  the Revision of the Constitution’, 1” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 80.   
184 One exception in the first six provisions was the change from the word “sacred” in Article 3 of  the Meiji 
Constitution to the word “supreme”. See “Comments on the Document ‘Gist of  the Revision of  the 
Constitution’,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 82.  See also, Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 551.  
185 “Comments on the Document ‘Gist of  the Revision of the Constitution’ 1,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 82. 
186 “Comments on the Document ‘Gist of  the Revision of the Constitution’ 2, 3, and 9,” Takayanagi, Seitei 
Katei, 1: 82, 84, 88.  
187 “Comments on the Document ‘Gist of  the Revision of the Constitution’ 2 and 10,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 
1: 84, 90. 
188 “Comments on the Document ‘Gist of  the Revision of the Constitution’ 4,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 84, 
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revised constitution in English.189 Whitney then informed them of  MacArthur’s understanding of  
“the desperate need of  the people of  Japan for a liberal and enlightened Constitution which will 
defend them from the injustices and the arbitrary controls of  the past.” 190  The Japanese 
representatives, who had assumed that they would discuss their own draft with the members of  the 
Government Section, were stunned to receive the American draft like a bolt from the blue. This 
meeting was clearly a turning point in history and has been the main source of  a serious controversy 
over the imposed constitution: the assertion that GHQ imposed the Constitution of  Japan upon the 
reluctant Japanese government in exchange for the safety of  the tenno. 191 
The phrases Whitney used might be understood as intimidation because he, among other 
things, mentioned the possibility that the tenno might be on trial for war crimes. Matsumoto later 
testified how he felt: “General MacArthur had for some time been considering most seriously the 
maintenance of  the Emperor, but that it was essential to the accomplishment of  this aim that the 
Japanese Government proclaim a revised constitution similar to the draft here being presented. If  
this was not done, the person of  the emperor could not be guaranteed.”192 However, the record of  the 
American side took a different tone. 
As you may or may not know, the Supreme Commander has been unyielding in his 
defence of  your Emperor against increasing pressure from the outside to render him 
subject to war criminal investigation. He has thus defended the Emperor because he 
considered that that was the cause of  right and justice, and will continue along that 
course to the extent of  his ability. But, gentlemen, the Supreme Commander is not 
omnipotent. He feels, however, that acceptance of  the provisions of  this new 
Constitution would render the Emperor practically unassailable. He feels that it 
would bring much closer the day of  your freedom from control by the Allied Powers, 
                                                 
189 For the full text of  the constitutional draft presented to the Japanese government by GHQ on February 13, 
1946, see “Draft, Constitution of  Japan,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 266-302. 
190 “Record of Events on 13 February 1946 When Proposed New Constitution for Japan Was Submitted to the 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Yoshida, in Behalf  of  the Supreme Commander,” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 320-336, 
322. 
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Sato, Seiritsushi, 3: 47.  
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and that it would provide your people with the essential freedoms which the Allied 
Powers demand in their behalf.193 
 
In fact, no Japanese and American participants except Matsumoto remembered that Whitney said 
that if  the Japanese government did not proclaim a revised constitution similar to the GHQ draft, 
the person of  the tenno could not be guaranteed.194 
 At that time, as discussed above, MacArthur had already decided to exclude the tenno from 
war criminal investigations and told the Joint Chiefs of  Staff  that he strongly opposed to a plan to 
render the tenno subject to a war crimes trial. However, the Japanese government did not know this 
fact but listened to only international opinions extremely harsh to the tenno.195 In such a situation, 
the Japanese participants who cared about nothing but retention of  the kokutai might well 
misunderstand GHQ’s intention as a threat. It is reasonable, however, to conclude what Whitney 
told them in that meeting as an objective warning of  “what might happen if  the Japanese 
Government failed to effect a constitutional reform in accordance with the terms of  the Potsdam 
Declaration.”196  It should be interpreted as advice to the Japanese government that lacked the 
knowledge of  international tension over the occupation policy and world politics itself.197 Charles 
Kades, one of  the American participants, explains Whitney’s intention on the analogy of  a lawyer’s 
counsel of  a danger if  a client refuses to follow his or her advice in the lawyer-and-client 
relationship.198  
After all, the governmental elites were infatuated with the obsolescent ideology of  the 
kokutai, understood the situation only from their narrow view on world politics, and would not be 
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careful enough to listen to weak but certain different voices among the Japanese people. If  
imposition occurred, that was surely self-induction. Whitney, indeed, lent the Japanese conservative 
elites a helping hand for survival: 
General MacArthur feels that this is the last opportunity for the conservative group, 
considered by many to be reactionary, to remain in power; that this can only be 
done by a sharp swing to the left; and that if  you accept this Constitution you can 
be sure that the Supreme Commander will support your position. I cannot 
emphasize too strongly that the acceptance of  the draft Constitution is your only 
hope of  survival, and that the Supreme Commander is determined that the people 
of  Japan shall be free to choose between this Constitution and any form of  
Constitution which does not embody these principles.199 
 
 
The Japanese participants now acknowledged that they had been required to fundamentally 
transform the constitution to fulfill the terms the Potsdam Declaration had set forth. However, they 
still did not completely understand that such constitutional transformation would be unavoidable. 
The Japanese government needed time to adjust to the unexpected situation. 
 
4. The Response of  the Japanese Government to GHQ Draft: A Second Defeat and Attempted 
Japanization 
 Surprisingly enough, the stunned Japanese representatives did not take the situation seriously. 
In vain, they attempted to revive the Matsumoto draft. On February 15, Shirasu Jiro, an adviser to 
the Central Liaison Office, who attended the critical meeting two days before, sent to Whitney a 
letter of  bold allegation that the object of the two drafts of  Matsumoto and GHQ was “one and the 
same in spirit”, although they took very different routes.200 The letter well showed an elitist bias 
toward constitutional writing, when Shirasu wrote that Matsumoto was anxious that Japan “should 
be placed on a constitutional basis once for all” but that he and his colleagues had “no means of  
knowing how much they can count on the support of  the people.” They fear that “too complete a 
reform all at once would only invite too extreme a reaction”, the letter said, as the Taisho 
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Democracy went too far and then caused a reactionary militaristic rule.201 The letter showed no 
serious reflection on the failure of  the Meiji constitutional regime on the side of  political leaders and 
attributed it to difficulty of  the people in accepting democracy. However, this rhetoric did not work 
at all because the difference in substance between the two drafts was so clear that it sounded like a 
meaningless joke. Whitney determinedly rejected reconsideration of  the Matsumoto draft and 
warned the Japanese government to realize the severe circumstances around Japan in international 
politics202 and not to miss this opportunity for them to take the leadership to build “a new and 
enlightened Japan charted to the path of  peace and dedicated to upholding the rights of  man in the 
fraternity of  nations”.203 
 Matsumoto himself  also unsuccessfully attempted to persuade GHQ to approve his draft. At 
the February 13 meeting, when he was presented with the unexpected draft, Matsumoto lectured the 
GHQ staff  on the significance of  bicameralism in constitutionalism because he found it provided for 
unicameralism.204 When the most fundamental principle was an objective of  the discussion, his 
behavior with a triumphant attitude was out of  place and even hilarious.205 Matsumoto once again 
explained his idea of  constitutional writing. Constitutional failure derived from “the arbitrary 
transplantation of  a constitutional system unadapted to the condition and circumstance of  the 
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nation concerned”.206  The Weimar German Constitution was a good example of  reality that a 
democratic constitution did not necessarily guarantee that democratic politics would be realized. 
Matsumoto then criticized the Japanese people for lacking knowledge of  and motivation for 
democracy.207 Because the GHQ draft seemed to him too idealistically democratic, he expressed a 
profound fear that when constitutional revision was carried out along the draft, there would occur 
“the internal friction which may be brought on by an attempt at too sudden and too drastic a move, 
which may beget reactionaryism and in the end retard the smooth and wholesome progress of  
democracy.”208 Matsumoto never thought that constitutional text played an educational function to 
the people unless a constitution was an instrument for ruling them.209 Here again Matsumoto failed 
to understand the meaning of  a constitution in a democracy and made a constitution as trivialized in 
the public life as possible. 
Whitney again decisively denounced Matsumoto’s noncommittal attitude toward a liberal 
democratic constitution and requested that the Shidehara cabinet, not Matsumoto himself, reply 
within 48 hours whether the government would accept the basic principles of  the GHQ draft and 
frame a revised constitution along the draft.210 Matsumoto now understood that GHQ would not 
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make an easy compromise. On February 19, finally, Matsumoto for the first time explained the 
situation in the cabinet meeting. Minister of  Education Abe Yoshishige criticized the manner in 
which Matsumoto had handled such a critical issue. Each cabinet member should have had enough 
chances to express his opinion and after full deliberation the cabinet should have made its own 
decision. Irie Toshio, who attended the cabinet meeting as Deputy Director General of  the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau, witnessed that many cabinet members were not satisfied with the secretiveness 
and privateness of  Matsumoto’s conduct.211  
Prime Minister Shidehara at last took the lead and decided to see MacArthur by himself  on 
February 21. The next day, Shidehara explained the meeting with MacArthur to the cabinet 
members. MacArthur’s point was that constitutional revision along the GHQ draft would be 
necessary under the current international circumstances, which would secure the status of  the tenno 
and that popular sovereignty and denunciation of  war were two major principles of  the draft. 
Matsumoto still persisted in his draft. Shidehara and some members were opportunistic enough to 
allege that there was no difference in essence between the American and Japanese plans. Abe was 
again critical of  persistence in the private draft of  Matsumoto and of  the opinion that because the 
two drafts were considerably different, if  the government framed a draft of  constitutional revision 
following the American model, the cabinet would make a truly important decision for the tenno and 
the people. Eventually, the cabinet decided to accept the GHQ plan basically and to frame a draft 
that would be as japanized as possible.212 What most surprises us is that when they agreed to make a 
revised constitution based upon the GHQ plan, most cabinet members did not know the concrete 
contents of  the GHQ draft Matsumoto and company were presented with on February 13 because 
                                                                                                                                                             
the understanding or requirements of  the people, are not acceptable. The Supreme Commander, however, is 
insistent that the principles embodied in the draft constitution which I submitted must be maintained; therefore, 
unless I hear from the Cabinet within 48 hours that the principles of  the constitution which I submitted are 
acceptable to the Cabinet, and will be sponsored by it before the people, the Supreme Commander will take the 
constitution to the people directly and make it a live issue in the forthcoming campaign in order that the people 
will have the opportunity to enact this constitution.” Ibid., 1: 368. 
211 See Irie, Keii, 198-201. 
212 See Irie, Keii, 201-203. 
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neither the American draft nor its translation was distributed to them.213 We have to wonder how 
they could make a responsible decision on accepting the American model and even what they 
actually decided without precise knowledge something that was crucially important. Public 
deliberation had nothing to do with constitutional making for the governmental elite. A second 
defeat of  the Japanese government was a necessary outcome of  the lack of  politics based upon 
public reason,214 which forms the basis of  the constitutional regime in a liberal democracy.      
 Matsumoto was still in charge of  framing a Japanese draft modeled on the GHQ plan. On 
February 26, he asked Sato Tatsuo, chief  of  the first division of  the cabinet legislation bureau, to 
join the work. Matsumoto and Sato alone engaged in preparing a revised constitution along the lines 
of  the GHQ draft. They hastily carried forward the work of  making a draft and finished anyway on 
March 2.215 Here again secretiveness rather than open discussion was important. Work as a group 
was totally foreign to the governing elites. More importantly, through the work, they considerably 
modified the GHQ model. 216  For example, the preamble was completely excluded because the 
principle of  popular sovereignty was believed to be inconsistent with Article 73 of  the Meiji 
Constitution, which provided for the tenno’s exclusive prerogative to amend the constitution.217 But 
this was merely a superficial reason. The real reason resided elsewhere.218 Matsumoto was so deeply 
captured by the kokutai ideology that he could not easily accept the principle of  popular sovereignty. 
As an instrument of  ruling the people, a declaration of  ideals and values the people cherish seemed 
unnecessary in a constitution. Only technicality mattered. Such an attitude was shared by Shidehara, 
who also disliked declaring straightforwardly the principle of  popular sovereignty. Article 1 was a 
crucially important provision in the revised constitution because the symbolic tenno institution would 
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be founded upon the principle of  popular sovereignty. However, the Japanese draft intentionally used 
the ambiguous expression of  “nihon kokumin shiko no soi (supreme will of  the Japanese people)” 
instead of  the phase “sovereign will of  the people”.219  
Protection of  rights also was substantially changed in the March 2 Japanese draft. A subject 
of  rights was changed from “person” in the GHQ draft to “all of  the people” in the Japanese draft.220 
Thus the latter would bring foreigners into a highly vulnerable position.221 Preservation of  law was 
also revived. Freedom of  speech, which is the most pivotal right in liberal democracy and thus 
deserves full protection, should be guaranteed “to the extent that [speech, writing, publication, 
assembly and association] do not interfere with peace and order.” Although guaranteeing freedom of  
speech foremost means exemption from prior restraint, censorship should be allowed “in cases 
specially provided for by law.”222 Sato explained the alternations saying that he worried that without 
reservation of  law, protection of  freedom of  speech might be literally interpreted as license.223 
Furthermore, socialization of  land and other natural resources was discarded and instead, a more 
moderate version of  the welfare state was declared.224 
In this way, japanization of  the GHQ draft was carried out at the possible maximum. GHQ 
carefully responded. On March 4, Matsumoto, Sato, and three other officials met the Government 
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Section officers to write up the final draft. Kades told Sato that the final Japanese draft should revive 
the preamble, which the March 2 draft purposely omitted. Kades continued to criticize the March 2 
draft for lacking important factors of  the American model: The phases “from no other source” and 
“such Imperial House Law as the Diet may enact”, which were significant in American thought, 
were missing in the Japanese draft.225 When the tenno performed some state functions, the Americans 
required the cabinet’s advice and consent for the solo basis of  action of  the tenno, but the Japanese 
draft omitted “consent”. GHQ feared that the tenno might be democratically uncontrolled once again 
in the revised constitutional system. Kades uncompromisingly attacked the change. Matsumoto 
aggressively responded that advice or consent did not matter, because once the advice of  the cabinet 
was required, the tenno’s conduct was under the control of  the cabinet and that first of  all, the word 
consent (kyosan) was usually used for the Diet, not the cabinet.226 Both of  them were excited, even 
enraged. Matsumoto was so annoyed that he lost his temper and left the table at two thirty in the 
afternoon. Irresponsibly enough, he walked out on his most important duty.227 Matsumoto was so 
profoundly infatuated by the kokutai ideology that he could not recognize his own objective mission.  
Sato Tatsuo and three other Japanese, who mostly served as interpreters and organizers of  
documents, were left in the GHQ building and continued to negotiate with at least sixteen officers of  
the Government Section plus interpreters.228 Harsh negotiations lasted from 10:00 a.m. through 4:00 
p.m. on the following day.229 With the Government Section officials, Sato worked on an article-by-
article discussion of  the draft prepared by the Japanese government. Sato by himself  struggled for 
possible japanization.230 He failed for the most part but succeeded in some instances. The members 
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of the Government Section paid very close attention to the Japanese attempts to distort the spirit of  
the GHQ draft. They particularly feared that the idea of  popular sovereignty would be diluted. They 
would not make an easy concession to the Japanese side on popular sovereignty and the symbolic 
tenno institution. They were also very skeptical about the Japanese way of  protecting rights. Thus 
reservation of  law was repudiated because of  its possible abuses.231 The Japanese government was 
required to follow strictly the American model concerning procedural rights of  suspects and the 
accused because police power was consistently abused in prewar Japan.232 For some reason, however, 
equal protection for foreigners vanished from the final draft.233 Because the current constitution 
provides that nationality is determined by law, not by the constitution,234 the omission of  a clause of  
equality of  foreigners has significantly reduced the value of  equality.235 Socialization of  land and 
other natural resources was also omitted.236 Sato later testified that while the Americans adopted a 
tough policy on the crucial issues, they often showed a cooperative attitude to try to frame a final 
draft together.237 
Sato often confronted the Government Section staff  by saying that phrases the Americans 
required the Japanese to adopt sounded so odd as Japanese that people might speculate the 
constitution had been imposed by foreigners.238 A member of  the Government Section who did not 
participated in drafting the constitution writes about the ability of  top Japanese legal bureaucrats: 
It is true that in the negotiations the bungotai [literary] translation of  the English 
draft which Government Section had prepared was used. What was most essential 
for the Americans as they undertook the work of  approving the Japanese text of  the 
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Constitution was to be proficient in Japanese. In this kind of  give and take the 
highly trained Japanese bureaucrats, even though few in number, were probably 
justified in thinking that they could easily outdo the many Nisei [second generation 
Japanese-Americans] interpreters and translators. 239 
 
Sato tried to write constitutional text as simply and briefly as possible.240 To him, the Meiji 
Constitution was a good model for drafting because it was indeed simple and brief. 
Simplicity and briefness gave wide room for legislation and interpretation. Sato’s strategy 
served for the conservative cause among the governing elite. We can find here the traditional 
attitude of  legal elite who preferred legal technicality to constitutional text itself. 
Constitutional text was once again trivialized. 
On March 5, at last, the Shidehara cabinet decided to approve the draft of  constitutional 
revision based upon the GHQ model. 241  At the cabinet meeting, Matsumoto explained the 
unexpectedly rapid development of  things the day before and expressed regret that he should have 
presented the March 2 draft to the cabinet meeting to have open discussion.242 But regret would not 
mend matters. It was too late to have any choice but to adopt the text as the official governmental 
plan. The Shidehara cabinet, who had been captivated by the kokutai ideology, had no thinking 
based upon principle. If  the “imposition” of  the fundamental law of  the land matters, it is the 
Shidehara cabinet that we should first blame for causing it.  
 After it further modified the March 5 draft in minor points of  wording as Japanese,243 the 
next day, the Japanese government published “the General Outline of  the Draft Revision of  the 
Constitution,”244 along with an Imperial Rescript dated March 5.245 To respond to the fear Shidehara, 
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Matsumoto, and others expressed on the deep inconsistency between the Meiji Constitution based 
upon tenno sovereignty and the proposed general outline of  the revised constitution declaring 
popular sovereignty, Irie proposed a form that the tenno who was almighty under the current regime 
would issue an imperial rescript to the effect that he would delegate his constituting power to the 
people by announcing his endorsement as an imperial rescript.246 This meant that, formally, the 
establishment of  the Constitution of  Japan was based upon the procedure provided for in the Meiji 
Constitution. Article 73 of  the Meiji Constitution required that in amending the constitution, the 
tenno might exclusively assume the initiative right and that the amendment project must be submitted 
to the Imperial Diet by “Imperial Order.” The members of  the Government Section believed that 
legal continuity in form was crucially important, because they could not confidently conclude that 
framing a completely new constitution during military occupation would not be considered 
improper interference in violation of  the Hague Convention of  Land Warfare.247 To retain the tenno 
system, there were no other feasible options available to Japanese government. This apparent 
continuity in legal form and discontinuity in substance have been a serious problem for a democratic 
point of  view. GHQ and the conservative Japanese government jointly deprived the people of  a 
precious opportunity to express themselves as sovereign. 
 Meanwhile, newspapers had reported that the work of  the Matsumoto Committee had come 
to a deadlock because of  serious disagreement over approaches to revision among cabinet 
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government to put forth in conformity with my wish their best efforts toward the accomplishment of  this end.” 
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members. 248  On March 6, in fact, the Mainichi Shinbun carried an article speculating that the 
Matsumoto private draft would be completely changed. 249  The next day, suddenly, newspapers 
covered the general outline of  constitutional revision with the statements of  Shidehara and 
MacArthur. Shidehara told the people that the tenno “has with firm resolve indicated clearly that we 
should establish a solid foundation for the building of  a democratic and peaceful nation by 
undertaking fundamental revision of  the present Constitution” and that “[i]n order for the Japanese 
people to occupy a place of  honor in human society, we must look forward to establishing the 
foundations of  basic democratic politics within the country and to taking the initiative toward the 
destruction of  war in the whole world.” and that “[t]he Government is publishing the principal 
points of  the draft revised Constitution in close liaison with the Supreme Commander of  the Allied 
Powers.”250 MacArthur “with a sense of  deep satisfaction” endorsed the draft of  constitutional draft 
the Japanese government announced.251  
Most of  the Japanese people must have been surprised when they learned that the 
governmental draft declared the principle of  popular sovereignty. From media reports that repeated 
the conservative attitude of  Matsumoto, they had assumed that the core of  the Meiji Constitution 
would be untouched. The government draft was a far more democratic and liberal text than the 
Matsumoto draft revealed on February 1. Because GHQ had censored all mention of  its involvement 
in making the draft of  the new constitution, the Japanese people could not understand exactly what 
was going on about the government draft. At the same time, most Japanese people were generally in 
favor of  the government draft. The editorial of  the Tokyo Shinbun on March 8 well expressed such a 
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251 See “Ma gensui seimeisho wo hapyo (General MacArthur Announced a Statement),” Mainichi Shinbun, 
article, March 7, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 214-215. For the English text of  his statement, see Endorsement by 
General MacArthur (3/6/46) SCAP in RM226. 
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popular sentiment when it said that the government draft had unexpectedly made a rapid and 
marvelous change from the Four Matsumoto Principles to the symbolic tenno system, that popular 
sovereignty and denunciation of  war were landmark principles and that because the people now had 
a decisive voice, democratization of  society should be developed along the basic points of  the 
government draft.252 Other newspapers carried editorials of  more or less the same opinion.253 Some 
of  them clearly pointed out the essence of  the work: establishment of  a new constitution rather than 
revision of  the Meiji Constitution.254  
Further, political parties basically welcomed the government plan. The Progressive Party 
and Liberal Party as conservatives, who published constitutional revision drafts based upon the idea 
of  one line unbroken for ages eternal, favored the symbolic tenno institution because the direct 
governance of  the tenno was the exception, not the rule, in Japanese history, and the government 
draft was consistent with historical reality (the Progressive Party) or because the principles of  the 
government draft of  the retention of  the tenno system, respect for fundamental rights and adoption 
of  thorough democracy, and denunciation of  war and building peace state completely coincided 
with the revision plan of  the Liberal Party.255 Although it welcomed the government plan in general, 
the Socialist Party was more critical than the conservatives because it proposed a more formalistic 
tenno system only with ritualistic functions than the symbolic tenno system of  the government draft in 
which the tenno would perform some state functions. The Socialists agreed to a progressive tendency 
                                                 
252 “Seifu no kenpo kaisei soan yoko naru (The Government Has Made Its General Outline of  Draft of  
Constitutional Revision),” Tokyo Shinbun, editorial, March 8, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 218-219. 
253 “Kenpo soan to sekai heiwa (The Constitutional Draft and World Peace),” Asahi Shinbun, editorial, March 8, 
1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 215-216; “Minshu kenpo to shindotoku (The Democratic Constitution and New 
Morality),” Mainichi Shinbun, editorial, March 8, 1946 in ibid., 217-218; “Minshushugi heiwa kokka no koso 
(A Conception of  Democratic Peace State),” Nihon Keizai Shinbun, editorial, March 8, 1946 in ibid., 219-220; 
“Jinmin no kenpo seitei (The People Establish the Constitution),” Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun, editorial, March 8, 
1946 in ibid., 221-222. 
254 “Minshushugi heiwa kokka no koso,” Nihon Keizai Shinbun, editorial, March 8, 1946, in Shoron Shuroku, 
219-220, 220. See also, Tsuneto Kyo, “ Tenno no shochoteki chii nitsuite,” Shinkenpo to minshushugi (The New 
Consitution and Democracy) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1947), 3-4; Minobe Tatsukichi, Kihongenri, 15-16; Minobe, 
Genron, 116-119; Kawamura Matasuke, Shinkenpo to minshushugi (The New Constitution and Democracy) (Tokyo: 
Kunitachi Shoin, 1948), 78. 
255 See “Jijitsu ni sokushita kaisei---Shipoto (Revision Based upon the Fact---The Progressive Party),” “Jyakkan 
no shusei wo yosu---Jiyuto (Some Amendments Needed--- The Liberal Party), Asahi Shinbun, article, March 8, 
1946 in Sato, Seiritsushi, 3: 204-205. 
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of  the government draft, which was similarly shown by their own draft of  constitutional revision, but 
criticized it for too many prerogatives of  the tenno.256 The Communist Party was only against the 
draft because it retained the tenno system, which they believed was the prop of  the feudalistic, 
militaristic, and bureaucratic reactionaries and would prevent popular sovereignty from developing 
in postwar Japan.257  
Intellectuals also expressed their basic support of  the government draft. Royama 
Masamichi, a professor of  public administration at the Tokyo Imperial University, pointed out as 
features of  the draft precise provisions of  rights of  the people without reservation of  laws, which 
would be highly educational for enhancing self-consciousness to protection of  rights and 
establishment of  a government responsible to the people. He continued to argue that democratic 
revolution would be carried out at least along the governmental plan.258 Kohno Mitsu, an executive 
committeeman of  the Socialist Party, personally talked with a reporter of  the Tokyo Shinbun about 
the progressiveness of  the draft. However, he criticized the way of  framing it as lacking public 
deliberation. He then proposed further democratization of  the draft: succession to the throne by the 
consent of  the Diet, immediate abolition of  the peerage, and occupational representatives in the 
House of  Councilors. He concluded his talk with saying that people’s enlightened commitment to 
democracy would be necessary for success in the drafted constitution.259 Takano Iwasaburo, the 
chief  of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai (Constitutional Research Group) and presenter of  a republican 
constitutional plan, also welcomed the government draft. But he believed that the draft was an 
outcome of  GHQ’s favor for peaceful and democratic reconstruction of  Japan and that to reward the 
favor, he had to express constructive criticism on the draft. He proposed that the second, third, and 
                                                 
256 “Osugiru taiken jiko---Shinpoteki keiko ni sansei---Shakaito (Too many prerogative items---Agree to Its 
Progressive Tendency---The Socialist Party),” Asahi Shinbun, article, March 8, 1946 in Sato, Seirtushi, 3: 205. 
257 See “Kenpo soan togi to haichi (The Constitutional Draft Conflicts with the Party Decision),” Asahi Shinbun, 
article, March 8, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 228-230. 
258 See Royama Masamichi, “Hokenteki zanshi isso (Sweeping away Feudalistic Vestiges),” Mainichi Shinbun, 
March 8, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 225-226. 
259 See Kono Hisoka, “Minkangawa yori shinpoteki daga ikanna ‘himitsushituan’ (The Government Draft Is 
More Progressive Than Private Plans, but ‘a Plan That Came from the Closed Door Meeting’ ),” Tokyo 
Shinbun, March 8, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 226-227. 
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fourth paragraphs of  the preamble should be moved to article 1 and that this new article would be 
the people’s pledge. The tenno should hold the throne with the consent of  the Diet and have no 
function in dissolving the House of  Representatives. Protection of  rights should include the right to 
payment and to a life of  a cultural standard. Peerage should be immediately abolished. He then took 
a pragmatic approach to constitutional problems. Because if  a constitution was everlasting, various 
difficulties would necessarily occur, a provision should be included in the constitution that a new 
constitution would be established by referendum in ten years after its promulgation. As a framing 
procedure, further, a constitutional committee would consider the draft and then submit its 
conclusion to the Diet. Takano here again showed strong commitment to the democratic principle.260   
As a whole an interesting situation emerged when people faced the government draft of  
constitutional revision: while parties who clung to the kokutai ideology somehow easily came to 
support the government draft, those who tried to conceive a new nation as more or less independent 
of  a line unbroken for ages eternal were skeptical about the symbolic tenno system because there 
would be some room for manipulation.261 More interestingly, this situation would turn around after 
Japan recovered its independence from the occupation. While the conservatives, who welcomed the 
government draft, have come to attack the basic principles of  the postwar constitution, the 
progressives, who were critical of  the proposed revision of  the government, have become defenders 
of  its liberal democratic values.  
It is true that the media was under censorship by GHQ and that GHQ eliminated the 
nationalistic and right-wing reactionary arguments and open criticisms of  GHQ from the public flow 
of  information on constitutional writing.262 Thus there were many opportunistic and sycophantic 
                                                 
260  See Takano Iwasaburo,“Daiichini ‘kokumin sensei’ (At First, the People’s Pledge),” Mainichi Shinbun, 
March 8, 1948 in Shoron Shuroku, 227-228.  
261 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 208. 
262 For the censorship of  the Civil Censorship Detachment of  GHQ and the situation of Japanese media in the 
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statements on the government draft. However, it is also true that many Japanese people were 
actually in favor of  the text of  the new constitution. They “had suffered from the arbitrary rule of  
the military, the police, and the bureaucracy”263  and saw their bright future with the proposed 
constitution of  popular sovereignty and denunciation of  war. To them, in fact, “[t]he new 
constitution symbolized a break with an oppressive past.”264 
 
5. The First Public Debate: Constituting a New Political Order 
 An unprecedented feature of  the postwar constitution is the manner of  its establishment. 
This constitution is an outcome of  public deliberation. The Meiji Constitution was established after 
only a few officials secretly prepared a draft. 265  The merciful tenno granted to his subjects the 
fundamental law as a benefit. There was no public discussion between the government elite and 
private citizens on what was the goal of  the government, which type of  governmental system would 
properly work to attain the goal, or whatever the pubic welfare meant. Japanese people failed to 
constitute a state structure because they were not entitled to participate in state affairs as active 
citizens. They could play only a subordinate role in a field the tenno had delineated. The very 
framework was a fait accompli and far beyond their control. If  a person discussed the governmental 
system openly, he or she was accused of  a violation of  the Chian Iji Ho (the Peace Preservation Law). 
Although it had an article on its amendment,266 open discussion about its amendability had never 
occurred because the Meiji Constitution was taught and indeed believed to be the immortal great 
code. The Meiji Constitution was, from the beginning to the end, a benefit granted by the benevolent 
tenno. There was no room whatsoever for self-determination by the people. Public deliberation was 
                                                                                                                                                             
Linguistic Space: The Censorship of  the Occupation Forces and Postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjyu, 1989, 1994) 
(this has accused the United States of  imposing its values upon Japan by using censorship but has been 
criticized by the previous two books).  
263  Tanaka Hideo, “The Conflict between Two Legal Traditions in Making the Constitution of Japan,” 
Sakamoto & Ward, Democratizing Japan, 125. 
264 Tanaka, “The Conflict between Two Legal Traditions in Making the Constitution of Japan,” Democratizing 
Japan, 126. 
265 See Chapter 1 section 2. 
266 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 73. 
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thus excluded from its constitutional grand framework. 
As discussed above,267 private groups and political parties presented their own proposals for 
constitutional reform. Although Matsumoto and company never tried to listen to what outsiders of  
power said, some of  these private drafts had a great influence upon GHQ’s draft. The most 
important one was made by the Kenpo Kenkyukai (the Constitutional Research Group).268 Based 
upon the idea of  popular sovereignty, in their draft, the tenno was deprived of  any political power 
and was intended to play only a ritualistic role as the head of  the state. The draft also placed special 
emphasis upon unconditional and detailed provisions of  classical human rights, particularly 
academic freedom and freedom of  speech and religion, together with newly recognized welfare 
rights. Among other important proposals for constitutional reform were: Nihon Kyowakoku Kenpo 
Shian Yoko (the Gist of  a Private Draft of  the Constitution of  the Republic of  Japan) by Takano 
himself; the draft following the English model of  the tenno-in-the-Diet with judicial review by Kenpo 
Kondankai; the Socialist Party’s draft that provided that the tenno performed only ceremonial 
functions and for welfare rights. 
Although exogenous factors were critically important, the postwar constitution is a product 
of  interaction of  the governing elites and private citizens. When the Matsumoto Committee 
prepared its draft, surely, there was no official interaction between the government and private 
citizens because Matsumoto and his colleagues clung to the kokutai ideology and would not listen to 
the outsiders.269 However, after the government was presented the GHQ draft, we can say that there 
was indirect interaction through GHQ intervention because the GHQ draft was, as discussed above, 
more or less influenced by the private Japanese ideas. This is critically different from the process of  
                                                 
267 See this Chapter section 2. 
268 Charles Kades, Deputy Chief  of  the Government Section, GHQ, bears witness that “Japanese sources were 
most useful” in making the GHQ’s draft. He mentions particularly two groups named Kenpo Kenkyukai (the 
Constitutional Research Group) headed by Takano Iwasaburo and Kenpo Kondankai (the Constitution 
Discussion Group) by Ozaki Yukio, who had been a liberal representative from the first general election. 
Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution,” 227, 219 -220. For the details of  the 
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269 For the work and failure of  the Matsumoto Committee, see Chapter 2 sections 4 & 5. 
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making the Meiji Constitution, which is regarded as a determinedly negative reaction to exaltation 
of  constitutional consciousness among private citizens in the Jiyu Minken Uundo (the Movement for 
People’s Rights to Participate in Politics and Civil Liberties).270  
Furthermore, this interaction became more direct when a general election of  the House of  
Representatives was held during the governmental preparation of  a constitutional draft based upon 
the GHQ model and the government draft was submitted to the Diet to deliberate on it. We can say, 
therefore, that the postwar constitution was established as a result of  public deliberation among the 
people, although it is also necessary to say that public deliberation existed within the limits of  the 
occupational policy. After all, Japan had lost her independence after the defeat. 
In December 1945, the election law was revised to expand suffrage to men and women who 
were twenty years old or older.271 The number of  eligible voters had enormously increased from 
14,594,287 (20.4% of  the total population) in 1942 to 36,878,417(51.2%) in 1946.272 This was a part 
of  MacArthur’s reform policy for liberal democracy.273 Another crucial policy that came from GHQ 
was a purge of  people who were undesirable for democratic politics from public office.274 Ultra-
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548) (1/4/46) SCAP to Japanese government” in RM052. According to the list in the appendix, 27 
organizations were targets of  abolition. 
 There was a severe controversy over the purge between the Government Section, which wanted to 
realize a thorough democratized political process in postwar Japan and G2, which emphasized maintenance 
of  conservative political order. MacArthur supported the GS plan. See Mark Gayn, Nippon Nikki (Japan Diary), 
translated by Imoto Takeo (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1963, 1998), 74-78. The controversy became more severe 
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nationalist and militarist leaders were excluded from the front stage of  politics. Without any doubt, 
the purge gave the democratic forces a good advantage over reactionary groups. The Progressive 
Party most seriously suffered from the purge. 260 people out of  274 members at the party formation 
were removed from public office. The Liberal Party had 30 purged members of  its first 43 members; 
the Socialist Party 10 of  17; and the Kyodoto (the Cooperation Party) 21 of  23.275 Because the 
Socialists suffered least from the purge, it was said that they might become the leading party after the 
forthcoming general election. 276  The exogenous element once again worked in favor of  the 
democratized political process. The purge brought to Japanese political parties drastic change in 
leadership at least during the occupation period.277 It marked a new beginning of  a political party 
system in postwar Japan.   
Following the new law, the first postwar general election was held on April 10, 1946. The 
election had revolutionary new trends: A dramatic expansion of  eligible voters, the first women 
candidacy in history (79 women candidates; 2.85% of  the total candidates 2770), virtual monopoly 
of  first-time candidacy (2624 first-time candidates; 95%), and a small party explosion (363 parties). 
Voters’ interest in the election was keener than people had expected.278 Voting rate reached 72.1 
percent. No parties won a majority in the election. The Liberal Party gained 141 seats (30.3% of  the 
total 466 seats and 24.4 % share of  votes) and took a lead; the Progressive Party: 94 seats (20.2%, 
18.7%); the Socialist Party: 93 seats (20.0%, 17.9%); the Cooperation Party: 14 seats (3.0%, 3.2%); 
the Communist Party: 5 seats (1.1%, 3.8%); other small parties 38 seats (8.2%, 11.7%); and 
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independents: 80 (17.2%, 20.4%). 279  The Asahi Shinbun analyzed the result of  the first general 
election and pointed out that the abstention rate was very low, that 39 women were elected,280 that 
though conservatives were still powerful, as expected, the democratic forces steadily gained seats, 
and that while objective conditions of  democratic revolution seemed to be satisfactory, subjective 
conditions were not ripe yet because of  sluggish growth of  socialists and communists.281 MacArthur 
welcomed the results of  the election to express his satisfaction that the Japanese people had chosen 
to take a balanced center course.282 Although it was surely a salient fact that the Socialists gained 
more than quintuple seats, it was also undoubtedly true that conservatives dominated the House of  
Representatives. After a long power struggle, the Shidehara cabinet, which had no foundation of  
political party, resigned on April 22 and Yoshida Shigeru was appointed prime minister and finally 
formed a Liberal and Progressive Parties coalition cabinet on May 22.        
The April 10 general election was held a week before the final governmental draft of  the 
Constitution of  Japan was completed and published. In the general election, thus, candidates argued 
about constitutional issues the General Outline of  Draft Revision of  the Constitution of  March 6 
had raised. As discussed above, 283  political parties prepared their own plans of  constitutional 
revision: The Progressive Party retained the principle of  direct governance on the part of  the tenno; 
The Liberal Party supported the tenno system but argued for a theory of  state sovereignty; the 
Cooperation Party also maintained the tenno system but proposed a democratized system of  joint 
governance of  the tenno and the people in which the tenno would have veto power; The Socialist 
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Party argued for a ritualistic tenno system, the idea of  state sovereignty, and a parliamentary cabinet 
system responsible to the people; The Communist Party adopted a plan of  the overthrow of  the tenno 
system and of  the republican form of  government.284 
In campaign, the General Outline of  the Draft of  Constitutional Revision itself  did not 
necessarily occupy the center of  debate. As a general trend, candidates did not mention the outline 
in their campaign bulletin. Only 17.4 percent of  candidates argued over the governmental draft of  
constitutional revision.285 It was true that food rather than a constitution was the most serious 
concern for most common citizens because they severely suffered from starvation at that time. 
Constitutional revision seemed a secondary issue. However, 78.5 percent of  candidates discussed the 
tenno institution.286 While an overwhelming majority of  candidates argued for any kind of  a tenno 
system, on the one hand, the principle of  direct governance on the part of  the tenno the Meiji 
Constitution had provided was supported by only 1.1 percent of  candidates. On the other hand, 4.7 
percent of  candidates did deny the tenno institution.287 There is no dispute that the number was 
extremely small. However, quantity was not a real issue at that time. Rather, the very fact was of  
critical importance that candidates publicly argued for and against the governmental proposal of  
constitutional revision in the electoral campaign. Someone could openly denounce the authority of  
the tenno and energetically argue for the republican form of  government in the electoral process. 
People who now were guaranteed the right to determine their own future as a whole did hear that a 
few candidates proposed abolition of  the tenno system. Not only did a small number of  them vote for 
the candidates but five candidates were also elected as representatives. Such a phenomenon was truly 
unprecedented.  
Thus, the first general election in the postwar era created a unique space of  public 
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deliberation on constituting the fundamental principles of  the nation. As a result of  the general 
election, along with traditional conservatives, women and leftists were able to garner seats in the 
virtually final Imperial Diet,288 which turned out to be a constitutional convention. Public discussion 
on the constitutional draft by representatives of  the people was also unprecedentedly new in 
Japanese history. The ninetieth Imperial Diet was convened on May 16, and sat on June 20, when 
the Japanese government presented the Draft Revision of  the Constitution to the House of  
Representatives.289 
On June 21, MacArthur issued a statement on the submission of  the government draft of  
constitutional revision to the Imperial Diet. In the statement, he clarified three principles of  
constitutional deliberation. (1)  Adequate time and opportunity should be allowed for the full 
discussion and consideration of  the terms of  the fundamental law; (2) the procedure followed should 
assure complete legal continuity with the Meiji Constitution now existing; and (3) the manner of  
adoption of  the fundamental law should demonstrate that it affirmatively expresses the free will of  
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the Japanese people.290 His statement emphasized that much public discussion had been done so far 
on constitutional revision in political parties, private groups, and the media as well as in the 
government and that it was “for the people of  Japan, acting through their duly elected 
representatives, to determine its form and content, whether it be adopted, modified, or rejected.”291 
Actually, this statement was MacArthur’s concession to the Far Eastern Commission and the State 
Department, both of  which were not informed beforehand of  anything about the draft of  
constitutional revision of  the Japanese government. The FEC and the State Department did not 
believe that the draft was adopted in a democratic enough way to satisfy the conditions of  the 
Potsdam Declaration. The FEC even questioned MacArthur’s jurisdiction over constitutional 
revision. FEC thus requested MacArthur to postpone the general election and guarantee the 
Japanese people adequate chances to discuss the draft of  the revised constitution. MacArthur’s three 
principles were virtually the same as those which the FEC requested from MacArthur through the 
U.S. government on May 13.292 By his June 21 statement, MacArthur finally ceased to challenge 
other authorities and showed compromise.293 His concession was critical for the democratic cause 
because duly elected representatives in the Diet could have adequate opportunities to discuss the 
draft and even change it. Now public deliberation on the new constitution would be guaranteed to 
the Japanese people. 
Kanamori Tokujiro was appointed the minister of  state in charge of  constitutional revision 
problems on June 19. Kanamori, a former chief  of  the cabinet legislation bureau, was also a 
constitutional theorist. He was forced to resign in 1936 because his theory was based upon the tenno 
organ theory, which was outrageously the target of  the fanatic militaristic movement.294 When the 
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war ended, being without any public office, he worked in the fields in fine weather and read at home 
in wet weather. As the minister of  state, Kanamori replied to interpellations and comments 1365 
times in the Diet and his longest reply lasted for one hour and a half.295 He gave full play to his 
versatility when he stood to explain the draft of  the revised constitution in the Diet. He eloquently 
defended the government position mostly for the conservative cause. 
On June 21, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru delivered a speech on general policy in both 
houses. Although Yoshida only mentioned introduction of  the draft bill of  the new constitution in 
his policy speech, interpellations raised important issues over the amenability of  the draft bill, the 
desirability of  a popularly elected convention style and the status of  the tenno. In response, Yoshida 
expressed the government’s intention of  drafting a new constitution: “The reason I would like to 
offer a word of  caution here is that we have not presented this bill for the revision of  the 
Constitution merely from the perspective of  the Constitution as the nation’s supreme law. At this 
moment of  defeat in war, we have presented the bill having fully in mind the questions of  how the 
nation can be saved and how the safety of  the Imperial House can be assured.”296 For conservatives, 
the Constitution of  Japan was regarded as a guarantor of  the safety of  the tenno family. 
On June 25, debates on the draft bill began in the House of  Representatives. Yoshida 
explained the reason why the government had submitted the bill of  revising the constitution. He at 
first pointed out the necessity of  executing the terms of  the Potsdam Declaration and then clarified 
the general trend of  the proposed constitution as follows: 
The draft Constitution is built upon the principle of  “Sovereignty of  the people’s 
will”, under which all the organs of  state are to be inaugurated, fundamental 
human rights respected, the blessings of  liberty secured, and the foundation of  a 
democratic government laid down for all time. Moreover, the new constitution 
renounces war, which is unprecedented in the history of  the world. The supreme 
law of  the land will thus exemplify the ideals of  mankind for freedom and peace, 
which are spoken of  in the Preamble.297 
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Yoshida continued to raise as its features the symbolic tenno system, denunciation of  war, full 
protection of  people’s rights, separation of  powers, the parliamentary government system, judicial 
review, and colloquialism in a writing style. Interpellations by eleven representatives lasted for four 
days. On June 28, a special committee was established for deliberation on the proposed constitution. 
The committee was composed of  72 members with proportional representation of  parties in the 
House of  Representatives.298 Ashida Hitoshi (Liberal Party), a future prime minister, was elected 
chairman by mutual vote. The committee started to discuss the proposed constitution on July 1 and 
ended its work on July 23. For revision, an informal subcommittee was established and met 13 times. 
On August 21, the special committee resumed its work and voted for the modified draft bill of  the 
constitution.   
On August 24, a plenary session of  the House of  Representatives approved the modified 
draft of  the constitution with 421 to 8 of  total 429 votes299 and immediately sent it to the House of  
Peers. On August 26, Yoshida gave a general explanation of  the bill in a plenary session and 13 
members interpellated the government. On August 30, a special committee was established for 
deliberating on the proposed constitution. The committee consisted of  45 members and elected Abe 
Yoshishige chairman by mutual vote.300 Deliberation in the committee lasted until September 26. 
Then a 15-member committee was established to frame a revised draft of  the proposed constitution. 
After receiving the report of  the 15-member committee for revision, the special committee adopted 
the modified draft. On October 6, a plenary session of  the House of  Peers overwhelmingly adopted 
the modified draft of  the constitution301 and sent it back to the House of  Representatives, which 
agreed to the modification without any detailed work next day. After passage in both Houses, the 
Draft was once again submitted to the Privy Council, which approved it on October 26. The 
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Constitution of  Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and was effectuated on May 3, 1947. 
Public deliberation on the constitutional plan was an unprecedentedly innovative event. 
The Meiji Constitution, which was once believed to be the immortal great code and beyond all 
criticism, was now openly criticized for its weaknesses by not only leftists but also conservatives.302 
Kanamori himself  made a comment on the Meiji Constitution that the disastrous collapse of  the 
regime derived mostly from misinterpretations and abuses of  the constitution, but partly from the 
very text.303 One even confidently delivered an interpellation speech from the rostrum at the plenary 
session hall of  the House of  Representatives to the effect that democratization in both political and 
economic areas might lead Japan to a social democracy.304 Such things had not happened ever before.  
During the deliberations in the Diet, important issues on constituting a new political order 
were frankly and seriously discussed. First of  all, a fundamental question was raised why the 
constitutional revision or the new constitution was necessary. As Minobe and Matsumoto argued,305 
one could contend that now that the military was abolished, the Meiji Constitution would not suffer 
from serious misuse.306 Yoshida and Kanamori admitted that after the fanatic rule by the militarist 
clique, the text of  the Meiji Constitution seemed to involve some weaknesses. To meet the terms of  
the Potsdam Declaration, they argued that the new constitution should include provisions for full 
protection of  fundamental rights and development of  democratic politics. The intense international 
circumstances required Japan to dispel doubts that an ultra-nationalistic and militaristic movement 
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would occur again.307  
Nanbara Shigeru, a political philosopher and the president of  the Tokyo Imperial 
University, keenly questioned the less enthusiastic attitude of  the government toward constitutional 
and political reforms that had to satisfy the terms of  the Potsdam Declaration. Nanbara implied that 
the “imposed” constitution should be attributed to the reluctant government. He thus interpellated 
the government about the commitment to materialize the spirit of  liberal democracy by the 
constitution that all the more should be needed.308 Yoshida, Shidehara, and Kanamori replied to his 
questions only by stating that Japan had to execute the reforms that the Potsdam Declaration had 
required and that the international circumstances had rapidly changed.309 Nanbara clearly pointed 
out that if  the government had taken GHQ’s directive on abolishing the national religion of  
Shintoism, they could have realized that the Meiji Constitution would be fundamentally reformed. 
For him, it was unfortunate that there was no real statesman in Japan who had the foreknowledge, 
wisdom, and courage to determinedly carry out reforms.  
The Potsdam Declaration was surely a starting point but more positively the constitution 
needed be fundamentally changed. Ashida Hitoshi urged his colleagues to see things more 
profoundly. The new constitution was not merely a product of  defeat in the war, but should express 
the universalistic ideals of  human beings for peace, high culture, and a better life. Constitutional 
reform should carry more positive values.310  
Secondly, the procedure of  making the Constitution of  Japan was a serious issue. How 
could a democratic constitution with the principle of  popular sovereignty be framed by amending a 
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constitution of  tenno sovereignty? A member did not doubt at all whether such a revision was 
possible. 311  The government contended that Article 73 of  the Meiji Constitution could be also 
completely applicable here. Now that the House of  Representatives had been fully democratized and 
the House of  Peers had several appointees of  the learned after the purge,312 to the government, legal 
positivism should control a way of  establishing the new constitution. The Diet might discuss the 
government draft freely and change it insofar as revisions met the terms of  the Potsdam 
Declaration.313 However, another member argued against the government’s policy because Article 73 
reserved all power to amend the constitution for the tenno alone and such a feature of  the article 
conflicted with the idea of  making a new constitution by the freely expressed will of  the people. 
Thus he continued to argue that amending Article 73 to a more democratized process came first and 
then the contents of  a new constitution would be established by the new rule.314 Or since acceptance 
of  the Potsdam Declaration, popular sovereignty had been principled in Japanese constitutional 
politics and thus deliberation and revision should be as free as the Diet wanted.315 Yet another 
member could go further and say that since accepting the Potsdam Declaration, the existing laws 
and rules that were inconsistent with the Declaration had become void. To this understanding, thus, 
Article 73 was nothing more than an expedient measure.316 
During the deliberations, Kanamori touched upon a critical point. When he was asked 
whether kintei kenpo (a constitution the tenno establishes) could be legally transformed to mintei kenpo 
(a constitution the people establish), he answered that the Constitution of  Japan would be 
legitimately established by following the procedure which Article 73 of  the Meiji Constitution 
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provided for. He denied that a bloodless democratic revolution occurred when Japan accepted the 
Potsdam Declaration. At the same time, however, he also denied the strictly biding power of  Article 
73 of  the Meiji Constitution. Although the process should rely upon the provision of  the existing 
constitution, the new constitution should be established by “the freely expressed will of  the Japanese 
people” the Potsdam Declaration had required. Two elements would mix together in the process of  
making the Constitution of  Japan. 
In whatever manner it may be construed, whether or not a special principle in the 
shape of  the principle of  popular sovereignty is made a postulate, I think we can 
fulfill the requirements of  the Potsdam Declaration if  we go legitimately through 
the deliberation and decision of  the Diet under the current Constitution. But it is 
obvious that this procedure for constitutional revision embodies a process in 
addition to that required by the Potsdam Declaration. If  there arise inconsistencies 
and discrepancies between this additional process and the minimum process, it will 
give rise to a very difficult problem in actual practice. Nevertheless, if  the people 
placed in such a difficult position act carefully, I wonder if  it is not possible to settle 
such a problem without insurmountable difficulty by taking proper steps in actual 
practice. This is a prejudgment. With allowance for this prejudgment, the present 
procedure has been taken under Article LXXIII of  the Constitution. Not only is 
there a single doubt about this measure under domestic law, but it also fulfills the 
requirements of  the Potsdam Declaration.317 
 
Thus the Diet as representatives of  the people could discuss freely the draft. Through free 
deliberation among representatives of  the people, popular sovereignty would emerge gradually but 
steadily. This can be understood as a theoretical justification of  a constitutional revolution in which 
by using the preexisting legal norms the people broke away from their past.318 
 However, the government offered only an ambiguous interpretation of  popular sovereignty. 
First of  all, the government draft of  the revised constitution intentionally adopted the ambiguous 
phrases “kokumin no soi ga shiko de aru”319 and “kono chii ha kokumin no shiko no soi ni motozuku”.320 
These phrases had survived GHQ’s careful check because their English translation clearly used the 
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phrases “the sovereignty of  the people’s will” and “the sovereign will of the people”.321 While the 
conservatives, who were still captivated by the kokutai ideology, welcomed the government’s 
reluctance to straightforwardly express popular sovereignty,322 the leftists attacked the intentional 
maneuver to request the government to clarify the principle of  popular sovereignty in the declaration 
of  the fundamental law.323 
 Kanamori explained the government’s position by stating that the term sovereignty has 
multiple meanings. In the draft, the government used the term sovereignty when the state expressed 
its single will to the outside. When it came to the source from which the will of  the state is actually 
derived, the government rather used “shiko no ishi (the supreme will).” 324 Then, interestingly enough, 
Kanamori alleged that this actual source of  the will of  the state, the supreme will, or sovereignty in 
Japan had, without any doubt, resided in the whole people including the tenno since the very 
beginning of  the state.325 Confrontation between monarch and the people had the Western origin and 
it was irrelevant in Japanese history because the tenno had governed the state with the heart of  the 
people and thus Japan had been a joint political community of  the tenno and the people. Kanamori’s 
explanation purposefully obscured a revolutionarily new idea of  popular sovereignty in postwar 
Japan. 
 Although the leftists criticized the government not for clarifying the idea of  popular 
sovereignty, the government hesitated to take any positive action by themselves. However, GHQ 
once again intervened. By being informed of  the situation by a small Japanese newspaper, GHQ 
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required the Japanese government to use the term sovereignty in the Japanese text to clarify the 
principle of  popular sovereignty.326 GHQ quickly responded to this situation because the Far Eastern 
Commission had had the same concerns. On July 6, SWNCC had forwarded to MacArthur the 
requirements of  constitutional revision the FEC had adopted on July 2. They included that “The 
Japanese Constitution should recognize that sovereign power resides in the people.”327 After several 
meetings between Kades and Whitney and Irie, Sato, and Kanamori,328 the Japanese government 
decided to adopt the term popular sovereignty. After all, the conservative Japanese government had a 
common interest shared by GHQ in avoiding the FEC’s intervention. In a meeting of  the informal 
subcommittee,329 the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party, which formed the Yoshida coalition 
cabinet, jointly proposed revising the government draft to clarify the principle of  popular sovereignty 
in the Japanese text. Finally, the Japanese draft straightforwardly declared that “sovereign power 
rides with the people” and that the tenno shall derive “his position from the will of  the people with 
whom resides sovereign power.”  
Although the text was now explicit in phasing the principle of  popular sovereignty and free 
from the intentional distortion of  the core value in the new constitution, the conservatives and 
government still attempted to obscure the significance of  the fundamental reform in the Japanese 
political system. When he introduced to the special committee of  constitutional revision the revised 
draft the informal subcommittee had prepared, Ashida Hitoshi, the chairman and future prime 
minister, explained the intentions of  the revision thus:  
In short, the first chapter of  the revised Constitution expressly provides that the 
Emperor of  one line, unbroken through the ages, is assured of  his position as a 
Monarch who, on the basis of  the sovereign will of  the people, unifies them 
coevally with Heaven and Earth, from eternity to eternity. (Cheers.) Thus, it has 
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been possible to confirm the solemn fact that the Emperor, while being in the midst 
of  the people, stands outside of  the pale of  actual politics and still maintains his 
authority as the center of  the life of  the people and as the source of  their spiritual 
guidance. This accomplishment the absolute majority of  the committee have 
received with the utmost joy and satisfaction (Cheers.) 330 
 
Kanamori also stated that although one line of  the tenno unbroken for ages eternal did not appear as 
text in the new constitution, the sprit had remained the same as in the Meiji Constitution.331 
 The conservatives were dissatisfied with the symbolic tenno institution. They still argued that 
in the Japanese tradition, the tenno and the people had formed a unity together and both of  them had 
shared common interests with each other.332 To them, thus, the new constitutional text should have 
clearly declared that the sovereignty of  the people included the tenno or that the tenno was not just 
the symbol of  the unity of  the people but the head of  the state or the center of  the unity.333 After the 
straightforward declaration of  the principle of  popular sovereignty, some of  them still required the 
same things in vain.334 Or more powers should have been granted to the tenno as the symbol than the 
draft provided.335 
 Indeed, Kanamori stated again and again that the new constitution would not change the 
kokutai (national polity, national character, or the form of  the state):  
As I have frequently stated, it is the spiritual relationship among the people, with 
the Emperor standing as the symbol of  their affection, that animates the hearts of  
all our people and that remains indelible and immutable in their hearts. The fact 
that the nation exists based on this very conception is, I think, expressed in the 
words “national character”. On this point, I am confident that it has never changed 
or shall never change, and I must positively avow here the principle of  the 
immutability of  our national character. 
It may be said, of  course, that within the extent of  what we call the 
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fundamental form of  government, the draft Constitution greatly differs from the 
former Constitution. Among the phases of  the State, there are some which can 
change and others which cannot change and although its various principles 
seemingly undergo change, we notice that they don’t change in fact, if  we penetrate 
deeper. And so when we see such principles of  the State as do not change, we can 
grasp the conception of  our national character, while when we mean such 
fundamental principles as have undergone change, we call them the fundamental 
form of  government.336   
 
In this way, Kanamori argued that the kokutai should be understood in a moral sense. In his view, the 
tenno was a moral, not a political or legal figure, and akogare no mato (the center of  national 
adoration). The new constitution would only change seitai (the form of  government). The kokutai 
had continued to be the same.  
It is true that the statement of  Kanamori had trivialized the revolutionary significance of  
the new constitution. He often used the following metaphor to claim that the people including the 
tenno had been at least potentially sovereign in Japan. “[W]hether we call it Ptolemaic theory or 
Copernican theory, we mean the same thing; it only follows a difference of  recognition. The 
statement that the will of  the people shall be supreme does not embody a change in substance, but a 
change of  recognition in the same way as I have shown in those examples.”337 Whatever Kanamori 
might say about the kokutai, however, the era had already changed. In the old days, the kokutai was 
conceptualized necessarily with the prerogative of  the tenno as the head of  the state to superintend 
sovereign power. For example, the Chian Iji Ho (Peace Preservation Act) provided the idea of  the 
kokutai: the fundamental principle that the empire should be ruled over and the reins of  its 
administration held by the tenno in one line unbroken for ages eternal.338 A symbolic tenno institution 
with popular sovereignty, however, would inevitably alter this traditional core idea of  the kokutai. 
Kanamori frankly admitted change in the central principle of  the kokutai once the new constitution 
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was established.339 In addition, Kanamori also argued that the status of  the tenno would be founded 
upon not a mysterious basis but the general will of  the sovereign people in the new constitution.340 In 
consequence, therefore, Kanamori basically agreed that the tenno system in which his status was held 
from an authority that was situated outside the constitutional scheme would clearly cease to exist. In 
its central logic, the new constitution has declared the denial of  the kokutai ideology of  one line of  
the tennos unbroken for ages eternal. It is obvious that the imperial founder and other imperial 
ancestors to whom the Emperor Meiji swore at the establishment of  the old constitution were no 
longer relevant to the new constitution. The symbolic tenno would be taken into the new 
constitutional framework, which was the most challenging task of  creating a postwar political order. 
Here we can find a fundamental discontinuity between two constitutions in Japanese history. 
Because Yoshida, Kanamori, and the government explicitly acknowledged the principle of  popular 
sovereignty, furthermore, they have basically accepted the idea of  persuasion through mutual 
interaction by speech, upon which democratic politics must rely, even if  they were highly reluctant to 
do so.  
In sum, in the ninetieth Imperial Diet as a quasi-constitutional convention, representatives 
of  the people and intellectuals and representatives of  the old regime for the first time argued for and 
against the governmental draft to constitute a new political order collectively. Socialists and 
communists, coping with a majority of  conservative parties, participated in deliberating about the 
new constitution. Although newcomers in the Diet were a definite minority, they played a very 
important role in the deliberative process. A relationship between the symbolic tenno system and 
popular sovereignty was a focal issue during the immediate aftermath of  the war because the elite 
devoted themselves to retaining the kokutai, the national polity, the essential component of  which 
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Matsumura Shinichiro, Kenkyukai, House of  Peers, and Kanamori, ibid., 1: 884-885. 
340 See, e.g., Kanamori Tokujiro, House of  Representatives, special committee, July 9, in Shimizu, Shingiroku, 
1: 464. 
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was reign and governance “by a line of  Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”.341 For them, the tenno 
was still more or less “sacred and inviolable”.342 The government draft, by using a highly ambiguous 
term, had tried not only to conceal the change of  sovereign power from the tenno to the people; the 
government and conservatives had also stated that the kokutai had never changed and that the tenno 
had been the center of  the national admiration and affection among the Japanese people.343 In 
marked contrast, leftists believed that, either in a republican form of  government or under a 
ritualistic tenno institution, popular sovereignty should become the fundamental principle in the new 
era. They therefore required the Yoshida cabinet to clearly express the principle of  popular 
sovereignty in the constitution because they acknowledged the government’s manipulation of  
phrases and to explicitly explain the change in the kokutai.344  
Although GHQ’s intervention was without any doubt crucial, the first public discussions 
were quite helpful in allowing the now sovereign Japanese people to articulate issues in the new era. 
The fundamental structure of  the constitutional regime has been essentially transformed with the 
new constitution. This revolutionary transformation was heatedly discussed in open debate. The 
conservatives were supposed to make every effort to obscure the unprecedentedly new features of  the 
postwar constitution. In his interpellation, Nanbara had already pointed out that a danger that the 
symbolic tenno institution might be mysteriously used once again unless the government officials 
explicitly acknowledge the fundamental transformation in the kokutai because what the government 
first attempted to retain as the kokutai was totally different from the ritualistic and ceremonial tenno 
                                                 
341 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 1.  
342 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 3. 
343 See, e.g., Kita Reikichi, Liberal Party, House of  Representatives, plenary session, June 25, in Shimizu, 
Shingiroku, 1: 861; Yoshida Yasu, Progressive Party, House of  Representatives, plenary session, June 27, ibid., 
1: 862-863, 864-86; Futaara Yoshitoku, Kenkyukai, House of  Peers, special committee, September 13, ibid., 
868, 869-870; Norura Yoshiroku, Doseikai, House of  Peers, special committee, September 2, ibid., 1: 898-900. 
344 See, e.g., Mori Mikiji, Socialist Party, House of  Representatives, special committee, July 8, in Shimizu, 
Shingiroku, 1: 811-812; Oikawa Nori, Socialist Party, House of  Representatives, special committee, July 11, 
ibid., 1: 816, 817-818, 819-821, 821, 822; Oikawa Nori, House of  Representatives, special committee, July 13, 
ibid., 826-827, 827-828. 
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system the new constitution provided for.345  Although finally, popular sovereignty was declared 
straightforwardly in the text of  the constitution, both the conservatives and the leftists could not be 
satisfied with the government position that the concept of  the kokutai in the sense of  the tenno as 
akogare no chushin (the center of  the national adoration) had never changed even with the principle of  
popular sovereignty. Kanamori further stated that lese majesty would be applicable to the symbolic 
tenno institution.346 However, this political crime is definitely inconsistent with the idea of  poplar 
sovereignty that is closely connected to free examination of  all kinds of  authority. Therefore, there 
have remained ambiguities in the relationship between the principle of  popular sovereignty and the 
symbolic tenno institution even after the new constitution was promulgated.   
Whatever the limits of  making the postwar constitution might be, we cannot underestimate 
the constitutional debate in the ninetieth Imperial Diet because for the first time in their history, the 
Japanese people self-consciously struggled to rationalize a relationship between themselves and the 
tenno institution. It is true that they failed to establish a republican form of  government, but 
whatever this might mean, they confronted an intrinsic tension between the idea of  popular 
sovereignty and the symbolic tenno institution. The governmental officials had to legitimatize the 
tenno’s powers in a public discussion for the first time and even reluctantly admitted that the tenno 
would derive its legitimacy from the general will of  the sovereign people. Under the Meiji 
Constitution, the government officials took the status of  the emperor for granted and needed no 
rationalization whatsoever concerning his powers over state affairs. Thus, a public discussion on the 
legitimacy of  political power was a revolutionarily new manner of  politics in Japanese history.  
From the general election to the quasi-constitutional convention, the people struggled to 
constitute a political order in postwar Japan. When the conservative forces criticized the new 
constitution for the imposition by GHQ and proposed to establish an autonomous constitution in 
                                                 
345 Nanbara Shigeru, Independent, House of  Peers, plenary session, August 27, in Shimizu, Shingiroku, 1: 518-
519. 
346 Kanamori Tokujiro, House of  Peers, special committee, September 11, in Shimizu, Shingiroku, 1: 473; 
September 10, ibid., 1: 575-576. For the discussion on lese majesty, see ibid., 1: 565-572. 
 265 
the late 1950s, Kanamori criticized such attitudes: “People had begun to forget how serious the 
Japanese people were and how hard they worked at the establishment of  the constitution....Under 
the difficult conditions, the Japanese people had made truly strenuous efforts to frame the 
constitution in considering the people’s future as a nation. They left a rare record of  achievements in 
political history.”347 The Japanese people as a whole had truly lived a republican moment for the first 
time in their history. The debate in the ninetieth Imperial Diet was only the first step in the ongoing 
struggle of  articulating or reconciling popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno institution. 
 
7. Conclusion 
As the previous chapter and this one have shown, the making of  the Constitution of  Japan 
was so complicated a process that one cannot say that the constitution was imposed upon the 
Japanese by MacArthur and GHQ. Who were the Japanese people? The conservative governing 
elites cared only about the retention of  the kokutai, the uniquely traditional governing system based 
upon the tenno sovereignty. Although most Japanese people overwhelmingly supported the tenno 
institution, they were not monolithic. Indeed, those who supported the system of  the sovereign tenno 
formed a minority in the postwar situation. A more non-political and ritualistic tenno institution was 
favored by a majority of  the people.348 There were also a few republicans who argued for abolition of  
the tenno institution itself. In coping with truly dominant men, women for the first time participated 
in public deliberation on constituting a fundamental political order. The conservatives attempted to 
japanize the GHQ’s draft as much as possible. Meanwhile, GHQ had a severe inner rivalry between 
the more idealistic and progressive Government Section and the more realistic and conservative G2. 
                                                 
347  Kanamori Tokujiro, in Sato, Tanjyoki, 184-185. Sato Tatsuo expresses his full consent to Kanamori’s 
statement. 
348 A public opinion poll was suggestive. It was held in December 1945. The result was published on February 
3, 1946. It was about one month before the government draft of  the symbolic tenno system was announced. 
While those who supported the tenno system provided for in the Meiji Constitution were only 16 percent, 28 
percent supported an institution of the tenno that would hold sovereignty joint with the Diet and 45 percent 
supported a non-political and moral tenno system. Those who supported a republican form of  government 
were 8 percent. See “Kenpo kaisei to yoron (Constitutional Revision and Public Opinion),” article, Mainichi 
Shinbun, February 4, 1946, in Shoron Shuroku, 188-189.  
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SCAP, the Department of  State, and the Far Eastern Commission complicatedly conflicted with one 
another in occupation policy toward Japan. Furthermore, GHQ and the conservative Japanese 
government jointly refused a democratic claim to hold a popular constitutional convention. 
The product of  the process of  making the postwar constitution cannot be said to be a return 
to the original position in the Japanese tradition, either. One might state that the symbolic tenno 
institution is the authentic type of  the tenno.349 But did popular sovereignty exist in the ancient days 
of  Japan?350 Did constitutionalism prevail in Japanese history? Could common citizens read legal 
document by which they were regulated? The symbolic tenno system with the principle of  popular 
sovereignty has been fundamentally innovative. Colloquialism with hiragana was revolutionary for 
not only Japanese legal writing but also political culture. 
Rather, establishing the postwar constitution should be regarded as an unfinished 
constitutional revolution. Whether they might be conservative or progressive, the Japanese people 
were self-consciously confronted with constituting a new political order for the first time in their 
history. Despite many limits, public deliberation was carried out among considerably many Japanese 
people. Through deliberation, traditional authority was no longer authoritative as it was. It now 
needed justification by persuasion. The constitution ceased to be an instrument of  ruling the people 
and become a common baseline for government shared by the people and the elites. The Japanese 
people with the postwar constitution partially broke away from their past. Because the retention of  
the kokutai was the paramount value for the government elites, a compromise was necessary for 
establishing the postwar constitutional system at the beginning. Otherwise, the formation of  the new 
constitutional regime would have been highly doubtful. Thus, the ideals that the Constitution of  
Japan declared are yet to be fulfilled. Indeed, its principle of  popular sovereignty always challenges 
the status quo. 
                                                 
349 For the details of  the internal continuity theory, see Chapter 5 section 6. 
350 See Maruyama Masao, “Sengo minshushugi no ‘genten’ (‘The Starting Point’ of  Postwar Democracy),” 
Kenpo no 100 nen: 3 Kenpo no saisei (100 years of  the Constitutions: 3 Revival of  the Constitution) (Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 
1989), 408-416, 414-415. 
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Before the draft of  the revised constitution was voted on in the House of  Representatives, 
Ozaki Yukio (1859-1954), nicknamed the god of  parliamentary politics because he had consecutively 
been a representative since the first general election of  1890, warned his fellow representatives that 
the new constitution would not be able to be well operated without their determined devotion to 
democracy. 
 Since the new Constitution is quite an advanced one, it will be still more difficult to 
understand for our fellow countrymen, who are thoroughly imbued with the evil 
habits of  respecting the officials and slighting the civilians. This is the very reason 
why I, while expressing wholehearted support for the new Constitution, earnestly 
hope that redoubled efforts will be made in considering and investigating how to 
operate it. 
 Since the Constitution is put into operation by men, however excellent the 
Constitution may be, good results cannot be secured if  the men are bad. The better 
the Constitution, the harder it is to put it into operation for the people whose 
culture is low.351  
 
What Ozaki said in August 1946 is still the case with the current situation. Making the constitution is 
one thing but realizing it is quite another. We always face an inevitable gap between political reality 
and the ideals the postwar constitution has inspired. Unlike the Meiji Constitution, the postwar 
constitution has provided the Japanese people with vital tools: freedoms both negative and positive. 
By utilizing them wisely, they could fill the gap by realizing the constitutional promise. The popular 
sovereignty the Japanese people were granted by the new constitution was nothing less than a serious 
challenge. Both the theorists of  imposition and continuity fail to appreciate this new element of  
constitutional experience for the Japanese people as a whole. Their positive engagement in the new 
constitutional governmental process is required, whether one likes it or not. That is why I called 
making the postwar constitution an unfinished constitutional revolution in Japan.352  
 The next question is how revolutionarily innovative are the political principles the postwar 
constitution has provided for. 
                                                 
351  Ozaki Yukio, Independent, House of  Representatives, plenary session, August 24, 1946, in Shimizu, 
Shingiroku, 4: 483-489, 483-484. For translation, see RM420. 
352 For my theoretical justification for an unfinished constitutional revolution, see Chapter 5 section 7. 
 268 
Chapter 4 
New Constitutional Principles: Popular Sovereignty and the Liberal Democratization of  Politics   
 
1. Introduction 
2. Toward a Common Basis of  the Governmental Process: Colloquialization of  the Constitution 
3. The Liberal Democratization of  Politics: An Overview 
4. Protection of  Rights and the Judiciary 
5. The Institutional Scheme for Responsible Politics 
6. The Sincere Desire for Peace and the Denunciation of  War 
7. Popular Sovereignty and the Amendment Process 
8. Consolidation of  the New Constitution: The Katayama Cabinet  





The Constitution of  Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and became effective 
six months later. This new constitution has drastically changed the political foundation of  Japan. 
The most fundamental transformation has been found in the provisions on the tenno institution.1 It is 
true that the Meiji Constitution and the new constitution both place “the tenno (emperor)” in 
Chapter 1 and that the thrones of  the two tennos are hereditarily succeeded in the same line of  
family.2 However, their contents are completely different from each other.3 First, the status of  the 
tenno has been dramatically transformed. While the tenno held the status as sovereign and head of  
the state and superintended sovereign powers under the Meiji constitutional regime, 4  the new 
constitution, on the one hand, has declared the principle of  popular sovereignty and, on the other, 
has retained the tenno institution as the symbol of  the state and the unity of  the people.5 Second, the 
bases of  the institutions also differ fundamentally. The tenno in the Meiji Constitution was entitled to 
                                                 
1 For the details on the tenno system in the Meiji constitutional regime, see Chapter 1. 
2 Compare the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 2 with the Constitution of Japan, art. 2. 
3 See Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, Kenpo, 175-178. 
4 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, arts. 1 & 4. 
5 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble and art. 1. 
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reign and rule because of  the will of  the imperial founder and ancestors.6 Even the will of  the tenno 
himself  was irrelevant as the foundation of  his sovereignty. The idea of  one lineal succession 
unbroken for ages eternal was influential enough for most people to believe in the perpetuity of  the 
state and the tenno’s governance. Thus this feature was closely connected to the concept of  
deification of  the tenno’s rule and tenno himself  because the imperial founder was, according to the 
founding myth, believed to be Amaterasu Omikami (legendary sun goddess). Unification of  politics 
and religion was essentially presupposed to be a principle in this sense. In sharp contrast, the new 
symbolic tenno was founded upon the sovereign will of  the people. The tenno declared himself  as a 
human before the new constitution was established. Separation of  state from religion has been 
importantly characteristic of  the new constitution.7 
With respect of  powers vested in the tenno, accordingly, there are substantial differences 
between the two institutions. In the Meiji constitutional system, the tenno as sovereign held and 
exercised the prerogatives to govern the state. In fact, legislative, administrative and judicial powers 
were all vested in the tenno himself. With support of  governmental institutions, further, the tenno was 
generally planned to exert such powers by himself. The legislative power the tenno held was exercised 
with the consent of  the Imperial Diet.8 The tenno enjoyed considerable leeway when he was allowed 
to make legislation without the consent of  the Diet as independent orders and emergency orders.9 
The administrative power all belonged to the tenno, who had the prerogatives on administrative 
appointment and organization, diplomacy, military command and organization, state of  siege, 
honors, and pardon.10 These prerogatives were exercised upon the advice of  ministers of  state.11 The 
courts of  laws exerted the judicature in the name of  the tenno.12 Meanwhile, the new constitution has 
                                                 
6 See Tsugebumi (Imperial Oath Sworn in the Sanctuary in the Imperial Palace); Imperial Rescript on the 
Promulgation of the Constitution. 
7 The Constitution of  Japan, arts. 20 & 89. 
8 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 5. 
9 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, arts. 9 & 8. 
10 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, arts. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, & 16.  
11 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 55. 
12 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 57. 
 270 
deprived the tenno of  all political powers. It has clearly denied the prerogative-oriented governmental 
system. The tenno shall have no powers related to government and perform only functions in matters 
of  state provided for in the constitution.13 Moreover, the tenno cannot act by himself  but only upon 
the advice and approval of  the cabinet.14 The constitution enumerates rather formal and ceremonial 
functions as matters of  state: Appointments of  the prime minister and the chief  justice of  the 
Supreme Court upon designation by the Diet and the cabinet, respectively; promulgation of  legal 
norms; convocation of  the Diet; proclamation of  election for the Diet; attestation of  appointment 
and dismissal of  public officials provided for by law and of  full powers and credentials of  diplomats; 
attestation of  pardon; granting honors; attestation of  diplomatic documents provided for by law; 
receiving foreign diplomats; performing ceremonial functions.15 The tenno as the symbol is supposed 
to play no positive role in the political process.  
Unlike the Meiji Constitution in which the tenno by himself  superintended sovereignty, 
furthermore, the postwar constitution adopts separation of  powers as a fundamental governmental 
principle. The legislative, administrative, and judicial powers are vested in the Diet, the cabinet, and 
the Supreme Court and inferior courts, respectively. 16 The Diet has become “the highest organ of  
state power” and “the sole law-making organ”,17 while the Imperial Diet was only a body of  giving 
the consent to the tenno’s prerogative to legislation.18 The Diet also controls national finances.19 The 
parliamentary government system has been officially adopted in the postwar constitutional scheme. 
The prime minister, now a constitutional institution, is the head of  the cabinet and must have a seat 
in the Diet and may appoint and remove ministers of  state.20 The cabinet is collectively responsible 
                                                 
13 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 4 par. 1. 
14 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 3. 
15 The Constitution of  Japan, arts. 6 & 7. 
16 The Constitution of  Japan, arts. 41, 65, & 76. 
17 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 41. 
18 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 5. 
19 The Constitution of  Japan, arts. 83 through 91. 
20 The Constitution of  Japan, arts. 66, 67 par. 1, & 68. 
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to the Diet for its exercise of  executive power.21 The cabinet relies upon the confidence of  the Diet, 
particularly of  the House of  Representatives, which has the power to vote a resolution of  non-
confidence. The cabinet may counter a non-confidence resolution by dissolving the House of  
Representatives. 22  Further, the judiciary now enjoys its independence from the cabinet. The 
administrative court system has been replaced by a unified judiciary system.23 The Supreme Court 
has been vested with the power of  judicial review.24 Closely related to the system, rights and liberties 
are no longer subject to preservation of  laws. Protection of  fundamental rights is regarded as a 
central feature of  the constitution. In addition, local autonomy has been guaranteed for the first time 
in history. Local residents now participate in governing and operating local organizations.25 In this 
way, the new constitution has presented an extremely different picture of  the governmental process 
in postwar Japan. 
This chapter will explore the alternation of  the nature of  politics from a vertical relation of  
order and subject to a more horizontal relation among equals. The external imposition theory and 
the internal continuity theory fail to realize the distinctive features of  the postwar constitution. These 
two theories do not pay much attention to the efforts of  the Japanese people to internalize the values 
constitutional revolution. The postwar constitution has been more accessible for common citizens 
than the predecessor because of  the Japanese initiative. Under the postwar constitution, moreover, 
the Socialists became the leading party and formed the first left-centered coalition cabinet. The two 
theories are unable to present a perspective from which we can evaluate the postwar constitutional 
experience of  the Japanese people. Liberal democratization of  politics, which was the international 
obligation of  Japan after the defeat in the war, has formed a baseline for evaluating constitutional 
success. Along the baseline, the third way theorizes the struggles of  the Japanese people to 
materialize liberal democracy.  
                                                 
21 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 66 par. 3. 
22 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 69. 
23 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 76. 
24 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 81. 
25 The Constitution of  Japan, arts. 92 through 95. 
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First in this chapter, we will examine the process of  creating a revolutionary new style of  
writing the constitution. The Japanese initiatives led to a colloquial constitutional text. It has made 
the constitution much easier for common citizens to access. Constitutional law can be a common 
baseline shared by both citizens, who are more or less objects of  government, and the governing elite. 
This reform in wording has been revolutionary for political culture. Then, after an overview of  its 
conspicuous features, we will precisely examine the new constitutional government system. 
Protection of  fundamental human rights and the judiciary, the institutional scheme of  responsible 
politics and positive pacifism will be discussed in detail in separate sections. We will find that the 
new constitution has liberally democratized the political process in principle. Further, the amending 
process under the new constitution will be carefully examined. One of  the most important new 
characteristics of  the postwar constitution is the principle of  popular sovereignty. This is fully 
expressed in the amending provision, which allows people’s direct participation in the process. In 
relation to this topic, we will look at the missed opportunities for the Japanese people to participate 
in constitutional politics. Finally, we will consider the consolidating function that the Katayama 
cabinet, the first cabinet under the new constitution, performed. This left-central coalition 
government tried to consolidate constitutional revolution, however limited it might have been 
because of  its weak foundation. 
 
2. Toward a Common Basis of  the Governmental Process: Colloquialization of  the Constitution  
 The English translation of  the Meiji Constitution and the Constitution of  Japan obscures 
fundamental changes in Japanese wording. The postwar constitution has adopted colloquialism, 
which has made the constitutional text much easier for citizens to read than the Meiji Constitution.26 
If  constitutional law means something positive, that happens when citizens themselves can actively 
engage in constitutional values. To do so, it is necessary for them at least to understand what is 
                                                 
26 See Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, “Shinkenpo no gaikan (An Overview of  the New Constitution),” Kokka Gakkai, 
ed., Shinkenpo no kenkyu (Studies on the New Constitution) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1947), 1-17, 6-8. 
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written in the text. The Meiji Constitution with its literary style kept common citizens away. Thus 
the postwar constitution has presented a revolutionary new character. This section will explore how 
such a revolution in wording occurred.   
 On April 17, 1946, the Japanese government announced its final draft of  the revised 
constitution. This draft would be submitted to the Privy Council following the revising process of  the 
Meiji Constitution and to the Imperial Diet, the House of  Representatives of  which was had had its 
first general election by universal suffrage just one week before. This government draft once again 
surprised people because of  its style of  wording. The proposed draft constitution was written in a 
much more colloquial way than the Meiji Constitution. 
This colloquialization is one of  distinctive features of  the new constitution that are 
fundamentally unprecedented. At the beginning of  the modernization of  Japan, the government had 
to abandon its traditional laws that derived from old China and to establish a new legal system in 
order to catch up with the advanced Western countries. After an intensified debate among the legal 
elites,27 the government decided to create a new legal frame following the German system.28 In this 
nation-rebuilding process, new words were coined to express western legal concepts in Japanese. 
Newly coined terms were difficult for common citizens to understand. It was partly because there are 
two steps to understand what a new word means: the original western legal concepts are translated 
into traditionally used Chinese characters each of  which carries not only sound but also meaning. It 
was also partly because the elites attempted to keep common citizens away from the governmental 
and legal processes. Thus, the prewar legal documents were written in a strictly literary manner 
(bungotai) with Chinese characters and katakana. People did not use such a style in daily life. 
In sharp contrast, the proposed governmental final draft of  the Constitution of  Japan was 
                                                 
27  There was a heated debate on which model Japan would follow. First the school of  French law was 
predominant. However, criticism that French law is too individualistic to be suitable to a communitarian 
society like Japan acquired momentum when a codification of family law became an important issue later. 
28 For influences of  foreign laws in Japan, see Noda Yoshiyuki, “Nihon ni okeru hikaku-ho no hatten to 
genjo,” in Tanaka Hideo ed., The Japanese Legal Systems: Introductory Cases and Materials (Tokyo: University of  
Tokyo Press, 1976), 194-229. 
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written in a colloquial style (kogotai) with Chinese characters and hiragana.29 Writing statutes and 
legal documents in colloquial Japanese has thereafter been a common practice. The imperial 
rescripts have been also colloquialized.30 Thus, legal materials have become more easily accessible to 
ordinary people than ever before. This is decisively important in terms of  a democratic foundation of  
the governmental process. Reading and understanding the fundamental law of  the state is the most 
rudimentary way of  participating in politics democratically.  
Furthermore, this change in wording style came totally from the leadership of  a group of  
private citizens on the Japanese side. Soon after the government’s “General Outline of  Draft 
Revision of  the Constitution” was published on March 6, an important petition occurred in the late 
March from outside the main Japanese political power. The Kokumin no Kokugo Undo (the People’s 
National Language Movement League) that was composed of  about thirty groups and eighty 
individuals proposed to follow a style in which common citizens could easily understand legal 
documents. The movement shared a belief  that language was for all the people, that language should 
be easy for everyone to understand and use and that easy language would enhance the culture of  the 
people, spread democracy widely and fortify the foundation of  Japanese culture.31  On March 26, its 
representatives, including Ando Masaji, a Japanese linguist, Yamamoto Yuzo, a famous novelist, 
Miyake Shotaro, a judge who had argued for the simple writing of  judgments, 32  and Yokota 
Kisaburo, a professor of  international law at the Tokyo Imperial University, visited the prime 
minister’s office to make a petition for colloquialism and simplification of  the constitution, laws, and 
other legal documents. The petition established a general principle in a democracy that “any written 
material that is important to the people must be written in a manner that is easily understood by 
                                                 
29 The administrative order of  the Ministry of  the Interior on April 23, 1946 is the first official legal document 
written in colloquial Japanese. 
30 The first colloquial imperial rescript was issued on May 7, 1946 when a special session of the Imperial Diet 
was convoked. See Irie, Keii, 273. 
31 See Irie Toshio, “Kenpo soan yoroku (The Anecdote of  the Constitutional Draft) 3,” Hoso, no. 56 (1955), 7-
10, 7. 
32  See Miyake Shotaro, “Horei to kokugo (Laws and Regulations and Japanese),” and “Shinkenpo ni 
nozomukoto (What I Expect in the New Constitution),” Miyake Shotaro Zenshu (Tokyo: Kogakusha, 1950), 
vol.3.  
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them.” However, it criticized the fact that “on this score the laws and other public documents have 
until now been remiss.” It then emphasized the importance of  popular commitment to democratized 
legal documents by stating “that there is little chance for success in trying to mobilize the strength of  
all the people to build a new Japan if  we leave this absurd situation as it is.”33  
Members of  the movement concretely requested the government that writing all laws and 
legal documents should be changed in the following manners: that they be written in colloquial 
Japanese; that, if  at all possible, they not use difficult kanji (Chinese characters); that they avoid 
obscure and difficult words and expressions; that the number of  kanji used be reduced; and that 
standard marks be used to indicate sound changes in the phonetic script, such as voiced 
consonants.34  
In sum, their petition was to use the colloquial style rather than the archaic literary style, 
and to avoid esoteric phrases. At the beginning of  the new nation, to the members, the style of  laws 
and public documents should be completely reformed in order to make them accessible to all the 
Japanese people and to muster up their courage as a sovereign power. 
Some bureaucrats in the cabinet legislation bureau responded to the petition positively. In 
fact, they themselves recognized the necessity to reform legal writings to make them more easily 
treatable. Irie Toshio, the chief  of  the bureau, was one of  them.35 Watanabe Yoshihide, a young legal 
bureaucrat, also thought that reform was needed in a new era.36 Irie and Watanabe independently 
discussed the possibility that the forthcoming constitution and other legal documents would be 
written in a colloquial style. They jointly prepared the constitutional draft in colloquial Japanese. 
Watanabe asked help of  Yamamoto, who was a popular writer and eager reformer in Japanese 
                                                 
33 “Write constitution in colloquial Japanese (petition) (3/26/46) People’s Language Reform Movement,” in 
RM233 par. 1.   
34 “Write constitution in colloquial Japanese (petition) (3/26/46) People’s Language Reform Movement,” in 
RM233 par. 2.   
35 See Irie, Keii, 269-273, 289-291. 
36 See Watanabe Yoshihide, “Shin kenpo to kogotai (The New Constitution and Colloquialism),” in Sato, 
Seiritsushi, 3: 278-279; Watanabe Yoshihide, “Hoseikyoku Kaiso (Recollections of  the Legislation Bureau)” in 
Naikaku Hoseikyoku Hyakunenshi Henshuiinkai ed., Shogen Kindaiho no Kiseki (Traces of  Modern Law: 
Testimonies) (Tokyo: Gyosei, 1985), 95-105, 98-102. See also Sato, Tanjyoki, 82-85. 
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language to frame a provisional colloquial draft.37 Yokota, a future chief  justice of  the Supreme 
Court, who lived nearby, joined Yamamoto to write a colloquial draft.38   
At the March 26 meeting of  representatives of  the People’s National Language Movement 
League, the minister of  state Matsumoto Joji was unenthusiastic about colloquialism in the 
constitution, because he believed that the fundamental law of  the nation must be solemn in style. 
Matsumoto thought, however, that colloquialism in this case might be helpful in disguising the 
importation of  the constitution from the United States.39 Irie, on the contrary, was enthusiastic about 
it and positively acted to gain the consent on colloquialization from the cabinet members. He finally 
persuaded Matsumoto to agree to make a decision on a colloquial draft in a cabinet meeting.40  
Irie and Sato perseveringly negotiated with the Government Section. GHQ could not 
understand the significance of  colloquialism in writing the constitution because they suspected that 
by manipulating words, the Japanese government was trying to obscure the meanings of  the text the 
origin of  which was their draft.41 The Japanese bureaucrats eventually succeeded in persuading 
GHQ to grant permission on the changes in the Japanese text.42 As a result, on April 17, the 
Japanese government published “the Draft of  Revision of  the Imperial Constitution” in the 
colloquial style with hiragana rather than katakana, which was and is more familiar to common 
citizens than the old and authoritative manner. On April 18, newspapers in a welcoming tone 
reported the new government draft written in a colloquial style. 43  Editorials pointed out 
colloquialism as epoch-making for a newly democratized political culture. They then insisted that 
                                                 
37 The process of  initiating colloquialization of the constitutional draft was not totally clear. The interested 
parties told slightly different stories. For this point, see Takami Katsutoshi, “Irie Toshio to Kenpo Jyobun no 
Kogoka,” Nakamura Mutsuo and Maeda Hideaki, eds., Rippo Katei no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 1997), 218-
251. 
38 See Yokota Kisaburo, “Kenpo no kogoka,” Pari no kiseki (Tokyo: Keso Shobo, 1952). 
39 Matsumoto’s testimony in Sato, Seiritsushi, 3: 274. 
40 See Irie, Keii, 270.  
41 See Sato, Seiritsushi, 3: 299. GHQ’s record showed that colloquialization derived from GHQ’s suggestion. 
See Political Reorientation. This is clearly false. The efforts to write the constitutional text in colloquial 
Japanese came completely from the Japanese initiative. See Irie, Keii, 271; Sato, Seiritsushi, 3: 300; Dower, 
Embracing Defeat, 392-393. See also, Moore & Robinson, Partners for Democracy, 155-158.  
42 There were no changes in the English text of  the new constitution. 
43 See e.g., “Shugiin kaisan chu no rinjisochi Sangiin ga kinkyushukai,” Asahi Shinbun, article, April 18, 1946 
in Shoron Shuroku, 290-291. 
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the government should make the constitutional text even simpler, clearer, and easier to comprehend 
than the April 17 draft, which sounded stiff  as Japanese.44  
Among the private activists, Yamamoto Yuzo most enthusiastically devoted himself  to 
lobbying to make legal documents easier.45 In the Gettysburg Address, Yamamoto said, Abraham 
Lincoln used 203 words of  one syllable in a total of  272 words. This shows how plainly Lincoln 
spoke and even so his address has moved people profoundly and become an immortal passage.46 To 
Yamoto, usage of  plain words and simple characters does not necessarily lead to worthless writings, 
but to prosperity and expansion of  a culture. When he saw the draft of  constitutional revision, 
Yamamoto praised the government’s decision and said that all kinds of  public documents would be 
written in a colloquial style as the constitution, that colloquialism would make public documents 
much more accessible and bureaucrats who write them psychologically gentler, and that the 
preamble of  the revised constitution should be written in shorter and clearer sentences.47   
The leadership Yamamoto and his colleagues took in the movement and the enthusiasm 
they showed moved flexible legal bureaucrats to frame a vernacularized constitution. This has been a 
revolution in the political and legal culture of  Japan. With colloquialism, the fundamental law of  the 
nation has for the first time become a common baseline for the governmental process between the 
people and the governing elites. After all, the Meiji Constitution, as the great code of  eternality, was 
nothing but an instrument for the elites to rule the people. If  the principle of  popular sovereignty 
means anything at all, it is only when the people who more or less tend to be the subject of  
governance in the ordinary political process can understand what the fundamental charter 
guarantees to them. Without any doubt, the Constitution of  Japan has become much more 
accessible for common citizens than the Meiji Constitution and thus far more democratized. Good 
                                                 
44 See “Kenpo jyobun no heiika (Simplification of the Constitutional Provisions),” Asahi Shinbun, editorial, 
April 18, 1948 in Shoron Shuroku, 288-289; “Kogo cho no kaisei kenpo soan (The Colloquial Draft of  Revision 
of  the Constitution),” Nihon Keizai Shinbun, editorial, April 18, 1946 in ibid., 289-290. 
45 See Yokota Kisaburo, “Kenpo no Hiragana Kogo,” Pari no Kiseki (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1952), 175-184. 
46 Yamamoto Yuzo, “Moji to nihonjin (Characters and Japanese People),” Sekai, April 1946. 
47 Yamamoto Yuzo, “Kanari Omoikitta Shochi,” Mainichi Shinbun, April 18, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 293-294. 
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opportunities have been opened for the people to exercise their sovereign power by actively 
participating in politics. Whatever the framers might intend,48 the consequence of  colloquialism has 
been enormous and decisive for the Japanese people. Colloquialism is one of  the most fundamental 
and revolutionary features of  the postwar constitution. In particular, the principle of  popular 
sovereignty the new constitution has solemnly declared has a positive significance only with the 
newly introduced colloquial style.      
  
3. The Liberal Democratization of  Politics: An Overview 
The Constitution of  Japan has solemnly declared that sovereignty resides in the people.49 
Unlike the Meiji constitutional system in which the tenno held and exercised sovereign powers, the 
people have become the sole source of  political legitimacy. As a result, the new regime has got rid of  
dualism between the Constitution and the Koshitsu Tenpan (the Imperial House Law) and created a 
unified system in which the constitution is superior to the new Imperial House Law.50  
The first sentence of  preamble of  the constitution well clarifies the basic structure of  the 
postwar constitutional system: “We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected 
representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity 
the fruits of  peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of  liberty throughout this land, 
and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of  war through the action of  
government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this 
Constitution.”51 First of  all, this constitution has been a product of  the exertion of  constitutional 
power on the part of  the people. This fact is in marked contrast to the Meiji Constitution, which was 
a kintei kenpo (constitution established by the tenno). Then the preamble declares the fundamental 
                                                 
48 Sato Tatsuo frankly admits that an expectation that colloquialism would obscure the tone of  translation in 
the constitutional text prompted the governing elite to adopt the draft in a colloquial style. See Sato, Seiritsushi, 
3: 274-275. 
49 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble par. 1 & art. 1. 
50 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 2. 
51 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble par. 1. 
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ideals upon which the constitution is based: above all, popular sovereignty, and representation, 
liberalism or constitutionalism, pacifism, and international cooperation. Importantly, the purpose of  
establishing the constitution is to secure “the blessings of  liberty”. Namely, the constitution has 
placed in the center liberalism or the principle of  respecting fundamental human rights, the kernel of  
which is respect as individuals.52 To achieve this purpose, thus, the constitution has adopted the 
principle of  popular sovereignty and pacifism.53  
The fundamental political principle in the postwar constitutional system is simple and 
universalistic: “Government is a sacred trust of  the people, the authority for which is derived from 
the people, the powers of  which are exercised by the representation of  the people, and the benefits of  
which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of  mankind upon which the 
Constitution is founded.”54 On the one hand, declaration of  popular sovereignty, as a result, leads to 
the status of  the tenno deriving from “the will of  the people with whom resides sovereign power.”55 
On the other, representative democracy has been adopted as the main manner of  the governmental 
process.56 Thus the Diet is regarded as “the highest organ of  state power” and has become the true 
and sole legislative institution.57 Because a parliamentary system has been introduced, moreover, 
responsible politics has been more secure than in the Meiji constitutional system.58 
Liberalism or constitutionalism is saliently prevalent in the constitution. First of  all, the 
essence of  fundamental human rights is especially placed in the Chapter of  Supreme Law.59 The 
                                                 
52 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 13. 
53 See Sato Koji, Kenpo, 3rd ed., (Tokyo: Seirin Shoin, 1995), 79, 83. 
54 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble par. 1. 
55 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 1. 
56 However, the constitution has partially adopted direct democracy. They are cases for a special law applicable 
only to one local public entity and for amendment to the constitution. See the Constitution of Japan, arts. 95 & 
96. See also, ibid. art. 79 par. 2 (popular examination of  the Supreme Court justices). On the local level, 
moreover, there are several direct democratic institutions. See Chiho Jichi Ho (Local Autonomy Law), arts. 74-
88. 
57 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 41. In the Meiji constitutional system, the Imperial Diet was not a legislative 
body but an institution that only gave consent to the tenno’s legislative prerogative. See Chapter 1 section 3. 
58 See the Constitution of  Japan, arts. 67-69. 
59  Article 96 of  the Constitution of  Japan reads: “The fundamental human rights by this Constitution 
guaranteed to the people of  Japan are fruits of  the age-old struggle of  man to be free; they have survived the 
many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all 
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postwar constitution is understood as the supreme law of  land.60 While the constitution provides for 
public officials’ obligation to respect and uphold the constitution, it does not include the people as a 
whole.61 This essentially shows that the postwar constitution tries to limit the political power of  the 
government, not the liberties of  common citizens, which is the core spirit of  modern 
constitutionalism. Further, the constitution has a detailed catalogue of  civil rights and civil 
liberties.62 The catalogue includes not only traditional negative rights but also recently developed 
positive rights such as the right to maintain the minimum standards of  wholesome and cultured 
living, the right to receive an equal education correspondent to one’s ability, and the right to work.63 
As importantly, the postwar constitutional system has introduced judicial review, which is a 
completely new institution for Japanese legal practices. 64  The mechanism of  controlling the 
constitutionality of  governmental actions would be helpful for enhancing the idea of  
constitutionalism. The Meiji constitutional system had nothing to do with constitutional review. 
Indeed, it had reservation of  laws with rights and liberties.65 The postwar constitutional system has 
dramatically strengthened protection of  people’s rights. 
Moreover, governmental powers are clearly separated in three different branches. The Diet, 
the cabinet, and the Supreme Court and inferior courts are vested with legislative, administrative, 
and judicial powers, respectively.66 Rather than concentrating political power upon one institution as 
the Meiji Constitution did, the postwar constitution has built a scheme of  checks and balances, in 
which major governmental institutions are supposed to interact with one another. Such a scheme is 
                                                                                                                                                             
time inviolate.”  
60 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 98. 
61 Article 99 of  the Constitution of  Japan reads: “The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of  State, 
members of  the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this 
Constitution.” 
62 See the Constitution of Japan, Chapter 3, arts. 13-40. Article 13 is regarded as a general principle of  
fundamental rights. It reads: “All of  the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of  happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme 
consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.” 
63 See the Constitution of  Japan, arts. 25- 27. 
64 See Article 81 of  the Constitution of  Japan reads: “The Supreme Court is the court of  last resort with power 
to determine the constitutionality of  any law, order, regulation or official act.” 
65 See Chapter 1 section 6. 
66 See the Constitution of  Japan, arts. 41, 65, & 76. 
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of  course good for protecting people’s freedom and what constitutionalism aims at. Further, it makes 
the way of  doing politics more reason-oriented because each institution that has its own independent 
policy judgment has to justify its decision in a way that other institutions can at least understand 
what it have tried to do. Politics is planned to be more articulated it than used to be. In addition, the 
constitution has introduced a system of  local autonomy for the first time in history.67 This also helps 
limiting governmental power. 
Another instrument for securing the blessings of  liberty is pacifism and international 
cooperation. “We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of  the high 
ideals controlling human relationships, and we have determined to preserve our security and 
existence, trusting in the justice and faith of  the peace-loving peoples of  the world…We recognize 
that all peoples of  the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.” 68  The 
constitution materializes this ideal in Articles 9 and 98.69 
The postwar constitution has the aim of  realizing constitutional politics much more steadily 
than the Meiji Constitution, which is perceivably situated between absolutism and constitutionalism. 
The ideas and institutions the Constitution of  Japan has adopted are intended to advance liberal 
democratization of  politics. Now we turn our attention to more detailed matters in the principles of  
the postwar governmental system. We will here examine protection of  rights, the institutional 
scheme of  government, and a sincere desire for peace. 
 
4. Protection of  Rights and the Judiciary 
 In the Meiji constitutional system, rights were understood as benefits from the benevolent 
                                                 
67 See the Constitution of  Japan, Chapter 8, arts. 92-95. 
68 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble, par. 2. 
69 Article 9 of  the Constitution of Japan reads: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of  the nation and the threat or use of  
force as a means of  settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of  the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of  
belligerency of  the state will not be recognized.” Article 98 paragraph 2 reads: “The treaties concluded by 
Japan and established laws of  nations shall be faithfully observed.” 
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tenno to his subjects.70 The Meiji Constitution was indeed a negative answer to claims for natural 
rights. Thus the tenno might have made whatever decision on the contents of  rights. Because 
reservation of  laws was added to the declaration of  rights, indeed, the legislative power could 
regulate rights as it liked. Thus, protection of  rights had some effect on administrative abuses but 
offered the Japanese subjects no real fortress against legislative power in particular and political 
power in general. The majoritarian defense for rights was not applicable because subjects themselves 
never had had legislative power. Further, the Meiji constitutional system was based upon a 
monopolization of  value judgments by the kokutai ideology of  one line unbroken for ages eternal. 
Unification of  the state and Shinto was in fact a distinctive feature of  the Meiji regime.71 
 In sharp contrast, the postwar constitutional system has rejected the concept of  reservation 
of  laws. Natural law thought is influential in the new constitution: “The people shall not be 
prevented from enjoying any of  the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights 
guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of  this and future 
generations as eternal and inviolate rights.”72 Thus basic rights are regarded as setting limits upon all 
kinds of  power of  the state, particularly legislative power. The core idea of  rights guaranteed in the 
constitution is due respect for human dignity as individuals.73 This concept of  individual dignity had 
been radically innovative in Japanese political and legal practices because the Meiji constitutional 
system was founded upon a family view of  the state and the heads of  family and the state were 
recognized as powerful enough to control members of  the group. Indeed, respect for individuals was 
once condemned as immoral.74 
                                                 
70 Suzuki Yasuzo, “Kihonteki jinken (Fundamental Human Rights),” Kenpo Fukyukai, ed., Shinkenpo kowa, 
149-174, 159; Kawamura Matasuke, Shinkenpo to minshushugi (The New Constitution and Democracy) (Tokyo: 
Kunitachi Shoin, 1948), 185-186. 
71 See Chapter 1, sections 3 & 9. 
72 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 11. See also, ibid., art. 97. 
73 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 13. 
74 See Tsuneto Kyo, “Kihonteki jinken ni suite (On Fundamental Human Rights),” Shinkenpo to minshushugi 
(The New Constitution and Democracy) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1947), 193-205, 200. See also, Noda Yoshiyuki, 
“Shiko, kyoiku, gakumon (Faith, Education, Scholarship),” Kokka Gakkai. ed., Shinkenpo no kenkyu (Studies on 
the New Constitution) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1947), 91-107.  
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 Respect for individual dignity leads to protection of  inner spiritual freedoms.75 Freedom of  
thought and conscience and academic freedom have been constitutionally guaranteed for the first 
time in Japanese history.76 Full protection of  freedom of  religion is crucially important against the 
background of  the Meiji constitutional system.77 The tenno was believed to be a living god as a 
descendant of  Amaterasu Omikami (legendary sun goddess) and the highest priest of  Shintoism. Thus 
Shinto was established in the Meiji regime but understood as non-religion.78 Thus the constitutional 
guarantee of  religious freedom tended to become meaningless. 79  Without any doubt, the Meiji 
constitution could not offer an inner fortress to people who did not share an orthodox thought. On 
the contrary, the postwar system has adopted the principle of  separation between the state and 
religion.80 Shinto has become the private religion of  the tenno family.81 It is true that there is a serious 
question of  how strict the separation is and later the Supreme Court has adopted a rather loose 
approach to the separation by using something resembling but different from the Lemon test its U.S. 
counterpart has formulated.82 Even so, however, the postwar constitutional system is a completely 
different system that assumes the unification between the state and religion from the very beginning. 
                                                 
75 As explanation of  the outline of  the new constitution, Kanamori Tokujiro especially emphasizes thorough 
protection of  inner spiritual freedoms. Kanamori Tokujiro, “Shinkenpo no seishin (The Sprits of  the New 
Constitution),” Jiji Tsushinsha, ed., Nihonkoku kenpo: Kaisetsu to shiryo (The Constitution of  Japan: Explanations 
and Materials) (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 1946), 16-30, 29-30 (hereinafter cited as Jiji Tsushinsha, Kaisetsu to 
shiryo).   
76 See the Constitution of  Japan, arts. 19 & 23. 
77 Article 20 of  the Constitution of Japan reads: “Freedom of  religion is guaranteed to all. No religious 
organization shall receive any privileges from the State nor exercise any political authority. (2) No person shall 
be compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, rite or practice. (3) The State and its organs shall 
refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.” In contrast, Article 28 of the Constitution of 
the Empire of  Japan read: “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not 
antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of  religious belief.” 
78 See Minobe Tatsukichi, Shinkenpo no kihongenri (The Fundamental Principles of  the New Constitution) (Tokyo: 
Kunitachi Shoin, 1947), 113-116 (hereinafter cited as Minobe, Kihongenri).  
79 See Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, “Shinkenpo no seikaku (Characters of  the New Constitution),” Jiji Tsuahinsha, 
Kaisetsu to shiryo, 31-45, 36. 
80 See the Constitution of Japan, arts. 20 & 89. The latter reads: “No public money or other property shall be 
expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of  any religious institution or association, or for 
any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of  public authority.” 
81 See Minobe, Kihongenri, 116. 
82 The Shinto Groundbreaking Ceremony Case, Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi, Saikosai Hanketsu(Supreme Court 
Judgment), July 13, 1977, Minshu vol. 31, no. 4, 533  in Lawrence W. Beer & Hiroshi Ito, The Constitutional 
Case Law of  Japan, 1970 through 1990 (Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 1996), Case 34, 478-491. See 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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Secularization of  politics was a starting point of  liberalism in human history. 83  The postwar 
constitution has for the first time made the Japanese people reach this point. Both guarantee of  
freedom of  religion and institutionalizing separation of  the state and religion are revolutionarily 
innovative for a way of  doing politics in postwar Japan.     
Further, respect for human dignity also requires protection of  equality among people. The 
Meiji Constitution guaranteed only a limited form of  equality: “Japanese subjects may, according to 
qualifications determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military or any other public 
offices equally.”84 In fact, Meiji society was full of  discrimination. First of  all, the tenno and his 
family were treated in a way essentially different from common citizens. The Koshitsu Tenpan (the 
Imperial House Law) was an autonomous legal rule for the tenno family, which was interpreted as 
equivalent to the Meiji Constitution. Around them, in addition, there was the nobility, from whom 
most of  the members of  the House of  Peers were selected.85 Above all, discrimination against 
women was rampant. They were not only denied the right to participate in politics but also mostly 
the right to legal transactions and inheritance because of  their subjection to the control of  the head 
of  the ie, the family or household, in private life. The Meiji constitutional system excluded women 
from political community and severely limited their legal competence in the private sphere as well. 
The postwar constitution has provided for equality in a more general way: “All of  the 
people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social 
relations because of  race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.”86 Although the tenno and his 
family are still constitutional exceptions, there have been no more nobles. 87 In this respect, the 
postwar constitution is more thorough than the governmental draft because while the latter admitted 
that those who held a peerage on the day when the constitution would be effective could keep their 
                                                 
83 See Kawamura, Shinkenpo to minshushugi, 14-19. 
84 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 19. 
85 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 34. 
86 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 14 par. 1. 
87 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 14 pars. 2 & 3. 
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status only for their generation,88 the former has no such a reservation and has simply abolished the 
peerage as a whole.89 Women are now full members of  the political and social community. Universal 
suffrage was introduced before the framing of  the Constitution of  Japan. 90  Indeed, women’s 
participation in the first general election in the postwar period and in deliberating on the government 
draft has greatly enhanced the legitimacy of  the postwar constitution. In addition, family life is 
regarded as an important place to realize equality between man and woman because the concept of  
ie was a miniature of  the state in analogy to family and a base of  absolutistic rule. Thus the 
constitution has a rather detailed provision on family: “Marriage shall be based only on the mutual 
consent of  both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of  
husband and wife as a basis. (2) With regard of  choice of  spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice 
of  domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted 
from the standpoint of  individual dignity and the essential equality of  the sexes.”91 The impact of  
this clause is potentially enormous because a horizontal rather than vertical human relationship 
becomes normal and standard.92 Transformation of  social and political structure could occur, thus, if  
the provision were fully implemented.93 
Another pivotal right for liberal democracy is freedom of  expression. The new constitution 
protects this precious right in a broad manner: “Freedom of  assembly and association as well as 
speech, press and all others of  expression are guaranteed. (2) No censorship shall be maintained, nor 
                                                 
88 Article 97 of  the government draft of  constitutional revision of April 17, 1946 reads: “As regards those who 
hold peerage on the effective date of  this Constitution, their title shall remain valid for their lives, but no right 
of  peerage shall from this time forth embody within itself  any power of  government.” 
89 Kanamori stresses this point as a reflection of thorough democratization in the new constitution. Kanamori, 
“Shinkenpo no seishin,” Jiji Tsushinsha, Kaisetsu to shiryo, 30. 
90 See Chapter 3 section 5. 
91 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 24. 
92  Kanamori emphasizes the significance of  recognizing the essential equality of  gender. Kanamori, 
“Shinkenpo no seishin,” Jiji Tsushinsha, Kaisetsu to shiryo, 30. For explanations of  a new image of  family life 
under the postwar constitution, see Miyasawa, “Shinkenpo no seikaku,” ibid., 37-38; Kawashima Takeyoshi, 
“Kazoku seido (The Institution of Family),” Kokka Gakkai, ed., Shinkepo no kenkyu, 108-133; Minobe, 
Kihongenri, 100-102; Wagatsuma Sakae, “Kazoku seido to fujin (The Institution of  Family and Women),” 
Kenpo Fukyukai, Shinkenpo kowa, 175-221; Wagatsuma Sakae, Shinkenpo to kihontekijinken (The New 
Constitution and Fundamental Human Rights) (Tokyo: Kunitachi Shoin, 1948), 174, 178; Nakagawa Zennosuke, 
Shinkenpo to kazoku seido (The New Constitution and the Institution of  Family) (Tokyo: Kunitachi Shoin, 1948). 
93 For the revision of Civil Code, see this Chapter section 8. 
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shall the secrecy of  any means of  communication be violated.”94 Free expression is crucial from the 
perspectives of  individuals’ realization of  themselves and of  democratic decision-making.95 It is 
intrinsically and instrumentally valuable for people to express themselves. By fully protecting free 
expression, thus, the postwar constitutional system intends to develop liberal democratization of  
society. Freedom of  expression is all the more important because the principle of  popular 
sovereignty has been declared. Without the free flow of  information and opinions, the power of  the 
people to make a final decision would be pie in the sky.96 
Along with these negative rights, moreover, the postwar constitution has declared positive 
rights, which are completely new for constitutionalism in Japan. On the one hand, the right to own 
property and freedom of  business, which were traditionally believed absolute and sacred, are 
understood as no longer so but relative and practical because the development of  capitalism has 
incurred some necessary arrangement of  these rights to social problems. Public welfare is supposed 
to control the contents of  these rights. 97  On the other hand, social rights are constitutionally 
guaranteed. The right to maintain the minimum standards of  wholesome and cultured living is 
understood as their representative.98 The postwar constitution is placed in the international trend of  
                                                 
94 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 21. 
95 For the values freedom of  expression advances, see Thomas I. Emerson, “Toward a General Theory of  the 
First Amendment,” 72 Yale L.J. 877, 878-886 (1963); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of  Speech (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Martin H. Redish, Freedom of  Expression: A Critical Analysis (Charlottsville, 
Va.: Michie Co., 1984).  
96 See Minobe, Kihongenri, 118. However, explanations on the new constitution do not pay much attention to 
the significance of  free expression. It might be because many scholars assume a close connection of  free 
expression to democracy, because the Meiji Constitution guaranteed free speech anyway and because scholars 
were interested in newly introduced positive rights around the establishment of  the new constitution.   
97 Article 29 of  the Constitution of Japan reads: “The right to own or to hold property is inviolable. (2) 
Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare. (3) Private property may be taken 
for public use upon just compensation therefore.” Article 22 reads: “Every person shall have freedom to choose 
and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public 
welfare. (2) Freedom of  all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of  their nationality 
shall be inviolate.” Technically, there is no mention about freedom of  business in Article 22. But freedom to 
choose one’s occupation is interpreted as including freedom of  business. See Hogaku Kyokai, ed., Chukai 
nihonkoku kenpo (The Constitution of  Japan Annotated) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1953), 2nd ed., 1: 442. 
98 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 25 par. 1. Other than that, the right to education, the right to work and the 
right to organize and to bargain and act collectively 
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socialization of  rights in the twentieth century. 99  Morito Tatsuo, an important member of  the 
Socialist Party that has modified the government draft to include the right to a decent life and the 
first Minister of  Education under the new constitution, triumphantly advocated, at the lecture 
meeting for popularizing the new constitution, the possibility of  a peaceful social revolution with the 
democratic postwar constitution.100 Immediately after their enactment, however, these social rights 
were interpreted as not real rights but programs.101 This general understanding of  these rights does 
not recognize their effect as an adjudicative norm and thus a character of  concrete rights. Even so 
interpreted, without any doubt, people’s social, economic and cultural existence has become the 
matter the state has to take care of. Social rights give the government important policy guidance 
when it exercises its discretionary powers on policy judgment. Therefore public welfare has 
transformed its meaning from a statist slogan to a standard of  individual-oriented arrangements. 
In this way, the new constitution has established a sphere where both negative and positive 
freedoms are fully guaranteed. The core concept of  protecting rights is to respect human dignity as 
individuals. However, there is a serious fear that the concept of  the public welfare might be abused as 
the idea of  reservation of  laws was in the Meiji constitutional system. That would make the 
constitutional guarantee of  detailed freedoms and rights meaningless. In fact, the most fundamental 
                                                 
99 The first constitutionalization of  the welfare principle was the Weimar Constitution of  1919 in Germany. It 
included a famous formula that “Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal”. See the 
Constitution of  the Weimar Republic, Article 153(3). In the aftermath of  World War II, this idea of  
constitutionalizing the welfare state disseminated among the countries that had to reestablish a structure of  the 
state for whatever reason they did. The French People declared several political, economic, and social principles 
as particularly necessary in their time in the Constitution of the French Fourth Republic of  1946. See, the 
Constitution of the French Fourth Republic, Preamble (emphasis added). Such principles consist of  parts of  
the current Fifth Republic Constitution of  1958. See the Constitution of  the French Fifth Republic, Preamble. 
The Italian Constitution of  1947 declares as one of  fundamental principles that “Italy is a democratic Republic 
founded on labor”. See the Constitution of Republic of  Italy, Article 1(3) (emphasis added). It enumerates 
thorough rights of  citizens in both ethical and social relations and economic relations. See ibid. Title II and III 
of  the Part I; Article 29-40. According to the Bonn Basic Law of  1949, “The Federal Republic of  Germany is a 
democratic and social federal state”. See the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of  Germany, Article 20(1) 
emphasis added). It inherits the social principle on private property from the Weimar Constitution. See the 
Constitution of the Weimar Republic, Article 14(2). 
100  Morito Tatsuo, “Shinkenpo to shakaishugi (The New Constitution and Socialism),” Kenpo Fukyukai, 
Kenpo kowa, 287-324, 320-323. 
101 See Wagatsuma, “Kihonteki jinken,” Kokka Gakkai, Shinkenpo no kenkyu, 86-89; Kawamura, Shinkenpo to 
minshushugi, 210; Hogaku Kyokai, Chukai nihonkoku kenpo, 1: 487-489. 
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right might be subject to a comprehensive idea of  the public welfare: “All of  the people shall be 
respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of  happiness shall, to the extent 
that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in 
other governmental affairs.”102 The constitution has also provided for a warning that “The freedoms 
and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant 
endeavor of  the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of  these freedoms and rights and shall 
always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.”103 And many scholars emphasize that 
it is freedom, not license, that the new constitution guarantees. It is often said that freedom and right 
accompany responsibility and obligation. 104  Communitarian claims are also developed on a 
relationship between freedoms and rights and public welfare.105 To be sure, these claims are not 
necessarily conservative altogether. Indeed, an excessive individualistic approach cannot materialize 
potentials of  rights in some context.106 However, a real problem at that time in postwar Japan was 
not to warn citizens against abuse of  their freedoms and rights but to offer full protection for them 
against abuse of  political power. The Japanese people as a whole had never experienced license 
because they had never sufficiently enjoyed freedoms and rights they could abuse. Here we can see 
the difficult situation postwar Japan has faced: the people had to respond to the new complication of  
liberal democracy in the world that had to be confronted before they were completely liberated from 
despotic political power. 
Whatever the public welfare might mean, it is crystal-clear that the postwar constitution has 
established an innovative framework for liberal democratization of  politics based upon respect for 
                                                 
102 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 13. 
103 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 12. 
104 For example, Minobe Tatsukichi stresses obligations of  rights for the interests of  the state and society and 
explains three obligations the constitution provides for regarding fundamental human rights: (1) to maintain 
fundamental rights with constant endeavor, (2) not to abuse them, and (3) to use them for the public welfare. 
Minobe, Kihongenri, 93-95. 
105 See Wagatsuma, “Kihonteki jinken,” Kokka Gakkai, Shinkenpo no kenkyu, 88-89; Wagatsuma, Shinkenpo to 
kihonteki jinken, 219-224; Kawamura, Shinkenpo to minshushugi, 211-224. 
106 For example, Alexander Meiklejohn has criticized Justice Holmes for excessive individualism he believed in 
antagonism to a republican project of  self-government by the people. See Alexander Meikeljohn, Free Speech 
and Its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 57-91. 
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human dignity as individuals. The concept of  the public welfare should be understood according to 
the new constitutional ideal, not an authoritarian spirit.  
When we discuss the protection of  freedoms and rights, we cannot forget the importance of  
the judiciary. In the Meiji constitutional system, judicial power was exercised in the name of  the 
tenno107 and the judicature was under the supervision of  the Ministry of  Justice. The court heard only 
civil and criminal cases and administrative cases had to be presented to the administrative court, 
which was an administrative organ.108 Although rights with reservation of  laws had to be protective 
against administrative abuse, standing to sue was narrowly defined in the Gyosei Saiban Ho 
(Administrative Justice Act) and thus rights were seldom recovered in the administrative court.109 
In marked contrast, the postwar constitution has fortified and expanded the judiciary to a 
remarkable extent.110 The entire judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and inferior courts.111 
The judiciary now enjoys independence.112 The Supreme Court may make a rule on judicial affairs, 
which is an exception to the monopoly of  legislative power on the part of  the Diet.113 Judges may 
hold office barring impeachment114 or mental or physical incompetence. Further, no disciplinary 
action shall be taken by any administrative organ.115 Because the administrative court system was 
abolished,116 courts hear not only civil and criminal but also administrative cases. This alternation 
would advance the protection of  citizens’ rights and freedoms because the administrative court after 
                                                 
107 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 57 par. 1. 
108 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 61. 
109 See Chapter 1 section 6. 
110 For the judiciary in the postwar constitution, see Kanamori, “Shinkenpo no seishin,” Jiji Tsushin, Kaisetsu to 
shiryo, 27-28; Miyasawa, “Shinkenpo no seikaku,” ibid., 41-43; Tanaka Jiro, “Shiho, chihojichi,” Kenpo 
Fukyukai, Shinkenpo kowa, 257-285, 258-270; Kaneko Hajime, “Shihoseido (The Judicial Institution),” Hogaku 
Kyokai, Shinkenpo no kenkyu, 229-243; Suenobu Sanji, “Iken ripo shinsaseido (Judicial Review),” ibid., 244-271. 
111 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 76 par. 1. 
112 Article 76 Paragraph 3 of  the Constitution of Japan reads: “All judges shall be independent in the exercise 
of  their conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws.” 
113 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 77. 
114 Impeachment is applicable only to judges. See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 64. 
115 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 78. 
116 Article 76 Paragraph 2 of  the Constitution of  Japan reads: “No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, 
nor shall any organ or agency of  the Executive be given final judicial power.” For the reform of  the 
administrative adjudication system, see Alfred C. Oppler, Legal Reform in Occupied Japan, 83-84, 115-
117(translation). 
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all was not an independent adjudicative organ.  
Above all, what is important from a liberal democratic point of  view is the introduction of  
a judicial review system: “The Supreme Court is the court of  last resort with power to determine the 
constitutionality of  any law, order, regulation or official act.”117 The constitution is the supreme law 
of  the land118 and the Supreme Court is now vested with the final power to determine what the 
constitution means. In the Meiji constitutional system, the highest court was denied the power to 
have the final word on interpretation of  the constitution and the legislative and administrative 
branches were equal to the judicial branch in terms of  constitutional interpretation. Liberals were 
rather interested in promoting parliamentary government, which judicial review was commonly 
believed to prevent from developing.119 In the postwar constitutional system, instead, constitutional 
justice has become its essential element.120 The concept of  constitutionality beyond legality would 
lead to strengthen the constitutional norm, the core of  which positivist parliamentarism once eroded. 
The judicial control of  constitutionality of  government actions means not only that citizens’ 
freedoms and rights are more sufficiently protected than the older system but also that it would 
change the quality of  politics.121 Namely, a majority does not automatically win political legitimacy 
under a system with judicial review. Postwar Japan has had a political regime based upon the 
justification of  governmental decisions from reasons the decision-makers give. The fundamental 
value of  protecting respect for human dignity as individuals in the new constitution would be 
enhanced through the institutional exchange of  reasons. Introduction of  judicial review into the 
constitutional system would radically transform the manner of  doing politics. Liberal democracy 
                                                 
117 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 81. 
118 Article 98 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of Japan reads: “This Constitution shall be the supreme law of 
the land and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of  government, or part thereof, contrary to the 
provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.” 
119 See Chapter 1 sections 6 & 8. 
120  For the idea of  constitutional justice, see Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). 
121 Tanaka Jiro has pointed out that from the lesson of American experience, the Supreme Court with judicial 
review would play a critically important role in Japan’s development not only legal but also political, economic, 
social and cultural. Tanaka, “Shiho, chihojichi,” Kenpo Fukyukai, Kenpo kowa, 267. 
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finally has a good opportunity to develop even with difficulty in arranging the realization of  majority 
will and the protection of  minority will.122                
 
5. The Institutional Scheme for Responsible Politics 
 In the Meiji constitutional regime, the tenno governed the state directly as a matter of  
principle but mostly behaved himself  as a constitutional monarch. A serious problem the regime had 
was that there was no unification of  advisory institutions, which led to non-responsible politics. First 
of  all, the cabinet was not a constitutional institution. A prime minister could not legally control his 
cabinet members and was nothing but primus inter pares. Ministers of  state were respectively 
responsible to tenno for their advice. 123  However, they could not monopolize the position of  
supporting the tenno. Military matters were out of  reach on the part of  the government because tosui-
ken, the power to command the military forces, was interpreted as independent.124 Other than the 
cabinet, there were various advisory institutions, constitutional and non-constitutional, such as the 
Minister of  the Imperial Household, the Lord Keeper of  the Privy Seal, genro (a group of  senior 
statesmen), the Privy Council and the General Staff  Office and the Naval Staff  Board in peacetime 
and the Imperial Headquarters in wartime.125 Although all these institutions played an active role in 
making policy decisions, they had obscured location of  political responsibility for a specific policy 
judgment. 
 The postwar constitution that declared the principle of  popular sovereignty changed the 
                                                 
122 It is true that the Supreme Court has stingily exercised the power of  judicial review and that it has often 
adopted a comprehensive concept of  the public welfare to uphold legal limitation upon freedoms. For example, 
the Public Offices Election Law prohibits those who engage in political campaign from door-to-door 
canvassing with criminal sanction. When the accused  attacked constitutionality of  the provision on the basis 
of  freedom of  speech, the Supreme Court rejected the allegation because it believed that free speech was not 
absolute and subject to rational limitations of  time, place, and manner and so on for the public welfare. The 
judgment had no substantial analysis on the public welfare. See Supreme Court Judgment, September 27, 1950, 
Keishu, vol. 4, no. 9, 1799. However, as a matter of  principle, undoubtedly, the introduction of  judicial review 
has enormous impact upon public discourse on politics. Even on the premise of  its poor function, it is 
undeniable that this system has promoted institutional dialogue. 
123 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 55 par. 1. 
124 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 11. There was no explicit ground of  independence of  
tosui-ken in the Meiji Constitution. See Chapter 1 section 2 (4). 
125 See Chapter 1 section 5. 
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political structure dramatically. Because political legitimacy all derives from the sovereign will of  the 
people, political institutions are directly or indirectly responsible to the people for their decisions. 
The constitution has clarified a simple principle that “Government is a sacred trust of  the people, the 
authority for which is derives from the people, the powers of  which are exercised by the 
representatives of  the people, and the benefits of  which are enjoyed by the people.” 126 To materialize 
this universal principle, the constitution has thoroughly democratized political institutions in terms 
of  popular control.     
 First, there have been no advisory institutions in the postwar constitutional system. The 
position of  the Lord Keeper of  the Privy Seal was abolished after its failed enterprise of  
constitutional revision.127 Technically, the genro (a group of  senior statesmen) ceased to exist when 
Prince Saionji Kinmochi, the last genro, died in November 1940. But the new constitution has given 
the Diet the most important function the genro had assumed. As an extra-constitutional institution, 
the genro was once powerful in the political process in prewar Japan because it recommended a 
candidate for next prime minister to the tenno. The power to designate a prime minister now belongs 
to the Diet and the tenno has no substantial power to appoint a prime minister. 128  Imperial 
Household Agency has been established as an independent organ under the cabinet. It takes care of  
the tenno’s matters of  state and his family matters and thus can have no political influence as the 
Ministry of  the Imperial Household did in prewar Japan. The postwar constitution has also 
abolished the Privy Council, which as the self-esteemed constitutional watchdog formidably 
confronted political party cabinets and sometimes blocked the realization of  their policies.129 There 
has been no independent institution of  prior review system the Privy Council had adopted. Instead, 
as discussed just before,130 the Supreme Court has become the ultimate interpreter of  the constitution. 
                                                 
126 See the Constitution of  Japan, preamble par. 1. 
127 See Chapter 2 section 3. 
128 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 67 & art. 6 par. 1.  
129 See Chapter 1 section 5. 
130 See this Chapter section 4. 
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Finally, because the new constitution has denounced war and the military forces,131 military advisory 
institutions are no longer relevant, whereas the General Staff  Office and the Naval Staff  Board in 
peacetime and the Imperial Headquarters in wartime had had the greatest influence upon the 
political process in pre- and mid-war Japan.  
Next, the Diet has greatly expanded and strengthened its power in the postwar 
constitutional regime. The Diet is now the highest organ of  state power. 132 The meaning of  “the 
highest organ” is commonly understood as political, not legal. The Diet has a direct relation to the 
sovereign people because it is representative of  all the people.133 In the normal way of  things, the 
people are supposed to act “through duly elected representatives in the National Diet.”134 This close 
connection to the people makes the Diet the most important institution in the postwar constitutional 
system.135 In addition, the Diet as a legislative body makes laws to which other organs are bound.136 
In consideration of  the said position, thus, the constitution calls the Diet the highest organ.  
More importantly, the Diet is the sole law-making organ of  the state. Unlike the Imperial 
Diet in the Meiji constitution, which was vested with nothing but the power to give consent to the 
tenno’s legislative prerogative, the Diet itself  has become not only an authentic legislative institution 
but also a monopolist of  legislative power. The Meiji constitutional system allowed the government 
to evade getting consent from the Imperial Diet because emergency orders and independent orders 
were legislation equivalent to law without the consent of  the Imperial Diet.137 In sharp contrast, the 
postwar constitution has denied this expediency. All laws must be enacted in the Diet138 and by 
                                                 
131 See this Chapter section 6. 
132 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 41. 
133 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 42. 
134 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble par. 1. 
135 See Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, “Kokkai to naikaku (The Diet and the Cabinet),” Kenpo Fukyukai, Shinkenpo 
kowa, 223-256, 234; Kawamura, Shinkenpo to minshushugi, 153. 
136 See Minobe, Kihongenri, 143; Kawamura, Shinkenpo to minshushugi, 153. 
137 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, arts. 8 & 9. 
138 Constitutional exceptions are (1) both houses have rule-making power (art. 58 par. 2), (2) the Supreme 
Court has rule-making power (art. 77), (3) the cabinet has the power to enact orders to execute the provisions 
of  the law (art. 73 (vi)), and local public entities have the power to enact their own regulations within law (art. 
94).   
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itself.139 Although the new constitution provides for the tenno’s matters of  state to promulgate laws,140 
this requirement is interpreted as not necessary for laws to take effect.141 Namely, laws are completely 
established before the tenno promulgates them. This is essentially different from the tenno’s sanction 
to laws, which was an official and indispensable part of  the process of  legislation in the Meiji 
constitutional system.142  
In addition, the Diet has strengthened control over the general administration of  matters of  
state. The Diet receives reports on general national affairs and foreign relations from the prime 
minister, who represents the cabinet.143 The Diet’s control over the budget has been particularly 
fortified. Administration of  national finance is exercised as the Diet has determined.144 The Diet 
authorizes national expenses and debts.145  The cabinet has to submit a budget to the Diet for 
consideration and decision each fiscal year.146 The cabinet also has to submit final accounts of  the 
national expenditures and revenues to the Diet after having an annual audit by the Board of  Audit.147 
These provisions are not exactly new. They are more or less the same as those in the old 
constitution.148 However, the Meiji constitutional system had several exceptional institutions. The 
government executed the budget of  the preceding year if  the government could not gain the consent 
of  the Imperial Diet.149 The government had the power to take all necessary financial measures 
without the consent of  the Imperial Diet in case of  urgent need for public safety.150 But the postwar 
constitution has abolished such loopholes.151 Further, each House now has the power to conduct 
                                                 
139 Constitutional exception is a special law applicable only to one local public entity (art. 95). In this case, the 
consent of  the majority of  voters of  the local public entity concerned is necessary to enact the law.  
140 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 7 (i). 
141 See Keibe So, “Ryoinsei (Bicameralism),” Kokka Gakkai, Shinkenpo no kenkyu, 175-210, 176. 
142 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 6. 
143 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 72. 
144 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 83. 
145 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 85. 
146 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 86. See also ibid., art. 72 & art. 73 (v). 
147 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 90. 
148 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, arts. 64, 62 par. 3, 72. 
149 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 71.  
150 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 70 par. 1. Such measures were required to gain the consent 
of  the Imperial Diet afterward. See ibid., par. 2.  
151 See Kawamura, Shinkenpo to minshushugi, 158-160. 
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investigations in relation to the government.152 With this power, each House can make contact with 
outsiders to enrich its activities of  legislation and supervision of  state affairs.153  
Further, the Diet has fortified its basis of  operation. It can now convene by itself. The Meiji 
Constitution vested the tenno with the prerogative to convoke, open, close and prorogue the Imperial 
Diet and to dissolve the House of  Representatives.154 In the postwar constitutional system, the tenno 
still convokes the Diet. But this is a formal matter of  state with the advice and approval of  the 
cabinet 155  and thus a substantial decision-maker is the cabinet. 156  Because the cabinet is 
parliamentary, as will be discussed shortly, sessions of  the Diet are determined in a more interactive 
manner. Further, the demand of  a quarter or more of  the total members of  either House forces the 
cabinet to convoke the Diet.157 This means that the Diet may always open session and thus the Diet 
dramatically expands room for its activities.158  
The Diet is much more democratic in its organization than the Imperial Diet. Although the 
former adopts bicameralism as the latter did, its quality is essentially different. In the Meiji 
constitutional system, absolutism and constitutionalism conflicted with each other, which was well 
reflected in the organization of  the Imperial Diet. It was true that the House of  Representative was 
popularly elected, even though suffrage was limited.159 However, the framers’ intention to prevent the 
Diet from being fully democratized is crystal-clear when the upper house is examined.160 The House 
of  Peers was composed of  the tenno family, the orders of  nobility and those who were nominated by 
the tenno.161 Organization of  the House of  Peers was a matter of  ordinance, not law, which meant 
that the House of  Representatives could not participate in creating a rule of  organization. Quite the 
                                                 
152 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 62. 
153 See Minobe, Kihongenri, 158. 
154 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 7. 
155 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 3 & art. 7 (ii).  
156 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 53, first sentence. 
157 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 53, second sentence. 
158 See Miyasawa, “Kokkai to naikaku,” Kenpo Fukyukai, Shinkenpo kowa, 229-232. 
159 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 35. 
160 See Chapter 1 section 4. 
161 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 34. 
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reverse, in fact: the House of  Peers could engage in making law organizing the House of  
Representatives.162 Further, the powers both houses were vested with were equal except for the 
budget case in which a budget bill was first submitted to the House of  Representatives.163 
The new bicameralism the postwar constitution has provided for consists of  the Houses of  
Representatives and of  Councillors. The upper house is also composed of  publicly elected members, 
representative of  all the people as the lower house is.164 The terms of  office for Representatives and 
Councillors are for four and six years, respectively. But if  the House of  Representatives is dissolved, 
the term immediately ends for Representatives before the full term.165 For Councillors, a half  of  the 
members are elected every three years.166 
Superiority of  the House of  Representatives over the House of  Councillors is eminently 
characteristic of  this new bicameralism. First, the lower house has a wider range of  powers than the 
upper house. The House of  Representatives alone can pass a resolution of  non-confidence in a 
cabinet or reject a confidence resolution.167 In addition, the budget must be still first submitted to the 
lower house.168 However, its superiority becomes more salient when it comes to the effect of  a 
resolution a house passes. The postwar constitution has admitted four exceptions to the rule that the 
Diet’s will is formed based upon agreement by both houses.169 (1) A bill on which each house 
disagrees becomes a law when the House of  Representatives passes it once again by a majority of  
two-thirds or more of  the present members.170 (2) In the case of  designation of  the prime minister, 
the effect of  a resolution by the House of  Representatives is the most powerful. In this case, 
disagreement between both houses is solved within ten days in that the decision of  the House of  
                                                 
162 Compare arts. 34 & 35 of the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan. 
163 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 65. 
164 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 43. 
165 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 45. 
166 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 46. 
167 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 69. 
168 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 60 par. 1. 
169 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 59 par. 1. 
170 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 59 par. 2. Anyway, a final decision of  the Diet is made within sixty days. 
“Failure by the House of  Councillors to take final action within sixty days after receipt of  a bill passed by the 
House of  Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of  Representatives to 
constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of  Councillors.” Ibid., par. 4.  
 297 
Representatives constitutes the decision of  the Diet.171 (3) In the case of  the budget, superiority of  
the lower house is situated between the previous two cases. Disagreement over the budget leads to a 
situation within thirty days that the decision of  the House of  Representatives is regarded as the 
decision of  the Diet.172 (4) The same rule as the budget case applies to the case of  approval of  the 
Diet of  the conclusion of  treaties.173 According to the Diet Law, in addition, disagreement over 
duration of  a session is solved by granting priority to a decision of  the House of  Representatives 
without any negotiation.174 
Therefore, the postwar constitution gives priority to the House of  Representatives in 
forming the will of  the Diet over important matters. This derives from reflection on the fact that the 
powerful House of  Peers prevented the popular will from being expressed in the legislative process. 
Because the House of  Councillors is also representative of  the people, however, superiority of  the 
lower house does not make strictly sense.  
The constitution has regulated the election process from a viewpoint of  equality.175 Thus 
substantial distinction between two houses is difficult. While eligibility for candidacy for councillors 
is the age of  thirty or over, for one thing, that for representatives is twenty-five or over. 176 
                                                 
171 Article 67 paragraph 2 of  the Constitution of Japan reads: “If  the House of  Representatives and the House 
of  Councillors disagrees and if  no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of  both Houses, 
provided for by law, or the House of  Councillors fails to make designation within ten days, exclusive of  the 
period of  recess, after the House of  Representatives has made designation, the decision of the House of  
Representatives shall be the decision of  the Diet.” There have been two cases so far in which the House of  
Representatives and the House of  Councillors designated different persons as prime minister and the decision 
of  the former constitutes designation of  the Diet.  
172 Article 60 paragraph 2 of  the Constitution of Japan reads: “Upon consideration of  the budget, when the 
House of  Councillors makes a decision different from that of  the House of  Representatives, and when no 
agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of  both Houses, provided for by law, or in the case 
of  failure by the House of  Representatives to take final action within thirty days, the period of recess excluded, 
after the receipt of  the budget passed by the House of  Representatives, the decision of the House of  
Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.” 
173 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 61. 
174 Kokkai Ho (Diet Law), art. 13. 
175 Article 44 of  the Constitution of  Japan reads: “The qualifications of  members of  both Houses and their 
electors shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of  race, creed, sex, social 
status, family origin, education, property or income.” 
176 See Koshoku Senkyo Ho (Public Offices Election Law), art. 10 par. 1 & 2. 
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Representatives were elected from a so-called medium-sized district system.177  Councillors were 
elected from a nation-wide district and local districts. Among 250 Councillors, 100 were from the 
former and 150 from the latter based upon prefecture. 178  A question is whether these election 
methods were sufficiently different to justify the new bicameralism. There may be a serious doubt 
about differentiation. Thus, the place of  a second house in the democratic institutional design has 
been an important problem from the very beginning.179  
To avoid tyranny of  majority and to make a judicious decision are often mentioned as 
reasons why a second house is needed in a democratic unitary state.180 Under the parliamentary 
government system, another channel of  public opinion is more needed than under the presidential 
government system. The longer term without dissolution serves for continuity, resistance to radical 
change and long sight. However, the very weak second house cannot stop the determined will of  the 
first house. Thus, the House of  Councillors can only make a contribution to enriching deliberation 
by presenting different views deriving from the feature of  its longer term without dissolution. 
Because both representatives and councillors are not the people themselves, their main task is to offer 
the people options on important issues. In this sense, the House of  Councillors as an institution 
makes some contribution to furthering deliberation in the whole political process. 
 We now turn our attention to the cabinet. First of  all, the cabinet has become a 
constitutional institution that is vested with administrative power in the postwar constitution.181 
                                                 
177 Each voter casts only one vote. Three to five candidates are elected in one district. 24 general elections were 
held under this medium-sized district system from the first in 1925 to the fortieth in 1993. The first general 
election in postwar was held under multi-member district system in which one prefecture formed one district. 
Since the forty-first general election in 1996, general elections have been held under single-member district 
system plus proportional representation system. See Muchida Mitsuru, ed., Gendai nihon seiji shojiten (Dictionary 
of Contemporary Japanese Government and Politics) (Tokyo: Burensha, 2001). 
178 For the establishment of  the election system for the House of  Councillors, see Soma Masao, Nihon senkyo 
seidoshi, 226-230. 
179 See Miyasawa, “Kokkai to naikaku,” Kenpo Fukyukai, Shinkenpo kowa, 224-229; Kawamura, Shinkenpo to 
minshushugi, 175-178. To strengthen the power of  the upper house, Kawamura, for example, proposed a system 
in which the House of  Councillors would be vested with the right to submit a bill to national referendum. Ibid., 
129.  
180 For the general discussion on reasons for bicameralism, see Keibe, “Niinsei,” Kokka Gakkai, Shinkenpo no 
kenkyu, 180-189.  
181 See the Constitution of Japan, art 65. Although the official translation uses the term executive power 
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Under the Meiji constitutional regime, there was also the cabinet as an institution. However, as a 
matter of  principle, its collectiveness was denied and each minister of  state respectively supported 
the tenno.182 In addition, the prime minister is also constitutionalized.183 In the new constitutional 
system, the prime minster is more than primus inter pares. The Meiji Constitution vested the tenno 
with the power to appoint and remove ministers of  state as his prerogative.184 In contrast, the prime 
minister not only appoints but also may remove ministers of  state.185 This means that the leadership 
of  the prime minister is tremendous. Thus, it is now possible under the leadership that the cabinet is 
collectively responsible for the exercise of  administrative power.186 In this sense, when the post of  
prime minister becomes vacant, the cabinet has to resign en masse.187   
The activities of  the cabinet have greatly changed as well as its nature. The most important 
task the old cabinet assumed was to give the tenno advice on his wide range of  prerogatives. The old 
cabinet executed only trivial administrative functions in its name.188 However, the new constitutional 
cabinet by itself  performs administrative functions that used to belong to the prerogatives of  the 
tenno.189 Thus the activities of  the cabinet have expanded enormously.   
One of  the most distinctive features of  the postwar constitution is to adopt a parliamentary 
government system to realize responsible politics. The prime minister and a majority of  cabinet 
members are selected from members of  the Diet.190 They have to be civilians,191 which strengthens 
                                                                                                                                                             
instead of  administrative power, the Japanese text of  the constitution adopts the term gyosei-ken rather than 
shikkou-ken.  
182 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 55 par. 1. 
183 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 66 par. 1. 
184 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 10. 
185 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 68 pars. 1 & 2. 
186 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 66 par. 3. 
187 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 70. 
188  See Miyasawa, “Kokkai to naikaku,” Kenpo Fukyukai, Shinkenpo kowa, 247; Sugimura Shozaburo, 
“Naikaku seido (The Cabinet System),” Kokka Gakkai, Shinkenpo no kenkyu, 211-228. 
189 See the Constitution of Japan, art. 73. The functions include: to “(i) Administer the law faithfully; conduct 
affairs of  state; (ii) Manage foreign affairs; (iii) Conclude treaties…(iv) Administer the civil service, in 
accordance with standards established by law; (v) Prepare the budget, and present it to the Diet; (vi) Enact 
cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of  this Constitution and of  the law…(vii) Decide on general 
amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of  punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.” 
190 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 67 par. 1 and art. 68 par. 1. 
191 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 66 par. 2. 
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the democratic nature of  politics. The prime minister is designated by a resolution of  the Diet and 
appointed by the tenno.192 Because he has no substantial power over governmental matters,193 the 
tenno cannot reject a person designated by the Diet and his appointment is merely formal. Thus, no 
institution other than the Diet can intervene regarding who will be a prime minister. Further, not 
only formation but also maintenance of  a cabinet depends upon the confidence of  the Diet in 
general and the House of  Representatives in particular. The cabinet is responsible for its exertion of  
administrative power to the Diet.194 The House of  Representative may pass a resolution of  non-
confidence in the cabinet or reject a confidence resolution. In response to a non-confidence 
resolution, the cabinet either resigns en masse or dissolves the House of  Representatives within ten 
days. 195  The House of  Representatives can introduce a non-confidence resolution for whatever 
reasons related to the cabinet’s whole performance of  administrative functions. The responsibility 
the House of  Representatives questions is political in nature. To pass the resolution, reasons of  non-
confidence have to be shared with a majority of  the representatives, who are faced with a counter-
attack of  dissolution by the cabinet. Or the cabinet appeals to dissolution to enhance its position by 
taking the risk of  losing popular support.196  The cabinet also needs good reasons to justify its 
decision. Thus interaction of  the two organs promotes competition of  justifications of  political 
decisions. There is a good chance for politics to be more deliberative in the new governmental 
                                                 
192 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 67 par. 1 and art. 6 par. 1. 
193 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 4. 
194 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 66 par. 3. 
195 See the Constitution of Japan, art. 69. The House of  Councillors may pass a resolution of  censure on the 
cabinet but the resolution has no legal effect though is expected to have political influence.  
196 There is a controversy over the power to dissolve the House of  Representatives. The postwar constitution 
substantially provides for dissolution as counteraction to a non-confidence resolution. See the Constitution of  
Japan, art. 69. However, it also provides that the tenno dissolves the House of  Representatives. See ibid., art. 7 
(iii). If  this provision is available for cabinet that has the substantial power to make a decision, the cabinet can 
dissolve the lower house at will by using it. Many scholars agree with this interpretation. However, there are 
severe criticisms on this interpretation because it after all leads to using the tenno politically. See Sato Isao, 
“Kaisan wo meguru kenpo ronso (A Constitutional Controversy over Dissolution),” Kenpo kaishaku no 
shomondai (Problems in Constitutional Interpretation) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1953), 143-194; Hasegawa Masayasu, 
“Kaisanken ryonso no moten (A Blind Spot in the Constitutional Controversy over Dissolution),” Horitsu Jiho, 
July 1952; Kojima Kazushi, “Tenno no kenno nitsuite (On the Powers of  the Tenno),” Horitsu Jiho, October 
1952; Kojima Kazushi, “Futatabi tenno no kenno ni tsuite (The Powers of  the Tenno Revisited),” Koho Kenkyu, 
no. 10, 1954, 37-44. 
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system. 
Introduction of  the parliamentary government system has created a close relationship 
between the Diet and the cabinet. Because the cabinet is formed and maintained upon the 
confidence of  the Diet, the cabinet has to have the majoritarian support in the Diet, particularly the 
House of  Representatives. The people can connect to the cabinet through a majority in the lower 
house. The political party mediates between the two institutions, although the postwar constitution is 
silent on this issue. However, when the parliamentary cabinet system was established, the 
constitution clearly expected political parties to play a positive role in the actual political process.197 
Thus a key to success in this system lies in the healthy development of  party politics. Prewar Japan 
once experienced a quasi-parliamentary government system based upon party politics. But it was 
brief  and half-hearted.198 Frequent corruption around political parties incurred popular distrust in 
party in particular and democratic politics in general.199 The collapse of  the Meiji constitutional 
regime has indicated that constitutional interpretation cannot entirely overcome institutional limits. 
Commitment to liberal democratic values has to spread so widely among the common citizens that 
political party politics prevails.  
In any event, the most serious defect the Meiji constitutional system involved was to 
obscure the place of  ultimate responsibility for political decisions in the whole government 
structure. 200  The postwar constitution has overcome this difficulty because the cabinet assumes 
political responsibility to the Diet in general and the House of  Representatives in particular. The 
Diet is regarded as the highest organ due to its representativeness of  the sovereign people and thus 
the cabinet is indirectly accountable to the people. The secret of  operating the new constitutional 
                                                 
197 The Supreme Court has taken the same position. “Because parliamentary democracy the constitution has 
provided cannot be expected to be operated smoothly with disregarding political parties, the constitution has 
naturally assumed existence of  political parties.” See Yahata Seitesu Kenkin Jiken, Supreme Court Judgment, 
June 24, 1970, Minshu, vol. 24, no. 6, 625. 
198 See Chapter 1 sections 7-8. 
199  See Minobe Tatsukichi, “Senkyo kakuseiron (An Essay on Electoral Reform),” Gendai kensei hyoron 
(Commentaries on Contemporary Constitutional Government) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1930), 1-59. See also, 
Chapter 2 section 6. 
200 See Chapter 1 section 9. 
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government scheme comes down to the people, who are sovereign after all. 
          
6. The Sincere Desire for Peace and the Denunciation of  War 
 The Constitution of  Japan has brought liberal democratization of  politics to postwar Japan. 
This is certainly revolutionary. However, political liberal democratization is not uncommon in the 
world. Rather, renunciation of  all kinds of  war and military forces is unique in comparative 
constitutional law. The idea of  renunciation of  wars of  aggression is found in the French 
Constitutions of  1791 and of  1848, the Brazilian Constitution of  1891, the Spanish Constitution of  
1931, and the Philippine Constitution of  1935.201 But they recognize wars of  self-defense as just. In 
this respect, thus, the postwar constitution is indeed unprecedented.202 How did people understand 
the epoch-making concept around its establishment? What does it potentially mean to liberal 
democracy in Japan? 
The preamble of  the postwar constitution declared high ideals.  
We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious 
of  the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to 
preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justices and faith of  the peace-
loving peoples of  the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an 
international society striving for the preservation of  peace, and the banishment of  
tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We 
recognize that all peoples of  the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear 
and want. 
  We believe that no nation is responsible to itself  alone, but that laws 
of  political morality are universal; and the obedience to such is incumbent upon all 
nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign 
relationship with other nations.203       
 
To realize these high ideals, the constitution introduced the provision of  renunciation of  war and 
military forces. Its Article 9 reads: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of  the nation and the threat or 
                                                 
201  For the details of  renunciation of war in foreign constitutions, see Yokota Kisaburo, Senso no hoki 
(Renunciation of  War) (Tokyo: Kunitachi Shoin, 1947), 86-99. 
202 See Kanamori, “Shinkenpo no seishin,” Jiji Tsushinsha, Kaisetsu to shiryo, 20-21. 
203 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble, pars. 2 & 3. 
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use of  force as a means of  settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of  the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of  belligerency of  the state will not be recognized.”204 
 The general idea of  the renunciation of  war and of  armed forces was prevalently welcomed 
when a draft of  the constitutional revision was announced.205 The people had suffered severely from 
the reckless war and were tired of  austerity. They felt that something was wrong with the state and 
social life in the past decade. Peace rather than war was desperately sought and a culture state 
instead of  a military one was sincerely desired. Ashida Hitoshi, the chairman of  the special 
committee for constitutional revision in the House of  Representatives and a future prime minister, 
well summarized an idealistic position widely shared among even politicians immediately after the 
war.   
At the beginning of  the statement of  the reason why the bill for revising the 
Constitution was presented to the Diet, the Prime Minister referred to the Potsdam 
Declaration and said that respect of  fundamental human rights and establishment 
of  a democratic form of  government are required by it. That is quite true, but I do 
not think it is possible to explain the motive of  this revision of  the Constitution 
merely by diplomatic records, such as acceptance of  the terms of  surrender. I think 
the motive lies far deeper. When we look out of  the windows of  this Diet building, 
we see nothing but a great and desolate stretch of  debris. Tens of  thousands of  
corpses which were lying there and tears shed morning and night by orphans and 
widows who live in the temporary huts built on the ashes! Out of  these is the 
Japanese Constitution destined to be born. Do not the Cabinet members think so? 
Not only in Japan, but also in England, in the fields of  the Ukraine, and under the 
shade of  willows along the Yangtze River, similar cries of  misery are to be heard. 
When we contemplate this lamentation of  mankind and ravage of  society, we come 
to realize that herein lies the fundamental problem common to mankind. There is 
no doubt that fervent hopes common to mankind for renunciation of  war, 
aspirations for higher culture, and wishes for a better life, combined with the defeat, 
forced a way to a great change. I should like to know if  my interpretation of  the 
                                                 
204 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 9. 
205 Puzzled over its essential difference from the reported Matsumoto plan, major newspapers highly evaluated 
the proposal of  a peace constitution. See “Kakkitekina heiwa kenpo,” Asahi Shinbun, editorial, March 7, 1946 
in Shoron Shuroku, 213-214; “Kenpo soan to sekai heiwa,” editorial, Asahi Shinbun, March 8, ibid., 215-216; 
“Minshu kenpo to shindotoku,” editorial, Mainichi Shinbun, March 8, ibid., 217-218; “Seifu no kenpo kaiseian 
yoko naru,” Tokyo Shinbun, editorial, March 8, ibid., 218-219; “Minshushugi heiwa kokka no koso,” Nihon 
Keizai Shinbun, editorial, March 8, ibid., 219-220. The Yomiuri Shinbun had a different tone. It made a 
distinction between wars of  aggression and wars of  self-defense and stated that life and independence of  the 
nation should be maintained even by bloody war. See “Jinmin kenpo no seitei,” Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun, 
editorial, March 8, 1946, ibid., 221-222.  
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reason for revising the Constitution is shared by the Government.206  
 
Article 9 of  the constitution expresses the motivation to denounce war: “Aspiring sincerely to an 
international peace based on justice and order”. This indicates a positive and highly idealistic 
attitude for the denunciation of  war. When Ashida as the chairman reported discussions of  the 
special committee to the House of  Representatives, he enthusiastically admitted their positive and 
idealistic nature:   
It is true it is not without precedent that the idea of  repudiating aggressive war has 
been legislated into the French Constitution of  1791 and the Brazilian Constitution 
of  1891. But perhaps this is the first time in the world that a Constitution, as our 
new Constitution proposes to do, has provided for the abolition of  the whole range 
of  armaments and for the repudiation of  all war. (Cheers.) Now that modern 
science has brought the atomic bomb into being, all will agree that horrors to 
mankind would be unpredictable, if  by any possible chance war should in future 
break out among the Great Powers. The reason why we choose to urge the 
repudiation of  war is not merely because the horrors of  war in the past have 
brought home to us how abominable war is. It is also because, I need hardly say, we 
are prompted by the ideal of  saving the world from the ruination of  civilization.  
 
The greatest characteristic of  the new Constitution is the fact that it proclaims, 
boldly and straightforwardly, the renunciation of  war. This is the very thing 
hankered after by all and everybody who have experienced a sanguinary war 
victimizing tens of  millions of  human lives.  It also constitutes the road to world 
peace. Under the banner of  this ideal, we are going forth to make a call to the 
whole world. (Cheers.)207   
 
At that time, truly, there was an atmosphere in which the Japanese people could accept these words 
naturally and frankly.208 
Even under such circumstances, the text of  Article 9 of  the postwar constitution seems 
extremely radical. The first paragraph provides for the renunciation of  a wide range of  exercises of  
military force. It can be understood as renouncing all kinds of  war with a highly idealistic 
                                                 
206 Ashida Hitoshi, Liberal Party, Special Committee, House of  Representatives, July 9, 1946 in Shimizu, 
Shingiroku, 1: 14. For the English translation, see RM337. 
207 Ashida Hitoshi, Liberal Party, Plenary Session, House of  Representatives, August 24, 1946 in Shimizu, 
Shingiroku, 4: 468-483,471-472, 482. 
208 See Sato Isao, “Senso hoki to anzen hosho (Renunciation of War and National Security),” Nihonkoku kenpo 
jyuniko(Twelve Lessons on the Constitution of  Japan) (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo, 1951), 130-155, 139-140.  
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preamble.209 And it broadly prohibits not only war itself  but also the threat or use of  force, which do 
not reach the level of  war.210 Renunciation of  the threat or use of  force is crucially important from a 
historical perspective. Aggression of  the Kwantung Army upon China took the form of  the use of  
military force. The Japanese government had never declared war against China. The Manchurian 
Incident from September 1931 and the China Incident from July 1937 were wars in reality. Thus the 
distinction between war and the use of  forces did not make much sense in this historical context. In 
addition, more importantly the government justified such military actions as self-defense.211  
However, the first paragraph can be read in a way that constitutional renunciation of  war is 
limited to such only as a means of  settling international disputes. War “as a means of  settling 
international disputes” is generally understood as an illegal war of  aggression.212 War other than a 
means of  settling international disputes commonly means a war of  self-defense. 213  This 
interpretation could thus allow Japan to fight a war for self-defense. 214  However, the second 
paragraph declares the repudiation of  military forces and war potential and the right of  belligerency. 
Thus even a war of  self-defense is actually denied because the state neither has any kind of  armed 
forces nor the right to fight a war. 215  This means that even though a war of  self-defense is 
theoretically permissible, the physical ban on armed forces and the legal ban on the right to wage 
war make it impossible as a matter of  fact. The constitutional denial of  the right of  belligerency 
                                                 
209 See Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, Kenpo, 75. 
210 See Yokota, Senso no hoki, 47. 
211 See Yokota, Senso no hoki, 52-53. 
212  See Sato Isao, “Dai kyujo kaishaku no shomondai (Problems in Interpretation of  Article 9),” Kenpo 
kaishakuno shomondai (Problems in Constitutional Interpretation) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1953), 55-77, 57 
(hereinafter cited as Sato, “Dai kyujyo”). 
213 See Sato, “Dai kyujyo,” 57.  
214 There is a minor interpretation that even the first paragraph of  Article 9 prohibits a self-defense war. 
215  See Sato, “Dai kyujyo,” 58-59. Precisely, there is a controversy over the meaning of  “the right of  
belligerency of the state”. It is commonly understood as the right of  the state to fight a war. See Yokota, Senso 
no hoki, 60-62; Hogaku Kyokai, Chukai, 216-220. See also, Minobe Tatsukichi, Nihonkoku kenpo genron (Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, 1948), 231 (hereinafter cited as Minobe, Genron). However, there is another minor interpretation 
that it means what a state that fights a war has as its rights in international law. See Sasaki Soichi, Nihonkoku 
kenporon (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1952), 235-236 (hereinafter cited as Sasaki, Kenporon); Sato, “Dai kyujyo,” 64. 
Kanamori Tokujiro as the minister of  state in charge of  constitutional revision stated in the Imperial Diet that 
he understood the right as the right in international law of  a state fighting a war. See Kanamori Tokujiro, 
Special Committee, House of  Peers, September 13, 1946 in Shimizu, Shingiroku, 2: 73.   
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especially is without any reservation. Therefore, the postwar constitution is so radically innovative 
that there is ample room to understand that all kinds of  war and threats or use of  force and armed 
forces are completely renounced on the highly idealistic premise of  “trusting in justice and faith of  
the peace-loving peoples of  the world”.216 Eminent scholars such as Minobe Tatsukichi,217 Miyasawa 
Toshiyoshi,218 and Yokota Kisaburo219 denied any kind of  war under the postwar constitution after 
all.220 Therefore, the new constitution was widely understood as proposing thorough pacifism. 
Surprisingly enough, the Japanese government seemed to take the same position: even a 
self-defense war is renounced in the postwar constitutional system. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
prepared a “Collection of  Expected Questions and Answers” before deliberation on constitutional 
revision in the Imperial Diet. It provided that “the provision concerning the renunciation of  war 
does not directly deny the right of  self-defense, but since it does not recognize Japan’s right to 
maintain any military forces or the right of  the county to engage in war, in actual fact Japan cannot 
undertake a real war as an exercise of  its right of  self-defense.”221 The government thought that 
Japan could not actually fight a war of  self-defense under the new constitution. Yoshida Shigeru, the 
prime minister, answered questions in this line of  thought: 
The provisions concerning the renunciation of  war in the draft 
Constitution do not directly deny the right of  self-defense. But because the second 
Paragraph of  Article 9 does not recognize all war potential and the country’s 
belligerency, both war as a manifestation of  the right of  self-defense and the right of  
belligerency are renounced. Of  late years, most wars have been waged in the name 
of  self-defense. This is the case with the Manchurian Incident, and so is the War of  
Greater East Asia. The suspicion concerning Japan today is that she is a warlike 
nation, and that there is no knowing when she may re-arm herself, wage a war of  
                                                 
216 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble par. 2. 
217 See Minobe, Kihongenri, 81-82; Mionbe, Genron, 228-231. 
218 See Miyasawa, “Shinkenpo no seikaku,” Jiji Tsushinsha, Kaisetsu to shiryo, 35; Miyasawa, “Shinkenpo no 
gaikan,” Kokka Gakkai, Shinkenpo no kenkyu, 8. Miyasawa understands that the first paragraph of  Article 9 
renounces not only wars of  aggression but also wars of  self-defense. Miyasawa, Kenpo, 75. 
219 See Yokota, “Senso hoki,” Kenpo Fukyukai, Kenpo kowa, 115-122; Yokota, “Senso no hoki,” Kokka Gakkai, 
Shinkenpo no kenkyu, 44-62; Yokota, Senso no hoki, 41-84. Yokota as a scholar of  international law argues that 
while the first paragraph of  Article 9 does not renounce wars of  self-defense, the second paragraph repudiates 
even wars of  self-defense. See Yokota, Senso no hoki, 48, 62-63. 
220 Sasaki Soichi exceptionally recognizes wars of  self-defense under the postwar constitution. See Sasaki, 
Nihonkoku kenporon, 231-238.  
221 Sato Tatsuo, Seiritsushi, 3: 468. For the English translation, see Koseki, Birth, 192-193, translated by Moore. 
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reprisal and threaten the peace of  the world. This is the most serious suspicion and 
misunderstanding respecting Japan. I think that the first thing we should do today is 
to set right this misunderstanding. The suspicion I have spoken of  is a 
misunderstanding, it is true, but there are not a few instances in the past history, in 
the light of  which it cannot be said that there is no foundation for that suspicion. 
Therefore, we should like to demonstrate in the proposed Constitution our 
determination, first of  all, to renounce voluntarily the right of  belligerency in 
whatever case it may be, to make that renunciation the basis of  establishing the 
peace of  the whole world, to march forward in the vanguard of  the world's peace-
loving nations, and thus to contribute to the establishment of  world peace. (Cheers.) 
In this way, I think, we should endeavor to promote a just understanding 
concerning Japan. If, in the event that an international peace organization has been 
established, any country initiates a war of  aggression, attacks Japan with the 
intention of  aggression, that country is a violator of  the peace, and it should be said 
to be the enemy of  the world. All the peace-loving nations of  the world should get 
together and assist each other in tackling this violator and in vanquishing this enemy. 
(Cheers.) Here, I think, international obligations respecting peace arise 
automatically as among the peace-loving nations or international organizations. 
(Cheers.)222 
 
Although he did not deny the right of  Japan to self-defense, Yoshida clearly repudiated wars of  self-
defense. The tone of  his answer sounds uncharacteristically idealistic and universalistic.223 Yoshida 
once raised a subtler issue when he replied to Nosaka Sanzo, the communist leader, who attacked 
the government for denying the right of  self-defense war he believed is indispensable for an 
independent state: 
With regard to the provisions of  the draft Constitution relating to the 
renunciation of  war, the Honorable Member seems to think that it is just for a State 
to wage war in legitimate self-defense, but I think that the very recognition of  such a 
thing is harmful.  (Cheers.) It is an outstanding fact that most modern wars have 
been waged in the name of  the self-defense of  States. It seems to me, therefore, that 
the recognition of  the right of  self-defense gives cause for the provocation of  war. 
The purpose kept in view in the provisions relating to the renunciation of  the right 
of  belligerency under the draft Constitution is the establishment of  an international 
peace organization. The purpose is to prevent all wars aimed at aggression through 
the establishment of  an international peace organization. 
If  there is to be a war in self-defense, this presupposes the existence of  a 
State bent upon a war with the object of  aggression. Therefore, the proposition to 
recognize the legitimacy of  a war made in legitimate self-defense by way of  
exercising the right of  self-defense of  a State is a harmful idea, involving, as it does, 
                                                 
222 Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister, plenary session, House of  Representative, June 26, 1946 in Shimizu, 
Shingiroku, 2: 82-83. For the English translation, see RM319.  
223 The cabinet reiterated the same position. See Kanamori Tokujiro, Minister of  State, special committee, 
House of  Representatives, July 9, 1946 in Shimizu, Shingiroku, 2: 90; Kanamori, special committee, House of  
Peers, September 13, ibid., 2: 80; Kanamori, special committee, House of  Peers, September 13, ibid., 2: 74-75; 
Kanamori, special committee, House of  Peers, September 13, ibid., 2: 72.  
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the provocation of  war. Not only that, but I also think that the very idea of  
recognizing the right of  legitimate self-defense in the event that a peace 
organization has been established is, in itself, harmful. I fear that the opinion 
expressed by the Honorable Member would do more harm than good. (Cheers.) 224  
 
Here his answer conveys an impression that the very right of  self-defense was denied. Sato Tatsuo, 
the chief  of  the first division of  the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, believed his feeling at that moment 
that the prime minister went too far. 225 In avoiding clarifying the right of  self-defense, Yoshida later 
explained what he really meant in the reply. 
Perhaps the words were insufficient last time to express my idea. What I wanted to 
say is this: It is not only useless but harmful to distinguish a war of  defense from a 
war of  aggression. It is the past fact that wars were started for the most part in the 
name of  defensive war. As it is by reason of  this distinction, made in belligerency, 
between a war of  self-defense and a war of  aggression that war is often induced, I 
hold that it is rather harmful. If  there is a war of  defense, on one hand, we have to 
assume that there is, on the other hand, a war of  aggression.  What I have in mind 
is the establishment of  an international peace organization. In view of  the fact that 
if  such organization has been established, a nation who makes a war of  aggression 
will become an enemy, rebel and traitor to the organization and all its member 
nations would join in war against this treacherous nation, I am of  the opinion that 
such discrimination in belligerency is superfluous. A war of  defense ceases to exist 
as a corollary to the extermination of  a war of  aggression. Recognition of  wars of  
two categories is therefore useless.226 
 
After Yoshida’s reply of  June 28, Sato wrote, Kanamori indirectly corrected it so as not to deny the 
right of  self-defense itself.227  Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the government clearly 
maintained the position on repudiation of  war of  self-defense as a matter of  fact.  
Ashida Hitoshi opposed the majoritarian interpretation of  Article 9. He maintained that 
the new constitution allowed Japan to engage in a war of  self-defense. Ashida’s contention well 
deserves special attention because he was the chairman of  the special committee for constitutional 
revision in the House of  Representatives and there proposed modification of  the words of  Article 9. 
                                                 
224 Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister, plenary session, House of  Representatives, June 28, 1946 in Shimizu, 
Shingiroku, 2: 42. For the English translation, see RM322. 
225 Sato Tatsuo, Tanjyoki, 130. 
226 Yoshida Higeru, Prime Minister, special committee, House of  Representatives, July 4, 1946 in Shimizu, 
Shingiroku, 2: 15. For the English translation, see RM330. 
227 Sato Tatsuo, Tanjyoki, 130-131. 
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Ashida wrote that renunciation of  war and the threat or use of  force was limited to the case of  a 
means of  settling international disputes and that it meant that the constitution denied wars of  
aggression alone and admitted wars of  self-defense and wars of  sanction against aggression.228 
Behind this contention, however, there was a trick. The current text of  Article 9 has reflected the so-
called Ashida modification as he introduced it. The original government draft of  constitutional 
revision on Article 9 and the subcommittee’s proposal for modification read:  
War, as a sovereign right of  the nation, and the threat or use of  force, is forever 
renounced as a means of  settling disputes with other nations. 
The maintenance of  land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be authorized. The right of  belligerency of  the state will not be recognized.229 
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of  the nation and the threat or use 
of  force as a means of  settling international disputes.  
In order to accomplish the aim of  the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, 
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of  belligerency of  
the state will not be recognized.230 
 
Comparison between the two provisions clarifies the positive nature of  the latter. But the issue here 
concerned the phrase that “In order to accomplish the aim of  the preceding paragraph”. Ashida 
came to assert that this phrase meant renunciation of  war as a means of  settling international 
disputes. Thus he maintained that a war of  self-defense was not prohibited and that Japan could 
hold and use armed forces to wage a war of  self-defense. Further, he stated that he had never 
changed his position on the constitutional maintenance of  military forces for self-defense since the 
special committee for constitutional revision in the House of  Representatives.231  
The sessions of  the subcommittee were held in the form of  secret free talking.232 What 
                                                 
228 Ashida Hitoshi, Shinkenpo kaishaku (Interpretations of  the New Constitution) (Tokyo: Daiamondosha, 1946), 36. 
His book was published for popularization of  the new constitution with its promulgation on November 3, 1946. 
229 The April 17 Draft of  the Constitution of  Japan, art. 9. See Sato Tatsuo, Seiritsushi, 3: 337. For the English 
translation, see RM280. 
230 Sato Tatsuo, Seiritsushi, 4: 784. 
231 Mainich Shinbun, January 14, 1951 in Koseki Shoichi, ‘Heiwa kokka’ nihon no saikento (Reconsideration of  
‘Peace State’ Japan) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002), 37. 
232 See Sato Tatsuo, Seiritsushi, 4: 713. Basically the government was absent unless the subcommittee wanted to 
ask it questions. Sato Tatsuo exceptionally attended almost all meetings as an assistant for legal and technical 
details. 
 310 
Ashida said had been regarded as authoritative because he was the very person who was responsible 
for administration of  the committee and subcommittee and proposed modification by himself. He 
was perhaps the most appropriate for representing the framers to show their intention. His 
contention has very much helped the conservatives to argue for the establishment of  self-defense 
forces and theoretically justify it. However, his contention had lacked credibility. Ashida’s report of  
the discussions and modifications to the House of  Representatives described the motivation of  
modifying Article 9 as the following:  
In Article 9, the phrase “aspiring to an international peace based on justice and 
order” has been placed at the beginning of  the first paragraph, while the phrase “for 
the above purpose” comes at the head of  the second paragraph. These amendments 
have been made for the purpose of  making it clear that the resolve to renounce war 
and to abolish armaments is motivated solely by aspirations for the concord and 
cooperation of  mankind and for the peace of  the world. (Cheers.) The spirit 
underlying the provisions of  Article 9 marks obviously a new epoch in the process 
of  human advancement. In proclaiming them internally and externally, we are 
prompted by the purpose of  pointedly demonstrating that the Japanese people, 
going ahead of  other Powers, are actuated by an aspiration to create a world peace 
based on justice and order. (Cheers.)233 
 
Ashida was silent about the intention of  the modification.234 Sato Tatsuo, in addition, has mentioned 
nothing about the framers’ intention Ashida had contended.235  Indeed, he wrote that he never 
thought the modification would be the basis for Ashida’s theory that “In order to achieve the 
purpose of  the preceding paragraph” means “In order not to wage war of  aggression” and that thus 
Article 9 does not prohibit Japan from keeping armed forces for the purpose of  self-defense.236 
Finally, stenographic records became available in September 1995. It has turned out that there was 
no such theory as Ashida’s. He simply explained there that his intention to add “In order to achieve 
the purpose of  the preceding paragraph” to the original text resided in avoiding repeating aspiration 
                                                 
233 Ashida Hitoshi, chairman of  the special committee, plenary session, House of  Representatives, August 24, 
1946 in Shimizu, Shingiroku, 4: 478. For the English translation, see RM420. 
234 See Shindo Eiichi & Shimogawara Motoharu, eds., Ashida Hitoshi Nikki (Diary of  Ashida Hitoshi) (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1986), 1: 126-129. 
235 According to Sato Tatsuo, discussions on Article 9 were held on July 29 when Ashida introduced his plan 
of  modification and August 1 when the subcommittee adopted the modification. There is no record of  
Ashida’s intention. See Sato Tatsuo, Seiritsuhi, 4: 748-749, 774-775. 
236 Sato Tatsuo, Tanjyoki, 138-139. Sato recognized that the modification would open a possibility that armed 
forces could be maintained for the purpose of  self-defense. See ibid., 137-139. 
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for international peace.237 
 Therefore, people cannot argue for constitutional armed forces for self-defense by relying 
upon the framers’ intention. The people in the ninetieth Imperial Diet were more or less idealistic. 
The sincere aspiration for international peace based upon justice and order was real enough for them 
to write it down in the fundamental law of  the land. With a touch of  uneasiness, most Japanese 
people welcomed Article 9 because even a war of  self-defense should be banned in the light of  the 
disaster the recent war brought.238      
The idealistic mood on domestic and international peace was in this way ubiquitous in the 
deliberations on the postwar constitution. However, a question that should be asked is how seriously 
the government believed in positive pacifism and wanted to execute concrete policies based upon 
renunciation of  war. Yoshida’s replies we have seen above also indicated that there was a strategic 
judgment about the international circumstances around Japan. It seemed wise for the governmental 
officials to express no intention to become a military power in the world in order to recover 
independence sooner. More importantly, as Koseki Shoichi has pointed out, the governing elite self-
consciously or instinctively realized that renunciation of  war was necessary to protect the tenno from 
harsh international opinion.239 
National security was of  course discussed but as Yoshida’s reply showed, vague trust in the 
United Nations was prevalently shared by many people. Interestingly enough, even a world 
federation was seriously discussed: 
                                                 
237 Dai kyujyukai teikoku gikai shugiin teikoku kenpo kaisei shoiinkai sokkiroku (The Stenographic Records of  
the Subcommittee for the Revision of  the Imperial Constitution in the House of  Representatives in the 
ninetieth Imperial Diet ), 194 in Koseki, Heiwa kokka, 38. 
238 The Mainichi Shinbun carried an opinion poll on the published governmental draft of  constitutional revision. 
70 percent of  people agreed on renunciation of  war and 28 percent disagreed. The reasons why they disagreed 
were that it was unnecessary to deny self-defense and that it was doubtful that the United Nations would 
function well. Meanwhile, 85 percent supported the symbolic tenno system but 13 percent opposed it. See 
“Shinkenpo soan heno yoron (Public Opinion toward the Draft of  the New Constitution),” article, Mainichi 
Shinbun, May 27, 1946 in Shoron Shuroku, 308-311. See also, Kawashima Takamine, “Shinkenpo kofu zengo 
no kokumin no ishikijyokyo (The Situation of the People’s Consciousness around the Promulgation of the 
New Constitution),” Rekishi Kyoikusha Kyokai, ed., Nihonkou kenpo wo kokumin ha domukaetaka (How 
did the People Receive the Constitution of Japan?) (Tokyo: Kobunken, 1997), 122-150. 
239 See Koseki, Tanjyo, bunkoban heno atogaki (Afterword to the Bunko Edition), 442-450; Koseki, Heiwa 
kokka, 9-17. See also, Chapter 3 section 3. 
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Defence against an external enemy and the maintenance of  internal peace have 
hitherto been universally regarded as minimum functions of  the State. Whatever 
international treaties designed for the maintenance of  peace may be entered into, a 
community of  armed nations has within itself  the danger of  an explosion. The 
atomic bomb appeared toward the close of  the late war. This invention will no 
doubt be perfected with the progress of  science. Another world war may therefore 
imply not merely the annihilation of  particular nations, but extermination of  the 
human species. Is not the time overdue for the creation of  a world federation? 
Political thought always lags behind science. Meanwhile, will not mankind be 
destroyed by the weapon of  its own making? This must surely be a serious concern 
for all men and women. Should a world state in the form of  a federation come into 
being, the members of  such a world state of  federation will have to renounce not 
only war, but scrap all their armaments, a condition prescribed for this nation by 
Article 9 of  the new Constitution. All disputes, no matter of  what kind, will then be 
settled in accordance with reason, without the backing of  armament. In such a state 
of  international society, an international police force will be the only force that 
remains a force, however, always serving as the handmaid of  human reason. Article 
9 is reasonable, on the hypothesis that such a state of  human society comes into 
existence. It presupposes a world federation. The United Nations Organization is of  
course but an embryo of  a world federation, if  it is so destined.  How the 
organization will develop or how the organization should be made to develop is a 
question for the future. If  Article 9 of  the new Constitution is adopted, as it will be, 
is it not necessary for Japan to take steps to join the United Nations Organization at 
an early opportunity, so that she may have her security assured and that she may 
cooperate in building a world federation?240  
 
Yoshida agreed with the interrogator.241 However, the government postponed answering the most 
serious question:  
Mr. Takayanagi Kenzô:  The United Nations Charter recognizes two kinds of  war, 
war of  self-defense and war for purposes of  collective sanction. This draft 
Constitution, however, wants to suppress both of  them; so in respect of  the 
underlying philosophy of  world peace, the draft Constitution and the United 
Nations Charter differ fundamentally. Is the Government of  the same opinion? 
The Minister of  State Dr. Kanamori:  As to the difference in basic conception 
between this draft Constitution and the United Nations Charter, no summary 
judgment can be made.  This draft does not necessarily represent a criticism of  the 
individual points of  the United Nations Charter, but contains a provision which this 
country considers necessary and proper. In this regard, questions were asked in the 
House of  Representatives, questions in which doubts were expressed as to other 
discrepancies between the two. As to the questions arising in this connection, there 
is room enough for study. 
Mr. Takayanagi Kenzô:  Switzerland, it is said, has decided not to join the United 
Nations because of  its position as a permanently neutral state. Considering the 
basic difference in philosophy between the United Nations Charter and this draft 
                                                 
240 Takayanagi Kenzo, Kenkyukai, plenary session, House of  Peers, August 26, 1946 in Shimizu, Shingiroku, 3: 
91-92. For the English translation, see RM421. 
241 Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister, plenary session, House of  Peers, August 26, 1946 in Shimizu, Shingiroku, 
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Constitution, will this country stand aloof  from the United Nations, in order to be 
faithful to the principles of  the new Constitution, or will it desire to join the United 
Nations in order to propagate new principles? 
The Minister of  State Dr. Kanamori:  In their Constitutions, there are points of  
difference between the United Nations and this country, as the learned member has 
pointed out.  However, considered from a broad [view]point and from various 
angles, there is room enough for adjustment, but the time has not yet come to 
consider the matter as a practical question.242 
 
 
Relief  from the long war and complete disarmament under the occupation made it possible to evade 
confrontation with the discrepancy between Article 9 and international politics.243 Article 9 of  the 
postwar constitution later became tossed by the waves of  real politics and has been a main target of  
the conservative attack for amendment. 244  In the time of  establishing the postwar constitution, 
however, idealistic arguments really appealed to many people including the governing elites. Their 
preoccupation lay in retention of  the tenno system, not international peace. 
 So, what is a meaning of  renunciation of  war and armed forces for liberal democracy in 
Japan? It is an experiment of  separation of  citizenship from soldiership. In the ancient Greek poleis, 
only citizens who defended their homeland with arms could participate in politics. Since then to be a 
citizen had meant more or less to be a soldier. That was partly why women had been excluded from 
the political sphere. However, because modern war has become total war and the home front has 
come to gain a real sense, the connection between citizenship and soldiership has loosened.245 A 
comparison between the two constitutional systems would be helpful. In the Meiji constitutional 
                                                 
242  Takayanagi Kenzo & Kanamori Tokujiro, special committee, House of  Peers, September 13, 1946 in 
Shimizu, Shingiroku, 2: 97. For the English translation, see RM455. 
243 As cold war intensified, the government started a series of  campaigns of  rearmament. When the Korean 
War broke out, in July 1950, GHQ ordered the Japanese government to establish the Keisatsu Yobitai (the 
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Koseki, Heiwa kokka. For the government interpretation, see Nakamura Akira, Sengo seiji niyureta kenpo kyujyo 
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244 For the conservative attacks on Article 9, see Watanabe Osamu, Kenpo ‘kaisei’shi (A History of  Constitutional 
‘Amendments’) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1987). 
245 In the United States, woman’s suffrage was constitutionalized after World War I. See Amendment XIX to 
the Constitution of  the United States of  America (1920). In Japan, as mentioned above, women have enjoyed 
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system, the tenno was the supreme commander of  the Army and Navy246  and vested with the 
prerogative concerning military strategies and tactics, which was interpreted as independent of  the 
government. The rule that the ministers of  the War and Navy should be respectively appointed from 
higher officers in active service made civilian control extremely difficult. The militaristic features 
caused the collapse of  the whole constitutional system.247 In sharp contrast, the postwar constitution 
has denounced war and armed forces. An ideal that has inspired postwar Japan is that “all peoples 
of  the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.”248 In “an international society 
striving for the preservation of  peace, and the banishment of  tyranny and slavery, oppression and 
intolerance for all time from the earth,” “the justice and faith of  the peace-loving peoples of  the 
world” constitutes “universal” “laws of  political morality”.249 Newly reborn Japan commits herself  
to such political morality. The concept of  peace non-dependent upon armed forces in fact has 
released citizenship from its close connection to solidership.  
Renunciation of  war and armed forces without any doubt favors liberal democracy. Civilian 
control is one of  its most rudimentary elements.250 But there is more than that. How can citizenship 
without solidership function in a liberal democracy? How can the state draw commitment to the 
public from the people? This should be a great experiment in world history. Unfortunately, however, 
a new concept of  citizenship has not been well theorized yet.    
   
7. Popular Sovereignty and the Amendment Process 
 One of  the most conspicuous features of  the postwar constitution is to adopt the principle of  
                                                 
246 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 11. 
247 See Chapter 1 section 3 (4) and section 7. 
248 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble par. 2. 
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Ashida modification, see Koseki, Tanjyo, 309-319. 
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popular sovereignty. 251  No matter what the principle might mean, nothing can more 
straightforwardly express its essence than a popular vote in the constitutional amendment process.252 
The people are vested with the power to amend the constitution, which directly derives from their 
sovereign power to create a constitution. A comparison with the Meiji Constitution clarifies the 
innovation of  the new constitution.253 The prerogative to project amendments was reserved for the 
tenno alone.254 This was a reflection of  the logic of  kintei kenpo shugi (the principle of  a constitution 
the tenno establishes). Although ministers of  state supported the tenno in this issue as general matters 
of  state,255 petitions for amendment were repudiated because popular commitment to constitutional 
revision was believed to be against kintei kenpo shugi.256 While there was a dispute of  whether the 
Imperial Diet could modify the tenno’s project of  constitutional amendment, rather rigid 
requirements were imposed upon deliberation and resolution of  the Diet: presence of  two-thirds of  
the whole members of  both Houses and a majority of  not less than two-thirds of  the present 
members.257 The tenno had to consult the Privy Council on constitutional amendment.258 In the Meiji 
regime, the constitution was regarded as codification of  the traditional instructions bequeathed by 
the imperial founder and ancestors and thus the process of  constitutional amendment was centered 
upon the tenno’s will. 
 The postwar constitution, in marked contrast, has made the amending process more 
democratic. The whole process consists of  three steps: initiative, popular ratification, and 
                                                 
251 See the Constitution of  Japan, preamble & art. 1. 
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promulgation.259 As the old one did, the new constitution imposes rather rigid requirements upon 
those who want to change the rules of  the game. First, the Diet initiates a bill of  constitutional 
amendment by passing a vote on it. Because of  severe confrontation over constitutional amendments 
in postwar politics, no legislation has been enacted yet over detailed proceedings. The proceeding on 
a general bill provided for in the Diet Law is analogically applicable.260 The power to propose a bill 
of  amendment undoubtedly belongs to members of  both Houses.261 There is a sharp controversy 
over the cabinet’s power to propose a bill of  amendment. It related to the question of  whether the 
cabinet can submit a bill of  legislation to the Diet, about which the constitution has no specific 
provision. A majority of  scholars agree on the cabinet’s power to submit a bill because submission is 
only a threshold of  legislation the Diet has to monopolize and the prime minister’s power to submit 
a bill to the Diet can be understood as including the power to submit a bill of  legislation.262 In fact, 
the Cabinet Law provides for the power.263 Even if  the cabinet is vested with the power to submit a 
bill of  legislation, one can think that it has no power to submit a bill of  amendment because 
constitutional amendment is so critically important that such a power should be limited to the Diet 
alone. However, there is no substantial reason to deny the cabinet the power to submit a bill of  
amendment.264 A majority of  the Diet members and the cabinet members usually belong to the same 
party under the parliamentary government system. The cabinet may enrich deliberation on 
constitutional amendment. An introduced bill of  amendment is deliberated and voted on in each 
House as a general bill is.265 A quorum for resolution is understood as two-thirds of  all the members 
of  each House. The meaning of  “all the members” is disputable between the fixed number and the 
fixed number minus vacancies. The former is desirable because careful deliberation is required in this 
                                                 
259 For the process of  amending the constitution, see Kawagishi Norikazu et al., Kenpo (Constitutional Law) 
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case. A quorum for deliberation can be one-third of  all the members as the general principle.266 
However, consideration for careful deliberation leads the matter to be treated as happens in the case 
of  a resolution.267 Resolution on a bill of  amendment has to be passed with two-thirds or more of  all 
the members in each House. The House of  Representatives and the House of  Councillors are equal 
in this capacity. The amending procedure thus constitutes an important exception to the superiority 
of  the House of  Representatives.268 Conversely, one-third of  the members of  each House can block a 
transformative proposal. Such a requirement indicates a value judgment that deliberation is much 
needed for constitutional amendment. 
 The second step is the popular ratification of  a bill of  constitutional amendment initiated by 
the Diet. A popular vote is held “at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall 
specify.” In the case of  the latter, as the nature of  the matter, the Diet has to specify a national 
election such as a general election for Representatives or a regular election for Councillors. Specific 
proceedings have not been decided yet in the process of  popular ratification for constitutional 
amendment.269 The bill of  amendment is ratified by a majority of  all cast votes. The meaning of  “a 
majority” is also controversial. A majority of  all eligible voters, all cast ballots, or all valid ballots are 
possible interpretations. The first interpretation would deny the right to abstain. The third one would 
open the possibility that the constitution would be amended with a minority of  the all voters many 
of  whom abstain from voting. Although the second one would turn invalid ballots into nays, this is 
most desirable because the people who visit polling places and positively give consent to amendment 
should form a majority of  the people. The strict interpretation secures a carefully deliberated 
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decision when the amendment is approved.270   
This referendum system truly reflects the principle of  popular sovereignty. From a 
comparative perspective of  postwar constitutional law, the Constitution of  Japan conspicuously 
shows thorough commitment to the principle. The Bonn Basic Law for the Federal Republic of  
Germany (1949) excludes the popular vote from the constitutional amendment process. The 
constitutional amending statute requires “the consent of  two-thirds of  the members of  the House of  
Representatives (Bundestag) and two-thirds of  the votes of  the Senate (Bundesrat).”271 The French 
and Italian Constitutions partially admit popular participation in the constitutional amendment 
process. The French Fifth Republic Constitution of  1958 supposes that constitutional amendment is 
popularly ratified but provides for an exception that when the president adopts a Congress manner 
(joint parliament of  the National Assembly and the Senate), a referendum can be omitted with three-
fifths concurring votes there.272 Similarly, the Italian Constitution of  1947 provides for a conditional 
referendum.273 Among postwar liberal democratic constitutions, the Constitution of  Japan uniquely 
requires a mandatory referendum.274 
                                                 
270  See Tsujimura Miyoko, Kenpo (Constitutional Law) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 2000), 562; Takahashi 
Kazuyuki, Rikkenshugi to nihonkoku kenpo (Constitutionalism and the Constitution of  Japan) (Tokyo: Hoso Daigaku 
Kyoiku Shinkokai, 2001), 292. 
271 See the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of  Germany, art 79 par. 2. 
272 The French Constitution of  1958, art. 89. The whole text reads: “(1) The initiative for amending the 
Constitution shall belong both to the President of  the Republic on the proposal of  the Prime Minister and to 
the members of  Parliament. (2) A Government or private member’s bill for amendment must be passed by the 
two Assemblies in identical terms. The amendment shall become definitive after approval by referendum. (3) 
Nevertheless, the proposed amendment shall not be submitted to a referendum when the President of  the 
Republic decides to submit it to Parliament convened in Congress; in this case, the proposed amendment shall 
be approved only if  it is accepted by a three-fifths majority of  the votes cast. The Bureau of  the Congress shall 
be that of  the National Assembly. (4) No amendment procedure may be undertaken or followed when the 
integrity of  the territory is in jeopardy. (5) The republican form of government shall not be subject to 
amendment.” The French Fourth Republic Constitution had an exceptionally unnecessary referendum system. 
See the French Constitution of  1946, art. 90. 
273 Article 138 of  the Italian Constitution reads: “(1) Amendments to the Constitution and other constitutional 
acts shall be adopted by each of  the two Chambers twice with an interval between the votes of  not less than 
three months, and shall be approved by a majority of  the members of  each Chamber in the second voting. (2) 
Such laws shall be submitted to popular referendum when, within three months of  their publication, a request 
is made by one fifth of  the members of  either Chamber or by 500,000 electors or by five regional Councils. The 
law submitted to referendum shall not be promulgated unless approved by a majority of  valid votes. (3) No 
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 Thirdly, the tenno promulgates a popularly ratified amendment “in the name of  the 
people”.275 The requirement of  “in the name of  the people” makes clear the principle that it is the 
people who have the power to amend the constitution. The tenno’s promulgation is merely formal. 
The amendment becomes an integral part of  the constitution, which constitutes the supreme law of  
the land.276 
Public discourse on constitutional amendment has centered upon the constitutional 
limitations on amendment. Popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno system, thorough pacifism, 
and fundamental human rights and the public welfare have been main issues since the immediate 
aftermath of  the establishment. The new constitutional principles were under nostalgic attack.277 
This popular vote requirement has also been a target of  criticisms. Removals or relaxations of  this 
requirement have been proposed.278 It is obvious that their aim lies in mitigating the burdensome 
hurdles for amendment to the constitution.  
However, a national referendum is profoundly connected to the idea of  popular sovereignty, 
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the people who have the power to create the constitution.279 It is true that the power to amend the 
constitution is not necessarily the same as the power to create the constitution. The former is 
organized in the constitution the latter has created. The latter is situated outside the constitution. It is 
a dynamic concept and its attribute resides in direct exercise.280 However, so long as the constitution 
that has already been created is premised, the power to amend the constitution is the most 
fundamental political power. If  popular sovereignty means something positive in an established 
political order, the power to change the order should be vested in the people. Thus popular vote in 
the constitutional amending process is regarded as an indispensable component of  the principle of  
popular sovereignty. Constitutional amendment to omit national referendum from the amending 
process leads to self-contradiction of  sovereign power that now belongs to the people.281 Theoretically, 
a popular vote in the amending process is a reflection of  the principle of  popular sovereignty and 
thus should not be excluded. It is especially noteworthy that the Japanese people have had no chance 
to exercise their sovereign power because no constitutional amendment has succeeded so far. The 
innovative experiment of  popular sovereignty has not yet displayed its own real worth. The 
amendment provision has well indicated that the people are now sovereign and that if  a sufficient 
number of  them really wish, the people can abolish even the tenno institution, which was once 
situated outside the constitution because of  the kokutai ideology based upon the concept of  one line 
unbroken for ages eternal. It is this provision that is the practical symbol of  the novelty of  the 
postwar constitution.   
 
8. Consolidation of  the New Constitution: The Katayama Coalition Cabinet 
 The Constitution of  Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and entered into force on 
May 3, 1947. Between the two dates, the government prepared bills of  important organizational laws. 
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The Imperial House Law was enacted on January 16, 1946. Because it argued and believed no 
change in the kokutai, the government used the same name of  Koshitsu Tenpan, not the new name of  
Koshitsu Ho. Unlike the old law, which was totally beyond the control of  the Imperial Diet, however, 
the new law has been normal legislation. The Diet can now control the composition of  tenno family 
matters. The dualism between the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial House Law that featured in 
the prewar constitutional system has been abolished under the postwar constitutional regime to 
make the constitution the supreme law of  the land.282 Even in the new Imperial House Law, however, 
there has been no provision to require the Diet to give consent to succession to the throne. Although 
many people point out an analogy between the British king and the tenno, they tend to ignore this 
decisive difference in succession. If  the people are sovereign at all, their representatives should be 
entitled to control succession to the throne, the legitimacy of  which derives from the general will of  
the sovereign people.283 
 As we discussed above, 284  the postwar constitutional system is founded upon three 
fundamental principles: To protect human dignity as individual, the new constitution has adopted 
the principle of  popular sovereignty and thorough pacifism. The new political principles in the 
constitution have been materialized as organizing laws. The Cabinet Law, Finance Law, Court 
Organization Law, Local Autonomy Law, and Board of  Audit Law, Diet Law were enacted 
respectively on January 16, March 31, April 16, April 17, April 19, and April 30, 1947. 
 The spirits of  the constitution are realized in the normal political process. In this sense, 
election has a great impact upon the execution of  constitutional values. April of  1947 was a month 
of  elections for public officials just before the new constitution took effect. Elections for governors 
and other chiefs of  local organizations were held on the 5th, elections for the House of  Councilors 
and positions created by postwar reforms on the 20th, a general election for the House of  
Representatives on the 25th, and finally an election for local assemblies on the 30th. Most 
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remarkably, the Socialist Party became the leading party in the House of  Representatives as a result 
of  the general election. The Socialist Party gained 143 seats (30.7% of  the total 466 seats and 26.2 % 
share of  votes) and took a lead; the Liberal Party: 131 seats (28.1% and 26.7%); the Democratic 
Party: 124 seats (26.6% and 25.4%); the National Cooperation Party 31 seats (6.7% and 7.0%);285 the 
Communist Party 4 seats (3.3% and 3.7%) ; small parties: 21 seats; and independents: 12 seats.286 No 
parties again won a majority of  seats in the House of  Representatives but even a plurality of  the left 
was regarded as revolutionary. This fully announced that a new era had come in postwar Japan.  
On May 23, Katayama Tetsu, the chairman of  the Socialist Party, was elected in the Diet as 
the prime minister of  the coalition cabinet government composed of  the Socialist, Democratic, and 
National Corporation Parties. The Katayama cabinet struggled to strengthen democratization and 
realize constitutional values. Generally this cabinet, which lasted for only eight months, developed a 
poor reputation. However, the Socialists occupied only about one third of  the seats of  the House of  
Representatives and 47 percent of  the seats of  the coalition parties. They had to make many 
compromises with the dominant conservatives. They also suffered from a severe inner conflict 
between the right and left factions. Under these unfavorable circumstances, however, we can point to 
very important achievements to consolidate constitutional values in the early stage of  a nation 
reborn.  
Katayama was a lawyer for people who are socially weak. He was most concerned with 
problems over women, tenant farmers, and laborers. In the prewar period, he was selected as the 
secretary-general of  the Shakai Minshuto (Social People’s Party), which was placed at the right wing 
of  proletarian parties. He firmly believed that social reforms had to be done only through legal 
parliamentary activities. Thus, direct mass movement was not his policy. Although as it was the case 
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with right leftists, he was never seriously confronted with the tenno institution, which essentially 
conflicted with the idea leftists inspired, Katayama refused to cooperate for the yokusan (imperial 
rule assistance) regime during the war time, unlike many other leftists who approached power in 
aiming at state socialism. This uncompromising attitude helped him become a central figure of  
movements for recreating a leftist party in the postwar period. 
When the Socialist Party was formed in November 1945, Katayama became its secretary-
general and later elected its first chairman. At the very beginning of  the postwar period, Katayama 
believed that popular sovereignty would be inconsistent with the tenno institution and that the theory 
of  state sovereignty was the most appropriate in the Japanese tradition.287 He supported a more 
democratized tenno system in which its prerogatives would be largely reduced, having in mind the 
British model where the king reigns but does not govern. Then Katayama faced the draft of  the new 
constitution, which came to have a great influence upon his political career. He now understood how 
the principle of  popular sovereignty was reconciled with the tenno institution. He as representative of  
he Socialist Party in the ninetieth Imperial Diet proposed revising the government draft to the effect 
that the provisions on the tenno should be placed after a declaration of  fundamental principles and 
that state affairs the tenno was supposed to perform should be largely reduced.288 Although these 
proposals were denied in the House of  Representatives,289 Katayama and his party now became 
more progressive than ever before in respect to clarifying the principle of  popular sovereignty.  
After the origin of  the postwar constitution took shape, interestingly enough, Katayama 
cherished popular sovereignty more than anything else. In his view, renunciation of  war, respect for 
human rights and equality between man and woman all derive from this principle.290 Katayama took 
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the postwar constitution seriously. In 1954, he formed an association to defend the peace 
constitution when the conservatives started to attack it to seek the remilitarization of  Japan. Such an 
activity is uncharacteristic of  members of  the right faction of  leftists. Katayama can be regarded as a 
statesman growing from the impact of  the postwar constitution.  
Before the draft was voted on in the plenary session on August 24, 1946, Katayama 
delivered a speech in favor of  the draft to express a view and hope on the new constitution. 
Katayama first pointed out that the Socialist proposal would have made explicit a fundamental 
principle that sovereignty derives from the people. Despite the denial of  the proposal, he argued for a 
democratized tenno system. To him, next, renunciation of  war, which is one of  the most important 
provisions in the constitution, should be interpreted as not only a negative denial of  war but also a 
positive dedication to world peace. A peace and culture state should be a goal Japan had to pursue 
from now onwards. The peace that the constitution solemnly has declared as a paramount value 
became his life long problem to solve. Thirdly, now that the idea of  popular sovereignty was clearly 
declared, Katayama stated that the constitution itself  should necessarily internalize the idea. On the 
one hand, popular sovereignty had been declared, but on the other hand, there remained feudalistic 
elements to overcome. Fourth, the constitution should lead the time and give people guiding hopes. 
Finally, the constitution must be a social law in the contemporary world and thus the state has to 
arrange guarantees of  the people’s life and labor at the statute level. His Socialist Party has 
successfully placed in the constitution the right to maintain minimum standards of  wholesome and 
cultured living,291 which would become a general principle for the welfare state.292 
On July 1, 1947, Katayama as prime minister delivered a policy address. He emphasized 
the government’s belief  in the constitution. His position was that of  a trinitarian theory of  political 
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democracy, economic socialism, and international pacifism.293 His policy speech involved defense of  
the constitution, active practice of  its spirits, and unification of  the nation by the constitutional 
spirits. There has been no prime minister who showed a more positive commitment to the postwar 
constitution than Katayama Tetsu did. Despite the unstable and short term of  the cabinet, Katayama 
and his colleagues tried hard to escape from a food crisis, overcome inflation, and realize the state 
management of  coal. Concretely, legal reforms such as family law and penal code, dissolution of  the 
Ministry of  the Interior, liquidation of  the Ministry of  Justice, personnel of  the Supreme Court, and 
establishment of  the Ministry of  Labor were important achievements under the Katayama cabinet.  
Among the reforms the Katayama government executed, legal ones were crucial from a 
perspective of  consolidating the constitutional revolution. Although restructuring the existing legal 
system had been already prepared in the Provisional Legislative Investigating Committee (PLIC) 
when the constitution needed to be revised, the Katayama cabinet carried out amendment of  the 
Civil Code on family and succession, which was one of  the most important works of  statutory 
revision.  
The former family law was enacted to maintain a feudalistic patriarchal family system. This 
patrilineal unit was called the ie. The head of  the ie, who was usually the oldest man, represented the 
entire ie. While he took care of  interests and welfare of  his family members, the head had powerful 
rights to control the members on all domestic matters. The members’ individual interests were often 
placed inferior to the whole household interest. Women usually occupied only subordinate status. 
For example, married women were legally incapable. The whole assets of  the ie were succeeded with 
the headship only to the eldest son. This ie system was an everyday basis of  maintaining the tenno 
institution. As discussed early, the Meiji constitutional system was based upon a family view of  the 
state.294 The koshu as the head of  the ie or household well paralleled the tenno as the head of  the state. 
Chu, loyalty and ko, filial piety were in complete harmony as morality forced upon subjects in the 
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Meiji regime as the Imperial Rescript on Education of  1890 vividly showed.295  
In sharp contrast, Article 24 of  the postwar constitution declares that family law shall be 
enacted “from the standpoint of  individual dignity and the essential equality of  the sexes.”296 
According to this spirit, family law and succession law, which form Books 4 and 5 of  the Civil Code, 
were completely changed to bring the family under more modernized regulation. The old family 
system, which centered on the head of  the ie, has been transformed to a system in which married 
couple and children occupy its core. The concept of  the head of  the ie has been abolished. Husband 
and wife are now equally responsible for household matters. They jointly exercise parental rights 
over their children. The wife is fully entitled to succeed. Provisions of  legal incapacity of  married 
women have been omitted. The principle of  single succession by the eldest son has been replaced 
with equality in succession among children. Thus under the postwar constitution, the traditional ie 
system has been abolished and a new family system has emerged that is based upon individual 
dignity and the essential equality of  men and women.297  
When the government draft was introduced in the Imperial Diet, the government officials 
insisted that even the new provision on family in the proposed constitution would never change the ie 
system. The conservatives well acknowledged that the ie system had essentially served the kokutai 
ideology. In the House of  Peers, for example, Sawada Ushimaro criticized the more modernized 
family system in the proposed constitution for destroying the kokutai along with the symbolic tenno 
institution.298 However, the government gradually changed its position. The government came to say 
nothing about the ie system and mention only the necessity to change family law because of  Article 
24 of  the new constitution. The members in the PLIC emphasized that the progressive reform did 
not derive from the wartime defeat and occupation but from modernization of  society. According to 
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them, the postwar reform was materialization of  the proposals in the 1920s. 299  Because the 
conservatives powerfully argued against revision of  the old family law, the progressive members in 
the PLIC decided not to propose the abolition of  the ie system directly. In fact, modernization of  
society had required a readjustment of  family law to the partially industrialized situation, whether 
the conservatives liked it or not. 
The Katayama cabinet adopted a bill to amending parts of  the Civil Code on July 15, 1947 
and submitted it to the first Diet on July 25. Public hearings, which were then an innovative 
procedure of  legislation, were held on August 20 and 21. To democratize the bill further, the 
Kazokuho Minshuka Kisei Domei (League for Realizing the Democratization of  Family Law), a 
coalition of  various positions for a democratized family law, submitted a statement that provisions 
on the family name should be removed because they were feudalistic remnants of  the ie system. The 
bill was passed in the both houses of  the Diet and a new family law written in colloquial Japanese 
was promulgated on December 22 becoming effective on January 1, 1948. More than sixty laws 
including the Family Registration Law, the Law concerning Fire Arms and Explosives, the Electric 
Industrial Law had to be rewritten because they more or less presupposed the ie system.300 
Importantly, it is the Japanese leadership that carried out the reform of  family law.301 GHQ 
did not once order the Japanese government to change the ie system because the officials in the 
Legislative and Justice Division of  the Government Section knew that this issue was very sensitive 
and that it was unwise to impose an Western style of  family upon a people who had developed a 
totally different family relationship. They gave the Japanese government only guidance when they 
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were asked.302 Japanese officials also witnessed leadership on the Japanese side.303   
The replacement of  the traditional ie system with a system based upon a nuclear family has 
been crucial from a democratic perspective. The ie system was formed in a vertical relationship: the 
head at the top of  the ie controlled the members. This structure was an exact miniature of  the prewar 
Japan as a state, in which the tenno occupied the zenith of  political power. The new family system, 
however, has an essentially different structure: the human relationships becomes horizontal, based 
upon the equality of  husband and wife. By liberating people from the kokutai ideology, the new 
family system provides a solid foundation for much needed democracy. Democracy after all requires 
equality among members of  a political community.304 
It is true that once the new constitution was established, family law was necessarily revised 
to conform to its ideal, whoever might be the prime minister. But it is fair to say that Katayama and 
the Socialist Party promoted the transition. Katayama had argued for abolition of  the ie system and 
of  discrimination against women since the prewar period. He himself  later recollected that the 
revision of  family law was one of  the most important achievements of  his cabinet.305 Kato Shizue as 
a woman Socialist participated in deliberation on the draft constitution in the special committee of  
the House of  Representatives and played a critical role there from a women’s point of  view. She had 
devoted herself  to the advancement of  women for a long time. She and her husband Kato Kanjyu, 
who refused to cooperate with the pre-and mid-war yokusan regime, were often asked by GHQ for 
informal advice on women and labor problems in Japan.306 In the special committee she pointed out 
the necessity to separate ethics and legal institutions in the matter of  revising family law. The 
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government and conservatives attempted to preserve the ie system under the name of  beautiful 
custom. Kato sharply criticized such an attitude by stating that law and ethics should not be 
confused and that the family as a legal institution must be a place for all family members to develop 
their personalities fully. 
Family life should include the conduct of  a lawful and well-ordered sexual life of  
men and women and should have the function of  maintaining and adjusting the 
population of  the race. Family life should also be a wholesome place of  rest for 
mind and body, so that the adult members of  a family can recreate the motive 
power of  work for the morrow. The home should fulfill the functions of  protecting 
children until they grow up into adults, of  giving them consolation, and of  
affording them the benefits of  moral and emotional cultures. The home should be a 
place where all the members of  a family can live freely and pleasantly, develop their 
individuality, and perfect their personality. I understand that such a mission is 
expected of  family life. In order that such functions can be fully achieved, I think it 




Kato’s interrogation drew a clear reply from Kimura Tokutaro, the minister of  justice, that while 
traditional beautiful customs and good manners should be duly respected, the respect was a matter 
of  ethics and that a legal system of  family must be framed by the new constitutional principle of  
individual dignity and essential equality between men and women. 308  Kato further stated that 
equality between man and woman would be guaranteed in the written document but that did not 
necessarily mean equality would be realized in a real life. Kato raised many issues concerning 
women, children, married couples, and family by pointing to problems that still remained in family 
law. She argued that social welfare programs should be enriched for realizing real equality of  men 
and women.309 In this context, the Katayama cabinet had credit for the leadership in creating a new 
family system and clarifying the problems that women in Japan then faced. Furthermore, the 
Katayama cabinet established the Ministry of  Labor in general and department of  women and 
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juveniles in particular. The Ministry of  Labor was founded to deal with, among other things, the 
newly enacted Unemployment Insurance Law, which materializes the right to work declared in the 
constitution. Here political reform came to be supported by social reforms under the Socialist 
administration.310 
Another important achievement in legal reform was to revise the Penal Code to abolish 
crimes against the tenno family in general and lese majesty in particular.311 A central issue was 
whether the privileged treatment of  the tenno in criminal law would be consistent with the new 
constitution of  popular sovereignty with the symbolic tenno system. Lese majesty is a political crime 
that seems obviously inconsistent with the principle of  popular sovereignty and protection of  
freedom of  expression. On October 4, 1945, MacArthur already ordered the Japanese government to 
abolish restrictions on “freedom of  thought, of  religion, of  assembly and of  speech, including the 
unrestricted discussion of  the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese 
Government.”312 However, the conservative Japanese government did not think that freedom of  
expression would deprive the tenno of  special protection in law. In early December 1945, the 
Japanese government had no idea whatsoever to abolish treason and lese majesty. 313  The 
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conservatives assumed that the tenno should be protected differently from common citizens. However, 
MacArthur and the Government Section showed no willingness to compromise on this matter 
because they firmly believed that treason and lese majesty as special protections for the tenno were 
remnants of  the ancient myth from which ultra-nationalism and militarism came in the past.314 The 
Japanese government did not easily follow GHQ’s guidance that defamation of  and insult to the 
tenno and his family should be treated equally with instances toward the common citizen. Japanese 
officials attempted to define defamation on the tenno as a crime indictable without a complaint. 
Kades heatedly refused the Japanese plan because a different treatment between the tenno and 
common citizens would not be tolerated and the Japanese plan was nothing but another form of  lese 
majesty.315 Whitney himself  attended a meeting with Kimura, the minister of  justice, and other high-
ranking officials and told them that MacArthur hoped that crimes against the imperial family would 
be immediately deleted from the Penal Code and in case of  defamation of  the tenno, the prime 
minister or minister of  justice might file a complaint on the tenno’s behalf.316  
On December 27, 1946, Yoshida Shigeru, the immediate predecessor of  Katayama, who 
was a passionate supporter of  the tenno himself  and the institution, wrote MacArthur to ask his 
reconsideration on deletion of  crimes against the imperial family. Yoshida stated that even in the 
new constitution, the tenno would be the symbol of  the state and of  the unity of  the people and this 
position the tenno would occupy “accord[ed] with the traditional faith which ha[d] been held firmly 
by the Japanese nation ever since the foundation of  Japan.” In his view, the tenno held “truly a high 
and lofty position” and was undeniably “ethically the center of  national veneration.” He believed 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sokoku, 273. In fact, a high-ranking official in the Ministry of  Justice suggested possible application of  lese 
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that these facts justified retention of  special crimes against the tenno.317 Two month later, Yoshida 
learned that he had failed to convince MacArthur to reconsider the matter. MacArthur wrote that as 
“the symbol of  the State and of  the unity of  the people,” the tenno was “entitled to no more and no 
less legal protection than that accorded to all other citizens of  Japan who, in the aggregate, constitute 
the State itself. To hold otherwise would violate the fundamental concept, clearly and unequivocally 
expressed in the new Constitution, all men are equal before the law, with the necessary implication 
therefrom that no individual, whatever his position, shall be vouchsafed judicial safeguards denied 
the ordinary citizen, the ultimate repository of  all State authority.” MacArthur believed that the very 
respect and affection the Japanese people had fostered would serve as special protection for the 
tenno.318 MacArthur and the Government Section took no serious measures whatsoever regarding 
Yoshida’s entreaty.  
The Katayama cabinet had a totally different attitude and strongly supported amending the 
Penal Code. The bill was submitted to the Diet in October 1947. The conservatives never gave up. 
The Liberal Party proposed revising the bill to retain only lese majesty. The proposed revision plan 
provided that defamatory or insulting acts committed against the tenno should be punished with 
penal servitude for a period of  not less than three months and not exceeding five years. The 
proposed revision did not gain support from a majority in the Diet. The new Penal Code with 
deletion of  crimes against the tenno house was promulgated on October 26, 1947.319 If  the Yoshida 
cabinet had continued to stay in power, the crimes against the tenno house could not have been 
deleted from the Penal Code. It is true that GHQ without any doubt would have intervened in such a 
situation. However, the Katayama cabinet positively tried to realize the new constitutional spirits in 
concrete measures.320 Revision of  the Penal Code was an example of  their efforts. Lese majesty 
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sharply conflicts with the principle of  popular sovereignty. If  the people rule at all, they must enjoy 
freedom of  expression. Because the people are by nature plural, they have to be able to communicate 
with one another to exert their sovereign power. They are sovereign so long as they can consider all 
aspects of  state affairs. Lese majesty, however, had a chilling effect on free thought and speech. This 
political crime was definitely inconsistent with the postwar constitutional system. Its abolition has 
been one of  the most important achievements in postwar legal reform.321 
In addition, the Katayama cabinet on December 31, 1947 liquidated the Ministry of the 
Interior that was in charge of executing the Chian Iji Ho (Peace Preservation Law) and on March 7, 
1948, reorganized a police system in a more democratized way: national local police and local 
autonomy police and a public safety commission. Local autonomy, which was not guaranteed in the 
Meiji Constitution, has been promoted by the replacement of the Ministry of the Interior with the 
Local Autonomy Agency, which would become the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1957.322   
Establishment of the Supreme Court was also under the obligation of the Katayama cabinet. 
While it was controlled by the ministry of justice under the tenno sovereignty in the Meiji 
constitutional system, the judiciary now enjoyed independence from the government. Thus the 
personnel of the Supreme Court, which is situated at the top of the independent judiciary, was vitally 
important for its future course. The chief justice of the Supreme Court is appointed by the tenno who 
follows the cabinet’s designation and the other fourteen justices are appointed by the cabinet.323 An 
advisory committee for recommendation of justices was established for the first appointment by the 
Yoshida cabinet. 324 Kimura Tokutaro, the minister of justice, Shimoyama Seiichi, Daishinin Incho 
(the Chief Judge of the former highest court), and Kanamori Tokujiro, the minister of state in charge 
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of the new constitution formed a list of recommended candidates for the first chief justice. Because 
they seemed too conservative to realize new constitutional values, GHQ intervened to postpone the 
appointment until after the upcoming general election.  
The Katayama cabinet recreated a new advisory committee for recommendations based 
upon a more democratic composition. 325  From thirty listed candidates, Katayama appointed 
Mibuchi Tadahiko as the first chief justice and fourteen associate justices. Mibuchi started his 
professional career as a judge but in his forties became an advisory lawyer for the Mitsui Trust 
Company. He also taught trust law in several universities. He understood socialism and himself 
translated Anton Menger’s Civil Law and Proletariats. Mibuchi was a person of high repute because of 
his sincerity. Katayama personally knew him and decided to appoint him the chief justice just after 
the committee announced the list of recommended candidates for the justices on July 28, 1947. On 
August 4, the Supreme Court officially started its service as the highest court and constitutional 
court in postwar Japan. In his address to the people at the beginning of service, Mibuchi expressed 
dedication of the newly born Court to justice for the Japanese people. The courts are places, he 
argued, to defend the people’s rights and to realize justice and fairness. Under the democratic new 
constitution, he continued, the courts have to become courts for the people right through to the bone. 
To do so, judges should not crouch in the small world of law but open their eyes wider, make their 
perspectives broader and pay close attention to what politics should be, the movement of society, 
transformations of the world and the directions of people’s feelings and opinions. To cope with these, 
judges should cultivate insights and abilities.326 We can see considerable passion for reforming the 
old judicial system that, in a sense, had helped the government to suppress the liberties and rights of 
people in prewar Japan. 
Yoshida, who formed a cabinet five times during 1946 to 1954, was more or less resistant to 
thorough postwar reforms. After MacArthur was fired as SCAP, Yoshida made a reconsideration of  
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the list of  occupation reforms. It included proposals to strengthen control of  the cabinet over local 
autonomy, legalize the head of  family and revive succession of  the eldest child, and centralize the 
police system. 327  The comparison with this makes clear Katayama’s position of  promoting 
constitutional values. Under the unstable circumstances, the Katayama cabinet worked hard to make 
the most of  the potentialities of  the new constitution. It is true that GHQ’s support was necessary 
for the Katayama cabinet to carry out their policies. But it is also true that the Katayama cabinet 
played a more progressive role than GHQ had expected. Revision of  old statutes and establishment 
of  new institutions materialized a constitutional promise in the new era. In this way, all major 
achievements of  the Katayama cabinet consolidated the constitutional revolution in ideas. 
 
9.  Missing Opportunities for “We, the Japanese People” 
 If  popular sovereignty is a fundamentally innovative principle in Japanese history, why was 
not the Constitution of  Japan adopted by a direct vote of  the sovereign people? A popular vote 
would have given the Japanese people a precious opportunity to express their own commitment to 
liberal democratic values. There were missing opportunities for the principle of  popular sovereignty. 
 Rather than the process Article 73 of  the Meiji Constitution provided for, some people 
argued for a more democratized method to establish a new constitution of  popular sovereignty. In 
early 1946, when formation of  the democratic people’s front was heatedly advocated, in fact, 
procedures for a convention with popular participation were also much discussed and proposed. 
After publishing the draft of  constitutional revision, Takano Iwasaburo and his fellows of  the Kenpo 
Kyenkyukai (the Constitutional Research Group) devoted their energy to realizing a constitutional 
convention. On January 26, 1946, the Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun carried an article where Takano 
announced his constitutional plan for a republic and democratic forces should be united to 
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democratize Japan, and that as a part of  the movement for united democratic forces, a constitutional 
convention by the people should be called in mid May. Suzuki Yasuzo joined Takano to call a 
popular constitutional convention.328 On February 14, the Kenpo Kenkyukai announced a proposal to 
establish a democratic constitution; all kinds of  progressive associations and groups should unite 
with one another to hold a popular convention for making a constitutional draft in mid March.329 
After the government’s outline of  the revised constitution was published, the Kenpo Kenkyukai issued 
another statement that while it welcomed the unexpectedly democratic plan of  the government, it 
had to criticize the halfway popular sovereignty of  the plan and it proposed to make a more 
democratized constitution by a more democratized way than the government tried. The statement 
advocated that a true constitution of  popular sovereignty should be framed by the people themselves 
through unifying their desires, passions, and good sense.330 Takano himself  made a comment on the 
outline of  the government draft that as to a way of  framing a constitution it would be better to form 
a new committee for deliberation.331 Closely related to the Kenpo Kenkyukai, the Minshu Jinmin Sensen 
Renmei (League for the Democratic People’s Front) proposed to form a constitutional committee on 
deliberating and framing the final draft of  a new constitution.332  
 The Asahi Shinbun also argued that to satisfy the requirement that a form of  government be 
determined by the freely expressed will of  the people, it would be desirable to first establish a 
constitutional convention for further consideration and to deliberate on a draft of  the convention in a 
more democratized Diet.333 The Yomiuri Hochi Shinbun was more progressive when it advocated that 
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the new constitution should be established by the general will of  the people and that the current 
constitution should be first amended to create a constitutional convention and that such a 
convention should establish a new constitution.334  
In fact, common citizens once favored a popular convention style over the existing 
procedure or a Diet constitution committee style.335 Some people in the cabinet legislation bureau 
also thought that the style of  a special committee on constitutional revision was more desirable than 
the existing procedure.336 However, a constitutional convention or a popular vote for the proposed 
draft never occurred in postwar Japan. As discussed above,337 MacArthur and GHQ hastened to 
establish the new constitution because they wanted to avoid the intervention of  the Far Eastern 
Commission that generally tended to require a more radical and thorough democratization of  Japan. 
They had already planned to preserve the tenno institution to execute the occupational policy easily. 
Thus they needed as a fait accompli the democratic constitution with the principle of  popular 
sovereignty, even though the principle was guaranteed only on the written document for the time 
being. Meanwhile, the conservative Japanese government was extremely reluctant to listen to 
people’s voices because retention of  the kokutai was the foremost concern for the governing elites. 
They wanted to avoid a wide range of  public discussion on the constitutional revision, which 
inevitably would make the kokutai a more or less severe target of  discussion in the public arena. Thus 
the Japanese government shared a common interest with MacArthur and GHQ in evading a more 
popularly involved process of  making the new constitution.338 
Indeed, the American and Japanese conspiracy worked dramatically well. Because the 
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published constitutional revision plan was more progressive than common citizens had expected, 
voices for a constitutional convention or popular ratification weakened significantly.339 Ironically, the 
progressive constitutional draft played a conservative role in the crucially important political process. 
Direct popular participation was excluded from constitution-making. The principle of  popular 
sovereignty lost a chance to exercise its decisive power, which has diluted the democratic values in 
the postwar constitution.   
A second potential opportunity for the Japanese people to express their decisive will came 
in early 1947. MacArthur wrote the Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru that the Allied Powers had 
decided the new constitution should be subject to review by the Japanese people and by the Diet 
between the first and second years of  its having taken effect.340 This letter reflected the decision of  
the Far Eastern Commission on October 17, 1946.341 Yoshida responded merely that he had surely 
received MacArthur’s letter and that he kept in mind what MacArthur said.342 Japanese newspapers 
reported this plan of  review of  the new constitution only in March 1947 because MacArthur was 
strongly opposed to publication of  the plan.343 In August 1948, the Ashida cabinet prepared a review 
of  the constitution and the Diet established a committee in its legal affairs office and examined 
certain articles of  the constitution for review. However, neither review by the Diet nor referendum 
for review has been realized after all. Most politicians and intellectuals were hesitant to review the 
constitution. After the collapse of  the Ashida cabinet due to a money scandal, Yoshida returned to 
the center of  power and expressed no intention to amend the constitution in April 1949, which was 
approaching the deadline the FEC had set forth.344  
In the 1950s, conservatives started to attack the postwar constitution for seeking an 
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independent and autonomous constitution. Three fundamental principles of  the postwar 
constitution were the target of  nostalgic criticisms. They included the following contentions: the 
symbolic tenno should have been more powerful as the head of  the state; the public welfare should 
have been placed over fundamental human rights too individualistically understood; the self-defense 
forces should have been maintained to wage a war of  self-defense.345 However, these conservative 
attacks were off  the point in a sense because the conservatives abandoned the opportunity of  self-
expression.346  
Although we have an illusion that conservatives have monopolized attempts at 
constitutional amendment, in fact, there were progressive proposals to amend the postwar 
constitution in the late 1940s.347 For example, the Koho Kenkyukai (the Public Law Research Group) 
proposed an opinion on constitutional amendment in March 1949.348 The opinion tried to expand 
and strengthen the basic ideas of  the new constitution. First of  all, it proposed, the word kokumin 
should be replaced with the word jinmin.349 The latter carries connotations more similar to the 
English word the people than the former. As the Japanese government actually explained,350 the 
word kokumin might include the tenno and thus has diluted the revolutionary effect of  popular 
sovereignty.351 The opinion proposed that the sovereignty of  the people should be declared in the 
new first article.352 This reorganization could have had a great influence upon the way of  thinking 
because it would show breaking off  with the Meiji Constitution in organization.353 Accordingly, the 
opinion argued, provisions over the tenno should become simpler. Because the word shocho (symbol) 
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sounds mysterious, the word gisho (emblem) should replace it. Further, in order that the spirits of  the 
postwar constitution become thoroughgoing, the opinion argued, the matters of  state the tenno 
performs should be limited to truly ceremonial matters. Appointment of  the prime minister and the 
chief  justice of  the Supreme Court,354 convocation of  the Diet and dissolution of  the House of  
Representatives355 should be removed from the list of  the matters of  state because they gave an 
impression that the tenno might have powers related to governmental affairs.356 Article 9 should been 
also modified to sweep away doubts on war of  self-defense and armed forces for self-defense.357 This 
revision would make renunciation of  war be taken at face value. In respect of  fundamental human 
rights, moreover, the concept of  the public welfare should be removed from Articles of  13, 22 and 29. 
The opinion feared that the concept might be interpreted along the prewar spirit of  messhi hoko 
(selfless devotion to the public). The human dignity of  the individual should be placed over public 
interests.358 All in all, the Koho Kenkyukai proposed constitutional amendment to develop its potential 
for progressive purposes. 
The Tokyo Daigaku Kenpo Kenkyukai (the University of  Tokyo Constitutional Research 
Group) also published its constitutional amendment plan in June 1949.359 In its overview, Tanaka 
Jiro wrote that the organization of  the postwar constitution should be reconsidered from the 
standpoint of  the principle of  popular sovereignty. As Tanaka pointed out, the current composition 
expressed a political compromise by placing the tenno in chapter 1.360 A new first chapter would 
declare the three general principles of  popular sovereignty, pacifism and respect for fundamental 
human rights. Chapter 2, Denunciation of  War, would be absorbed into a general principle in the 
new chapter 1. New chapter 2 would provide for fundamental human rights. Then a chapter about 
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the tenno would come next.361 Although the group paid perfunctory attention to the vicious old 
practices and showed an elitist disdain toward the ability of  the people to engage in politics,362 the 
proposals the group published also were as a whole progressive in nature from a liberal democratic 
point of  view. 
If  these progressive amendments had succeeded, the new constitution would look different. 
Discontinuity would be strongly emphasized in organization. If  human dignity as individuals is the 
most fundamental principle of  the postwar constitution, why should not such a provision be placed 
before anything else as the Bonn Basic Law does?363 Even with the principle of  popular sovereignty, 
the provision on the tenno institution should not come first of  all if  human dignity matters. 
Continuity in appearance has obscured discontinuity in substance. 
The episodes over constitutional amendment in the early postwar period, on the one hand, 
formed an important ground for countering the imposition theory. This was surely an opportunity to 
reconsider the constitution by the Japanese people themselves. But the conservative Japanese 
government willingly missed an otherwise precious chance to express decisively the popular will. If  
the “imposition” occurred at all, it was limited only to the outset of  the event, the defeat and ensuing 
occupation. The governing elite, who could not understand serious international opinions toward 
Japan in general and the tenno in particular, had invited the “imposition” of  the constitution they did 
not welcome.  
On the other hand, however, it is true that if  the Constitution of  Japan had been authorized 
by popular vote, popular sovereignty could have been a more vitalized political principle in postwar 
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Japan. Liberal democratic values could have been better articulated. However, it is also true that a 
significant number of  the Japanese people self-consciously confronted the difficult task of  
constituting a new political order and struggled to initiate a new politics that is based upon a 
fundamentally innovative idea of  popular sovereignty. Either positively or passively, the Japanese 
people as a whole had to face the basic problem of  political legitimacy and justified political power 
by their choice. We cannot deny the unprecedented value of  the experience of  public deliberation on 
the constitution of  political legitimacy and public goods for the state. The constitutional choice made 
relative the traditional authority, which had captured the way of  thinking of  the people. Popular 
sovereignty among other things requires robust public discussion between the government elite and 
common citizens. Making the postwar constitution for the first time brought such a robust debate to 
Japan. We cannot emphasize this experience too much. How to exercise the principle of  popular 
sovereignty was the next problem for the Japanese people to answer. The principle of  popular 
sovereignty was already established in the fundamental law of  the land, no matter who might have 
helped to write it. The Constitution of  Japan has in fact invited the Japanese people to participate in 
the process of  creating new constitutional values. This project has just started. 
 
10. Conclusion 
After the Katayama cabinet resigned en masse, Ashida Hitoshi, the president of  the 
Minshuto, the Democratic Party, succeeded as prime minister on March 10, 1948. His cabinet was 
formed upon the same center-left coalition of  the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and the 
National Cooperation Party as the Katayama cabinet. This alternation also indicated a new way of  
performing politics.364  Yoshida Shigeru, the president of  Jiyuto, the Liberal Party, criticized the 
rotation of  the reins of  government within the same coalition and argued for a change in power to 
appeal to the traditional, though liberal in a historical context, idea of  kensei no jodo (the normal 
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course of  constitutional government).365 What Yoshida resorted to was the practical principle of  
cabinet change in the prewar period, when the parliamentary government system was not 
constitutionalized and the genro had a great influence on recommending a candidate for the next 
prime minister to the tenno, who held the prerogative to appoint him. Now the cabinet must gain 
trust from the Diet, particularly the House of  Representatives. Thus the normal course of  
constitutional government has changed its meaning to who can gain the trust of  the Diet. On 
February 21, 1948, the House of  Representatives designated Ashida over Yoshida for the prime 
minister by 216 to 180 of  the total 421 votes. Meanwhile, the House of  Councillors, on the other 
hand, designated Yoshida over Ashida by 104 to 102 of  the total 208 votes in a runoff  election. A 
joint committee of  both Houses was held on February 23.366 It failed to reach an agreement.367 
According to the principle of  superiority of  the lower house, then, the decision of  the House of  
Representatives became the decision of  the Diet.368 
This transition of  cabinet has made it clear that the parliamentary government system the 
postwar constitution has provided for is operated by the will of  the Diet, especially of  the House of  
Representatives. Unlike the Meiji constitutional system, it now becomes crystal-clear who decides 
one of  the most important components of  the governmental process and thus is responsible for the 
decision. A majority of  the House of  Representatives holds the decisive voice in the process. 
Furthermore, the Diet has now genuinely become an institution representative of  all the people with 
true universal suffrage.369 The people can even indirectly control a political decision at the level of  a 
national institution. In principle, politics has transformed its nature from dedication to the tenno to 
competition to gain popular support. The formation of  the Ashida cabinet has vividly shown this 
                                                 
365 For the normal course of  constitutional government, see Chapter 1 section 7.  
366 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 67 par. 2. There have been so far only two cases in which each House 
designates a different person as prime minister. The other occurred in August 1989 when the House of  
Representatives designated Kaifu Toshiki but the House of  Councillors Doi Takako. 
367 See the Kokkai Ho (the Diet Law), art. 86. A joint committee consists of  10 members each elected in their 
respective House. Ibid., art. 89. It is necessary to pass a resolution with a majority of  two-thirds or more to 
make an agreement in a joint committee. Ibid., art. 92.  
368 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 67 par. 2. 
369 See the Constitution of  Japan, arts. 43 & 44.  
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transformation of  politics in postwar Japan. 370  Therefore, the universal principle of  democratic 
politics has been gradually more meaningful.371  
The postwar constitution has chosen as the fundamental value the protection and 
enhancement of  human dignity as individuals. To realize the value choice, it has adopted the 
principles of  popular sovereignty and of  denunciation of  war and armed forces. In sum, it has tried 
to liberally democratize politics in postwar Japan. Politics has transformed itself  from a vertical 
relation of  order and subject to a more horizontal relation among equals in nature. The theorists of  
both the external imposition and the internal continuity fail to appreciate this transformation in 
politics because the former refuses to see the efforts of  the Japanese people to start a new 
constitutional life and the latter trivializes the discontinuity that clearly exists between the two 
Japanese constitutions. The third theory of  the postwar constitution as an unconstitutional 
revolution has presented a viewpoint from which the liberal democratization of  politics in postwar 
Japan should be fully theorized.   
However, the most serious problem immediately after the establishment of  the postwar 
constitution was for the Japanese people to internalize new constitutional values because under the 
circumstances of  prevalent preoccupation with the kokutai, political compromise was in a sense 
necessary for creating the postwar constitutional system. In particular, the Japanese people missed a 
precious opportunity to express their commitment to liberal democracy by themselves in a national 
referendum. The kokutai ideology had been so influential that many people had been enchanted. 
How successfully has the new constitution disenchanted the Japanese people of  the subjection to be 
sovereign? Writing the principle in the fundamental document is one thing. But operating it properly 
                                                 
370 The Ashida cabinet lasted only for seven months. Money scandals destroyed this cabinet. Behind the 
incident, it is said that there was a severe conflict between the Government Section and G2 in GHQ. While the 
former generally perused a more idealistic goal of  liberal democratization of  Japan, the latter adopted a more 
realistic approach to the cold war situation. Yoshida Shigeru became the prime minister again and kept office 
until December 1954. Under his conservative leadership, the Japan people came to live in “the reverse course”. 
But this is another story. For “the reverse course”, see Takemae, Inside GHQ, 457-515. 
371 “Government is a sacred trust of  the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers 
of  which are exercised by the representatives of  the people, and the benefits of  which are enjoyed by the 
people.” The Constitution of Japan, preamble par. 1. 
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in real politics is quite another. Thus, we have to pay close attention to the relationship between the 
principle of  popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno institution. How did the Japanese people 
conceptualize the new tenno system in the regime that the people are sovereign? How were they 
ready to take full responsibility for politics? 
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Chapter 5  
Transformation of  Politics: The Symbolic Tenno System and the Rise of  Reason 
 
1. Introduction: From Sovereign to Symbol 
2. A New Start in Continuity 
3. Democracy Explained in School Textbooks 
4. The Formation of  the Symbolic Tenno System 
5. The Tenno Family and the New Constitution 
6. The Tradition and Intellectuals: Tsuda Sokichi and Watsuji Tetsuro  
7. The Controversy between the August Revolution and Nomos Sovereignty and Beyond 
8. The Tenno Institution in the New Constitution 
9. The Interpreted Symbol 





1. Introduction: From Sovereign to Symbol 
The Constitution of  Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946, and became effective 
six months later. This new constitution has drastically changed the political foundation of  Japan. 
The most fundamental transformation is found in provisions on the tenno institution.1 It is true that 
the Meiji Constitution and the new constitution both place “the tenno (emperor)” as chapter 1 and 
that the thrones of  the two tennos are hereditarily succeeded in the same line.2  However, their 
contents are completely different from each other.3 First, the status of  the tenno has been dramatically 
transformed. While the tenno held the status as sovereign and head of  the state and superintended 
sovereign powers under the Meiji constitutional regime,4 the new constitution, on the one hand, has 
declared the principle of  popular sovereignty and, on the other, has retained the tenno institution as 
the symbol of  the state and the unity of  the people.5 Second, the bases of  the institutions also differ 
fundamentally. The tenno in the Meiji Constitution was entitled to reign and rule because of  the will 
                                                 
1 For the details on the tenno system in the Meiji constitutional regime, see Chapter 1. 
2 Compare the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 2 with the Constitution of Japan, art. 2. 
3 See Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, Kenpo, 175-178. 
4 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, arts. 1 & 4. 
5 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble and art. 1. 
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of the imperial founder and ancestors.6 Even the will of  the tenno himself  was irrelevant as the 
foundation of  his sovereignty. The idea of  one lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal was 
influential enough for most people to believe in the perpetuity of  the state and the tenno’s governance. 
Thus this feature was closely connected to the concept of  the deification of  the tenno’s rule and the 
tenno himself  because the imperial founder was, according to the founding myth, believed to be 
Amaterasu Omikami (legendary sun goddess). Unification of  politics and religion was essentially 
presupposed to be a principle in this sense. In sharp contrast, the new symbolic tenno was founded 
upon the sovereign will of  the people.7 The tenno declared himself  to be human before the new 
constitution was established.8 Separation of  state from religion has been importantly characteristic 
of  the new constitution.9 
With respect to powers vested in the tenno, accordingly, there are substantial differences 
between the two institutions. In the Meiji constitutional system, the tenno as sovereign held and 
exercised prerogatives to govern the state. In fact, legislative, administrative and judicial powers were 
all vested with the tenno himself. With support of  governmental institutions, further, the tenno was 
generally planned to exert such powers by himself. The legislative power the tenno held was exercised 
with the consent of  the Imperial Diet.10 The tenno enjoyed wide leeway when he was allowed to 
make legislation without the consent of  the Diet in the form of  independent orders and emergency 
orders. 11  The administrative power all belonged to the tenno, who had the prerogatives of  
administrative appointment and organization, diplomacy, military command and organization, state 
of  siege, honors, and pardon.12 These prerogatives were exercised upon the advice of  ministers of  
                                                 
6 See Tsugebumi (Imperial Oath Sworn in the Sanctuary in the Imperial Palace); Imperial Rescript on the 
Promulgation of the Constitution. 
7 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 1. 
8 See Hingen Sengen, Imperial Rescript on January 1, 1946, FRUS, 8 (1971): 134-135 in RM096. 
9 The Constitution of  Japan, arts. 20 & 89. 
10 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 5. 
11 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, arts. 9 & 8. 
12 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, arts. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, & 16.  
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state.13 The courts of  laws exerted the judicature in the name of  the tenno.14 Meanwhile, the new 
constitution has deprived the tenno of  all political powers. It has clearly denied the prerogative-
oriented governmental system. The tenno shall have no powers related to government and perform 
only functions in matters of  state provided for in the constitution.15 Moreover, the tenno cannot act 
by himself  but only upon the advice and approval of  the cabinet.16 The constitution enumerates 
rather formal and ceremonial functions as matters of  state: Appointments of  the prime minister and 
the chief  justice of  the Supreme Court upon designation by the Diet and the cabinet, respectively; 
Promulgation of  legal norms; Convocation of  the Diet; Proclamation of  election for the Diet; 
Attestation of  appointment and dismissal of  public officials provided for by law and of  full powers 
and credentials of  diplomats; Attestation of  pardon; Granting honors; Attestation of  diplomatic 
documents provided for by law; Receiving foreign diplomats; Performing ceremonial functions.17 
The legislative, administrative, and judicial powers are vested with the Diet, the cabinet, and the 
Supreme Court and inferior courts, respectively.18 The tenno as the symbol is supposed to play no 
positive role in the political process. In this way, the new constitution has presented a totally different 
picture of  the governmental process in postwar Japan. 
Now political principles of  liberal democracy have been innovated since the postwar 
constitution was established. They are the product of  the Japanese people’s struggle to create a new 
political order based upon freedom after the defeat in the war. It is fair to say, however, that the 
constitutional revolution did not involve popular mass mobilization for liberal democratic values. 
Thus the postwar constitution has to have the character of  more progressive agendas than 
reservation of  great political achievements. Discrepancies between norms and facts might be larger 
in this case than in other constitutions. How did the Japanese people receive the innovative 
                                                 
13 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 55. 
14 The Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 57. 
15 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 4 par. 1. 
16 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 3. 
17 The Constitution of  Japan, arts. 6 & 7. 
18 For the details on the governmental institutions under the new constitution, see Chapter 4. 
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constitutional principles? The national consciousness of  the innovative constitution is on trial. A 
liberal democratic constitution cannot be well operated without the people’s commitment to its basic 
values.  
This chapter will examine public discourse on the Constitution of  Japan in the early 
postwar period.19 My main concern lies in how the Japanese people conceptualized the relationship 
between the principle of  popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno institution the postwar 
constitution has newly introduced. Because writing the principle of  popular sovereignty is only a 
starting point of  democratization of  society, we should pay attention to how this new principle was 
accepted and operated around the establishment of  the postwar constitution. Internalization of  the 
constitutional values is crucially important from a liberal democratic perspective, particularly 
because the postwar constitutional revolution was exogenous as well as indigenous. How different 
was the postwar constitutional regime based upon popular sovereignty with the symbolic tenno 
system from the Meiji constitutional system? How similar were they? By examining these questions, 
the third theory of  the constitutional experience in the postwar era differentiates itself  from both the 
external imposition theory and the internal continuity theory because the latter two theories fail to 
appreciate the efforts of  the Japanese people to strike a delicate balance between the principle of  
popular sovereignty and the newly established symbolic tenno institution.  
At first we will briefly look at the starting point of  the postwar constitution in terms of  
discontinuity and continuity. The postwar constitution’s promulgation and effectiveness ceremonies 
well showed a conflict between discontinuity and continuity. Next, we will review the images of  
democracy explained in high school textbooks as one representative of  public discourse on the new 
constitution. The Ministry of  Education once enthusiastically advocated the kokutai ideology 
through their school textbooks. After the constitutional revolution, how different are the postwar 
textbooks from those in the prewar period? Rather idealistic discourse emerged immediately after the 
wartime defeat. 
                                                 
19 I will limit my discussion here to the period until around 1952, when Japan recovered its independence. 
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Then we will turn our eyes to the most serious problem in the postwar liberal democratic 
system: the symbolic tenno institution. First we will review its origins. Historical records have shown 
at least three independent lines of  influence upon forming the symbolic tenno system. We will see a 
solid indigenous footing of  the new institution. Then we will examine how the tenno and his family 
received the newly created constitutional system. We will recognize continuity and discontinuity 
even here.  
Then we will turn our attention to public discussions on the institution. First, we will 
explore how intellectuals such as Tsuda Sokichi and Watsuji Tetsuro tried to respond to the 
fundamentally new political situation. By relying upon long tradition, they tried to convince people 
that the symbolic tenno matched an authentic image of  the tenno and that the tenno as sovereign was 
a deviant. Continuity was a crucial theme for them. The debate between Watsuji and Sasaki Soichi 
over the change in the kokutai will clarify a character of  constitutional discourse in postwar Japan. 
Further, we will consider another debate over the relationship between popular sovereignty and the 
symbolic tenno institution between Miyasawa Toshiyoshi and Odaka Tomo. Although this time the 
debate was over popular sovereignty, not the kokutai, the theme was the same: which was the best 
characterization of  the postwar constitution, discontinuity or continuity? In the process of  
examining this debate between the August Revolution and Nomos Sovereignty theses, I will clarify 
my thesis of  the postwar constitutional making as an unfinished constitutional revolution. Moreover, 
we will focus upon the symbolic tenno system itself. How was the system understood in the early 
postwar period? What role was the symbolic tenno expected to play in the new constitutional regime? 
Finally, the Placard Case will be fully analyzed, which will indicate that politics in postwar Japan 
was changing from one characterized by the order-subject relation to one founded upon mutual 
persuasion by speech. Through the public discussions, discontinuity gradually became basic 
recognition of  the postwar constitution, although some still continued to argue for continuity.  
All the debates we will consider in this chapter occurred over more or less the same topics: 
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How new is the new constitution? How continuous and discontinuous is the postwar constitution 
with the Meiji Constitution? In the Meiji constitutional system, people were used to understanding 
the constitution in the essential connection with the tenno. Indeed, the kokutai ideology had 
enchanted even highly educated people. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for them to try to 
understand the new constitutional order in terms of  meanings of  the newly introduced symbolic 
tenno institution. Palatable or not, focus tended to be placed on the symbolic tenno institution. 
Significant change in the constitutional text had to be explained anyway because the kokutai ideology 
had profoundly captured most Japanese people. Thus public discussion was repeatedly carried out 
over the symbolic tenno institution and its relation to the new principle of  popular sovereignty. 
While many people heatedly argued for continuity between the two constitutions and most 
really wanted to see it, there were a few frank and solid discussions that recognized discontinuity and 
advocated the newness of  the postwar constitution. Whatever might have been argued for the 
symbolic tenno system, it clearly is different from the old tenno institution based upon the idea of  one 
line of  tennos unbroken for ages eternal. The substance of  the symbolic tenno institution all depends 
upon the political will of  the people. In fact, the postwar constitution has taken the tenno into its 
constitutional frame anyway.   
 
2. A New Start in Continuity 
The Constitution of  Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946. The date is a symbol of  
difficulties this new constitution would face because November 3 was the national holiday for 
celebrating the birthday of  the Tenno Meiji.20 However, most Japanese people sincerely welcomed the 
Constitution of  Japan. All political parties but the Communist Party welcomed the new constitution, 
although the conservatives were truly reluctant to accept the principle of  popular sovereignty with 
                                                 
20 For the process of  selecting November 3, see Irie Toshio, Keii, 428-429,432-435. Yoshida originally wanted 
the postwar constitution to be effective on February 11, which was the National Founding Day based upon the 
founding myth and also the date when the Meiji Constitution was promulgated. However, the deliberation in 
the Imperial Diet lasted longer than he had expected. See Koseki Shoichi, Tanjyo, 319-320. 
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the symbolic tenno institution only a few months before. Newspapers made a large contribution to 
enhancing the welcoming moods.21 Whatever it might mean, the Japanese people surely perceived 
the constitution as a new beginning. The postwar constitution was regarded as the symbol of  a break 
with a past darkened by long wars, suppression, and austerity.22 Undeniably, a bright future for the 
state as well as for individuals was ardently expected in connection with the new fundamental law.  
From the date of  promulgation to that of  effectiveness, all kinds of  popularization of  the 
ideas of  the new constitution were carried out all over the country under the auspices of  the 
Government Section of  GHQ. The Kenpo Fukyukai (the Committee to Popularize the Constitution) 
sponsored many lectures on the new constitution around various parts of  Japan. The Kenpo Fukyukai 
also edited a booklet, Atarashii kenpo, akarui seikatsu (The New Constitution A Bright Life), twenty 
million copies of  which were distributed to almost all households. The ceremonies for celebration of  
the promulgation were held with enthusiasm for the new fundamental law of  the nation. People 
were exposed to lectures, leaflets, illustrated books, movies, and paper slide-picture shows, and even 
constitution songs and dances.23 On promulgation day, local governments had lectures, sports and 
athletic meetings, cultural festivals, concerts, and variety shows for congratulatory events.24 The 
Japanese people were more or less positively involved in celebration of  the new constitution.  
On November 3, 1946, a governmental ceremony was held in the House of  Peers, which 
had the tenno’s seat placed at the center of  the stage higher than common members’ seats and even 
the president’s seat. At the ceremony, the tenno granted an Imperial Rescript to the Dietpersons and 
the people.  
I rejoice that the foundation for the construction of  a new Japan has been laid 
according to the will of  the Japanese people, and hereby sanction and promulgate 
                                                 
21 See Ariyama Teruo, Sengoshi nonakano kenpo to janarizumu (The Constitution and Journalism in Postwar History) 
(Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 1998), 129 (hereinafter cited as Ariyama, Sengoshi). 
22 See Tanaka Hideo, “The Conflict between Two Legal Traditions in Making the Constitution of Japan,” 
Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 125-126. 
23 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 321-345. 
24 For various congratulatory activities in Hokkaido, Tohoku, Ibaragi, Yamanashi, Shizuoka, Kyoto, Okayama, 
Ehime, and Fukuoka, see Rekishi Kyoikusha Kyogikai ed., Nihonkoku kenpo wo kokumin ha do mukaetaka (How 
did the People Receive the Constitution of  Japan?) (Tokyo: Kobunken, 1997), 2001-298. 
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the amendments of  the Imperial Japanese Constitution effected following the 
consultation with the Privy Council and the decisions of  the Imperial Diet made in 
accordance with Article LXXIII of  the said Constitution.25  
 
The constitution that solemnly declares the sovereignty of  the people was promulgated with the 
sanction of  the tenno, the position of  which derives from the will of  the sovereign people. The 
postwar constitution was born as the total amendment of  the old constitution. Yamazaki Takeshi, 
the speaker of  the House of  Representatives, Tokugawa Iemasa, the president of  the House of  Peers, 
and Yoshida Shigeru, the prime minister, with reverence replied to what the tenno said. Particularly, 
Yoshida as the prime minister promised that the Japanese people were ready to meet the seishi (the 
desire of  the tenno) with doing their best from now onward. This ceremony looked like that of  the 
Meiji Constitution, which was quite natural as kintei kenpo (a constitution established by the 
beneficiary tenno as a favor). The government tried hard to keep up the continuity between the two 
constitutions. However, such ceremonial manners are dubious or at least inappropriate from a 
perspective of  the ideals of  the new constitution as mintei kenpo (a constitution established by the 
people). The sovereign people, who should have been spotlighted, were ignored because they were 
nowhere in the ceremony. The limits of  using the amendment procedure of  the Meiji Constitution 
explicitly emerged at the very beginning of  an innovative constitutional life. 
 In the afternoon of  the same day, the Tokyo Citizens’ Congratulatory Ceremony was held at 
the imperial palace plaza. After Yoshida, Tokugawa, Yamazaki, and Yasui Iku, the Tokyo governor, 
delivered congratulatory addresses, all of  a sudden the Kimigayo (the reign of  his imperial majesty) 
was played and then the tenno and kogo (empress) appeared, riding in a carriage. People gave banzai 
(cheers) for the tenno and sang the Kimigayo in chorus. Newspapers reported the ceremony by 
focusing upon the tenno surrounded with common citizens deeply moved by seeing him directly. 
While they praised the postwar constitution for its bloodless revolution and democracy, newspapers 
                                                 
25 The Imperial Rescript on November 3, 1946 in RM499. 
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carried articles as though the tenno was the most important figure in the new constitutional politics.26 
The elaborately state-managed ceremony was not for the new constitution itself  but for the newly 
introduced symbolic tenno.  
At the same time, however, the Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of  the Constitution 
of  Japan itself  indicated that something different had happened. It was written in colloquial 
Japanese with hiragana, Chinese characters, and punctuation marks. It accorded with the postwar 
constitution in colloquial and plain Japanese.27 Change in a writing style could be understood as the 
first step for thorough democratization because plain language in the fundamental law of  the land 
expands popular participation in the government process. In this way, the postwar constitutional 
system started in the mixed discourse of  discontinuity and continuity. 
When the Constitution of  Japan became effective on May 3, 1947, the Kenpo Fukyukai 
(Committee to Popularize the Constitution) again held a congratulatory ceremony at the imperial 
palace plaza. Several addresses were delivered and a new people’s song, Our Japan was played. Then 
suddenly the music changed to the Kimigayo. The tenno appeared. This time the tenno was by himself  
and in a car. People once again repeated banzai (cheers) for the tenno and sang the Kimigayo in chorus. 
Newspapers were also full of  articles on the tenno particularly as a common person---husband, father, 
and biologist.28 The symbolic tenno institution was well directed in its search for a soft landing. On 
the other hand, this meant that the symbolic tenno system needed careful treatment in performing the 
role of  symbol the postwar constitution has provided for.29 Because the postwar constitution has 
officially denied the idea of  one line unbroken for ages eternal, the symbolic tenno has to have 
popular support to be stabilized as an institution. In other words, the tenno institution now needs 
justification for its existence. The very tradition did not necessarily serve the purpose. Although it 
                                                 
26 See Ariyama, Sengoshi, 137-146. 
27 For the significance of  change to colloquial Japanese in wording, see Chapter 4 section 2. 
28 See Ariyama, Sengoshi, 154-156. 
29 For the tenno’s visit to various parts of  Japan, see Sakamoto Kojiro, Shocho tennosei heno pafomansu: Showaki 
no tenno gyoko no hensen (Performances to the Symbolic Tenno System: The Transformation of  the Tenno Visits in the 
Showa Period) (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1989). 
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retained the same name, the tenno system has essentially transformed its logical structure. A 
popularly, namely democratically justified tenno institution is unprecedentedly new in Japanese 
history.   
However, such recognition toward the tenno system did not gain momentum easily. The 
governing elite expressed their desire to see continuity rather than novelty. In a lecture held by the 
Committee to Popularize the Constitution on February 1947, 30 Kanamori Tokujiro, its vice president 
and the former minister of  state in charge of  constitutional revision, argued that the new 
constitution was necessary because the Japanese people did not respect freedom and lacked self-
awareness about political responsibility. 31  He emphasized the significance of  framing the new 
constitution in the world history of  development of  liberal democracy.32 However, Kanamori alleged 
that popular sovereignty was nothing new. For him, Japan had invariably adopted the principle of  
popular sovereignty but ways of  explanation and perception alone had changed.33 He understood 
that popular sovereignty as a principle that a source of  political power in a common life of  people 
resides in the people. 34  If  popular sovereignty was a universal principle, 35  Kanamori seriously 
contended, that was true even under the Meiji constitutional regime.36 In his explanation, the Meiji 
Constitution provided for the tenno as the outlet of  political power, the source of  which was the 
people. In the new constitution, there were other outlets of  the Diet, the cabinet, the courts and the 
people themselves.37 Although the status of  the tenno in the postwar constitution became lighter than 
that in the Meiji system, Kanamori emphasized, the tenno as the symbol had never altered the 
                                                 
30 Kanamori Tokujiro, “Shinkenpo taikan (An Overview of  the New Constitution),” Kenpo Fukyukai, ed., 
Shinkenpo kowa (Lectures on the New Constitution) (Tokyo: Seikai Tsushinsha, 1947), 31-71 (hereinafter cited as 
Kanamori, “Taikan”). Kanamori also presented the same idea on the new constitution somewhere else. 
Kanamori Tokujiro, “Shinkenpo no seishin (The Spirits of  the New Constitution),” Jiji Tsushinsha, ed., 
Nihonkoku kenpo: Kaisetsu to shiryo (The Constitution of  Japan: Explanations and Materials) (Tokyo: Jiji Tsushinsha, 
1946), 16-30. 
31 Kanamori, “Taikan,” 43-44. 
32 Kanamori, “Taikan,” 32-42. 
33 Kanamori, “Taiakan,” 52-53. 
34 Kanamori, “Taikan,” 51. 
35 See the Constitution of  Japan, preamble, par. 1. 
36 Kanamori, “Taikan,” 52. 
37 Kanamori, “Taikan,” 68. 
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meaning of  the institution. The old tenno system was so naturally supposed to be the symbol of  the 
state and the unity of  the people that the Meiji Constitution did not mention its status.38 No matter 
what he might say about the newness of  the postwar constitution, Kanamori intended to place 
emphasis upon and defend the continuity between the two constitutions.39 
  Ashida Hitoshi, the chairman of  the special committee for constitutional revision in the 
House of  Representatives and the president of  the Committee to Popularize the Constitution, 
expressed the same kind of  observation on the postwar constitution. Ashida confirmed the 
significant change in the governmental process in which the tenno used to enjoy and exercise 
sovereign powers but now had no relation to governmental affairs. He also clearly admitted that 
popular sovereignty had been principled. However, he contended that the tenno had been included in 
the people in the long tradition of  Japan and thus popular sovereignty in the new constitution meant 
that the people including the tenno were the source of  the state’s will. 40  Ashida shared with 
Kanamori the concept of  the tenno as the center of  national adoration.41 When he explained the new 
functions the tenno was entitled to perform, Ashida used the word of  prerogative, which was no 
longer suitable for the tenno under the new constitutional system. 42  In this way, Ashida like 
Kanamori tried to stress the continuity in the kokutai between the old and new constitutions.43 
Because both of  them were central persons who advocated the popularization of  its spirit, the 
revolutionary new constitution was expected to be given some disguise of  continuity.  
In general, the conservative government tried to conceal the revolutionary newness of  the 
postwar constitution. Because the ruling elite regarded the retention of  the kokutai as their top 
                                                 
38 Kanamori, “Taikan,” 70. 
39 See Hata Nagami, “Kenpo Fukyukai no katsudo wo shudoshita shinkenpokan (The View of  the New 
Constitution that Led the Committee to Popularize the Constitution), Rekishi Kyoikusha Kyogikai, ed., 
Nihonkoku kenpo wo kokumin ha do mukaetaka (How did the People Receive the Constitution of  Japan?) (Tokyo: 
Kobunken, 1997), 96-121, 99-103 (hereinafter cited as Hata, “Kenpo Fukyukai”). 
40 Ashida Hitoshi, “Shinkenpo to kyoiku (The New Constitution and Education),” Shinkenpo kowa, 73-110, 90-
91. 
41 Ashida, “Shinkenpo to kyoiku,” 90. 
42 Ashida Hitoshi, Shinkenpo kaishaku (Interpretations of  the New Constitution) (Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 1946), 26. 
43 See Hata, “Kenpo Fukyukai,” 104-107. 
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priority, they did not necessarily welcome the Constitution of  Japan. It can be said that for the safety 
of  the tenno house, they unwillingly accepted it. Soon after the recovery of  independence in 1950s, 
the conservatives started a campaign against the “imposed” constitution and for establishing an 
autonomous constitution. When the Liberal Democratic Party was formed in 1955, one of  its main 
policies was to independently revise the current constitution and reconsider legal reforms in the 
occupation. 44  On the other hand, however, most common citizens supported the postwar 
constitution from the bottom of  their hearts. Ideals such as popular sovereignty, civil rights and civil 
liberties, and the peace the postwar constitution has inspired, have attracted a sufficiently significant 
number of  citizens to have prevented conservative attempts to revise the constitution. Citizens have 
never given two thirds of  the Dietpersons permission to project constitutional amendments which 
attempt to revert to the prewar situation.45 
Discontinuity and continuity, progressive and conservative, and goken (to defend the 
constitution) and kaiken (to revise the constitution) have been characteristic of  public discourse on 
the postwar constitution.46 Thus it is worth examining the origins of  such public discourse. Before 
we fully engage in the examination, let us pay attention to how democracy was understood 
immediately after the defeat. Liberal democratization of  politics was the foremost important 
problem of  the time and thus public understanding of  democracy constituted a great portion of  
public discourse on the postwar constitution, along with the tenno institution.  
 
3. Democracy Explained in School Textbooks 
                                                 
44 Jiyuminshuto(Liberal Democratic Party), To no Seiko (Major Policies of  the Party),6, November 15, 1955 in 
Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, ed., Nihonshi Shiryo (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), 5: 254-256, 256.  
45 Article 96 paragraph 1 of  the Constitution of  Japan reads: “Amendments to this Constitution shall be 
initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of  two-thirds or more of  all the members of  each House and 
shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of  a 
majority of  all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.” For the 
amendment process in the postwar constitutional system, see Chapter 4 section 8. 
46 There is a twist in the constitutional discourse in postwar Japan. While Conservatives argue for kaiken 
(revision of  the constitution), progressives argue for goken (defense of  the constitution). What they try to 
preserve differs between conservatives and progressives: for the former the Meiji constitutional conceptions 
and for the latter the postwar constitutional ideals. 
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 The new constitution has adopted the principle of  popular sovereignty and a political system 
of  liberal democracy. How did people understand democracy in the reconstruction era? We will see 
briefly how school textbooks explain governmental principles of  the new constitution because they 
well display not only the government’s attitude toward the new constitution but also the formation 
of  public understanding about it through education. The Ministry of  Education once tried hard to 
implant the kokutai ideology into young students. Under the new constitution, however, it could not 
maintain the same stance. A change was necessary, but how?   
The Ministry of  Education edited and published Atarashii kenpo no hanashi (A Story on the 
New Constitution), which was a textbook of  social studies for first year students of  junior high school 
(the seventh grade). This small textbook was used from August 1947 to March 1952. It pointed out 
democracy as one of  fundamental principles of  the new constitution. According to the textbook, 
democracy meant that collective decisions in a group were made by as many people as possible and 
that similarly, the government of  the state was operated based upon decisions by as many people as 
possible.47 Interestingly, the textbook took the position that democracy does not necessarily limit its 
application to politics over the state. It might reflect in the social atmosphere of  the time that 
democratization was needed in all aspects of  human life. Democracy was, the text continued, the 
enterprise of  the people as a whole to govern the state. It was least erroneous to make decisions by 
opinions of  all. When governmental decisions were based upon democracy, it concluded, people 
would become happy and the state would prosper.48 Then the textbook introduced a distinction 
between direct democracy and representative democracy. Even though political decisions should be 
made by all members, it explained, the state, unlike a school class, was too large for all members to 
gather in one place. Representatives gathered in the Diet for the people to govern the state. However, 
the textbook pointed out, important things were not left to the Diet but decided by the people 
themselves. This is direct democracy, which the new constitution has provided for in a few cases, 
                                                 
47 Monbusho ed., Atarashi kenpo no hanashi (A Story on the New Constitution) (Tokyo: Dowasha, 2001, 1947), 16-
17. 
48 Atarashi kenpo no hanashi, 18. 
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most importantly amendment to the constitution.49 The textbook explained that the new constitution 
adopted two kinds of  democracy: representative and direct. While the former is a normal way of  
governing, the latter is an extraordinary way of  making crucially important decisions.50  
The textbook also mentioned popular sovereignty as a basic principle of  the new 
constitution. It explained that because governmental affairs were decided by the people as a whole, 
they would be supreme. Because the new constitution had premised democracy, it added, 
sovereignty quite naturally resided in the people as a whole. However, this explanation obscured a 
revolutionarily novel feature of  popular sovereignty in the new constitution. Democratic politics was 
partially realized even in the Meiji constitutional system.51 Thus the government was once extremely 
reluctant to revise the Meiji Constitution. The textbook presented a logic developed from democracy 
to popular sovereignty, not the other way around. Therefore, it may be said that the textbook tried to 
conceal a distinctive characteristic of  the new constitution because it did not want to clarify the 
change in the kokutai.52  
At all rates, the textbook offered an optimistic view on democracy: “Your ideas and 
activities will govern the state. There is nothing more pleasant than if  you all keep on good terms 
with one another and administer your own country by yourselves.”53 Because it was for seventh 
grade, of  course, there was no mention about complicated matters in actual democracy such as 
severe confrontations of  interests, apathy and the tyranny of  majority. The textbook simply 
emphasized a positive image of  democracy. It is undeniable that this optimistic view indicated a 
widely accepted sentiment that the new constitution was really understood in a manner that it is 
                                                 
49 See Chapter 4 section 7. 
50 Atarashi kenpo no hanashi, 19-20. 
51 See Chapter 1 section 7. 
52 In fact, the textbook wrote the section of  the tenno in a different tone from the rest of  the book. The title of  
the section was “tenno heika (His Majesty the Emperor)” written with an honorific title. And the text was full 
of  honorific words. It sounds as if  the kokutai had never changed. See Atarashi kenpo no hanashi, 28-30. Indeed, 
the textbook wrote “we should place the symbolic tenno at the center of  us and then should not give him 
trouble when we govern the state.” Atarashi kenpo no hanashi, 30. Continuity was implicitly emphasized. See Ito 
Satoru, “’Atarashi kenpo no hanashi’ ni miru ‘kokutai goji’ no ronri (The Logic of  the Retention of the 
Kokutai Seen in A Story of  the New Constitution),” Nihonkoku kenpo wo kokumin ha do mukaetaka, 62-95.  
53 Atarashi kenpo no hanashi, 21. 
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connected with a bright life.54  
Another textbook for junior and senior high school students was more substantial. The two-
volume textbook Minshushugi (Democracy) was edited and published by the Ministry of  Education in 
October 1948 and August 1949. As Atarashi kenpo no hanashi, Minshushugi also took democracy not 
only as a political phenomenon but as deeply related to social and economic life. 55 The textbook 
thus understood democracy as having three aspects: political, social and economic democracy. 
Although they were interrelated with one another, it believed, political democracy was the most 
basic because political democracy was recognized early on and political decisions more or less 
influenced other decisions.56  
The textbook started its discussion by mentioning the popularization of  the word 
democracy and its ambiguities. It understood that democracy was not just about political institutions 
but about spiritual attitudes. Its fundamental spirit lay in respect for humankind. By following 
authoritative orders blindly, many Japanese people abandoned even self-respect during the pre- and 
mid-war period. Recovery of  self-respect would lead to respect for others’ dignity. The textbook 
argued that democracy presupposed the equality of  all people. 57  Further, it also understood 
democracy from a utilitarian point of  view. While democratization of  society would lead to 
prosperity and peace, the textbook juxtaposed, its failure would cause human beings war and ruin in 
the future. In short, it seriously maintained, establishment of  democracy was a problem of  life and 
death.58    
 The textbook juxtaposed democracy with dictatorship and rejected the latter because it 
                                                 
54 The Kenpo Fukyukai (Committee to Popularize the Constitution)’s pamphlet was called Atarashi Kenpo 
Akarui Seikatsu (The New Constitution! A Bright Life!). See Koseki, Tanjyo, 332-334. See also this Chapter 
section 2. 
55 See Monbusho, ed., Minshushugi (Democracy) (Tokyo: Komichi Shobo, 1995, 1948 & 1949), 16-19. In fact, its 
chapters 8, 9 and 10 were entitled democracy in social life, democracy in economic life, and democracy and 
labor unions. Ibid., 146-162, 163-191, 192-211. 
56 Minshushugi, 212-217. 
57 Minshushugi, 17-18. 
58 Minshushugi, 16. 
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believed that democracy was a much better way of  doing politics.59 Dictatorship tended to favor a 
small minority at the sacrifice of  the overwhelming majority of  people. On the contrary, it argued 
that democracy depended upon the full protection of  freedom and equality. Importantly, it 
emphasized, a close relationship between democracy and freedom of  speech. Freedom of  speech 
was necessary for knowing facts, forming opinions, exchanging ideas and thus making better 
political decisions.60 It argued that the free flow of  information would help people to cultivate critical 
powers and enhance political judgments. It also stressed that free speech would make majority rule 
work well because abuse of  the majority would be prevented through free exchange of  information 
and ideas.61 It was awakened voters with deliberated opinions who resisted against demagogical or 
authoritative politics and well practiced democracy.62 
 The textbook recommended its readers to practice democracy by themselves. Although 
reading and studying democratic theories gave them knowledge about democracy, it argued, this 
knowledge did not necessarily mean living in it. The textbook suggested that it was best to practice 
democracy to acquire it and that school was a good place to learn democracy. The teacher-student 
relationship in the prewar school education was based upon a vertical morality of  order and subject, 
which should be replaced with a horizontal morality of  mutual respect for individual dignity. 
Student councils and extra-curriculum activities were good opportunities for students to train 
themselves for a democratic way of  administering matters. Elections of  executive boards or 
representatives, management of  general meetings and decision-making for groups were all precious 
occasions to learn how democracy would actually work.63 The textbook also emphasized education 
for women, which would be necessary to enhance the substantial equality of  men and women the 
                                                 
59 See Minshushugi, 212-240. 
60 Minshushugi, 27-28. 
61 Minshushugi, 102-105. 
62 Minshushugi, 109-128. 
63 Minshushugi, 289-294, 299-310. The textbook took the Future Farmers of  America for an example of  extra-
curricular activities in the United States.   
 362 
new constitution has provided for.64 
 Finally, the textbook warned its readers against a short-sighted expectation that democracy 
would soon bring prosperity and happiness to Japan. Because Japan not only was essentially a small 
land and lacked natural resources but also had recently suffered from devastating damages in the 
reckless war, the textbook coolly pointed out, it was not easy to recover and develop immediately. 
There was no easy magic for prosperity.65  The textbook argued that a driving force of  democracy 
resided in the people’s spirit of  self-reliance, namely the indomitable efforts of  the people to carve 
out a destiny for themselves and to build up their own happiness all by themselves. Democracy thus 
depended upon confidence in the common citizens, not heroes.66 Democracy was nothing but self-
government based upon deep respect for individual dignity, freedom and equality. It was true that 
there were so severe conflicts among interests that people could not always expect unanimous 
political decisions. However, because democracy relied upon majority rule, political decisions 
conformed to the interests of  the majority of  the people.67 In addition, majority rule should always 
be supplemented with free exchange of  information and ideas and mutual criticism. In sum, the 
textbook stated, democracy would be realized as politics of  the people, by the people and for the 
people. Democracy would eventually bring the people their own interests though trial and error. 
Thus the people tended to try hard democratic decision-making all the more because benefits from 
democratic practices would belong to themselves. Then, the textbook recommended its readers to 
take a pragmatic approach to democracy. Discussion and practice and practice and discussion would 
make democracy function well.68 
 In this way, high school textbooks by the Ministry of  Education presented a bright image of  
democracy. They formed such an image both from an intrinsic view and from an instrumental 
                                                 
64 Minshushugi, 311-334. 
65 Minshushugi, 365-370. 
66 Minshushugi, 360-361. 
67 Minshushugi, 363. 
68 Minshushugi, 378-379. 
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perspective.69 On the one hand, they supposed that democracy was dependant upon fundamental 
values of  people. Dignity, freedom and equality were understood as profoundly connected to the 
idea of  democracy. The textbooks thus argued for a liberal type of  democracy, although they did not 
use the term of  liberal democracy explicitly and raise a serious question on intrinsic tension between 
liberalism and democracy. On the other, they also appealed to utilitarian motivation. They argued 
that democracy would lead to prosperity and the happiness of  the people. They basically 
presupposed a close relation of  democracy to marketplace capitalism, which was being modified by 
various attempts deriving from social consciousness. When they placed democracy over dictatorship, 
their political motivation was obvious. As the cold war became intense, textbooks tried to reject the 
communist way of  politicking. However, we should rather pay attention to their romantic view of  
democracy. The government might come to believe that collapse of  the Meiji constitutional regime 
had required a serious reflection on a political manner, although it was quite hesitant to change the 
old style immediately after the war.70 Whatever reasons they might have had, it seems undeniable 
that democracy was really regarded as a hope for the future at the beginning of  the new 
constitutional system. If  people fully acquired a democratic attitude, the future of  Japan was widely 
believed to be filled with prosperity and happiness.  
 Then, a question had to be asked whether the optimistic view of  democracy the government 
had expounded really had a solid footing in the new constitution. Because the constitution has 
carried over the tenno system anyway, the system might work against the optimistic view on 
democracy. In the old regime, the tenno was the sole source of  political power. In fact, Atarashii 
kenpo no hanashi (A Story of  the New Constitution) was full of  terms of  respect for the tenno.71 This 
textbook even stated that the Japanese people should place the tenno at their center and that they 
                                                 
69 For basic ideas about democracy, see Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998). 
70 See Chapter 2. 
71 See Atarashii kenpo no hanashi, 28-30. 
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should not give the tenno trouble when they govern the state.72 The textbook almost said that the 
sovereign people should serve the tenno for his peace. Without doubt, such feeling is harmful to 
liberal democracy. Thus the next question is how the Japanese people tried to strike a balance 
between the principle of  popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno institution. Before embarking 
upon a consideration of  the relationship between the two institutions, we first briefly confirm the 
origins of  the symbolic tenno system.      
 
4. The Formation of  the Symbolic Tenno System  
 As discussed in the third chapter,73 at its early stage, the Allied, overwhelmingly American, 
occupation forces decided to maintain the tenno system to operate its purposes smoothly. However, 
international opinion, particularly in China, the Soviet Union, Australia, and Holland were so severe 
that MacArthur and GHQ and the U.S. government were definitely unable to sustain the status quo 
of  the tenno institution.74 The Shidehara cabinet was extremely reluctant to execute, among other 
things, constitutional reform. The Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinkai (the Committee for the Investigation of  
Constitutional Problems) over which Matsumoto Joji presided showed an unacceptably poor 
performance. MacArthur and the Government Section of  GHQ decided to frame a draft of  
constitutional revision by themselves and present it to the Japanese government to make the 
Japanese draft by modeling their draft. 
 The GHQ draft of  the Constitution of  Japan used the word “symbol”. Article 1 reads “The 
Emperor shall be the symbol of  the State and of  the Unity of  the People, deriving his position from 
the sovereign will of  the People, and from no other sources.”75 This is the direct origin of  the shocho 
                                                 
72 Atarashii kenpo no hanashi, 30. 
73 See Chapter 3 section 3. 
74 For conflicting views on the tenno around 1945, see Takeda Kiyoko, Tenokan no Sokoku (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1978, 2001). 
75 For the text of  the GHQ draft, see Takayanagi Kenzo, Otomo Yuichiro, and Tanaka Hideo, eds., Nihonkoku 
Kenpo Seitei no Katei (The Making the Constitution of  Japan) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1972), 1: 266-303 (hereinafter 
cited as Takayanagi, Seitei Katei). Article 1, ibid. 268. 
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tennosei (the symbolic tenno institution) in the postwar constitution. 76  Nakamura Masanori has 
clarified the complicated process of  providing for the word symbol.77  
There were three independent lines of  theoretical influence. Two were on the United States 
side. Joseph C. Grew, former American ambassador to Japan, was the central figure of  the pro-
Japanese in the Department of  State. He served as the director of  the Office of  Far Eastern Affairs 
from May 1944 and Undersecretary of  State from December 1944 to August 1945 to plan a policy 
for postwar Japan. He had never changed his mind about treatment of  the tenno: utilizing the 
authority of  the tenno for the occupational aim to liberally democratize Japan. He mentioned the 
tenno system as the symbol of  Japanese society.78 
In GHQ, Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, Military Secretary to SCAP, submitted to 
MacArthur a report that the tenno should not be subject to a war criminal investigation. In the report, 
Fellers used the word symbol twice. “[The Japanese] Emperor is the living symbol of  the race in 
whom lies the virtues of  their ancestors.” “Were the Japanese given [an] opportunity [to choose their 
own government], they would select the Emperor as the symbolic head of  the state.” 79  And 
MacArthur himself  referred to the tenno as a symbol. He telegraphed Eisenhower, the Chief  of  Staff, 
United States Army, that he was opposed to a policy of  trying the tenno as a war criminal. What he 
stated in the telegraph was basically the same as Fellers’ argument.   
“If  [The Emperor] is to be tried, great changes must be made in occupational plans 
and due preparation therefore should be accomplished in preparedness before 
actual action is initiated. His indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous 
confusion among the Japanese people, the repercussions of  which cannot be 
                                                 
76 For the formation of  the symbolic tenno institution, see Tanaka Hideo, Kenpo seiteikatei oboegaki (Tokyo: 
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overestimated. He is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the 
nation will disintegrate. Practically all Japanese venerate him as the social head of  
the state and believe rightly or wrongly that the Potsdam agreements were intended 
to maintain him as the Emperor of  Japan.”80 
 
 
It is clear that MacArthur used the word “symbol” for the tenno. When he informed Courtney 
Whitney, Chief  of  the Government Section of  his decision to write a draft of  the Japanese 
constitution on February 3, 1946, however, MacArthur did not say anything about the symbolism of  
the tenno. The so-called MacArthur Notes on the fundamental principles of  the new constitution 
included the following on the tenno.   
Emperor is at the head of  the state. 
His succession is dynastic. 
His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and 
responsive to the basic will of  the people as provided therein.81 
 
 
When the Government Section started its work on constitutional revision, Whitney reported to its 
members the general principles MacArthur presented to him as follows: “The Emperor is at the head 
of  the state and his succession is dynastic. But his powers will be exercised in accordance with the 
Constitution and responsive to the will of  the people as provided therein.”82 In the free discussion, 
the members agreed that while “placing sovereignty squarely in the hands of  the people”, “the 
Emperor’s role [would] be that of  a social monarch, merely.”83 Thus, when the Government Section 
started writing a new constitution for Japan, no specific word of  “symbol” emerged yet in the official 
documentation. The members of  the Government Section divided into small groups for drafting a 
part of  the constitution under the steering committee. Provisions on the tenno were drafted in the 
committee on the emperor, treaties and enabling provisions, to which George A. Nelson, Jr., first 
lieutenant, and Richard A. Pool, ensign, were assigned. 
                                                 
80 Telegraph from MacArthur to Eisenhower, January 25, 1946, FRUS, 8(1971): 395-397 in RM054. 
81 Three basic points stated by the Supreme Commander to be “Musts” in constitutional revision. Takayanagi, 
Seitei Katei, 1: 98. 
82 Summary Report on Meeting of  the Government Section, 4 February 1946 in Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 
102. 
83 Summary Report on Meeting of  the Government Section, 4 February 1946, Points in Open Discussion, in 
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 367 
 The first draft of  the committee explicitly adopted the symbolic tenno system.  
“Article 1 Sovereignty over Japan shall be in the Japanese People and shall be 
exercised by the State, which is their instrument.”  
“Article 2 The Japanese Nation shall be reigned over by a line of  Emperors, whose 
succession is dynastic. The Imperial Throne shall be the symbol of  the State and of  
the Unity of  the People, and the Emperor shall be the symbolic personification 
thereof, deriving his position from the sovereign will of  the People, and from no 
other source.”84  
 
At the meeting of  the steering committee and the committee on the emperor on February 6, 1946, 
article 1 on sovereignty was deleted and the first sentence of  article 2 was also deleted because the 
term “reign” might carry the connotation of  the term of  “govern” in Japanese usage.85 The second 
draft provided merely that “An Imperial Throne shall be the symbol of  the State and of  the Unity of  
the People, and an Emperor shall be the symbolic personification thereof, deriving his position from 
the sovereign will of  the People, and from no other source.”86 Further, this second draft was revised 
to a simple provision that “The Emperor shall be the symbol of  the State and of  the Unity of  the 
People, deriving his position from the sovereign will of  the People, and from no other sources.”87 
Because the juxtaposition of  the throne and the tenno in the proposed draft showed a double 
symbolism, “the mysticism” of  the throne was omitted for the sake of  simplification.88 This was the 
final version of  the GHQ draft, which was presented to Matsumoto, Yoshida, and other Japanese 
representatives on February 13, 1946. 
 On the one hand, Theodore McNelly, who has specialized in research on framing the 
postwar constitution, has argued that Alfred Rodman Hussey, one of  three members of  the steering 
committee, was a leading figure in advocating the symbolic tenno.89   
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On the other, Kades bears witness that when the Government Section drafted their own 
constitutional plan, MacArthur did not order use of  the term “symbol.”90 He also bears witness that 
on February 6, 1946, the members who participated in preparation of  provisions on the tenno did not 
know the usages of  the term “symbol” by Grew, Fellers, and MacArthur.91 He hinted that Jerivis 
Langdon, Jr., might influence him in using the term “symbol.” When Kades attended Cornell 
University, he was a senior editor of  the Cornell Daily Sun, of  which Langdon was the editor-in-chief. 
Landon wrote articles on the Statute of  Westminster, 1931, which provided that “the Crown is the 
symbol of  the free association of  the British Commonwealth of  Nations,” and “they are united by a 
common allegiance to the Crown.” Kades read Langdon’s articles enthusiastically and he pointed 
out that when the symbolic personification was to be replaced with a less mysterious and pompous 
phrase, he came across the term “symbol” from subconsciousness because he was familiar with the 
Statute of  Westminster through reading Langdon’s articles.92 
 This is the second line of  influence about framing the symbolic tenno institution. Walter 
Bagehot has presented a famous formula that the English constitutional structure has the dignified 
parts represented by the king and peers and efficient parts represented by the cabinet and the House 
of  Commons in the United Kingdom.93 He uses the term “symbol” referring to the monarchy. “The 
nation is divided into parties, but the Crown is of  no party. Its apparent separation from business is 
that which removes it both from enmities and from desecration, which preserves its mystery, which 
enables it to combine the affection of  conflicting parties---to be a visible symbol of  unity to those still 
so imperfectly educated as to need a symbol.”94  
Arthur James Balfour wrote an introduction to the world classic edition of  Bagehot’s the 
English Constitution. He also used the word of  “symbol” and the concept of  monarch as the chief  of  a 
                                                                                                                                                             
is a symbol.” 
90 The first letter from Charles Kades to Nakamura Masanori, Nakamura, Shocho, 190.  
91 The second letter from Charles Kades to Nakamura Masanori, Nakamura, Shocho, 191.  
92 The second letter from Charles Kades to Nakamura Masanori, Nakamura, Shocho, 192-193. 
93 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1867, 1928), 3-4.  
94 Bagehot, The English Constitution, 40. 
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unified nation. 
Patriotism involves conceptions of  unity and continuity. The coldest patriot 
recognizes himself  as part (by birth or adoption) of  an enduring ‘Whole’. He has 
feelings, however, vague, about its past. He entertains, however faintly, hopes and 
fears about its future. How can the machinery of  Cabinet Government either 
suggest or strengthen sentiments like these, even at their lowest level? It assumes 
their existence. It cannot perform its duties without them. But are they its natural 
product? Admittedly it works through Party at every stage---Party Cabinets in 
Downing Street, Party majorities in the House of  Commons, Party majorities in the 
constituencies. These cannot of  themselves give us unity because they are at once 
the product and the instrument of  partisan separations. They cannot give us 
continuity, because partisan majorities have ever proved unstable. They do the 
Nation’s work and on the whole do it well; but is it not at the cost of  deepening and 
hardening national divisions? If  therefore Bagehot’s cabman sought a shrine 
symbolic of  his country’s unity and continuity rather than of  its controversies and 
quarrels, evidently, it was to Buckingham Palace that he should have looked rather 
than to Downing Street.95 
  
Wider horizons open before us when we turn to the second of  the non-Party 
elements in our political system---I mean the Monarchy. British Kingship, like most 
other parts of  our ancient constitution, has a very modern side to it. Our King, in 
virtue of  his descent and of  his office, is the living representative of  our national 
history. So far from concealing the popular character of  our institutions (as Bagehot 
supposed) he brings it into prominence. He is not the leader of  a party, nor the 
representative of  a class; he is the chief  of  a nation,---the chief  indeed of  many 
nations. He is everybody’s King; by which I do not so much mean that he is the 
ruler of  the Empire, as that he is the common possession of  every part of  it. He is 
the predestined link uniting all the various communities, whatever be their status, of  
which the Empire is composed. The autonomous democracies, including among 
them Great Britain, the mother of  them all, each regard him as their constitutional 
head; and besides this he is the chief  of  all the diverse races in all the scattered 
territories, for whose welfare Great Britain, in the course of  generations, has made 
herself  responsible.96 
 
 
These expressions are extremely similar to the phrases Grew and Fellers used for the description of  
the tenno institution. In fact, Balfour himself  prepared a draft of  the Statute of  Westminster of  1931.  
 In sum, two independent lineages of  influence intersected coincidentally. 97 One lineage ran 
from Grew through Fellers to MacArthur. Bagehot and Balfour were at its origin. The other line was 
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obscure: from Bagehot, and Balfour through Langdon to Kades. Pool or Nelson also somehow used 
the term of  ‘”symbol.” These are the exogenous origins of  the symbolic tenno system.  
Indigenously, there was a solid basis for accepting the symbolic tenno institution. As the 
previous chapter has showed,98 the constitutional draft of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai (the Constitutional 
Research Group) had a great influence upon the work of  the Government Section. The draft offered 
an image of  the tenno without political power but with ritualistic and ceremonial functions. Although 
its conception of  the tenno institution is regarded as virtually symbolic, the draft of  the Kenpo 
Kenkyukai did not adopt the term of  “symbol” directly. There is testimony that the word of  “symbol” 
was used in discussions of  the group, although it has not been entirely confirmed yet. Iwabuchi 
Tatsuo, a constant participant in activities of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai, witnessed that Sugimori Kojiro 
and Murofushi Takanobu, its other important members, came up with the term “symbol” in a 
discussion of  the Kenkyukai.99 When he went to GHQ to submit the constitutional draft of  the 
Kenkyukai, Sugimori explained the contents of  the draft in a rather detailed way.100 In Iwabuchi’s 
account, the explanation Sugimori gave to an unidentifiable official of  GHQ included the term 
“symbol” about the tenno.101 
In addition, as Koseki Shoichi has clarified, 102  Kato Kanjyu, an important Socialist, 
published an article in which he placed the tenno as the symbol of  national harmony. Kato wrote the 
article on November 10, 1945, which it was about one month and a half  before the Kenpo Kenkyukai 
finished its draft of  the revised constitution and well before the Government Section started its work 
on constitutional writing. Kato with his wife Kato Shizue were highly influential over GHQ because 
they as leftist socialists had never cooperated with the ultra-nationalist rule in the pre- and mid-war 
                                                 
98 See Chapter 3 sections 2 & 3. 
99 See Kenpo Chosakai, Kenpo Seitei no Yurai (Tokyo, Jiji Tsushinsha, 1961), 252-253 (hereinafter cited as 
Chosakai, Yurai). 
100 See Suzuki Yasuzo, “Kenpo Kenkyukai no Kenposoan Kiso oyobi Kenpo Seiteikaigi Teisho,” Aichi Daigaku 
Hokei Ronshu, No. 28 (1959), 204. See also, Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 829-830. 
101 See Chosakai, Yurai, 253. 
102 See Koseki, Tanjyo, 68-70. 
 371 
period and had a long enthusiastic commitment to labor movement and women’s problems.103   
In view of  its historical development, the imperial institution should always exist as 
a ceremonial and ritual symbol of  the harmony of  the Japanese. The emperor 
system is a product of  history; the fact that it is not absolute is something to which 
history truly attests. That is to say, as one can see from history, the imperial 
institution was frequently exposed to crises. The reason why the emperor’s position 
was preserved in such cases was not because he was absolute. Rather, it was the 
common feeling of  the Japanese, in various periods of  their history, that it was in 
their mutual interest to avoid the disorder that would arise from the abolition of  the 
emperor as an historical institution, and they thought that by protecting the 
emperor they could maintain the unity of  the country.104  
 
 
Although the concrete flow of  influence is uncertain, Kato’s idea shows that there was an indigenous 
solid intellectual basis for accepting the symbolic tenno institution in postwar Japan. At the same 
time, as Koseki has accurately pointed out, Kato’s conception of  the symbolic tenno system was “a 
product of  history” and something beyond an institution that performs the state functions the 
postwar constitution has provided for.105 The conservative mind could easily gain in the symbolic 
tenno a footing for eroding new constitutional values.  
In fact, Satomi Kishio, who had written many books on the kokutai, the national polity or 
national character of  the state, from a conservative perspective, was regarded as the first person that 
defined the tenno as the symbol in Japan.106 Satomi understood the tenno as the supreme symbol of  
the society and state of  the Japanese people. In his interpretation, symbolism derived from the 
traditional and religious authority of  the tenno from ancient days.107 On January 28, 1946, Satomi 
proposed the revised constitution based upon the kokutai ideology that the tenno in one line unbroken 
for ages eternal should reign and govern the state.108 More liberally, Tsuda Sokichi, an eminent 
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historian on ancient Japan, argued for the symbolic tenno institution in January 1946, which was 
surely before the Government Section started to engage in framing the Japanese constitution.109  
Tsuda saw the significance of  the koshitsu (imperial house, or tenno house) in a democratized political 
life of  the state as “the center of  the national unity and the living symbol of  the national spirit”.110 
Too much emphasis upon the Japanese tradition or harmony of  the Japanese people could lead 
easily to the internal continuity theory, which tries to trivialize the revolutionary newness of  the 
postwar constitution. The symbolic tenno system could without doubt provide a logical foundation 
for Japanese exceptionalism. Therefore, it is pivotally important to ask what the symbol the tenno 
institution has come to present under the postwar constitution concretely stands for. What the new 
constitution has declared is more or less neutral: the tenno as “the symbol of  the State and of  the 
unity of  the people” derives “his position from the will of  the people with whom resides sovereign 
power.”111 Thus, a relationship between the principle of  popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno 
system has to be carefully explored in order to clarify the revolutionary features of  the postwar 
constitution. How was it conceptualized in the wake of  the establishment of  the constitution? The 
ultimate question comes down to what the symbolic tenno system really stands for. 
 
5. The Tenno Family and the New Constitution 
 At first, we examine how the tenno and his family recognized their own status under the 
postwar constitution. This new constitution placed a living person as the symbol of  the state and of  
the unity of  the Japanese people. Unlike a lifeless thing much as a crown or a flag, the tenno can act 
and indeed has his own will. Thus the tenno’s state of  mind is greatly relevant to the healthy 
operation of  the postwar constitutional regime.  
In reality, however, it seemed that Tenno Showa (Hirohito) had never understood that he no 
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longer held and exercised the sovereign power and found himself  the symbol now. Even under the 
new constitutional regime, he still wanted cabinet members to report themselves to him. Because the 
Katayama and Ashida cabinets, the first and second under the postwar constitution, reported to him 
on as few occasions as possible, the tenno expressed his dissatisfaction to Ashida Hitoshi, minister of  
foreign affairs in the Katayama cabinet.112 On the other hand, the second Yoshida cabinet, which 
started in October 1948, ceased to work for “symbolizing” the tenno and made every effort to revive 
the tenno institution under the Meiji Constitution.113 Yoshida and his cabinet members often reported 
to the tenno about governmental matters.114 Further, the tenno attempted to play an active role in 
foreign affairs without the advice and approval of  the cabinet. The tenno positively supported 
cooperation policy toward the United States. On May 6, 1947, just after the new constitution became 
effective, the tenno visited General MacArthur to have their fourth meeting. The tenno expressed his 
anxiety over the thorough disarmament policy the new constitution had adopted and asked 
MacArthur to support for the realization of  an initiative on the part of  the United States to 
guarantee the national security of  Japan.115 In July of  the same year, further, the tenno through his 
aide Terasaki Hideshige proposed to the United States government that in order to keep the national 
security of  Japan after a peace treaty, the United States should continue military occupation of  the 
Ryukyu Islands including Okinawa in the form of  long term lease.116 Such an action would have 
been unconstitutional even in the Meiji constitutional system because although the tenno had the 
diplomatic prerogative, the advice of  a minister of  state was understood as necessary for his exercise 
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of the prerogative.117 And it would have been all the more unconstitutional for a symbolic tenno 
without any governmental power.     
In respect of  domestic politics, for example, when Matsuoka Komakichi, the speaker of  the 
House of  Representatives, reported to him the designation of  Katayama Tetsu as the first prime 
minister under the new constitution, the tenno asked questions about Katayama and said that he 
believed Katayama was weak.118 When Ashida became the prime minister succeeding Katayama, the 
tenno told him that he should take action against the communist party and asked what influence the 
Ashida cabinet had when it had members from the left faction of  the Socialist Party.119 The tenno was 
seriously worried about leftist forces in politics. Conversely, he conveyed a message to John Dulles 
that he wanted GHQ to mitigate purges because the purged were mostly politicians and servicemen 
who supported him during the pre- and mid-war period.120 
Under the new constitution, the tenno should have been deprived of  all powers related to 
government. The actions the tenno took without any doubt deviated from the constitutional norm. 
The tenno misunderstood, believing that he continued to hold and exert sovereign power, and never 
tried to become the symbolic tenno.121  
If  the cabinet had often reported to him and followed his suggestions, conversely, the tenno 
should have not necessarily acted directly. This means that whether he liked it or not, the political 
structure had been to a significant degree transformed from a system in which the tenno was essential 
to a system in which the tenno is a mere decoration. The tenno had been gradually eliminated from 
the substantial decision-making process and that was why he strongly wanted cabinet members to 
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report to him. While conservatives have always attempted to maximize the authority of  the tenno, 
they have never succeeded in making the tenno sovereign again. 
Nonetheless, it was also true that the position of  the symbolic tenno was occupied by the 
same person who was sovereign and a living god only shortly before. We cannot ignore the 
perceptional, psychological, and emotional factors of  the people. Constitutional reason might 
sometimes give way to these factors. When he resigned as prime minister on February 10, 1948, 
Katayama reported his resignation to the tenno, which incurred GHQ’s harsh reaction.122 GHQ 
fiercely criticized the bureaucratic manner of  politicking, which undermined the principle of  popular 
sovereignty the new constitution had declared. GHQ’s intervention could barely set a new political 
practice in the right direction. Indeed, the tenno system persistently restrained people from thinking 
freely.  
However, we can also perceive a new phenomenon within the tenno family. An 
unprecedented incident indeed occurred when the tenno’s youngest brother, Prince Mikasa, publicly 
criticized the manner in which the government held the celebratory ceremony for the postwar 
constitution that newly came into effect on May 3, 1947. His story first appeared in a small column 
of  the Asahi Shinbun on May 6123 and he himself  contributed an essay to the Teikoku Daigaku Shinbun 
(Imperial University Newspaper) two days later because he was a special student at the graduate school 
of  the Tokyo Imperial University.124 The prince was absent from the ceremony of  May 3 because of  
illness. About ten days before, he wrote, he received an invitation letter to the ceremony. He 
wondered why the kogo (empress) and his wife were not invited. By juxtaposing the Japanese custom 
with that of  the British royal family, the prince conjectured this inferior treatment of  female tenno 
house members might be related to the extremely slow advancement of  women in society. When he 
listened to the ceremony on the radio, he found too many keigo (honorific words) used for the tenno 
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house. To build a new culture state, he believed, simplification and democratization of  the Japanese 
language should come first and the words for the tenno house could surely not be exceptional. Then 
the prince turned to the ceremony itself. He did not agree with Prime Minister Yoshida leading 
participants in calling out “Tenno Heika Banzai!(Long Live the Emperor!)” three times. If  it had been 
a ceremony for celebrating the tenno’s birthday, such an act would have been appropriate. But, in the 
light of  the sprit of  the new constitution, the tenno as the supreme public servant should have led the 
participants in calling out “Zen Nihon Kokumin Banzai! (Long Live All the Japanese People!).” The 
tenno now gave up his sovereign power over the people and was no longer a living god. Further, in 
favor of  Japan’s rebirth as a peace-loving country, the tenno could have led citizens to call out “Sekai 
Zen Jinrui Banzai! (Long Live All the Peoples of  the World!).” The prince stated that progressive 
provisions of  the new constitution had made clear the obsoleteness of  its operators. At the end of  his 
essay, the prince pointed out that democratization of  the tenno house was both a first step in the 
democratization of  Japan and its last step.125  
Whatever the prince might have really intended, it was unprecedented that a member of  the 
tenno house himself  argued for democratization of  the family in a public arena. This episode well 
shows that the principle of  popular sovereignty with the symbolic tenno institution the postwar 
constitution has ordained includes an intrinsic tension. And the tension was actually conceptualized 
and publicly expressed. The question to be asked is what the latter really stands for and how it is 
related to the principle of  popular sovereignty. So now we turn our attention to the 
conceptualization of  the tenno institution in postwar Japan.  
   
6. The Tradition and Intellectuals: Tsuda Sokichi and Watsuji Tetsuro 
 The announcement of  the government draft of  the revised constitution, which proposed the 
symbolic tenno system, put a stop to the unprecedented heated discussion over the tenno and its 
                                                 
125 See Mikasanomiya Takahito, “Shinkenpo shikou kinen shikiten no hini omou (Reflections on the Day of 
Celebratory Ceremony for Effectiveness of  the New Constitution),” Teikoku Daigaku Shinbun, No. 1025, May 8, 
1947.  
 377 
institution after defeat in the war.126 When the Constitution of  Japan was established, however, what 
was clear was that on the one hand, the Japanese people was now sovereign but on the other, the 
tenno also remained as an institution. The people and the tenno are both constitutional organs under 
the postwar constitutional system. The relationship between the two has been constitutionally 
provided in a way that the tenno “shall be the symbol of  the State and of  the unity of  the people, 
deriving his position from the will of  the people with whom resides sovereign power.”127 Besides that, 
however, there was nothing clear about the relationship in the real social and political context.  
The postwar constitution has undoubtedly weakened the powers the tenno had had under 
the Meiji constitutional regime. Unlike the draft of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai (Constitutional Research 
Group),128 however, the postwar constitution has provided the tenno as a not entirely ceremonial and 
ritualistic institution. The tenno is supposed to perform the state affairs enumerated in the 
constitution including affairs political in nature such as dissolution of  the House of  
Representatives.129 Thus a question should be asked how different the symbolic tenno is from the 
tenno in the Meiji Constitution. 
 Under the unstable situation around the tenno system in the wake of  the defeat, the 
theorization of  the symbolic tenno was promoted by liberals in the old era, not by ultra-nationalists 
or advocates for the kokutai. Tsuda Sokichi, a professor of  Japanese history at Waseda University 
and a part time lecturer at the faculty of  law, the Tokyo Imperial University, was one of  the most 
eminent theorists. He was a distinguished scholar of  ancient Japanese history. His positivist 
                                                 
126 The discussions over the tenno and its institution in the newspapers were concentrated in the period from 
October 1945 and March 1946, when the government draft revealed its intention to retain the tenno system as 
the symbol. Since then the discussions had rapidly become sluggish. Further, it is noteworthy that GHQ 
censored the media at that time to carry out their occupation policy more smoothly. See Ishida Takeshi, 
“Sengo no tennosei (The Tenno System in the Postwar Era),” Sengo nihon no seijitaisei (The Political Regime of  
Postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1961), 7-59; Takeyama Akiko, “Amerika senryoki masu media no ‘tennosei 
rongi’ (‘The Discussions on the Tenno System’ in the Mass Media during the American Occupation),” 
Mediashi kenkyu (Studies of  History of  the Media ), No. 5 (1996), 115-144. See also, Ikeuchi Hajime & Okazaki 
Keiko, “Seiryokikan niokeru nihon shinbun no suko (Tendencies of  Japanese Newspapers during the 
Occupation),” Tokyo Daigaku Shinbun Kenkyusho Kiyo, No. 5 (1956), 109-131. 
127 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 1. 
128 For the draft of  the Constitutional Research Group, see Chapter 3 section 2. 
129 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 7 (iii). 
 378 
approach, which rejected the myth of  the national foundation, derived from his subjective intention 
to promote the safety of  the tenno house by separating it from the mysterious pre-modern ideology. 
Like Minobe, Tsuda became a victim of  a fanatical right-wing assault. He had never taken a 
compromising position about his study. He was accused of  profanation of  the dignity of  the tenno 
house in the Publishing Law and convicted in a Tokyo district court in 1942.130 And he was forced to 
resign from his professorship at Waseda. Thus people, regardless of  their ideological positions, were 
very interested in what Tsuda would say after liberation from the suppression of  academic activities 
during the war. By showing how the idea of  a line unbroken for ages eternal was born and had 
developed, he argued for a symbolic tenno institution in his famous and controversial essay of  1946 
before the government draft of  the revised constitution was announced.131   
Tsuda mentioned five points of  the birth of  the idea of  one line unbroken for ages eternal. 
First, the tenno house was not an exogenous conqueror but an endogenous power maximizer, thus 
there were very few people who came into antagonism with the tenno house. The tenno ruled local 
powerful clans, not common people. Second, there were few wars against foreign peoples, which 
usually made monarchy unstable and then gave an opportunity to change a family line of  monarchy. 
Third, the tenno had nothing to do as the head of  the state in ancient times. Thus the tenno did not 
directly govern the nation. While the tenno bore relation to political matters in his name, senior 
statesmen actually made and executed political decisions. Fourth, the tenno also had religious 
authority and assumed religious tasks. The tenno prayed for the common people. The tenno was 
called a living god only because he or she ideologically or nominally governed the state in the 
capacity of  a god. In other words, living god was the name of  the status of  the tenno as a political 
monarch. The tenno had never been regarded as a god, as an object of  worship. Fifth and finally, the 
tenno also held a leading position in culture. The tenno house first accepted and made most use of  an 
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advanced culture, when it was introduced from China though the Korean peninsula to Japan. In sum, 
the tenno house was affectionate and respectable for senior statesmen and local powerful clans and 
they could maintain their lives and status through being dependent upon the tenno house.132  
           The continuity of  the tenno house as a fact, Tsuda added, brought about a conviction that it 
would last forever. The eternality of  the tenno house, in Tsuda’s explanation, lies in the fact that the 
tenno did nothing wrong because he or she did not directly govern the state. This is a negative reason. 
Positively, however, the tenno house possessed an unchallenged spiritual authority. Although those 
who held the real powers of  a political monarch changed from aristocrats to militants, they had 
always been under the tenno house, the existence of  which had never suffered from social turbulence. 
Tsuda pointed out that this dual organizational system was incomparable in the world. In Tsuda’s 
understanding, spiritual authority did not mean religious authority separated from political power 
but the tenno from the beginning to the end held authority as a political governor of  Japan. His 
authority was spiritual to the extent that he did not govern the state by himself. The authority the 
tenno held was recognized in relation to political power holders, either aristocrats or soldiers, not to 
the common people.133  
           From Tsuda’s perspective, therefore, the Meiji constitutional regime was deviant from the 
traditional Japanese dualism. The central meaning of  the Meiji Restoration was a political reform to 
realize the direct governance on the part of  the tenno. The Meiji Constitution was established based 
upon a European idea that a monarch and the people are in conflict with each other. Thus, while the 
constitutional system magnified the tenno’s power over the people, it imposed restraint upon the 
political activities of  the people. In Tsuda’s view, however, that kind of  governmental system was 
foreign to the Japanese tradition that the tenno house was an object of  affection and respect by the 
people. On the one hand, Tsuda criticized the distortion of  the tenno’s will by fanatical military clans 
and bureaucrats and rejected the forced mysterious idea of  the kokutai as a false ideology. On the 
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other, however, he also criticized opponents of  the tenno institution because they misunderstood the 
history of  the tenno house. Both sides of  the tenno system, in his opinion, failed to recognize that the 
essence of  the tenno was compatible with democracy. In Japanese history, the tenno house and the 
people had never been antagonistic to each other. If  democracy meant that the people should bear 
their own responsibility for the practice of  national politics, it was reconciled to the tenno system 
because the tenno lay within, not outside, the people and the tenno governed, which was based upon 
the popular will embodied by himself. From the people’s side, democracy could be in concord with 
the tenno system when the people promoted democracy completely. Tsuda’s reasoning reached a 
point similar to what the Constitution of  Japan declared several months later.134 “The significance of  
the existence of  the imperial house consists in the center of  the unity of  the people and the living 
symbol of  the national spirit.”135 
As mentioned above, Tsuda was a victim of  the ultra-nationalistic movement which was 
deeply connected to the narrow conception of  the tenno institution. Thus what he said about the 
tenno institution and Japanese history attracted close public attention after the defeat in the war. In 
the new era, Tsuda presented an unchanged true image of  the tenno as “the living symbol of  the 
national spirit.” No matter what he might personally intend, because of  his academic reputation, his 
essay provided a solid theoretical base for the unstable tenno institution at that time. He liberated the 
tenno institution from the narrow idea of  the kokutai related to the fanatic movement. From his point 
of  view, the Constitution of  Japan is nothing revolutionary, but it expresses merely the core of  
Japanese tradition of  a line unbroken for ages eternal. From his logic, the postwar constitution is 
supposed to guarantee a return to the normalcy. In fact, Tsuda published another essay in 1952 to 
the effect that the authentic authority of  the tenno had been clarified by Articles 1 through 4 of  the 
new constitution and that has assured the eternality of  the throne.136 
                                                 
134 Tsuda wrote this essay in January 1946. It was at least more than one month before the government 
officially announced its constitutional draft including the symbolic emperor system.  
135 Tsuda, “Kenkoku no jijyo,” 140.  
136 See Tsuda Sokichi, “Nihon no koshitsu (The Tenno Household of  Japan),” Chuo Koron, July 1952, reprinted 
 381 
Watsuji Tesuro played a similar role to Tsuda. Watsuji was a professor of  ethics at the 
Tokyo Imperial University and a moderate liberal in the pre- and mid- war period. Although the 
right wing criticized him as a liberal, he was never victimized as Minobe and Tsuda were. Watsuji 
wrote an essay on the nature of  the tenno’s governance in November 1945.137 He argued that the 
tradition of  the tenno’s governance in Japan had no essential relation to feudalism from the medieval 
period and doctrines of  Shintoism. In Watsuji’s explanation, loyalty was characteristic of  a feudal 
relation between master and servant. Loyalty was the morality of  samurai, warriors. The relationship 
between the tenno and the people was originally characterized as makoto, purity or honesty. It was not 
regarded as a master and servant relation.138 The Meiji constitutional system only halfway overcame 
feudalism. Complicated relations of  human morality were mistakenly simplified as a family view of  
the state. Thus, the idea of  harmony of  loyalty and filial piety should not be connected to the 
tradition of  the tenno’s governance.139 When the tenno began to govern the state in the age of  the gods, 
there were no ultimate god and doctrinal ideas. Matsurigoto, politics, meant matsurigoto, feasts. Shinto 
was much later organized, on the one hand, to cope with Buddhism as a doctrinal religion and, on 
the other, to become the religion for supporting the tradition of  the tenno’s governance. However, 
Watsuji asserted, the Meiji constitutional system protected freedom of  religion and thus the 
establishment of  Shintoism should not have been an essential element of  the tenno’s governance. 
Watsuji defended the tenno’s rule from the fanatic Shintoist movement, which was naturally 
unrelated to the tenno’s authority to govern the state.140 At the conclusion of  his essay, Watsuji made 
clear his intention to save the tenno institution by arguing that the recent narrow understanding of  
feudalism and Shintoism should not damage the tradition of  the tenno’s governance. 
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Watsuji also contended that popular sovereignty did not necessarily conflict with the tenno 
system. Popular sovereignty did not mean that individual people were sovereign but that the will of  
harmony of  the people was the source of  ultimate power in the nation. In his view, what best 
expressed the general will of  the people was nothing but the tenno. In Japanese history, the people 
had recognized the tenno alone as the expression of  their general will. Watsuji appreciated the 
underlying strength of  what had existed for an extremely long time.141 Watsuji understood a nation 
as a culture community sharing the same language, custom, history, and belief  and also a group of  
members of  a state in a political sense. Thus the will of  the people was one general will, not the 
aggregated wills of  individuals. The living entirety of  one group was invisible and only individuals 
could be visible. In Watsuji’s view, a question of  by what the living entirety or the general will of  the 
people was expressed was in essence a question of  how the living entirety which could not be an 
object and was invisible was made an object and visible. He answered himself  that the living entirety 
had been expressed in the tenno in Japan.142 
 By adopting the symbolic tenno institution, in Watsuji’s understanding, the Constitution of  
Japan has provided that the tenno shall be expressive of  the general will of  the people. The symbolic 
tenno institution was chosen by the freely expressed will of  the people as it had been the case 
throughout Japanese history. It was significant that the tenno even with no real political power had 
held authority, which had been indispensable for persons with real political power. That was because 
the tenno had been the expresser of  the entirety of  the people. Watsuji pointed out as evidence of  the 
tenno expressive of  the unity of  the people that there had been many poems and novels in popular 
culture on the tenno throughout history, although it was a very weak argument because they did not 
directly support the tenno’s position as the sole expresser of  the living entirety of  the people. They 
might at the best show that people had recognized or not forgotten the existence of  the tenno even 
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without real political power.143 
In this way, Watsuji attempted to defend the symbolic tenno system as a historically 
appropriate type of  the tenno institution. His intention became clearer when Watsuji asked Sasaki 
Soichi for instructions on changing the kokutai. Sasaki, an eminent professor of  constitutional law, 
explicitly argued that the Constitution of  Japan had changed the kokutai from tenno sovereignty to 
popular sovereignty. As we have already discussed,144 Kanamori Tokujiro, the minister of  state in 
charge of  the constitutional problem in the first Yoshida cabinet, repeated that the new constitution 
would never change the kokutai in a moral sense. In his explanation, the tenno would remain as 
akogare no mato (the center of  national adoration) even under the new constitution. Sasaki’s essay of  
1946 tried to clarify the significance of  the constitutional change.145 According to Sasaki, the kokutai 
as a character of  a state from a political point of  view was determined by the location of  sovereignty 
in the state. Under the Meiji constitutional regime, the tenno held sovereign power based upon the 
fact of  one line unbroken for ages eternal. However, the new constitution would change that kokutai 
because the tenno would be the symbol of  the unity of  the people, who would become the holder of  
ultimate power over political affairs.146 Sasaki straightforwardly acknowledged that the constitutional 
change would alter the kokutai. He further added that although the alternation of  the kokutai in the 
political sense would not be directly connected to a change of  the kokutai as a character of  a state 
from an ethical and spiritual point of  view, the kokutai in a spiritual sense might change in the long 
run because the kokutai in both senses had influenced each other in Japan.147  
Like Minobe,148 Sasaki was also a liberal constitutional theorist in the old era but could not 
draw a ground design for the new era. Sasaki firmly believed that the principle that the tenno held 
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sovereign power would be maintained even in the new era.149 In fact, Sasaki as a member of  the 
House of  Peers had argued against the Constitution of  Japan. He objected to the proposed change in 
the principle of  the tenno sovereignty as the fundamental character of  Japan. 150  Once the 
Constitution of  Japan was established, however, Sasaki tried to see the situation more directly than 
Minobe.151 He explicitly argued that the kokutai had changed.152      
Watsuji could not agree with Sasaki. 153  First of  all, Watsuji argued, classification of  
governmental forms by the location of  sovereignty had been traditionally called the seitai. As Sasaki 
said, the concept of  the kokutai was complicated and ambiguous and then often misused. Thus 
Watsuji suggested that it should be better not to use the term of  kokutai when one discussed 
classification of  forms of  government. It was well argued that the recent change from the Meiji 
Constitution to the Constitution of  Japan would alter only the seitai in Japan.154  
To Watsuji, furthermore, the change of  the kokutai in the political sense seemed trivial 
because the tenno’s supervision of  sovereignty had been merely exceptional in the long tradition of  
Japan.155 In his view, the entirety of  the Japanese people had been expressed by the very tenno. From 
the beginning of  Japanese history, the tenno was the symbol of  the unity of  the group. The tenno 
made the entirety of  the Japanese people an objective as the symbol. If  legal study had no idea about 
the symbol, Watsuji suggested that it could learn from philosophy, which had long treated problems 
of  symbolism. Because he understood the significance of  symbolism in the essence of  the tenno, the 
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tenno that Article 1 of  the Constitution of  Japan provided for should have more superintendent 
sovereign power than the tennos in the Muromachi and Edo periods. In Watsuji’s view, the new 
constitution clarified that the tenno should be the symbol of  the sovereign will of  the people.156 He 
reasoned that if  sovereignty resided in the general will of  the people and the tenno should be the 
symbol of  the unity of  the people, then the tenno should be nothing but the symbol of  sovereignty. 
Watsuji emphasized that the essence of  the tenno lay in the symbol of  the unity of  the Japanese 
people but it was not necessarily related to the state. Even when Japan lost unity as the state, the 
tenno had continued to retain its status. Thus, what the tenno had symbolized was the popular unity 
of  culture, not of  politics. To Watsuji, the tradition of  respect for the tenno which had existed 
throughout the history of  Japan was nothing other than self-recognition of  the unity of  the people as 
a cultural community.157 Although the unity of  the state and that of  the people were not the same, 
many people did not differentiate the two and directly connected the tradition of  respect for the tenno 
to the state. This was the concept of  the kokutai in the spiritual and ethical sense. Watsuji cautiously 
refused to confuse the feudalistic master-servant relationship with the idea of  respecting the tenno 
because such a confused idea of  the kokutai was what the recent dictatorship resorted to.158  
We should keep in mind the background that the governing elite was at the end of  the war 
desperate to retain their cherished kokutai, the principle that the tenno in one line unbroken for ages 
eternal governed Japan as sovereign.159 In the process of  making the postwar constitution, their 
foremost concern gradually shifted to the safety of  the tenno house. Although the symbolic tenno 
system did not necessarily conform to the core idea of  the kokutai, it anyway retained the tenno 
institution as a center of  the stage in a sense and thus the elites could console themselves with the 
ambiguous idea of  the kokutai. The Sasaki-Watsuji controversy was important not only because they 
were eminent scholars but also because it showed that a debate over the tenno institution could be 
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carried out in a rational way under the postwar constitutional regime.160 We may recall the tenno 
organ theory controversy between Uesugi and Minobe, in which Uesugi could often appeal to the 
mysterious idea of  the kokutai deeply connected to labeling rebellion. The concept of  the kokutai 
functioned as a litmus test for loyalty to the tenno in the Meiji constitutional regime. Thus people 
could not openly object to it and when someone questioned their stance toward the kokutai, they had 
to defend themselves by proving that they supported the concept.161 The Sasaki-Watsuji debate thus 
showed a possibility of  rationalization of  politics in postwar Japan.  
Now the postwar constitution declared popular sovereignty, conversations on constitutional 
values should not be confined to narrow constitutional scholarship, which could not make a 
meaningful contribution to constituting a new political order in the postwar era. The controversy 
was carried out beyond difference of  disciplines. Many constitutional scholars have commented that 
this controversy was not productive because it lacked agreements on basic concepts, which derived 
from disciplinary differences. 162  However, if  disciplines matter, under the principle of  popular 
sovereignty, constitutional scholarship should have assumed extra responsibility to explain clearly its 
own scholarly contents to common citizens. The constitution was no longer an instrument of  the 
elite for ruling the people. The prewar constitutional scholarship had unfortunately presented that 
interpretive technicality might lose the perspective appropriate for the day.163 The constitution was 
open to challenges by common citizens, no matter what they might think of  it.164  
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In any event, the Sasaki-Watsuji controversy made it clear that there was no consensus 
among old liberals.165 While some of  them, even reluctantly, tried to take the postwar constitution 
seriously, others attempted to trivialize its significance. Watsuji’s argument surely had an effect of  
mitigating the impact of  change in the kokutai. Its emphasis upon the fact that the tenno had been the 
symbol of  the unity of  the cultural community of  Japan has not only offered internal continuity 
advocating a solid theoretical foundation but also diminished the universalistic values of  the new 
constitution.   
 
7. The Controversy between the August Revolution and Nomos Sovereignty and Beyond 
 Another important debate over the nature of  the postwar constitution occurred between 1946 
and 1949. This time two prominent legal professors exchanged ideas about a relationship between 
popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno institution, both of  which had been newly established in 
the postwar constitution. As the Sasaki-Watsuji debate suggested, public discourse on the new 
constitution in postwar Japan can be described as a conflict between two ideas: continuity and 
discontinuity. 166  It depended upon how people evaluated the revolutionary character of  the 
Constitution of  1946. Whereas conservatives have attempted to trivialize its newness, liberals have 
argued for expanding democratic promise in the postwar Constitution. The Miyasawa-Odaka 
controversy more clearly showed that the dichotomy was relevant in the wake of  the wartime defeat. 
However, it also indicated that the Japanese people had started a new constitutional life, whether 
they willingly recognize it or reluctantly ignore it.  
The beginning of  the controversy lay in an important question of  how to understand the 
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relationship between the two Constitutions. The Constitution of  Japan was born as an entire revision 
of  the Meiji Constitution. However, this procedure, a revision pursuant to the Meiji Constitution, 
contradicts the content of  the postwar constitution. 167  The tenno formally took the initiative in 
amending the Meiji Constitution, which had been replaced by the Constitution of  Japan that 
declared the Japanese people as having established this constitution.168 
 If  we follow a thesis whereby there is no limitation on amending a constitution, we would 
have no difficulty in justifying the process in which the Constitution of  Japan was established. Under 
this thesis of  legal positivism, the transformation from tenno sovereignty to popular sovereignty 
would be legitimate simply by following the required procedure.169 The Constitution of  Japan is a 
kintei kenpo (a constitution established by the tenno).170 However, this thesis was and has been in an 
extreme minority among Japanese constitutional scholars. Almost all constitutionalists of  the day 
accepted the theory that no constitutional amendment could change the kokutai, because they 
assumed that the fundamentals of  Japanese government had been set forth by divine will and that 
they would last forever.171 If  we do not accept the strict legal positivism, therefore, we should take 
seriously the legal and political discrepancy in substance between the two constitutions. 
 The establishment of  the Constitution of  Japan, therefore, was based upon something 
different from mere legality. So revolution came to be a crucial issue. As discussed earlier,172 Minobe 
Tatsukichi recognized that there was a bloodless revolution when the Japanese government accepted 
the Potsdam Declaration.173 Actually, the revolution theory was provided by his student, Miyasawa 
Toshiyoshi. Miyasawa, a professor of  constitutional law at the Tokyo Imperial University, played an 
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important role in the Matsumoto Committee.174 He developed “the August Revolution Thesis” in the 
spring of  1946.175 
 When he saw the government draft of  the revised constitution, Miyasawa recognized that 
something had fundamentally changed. While the Meiji Constitution adopted the principle that the 
tenno should hold and exercise sovereign power based upon divine will, the Constitution of  Japan 
would declare the principle of  popular sovereignty. He rejected arguments that popular sovereignty 
did not necessarily conflict with the existing fundamental principle of  politics and that the basic 
principle of  Japanese politics was essentially the principle of  popular sovereignty. In Miyasawa’s 
view, the principle of  popular sovereignty would require that even the authority of  the tenno be 
founded upon the will of  the people. The requirement was explicitly in discord with the divine tenno 
system.176 
 Then Miyasawa raised the procedural issue. The constitution of  Japan would be an illegal 
product of  amendment of  the Meiji Constitution because the fundamental principles of  the 
constitution were understood as unchangeable and such a revision regarded as logically suicidal and 
legally impossible. The Constitution of  Japan, which changed the kokutai, the notion that sovereignty 
resided in the tenno, based upon divine will, in fact exceeded the amendment power provided by 
Article 73 of  the Meiji Constitution.177 He suggested that a different reasoning must have worked.  
Miyasawa therefore argued that the acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration brought a 
revolution without blood to Japan. Otherwise the transformation of  sovereignty from the tenno to the 
people could not be explained in a rational way. Miyasawa pointed out that the basis of  adopting the 
new constitution should be found in the constitutional change brought about by Japan’s surrender, 
which had already established the principle of  popular sovereignty in spite of, or in violation of, the 
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Meiji Constitution. Miyasawa understood the nature of  this change as a revolution because even the 
tenno’s will could not legally change the essence of  the Japanese constitutional regime. The tenno 
himself  was restricted in the idea of  one line unbroken for ages eternal. The new constitution could 
be founded upon popular sovereignty only because “the August Revolution” had already discarded 
the divine right to rule of  the tenno and replaced it with popular sovereignty in Japan.178 The tenno’s 
declaration of  himself  as a human on January 1, 1946 could make sense only on the premise of  the 
August Revolution.179  
 Miyasawa recognized that it might have been more in order if  the Constitution of  Japan had 
been adopted by a popularly elected constitutional convention rather than through the process 
provided in Article 73 of  the Meiji Constitution. In his view, however, Japan’s acceptance of  the 
Potsdam Declaration did not abolish the whole Meiji Constitution, but simply substantially modified 
it, as long as the old provisions were in conflict with the principle of  popular sovereignty. Thus, the 
new Constitution was legally established by following only the procedure provided in Article 73 that 
was still valid. Historical continuity between the two Constitutions was favored, in terms of  
procedural efficiency.180 As a result, the Constitution of  Japan should be referred to as the new 
constitution, not as the amended constitution.181 
 While Miyasawa represented those who tried to see discontinuity in the postwar Japanese 
constitutional framework, there was another school of  thought. As we have just discussed above,182 
Watsuji Tetsuro was one of  the most prominent scholars who belonged to this school. Here we take 
another example from legal scholars. Odaka Tomo, a professor of  jurisprudence at the University of  
Tokyo, argued that although the new constitution had changed the kokutai in a legal form, continuity 
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could be found between the two constitutions in a national ideal. Both tenno sovereignty and popular 
sovereignty were an expression of  the idea of  righteous politics. Namely, these two principles in 
governance were parts of  the idea of  “nomos sovereignty.”183  
Odaka further developed his idea of  nomos sovereignty as a book in October 1947.184 He 
recognized that the new constitution would change the kokutai as the tenno’s governance. He even 
appreciated that the principle of  popular sovereignty had been newly adopted by the postwar 
constitution because it would express the people’s attitude of  positive and responsible commitment 
to politics. The promotion of  their political awareness, the guidance of  legislation by deliberated 
public opinions, and constant political criticism through free speech would gradually make the idea 
of  popular sovereignty a substantial principle of  politics. In this sense, Odaka highly valued the fact 
that the new constitution had changed an expressive form of  the fundamental principle of  politics 
from tenno governance to popular sovereignty.185 However, here he cautiously avoided the term of  
tenno sovereignty not to juxtapose it with popular sovereignty.186 The main purpose of  his argument 
lay in making a search for a possibility of  connecting popular sovereignty and the tenno system 
through the living national spirit.187 He sought a harmony between the two systems apparently 
incompatible by asking a question different from that of  who is the ultimate power holder in the state. 
To Odaka, the most urgent problem of  the day was to reconsider the concept of  sovereignty 
that had been understood as absolute and to recast it under the ideal of  law rather than to seek the 
location of  sovereignty in the state: monarch or the people.188 Criticizing the position that power is 
above law, he defended another position that any political power must be subject to law as justice. 
                                                 
183 Odaka Tomo, “Kokuminshuken to tennosei (Popular Sovereignty and the Tenno System),” Kokkagakkai, 
ed., Shinkenpo no kenkyu, 18-43. 
184 Odaka Tomo, Kokuminshuken to tennosei (Popular Sovereignty and the Tenno System) (Tokyo: Kunitachi Shoin, 
1947). 
185 Odaka, Kokuminshuken to tennosei, 202. 
186 See Miyasawa’s criticism. Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, “Kokuminshuken to tennosei to nitsuiteno obegaki (A 
Note on Popular Sovereignty and the Tenno System),” Kokka Gakkai Zaashi, vol. 62, no. 6, 1948, Kenpo no genri, 
281-317, 299-300 (hereinafter cited as Miyasawa, “Oboegaki,” Kenpo no genri). 
187 See Odaka, Kokuminshuken to tennosei, preface, 2. 
188 Odaka, Kokuminshuken to tennosei, 58. 
 392 
Then Odaka argued that no kind of  supreme power could breach law and that nomos as the 
fundamental principle of  law should be the king of  kings. If  supreme authority in a state was called 
sovereignty, it was nomos, not the monarch or the people that held sovereignty. Because the idea of  
sovereignty as naked power was anachronistic, to Odaka, the idea of  nomos sovereignty should be 
established in the new era.189 He understood the standard of  the rightness of  law as a realization of  
the equal welfare of  all people. Because equality was a contested concept, in his view, the welfare of  
the whole people should be pursued by constant discussion of  the rightness of  law. This was what 
his popular sovereignty required.190 
How did Odaka understand popular sovereignty in his thesis of  nomos sovereignty? In the 
principle of  popular sovereignty, the general will of  the people is supreme. To him, that was always 
right as the legal ideal because that aimed to realize the public interest and common welfare. To 
regard the general will of  the people that was always right as the supreme authority of  politics above 
all real wills for power, the principle of  popular sovereignty accepted nomos sovereignty.191 The next 
problem was how to recognize “the general will of  the people that was always right.” Rejecting the 
leader principle that the will of  a great leader was regarded as the general will of  the people, Odaka 
admitted that majority rule was the solid method to express in the real will for power “the general 
will of  the people that was always right.” A serious problem about majority rule for him was, 
however, that there was no guarantee that what was decided by a majority was always right. The 
essence of  the principle of  popular sovereignty was, in his interpretation, that the ideal of  the 
righteous legislative will, which people could realize only approximately, no matter how hard they 
might try, was highly raised as the general will of  the people.192  
Then how did Odaka reconcile the principle of  popular sovereignty with the tenno system? 
It was a superficial view to Odaka that the tenno-centered national polity of  Japan and popular 
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sovereignty were as irreconcilable as oil and water. Rather, popular sovereignty and governance of  
the tenno had something in common. On the one hand, the principle of  popular sovereignty did not 
mean what the people could do as real politics whatever they wished but represented an ideal that 
the invariably righteous general will of  the people must be the supreme policy of  politics. On the 
other hand, rule by the tenno did not mean that the tenno’s real will had made final decisions on 
political affairs but meant that the tenno’s will that was always righteous should have been a model of  
politics. Both the tenno’s rule and popular sovereignty thus came down to the acceptance of  nomos 
sovereignty.193  
Odaka tried to defend the tenno system by appealing to history. Japan had had a long 
tradition of  the tenno’s governance but in reality it had taken different sorts of  forms. That was 
irrelevant to the direct exertion of  sovereign power on the part of  the tenno. The eternal governance 
of  the tenno, in his understanding, meant the ideal of  politics of  Japan.194 No matter what forms the 
tenno’s governance might take, furthermore, the tenno had been adored by the Japanese people 
throughout its tradition. In Odaka’s view, the continuous profound respect for the tenno of  the people 
could be understood only as the ideal of  invariably righteous governance separated from actual 
politics. Indeed, “a line unbroken for ages eternal”195 was nothing other than an ideal. This provision 
well expressed an admiration for eternality that never exists in the human world. In fact, he argued, 
the tenno reigned but did not govern even during most of  the period under the Meiji Constitution. 
Thus, the Japanese tradition showed that the tenno had constantly embodied the invariably righteous 
ideal of  politics.196 
Odaka therefore concluded that in Japanese history the rule of  nomos had been consistent. 
While the Meiji Constitution had declared the tenno’s governance, one of  the two closely tied 
elements of  the same ideal, the new constitution has adopted an expressive form of  popular 
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sovereignty when it grasped the ideal of  nomos sovereignty.  
According to the Japanese tradition, the tenno had embodied “the ideal of  invariably 
righteous politics”. Purification of  the tenno’s status as such from all its superfluous 
mixture in real politics leads to the symbolic tenno system. The tenno as symbol 
represents the invisible people as a whole in a visible way when he appoints a prime 
minister and a chief  justice of  the Supreme Court and promulgates the Constitution as 
amended and statutes. These acts of  the tenno make decisions by majority rule 
understood as acts of  the people as a whole. These acts give meaning to decisions of  a 
majority as acts of  the people as a whole. Thus, the acts by the tenno as symbol are not 
meaningless forms but the most important state affairs that are filled with the ideal and 
meaning of  popular sovereignty. This is a true reconciliation of  popular sovereignty 
and the tenno institution in the new Constitution. This is what a new tenno institution 
should be like in a new era, without extinguishing the tradition of  history and with 
purifying long-standing abuses associated with the tradition of  history.197 
 
In this way, Odaka claimed that nomos as an expression of  a legal idea had remained unchanged. 
Thus, to him, the Meiji Constitution and the Constitution of  Japan had the core system of  
governance in common. Undoubtedly, his argument well served the continuity thesis. 
Miyasawa criticized the nomos sovereignty thesis for concealing a clear discontinuity 
between the two constitutions. This thesis failed to explain who had the ultimate power to decide 
political issues within the state.198 The nomos sovereignty thesis said nothing special, Miyasawa 
commented, because it advocated only a self-evident principle that political decision-making by 
those who were supreme must follow nomos whether the tenno held sovereign power or the people.199 
It only preached the mental attitude of  legislators: to follow the sublime ideals of  politics.200 The real 
issue was, rather, who decided the content of  the sovereign nomos. Its aim of  reconciling popular 
sovereignty and the tenno system in the new constitutional regime functioned as “a bandage that 
wraps a fatal injury which the tenno system has suffered from by adopting the principle of  popular 
sovereignty and that gives the tenno system the best opportunity available to take on the same 
appearance as in the good old days.”201 For Miyasawa, discussions on the tenno system in the new 
constitution should have started from clear recognition that the principle of  the tenno’s governance 
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hitherto established had been denied in the new era. Without starting discussions from this 
recognition, he believed, the nature of  the tenno institution in the new constitution could never be 
appreciated.202      
 Odaka responded to Miyasawa’s criticism. Odaka repeated that even sovereignty was never 
almighty but that what it could do depended upon the fundamental principle of  law, or nomos.203 He 
agreed with Miyasawa that who decided the concrete content of  nomos was the crucial question and 
it was either a person with special status as a monarch or the people in general. However, he 
disagreed that sovereignty should be understood as the ultimate power to decide political affairs in 
the state. To Odaka, whether it was the monarch or the people could not decide ultimately the 
concrete content of  nomos because it was objectively determined and thus a political decision by 
either the monarch or the people had to conform to the fundamental principle of  nomos so 
determined. He tried to reject sovereign power as whatever its holder might wish to do. 204  He 
understood sovereignty as normative and idealistic. This was what he wanted to defend and the 
apologia for the tenno system had only secondary significance.205 When sovereignty resided in the 
people, it meant to him an ideal in a dual sense: both that political affairs should be carried out 
according to the will of  the people and that politics of  the people should always be politics for the 
people. Thus this ideal burdened the people themselves with a responsibility whereby the people 
tried hard to realize the ideal in this dual sense.206 Odaka once again argued for the mental attitude 
of  the people who should be ideally invariably righteous. 
 This controversy deviated from what Miyasawa originally thought was a seriously 
misleading argument in Odaka’s essay. For Miyasawa, the real issue over sovereignty in the new 
constitution was the shift of  its holder from the tenno to the people. Now Odaka was more interested 
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in defending his position on how to exercise sovereign power, no matter who might be sovereign. 
Miyasawa repeated his criticism of  Odaka’s nomos sovereignty. Although Odaka attempted to 
reformulate the ultimate power to make a political decision to responsibility to decide the concrete 
content according to the fundamental ideal of  nomos, for Miyasawa there remained the same 
question of  who should assume responsibility, the tenno or the people.207 To him, Odaka’s argument 
served only to evade clarifying the location of  sovereignty and there was a danger that such 
reformulation might be politically misused. Miyasawa believed that sovereignty in question was 
persistently a matter of  choice between alternatives. Tenno sovereignty and popular sovereignty 
should be distinguishable in principle. Odaka again replied to Miyasawa’s criticism by refocusing on 
the distinction between fact and oughtness. Even if  popular sovereignty was established as a 
principle in a constitution, a small minority of  the people always ruled in reality. He agreed with 
Miyasawa that he was wrong if  his nomos sovereignty worked for obscuring the clear distinction 
between popular sovereignty and tenno sovereignty as norm. 208  However, Odaka believed that 
admitting that sovereignty normatively resided in the people was only the starting point of  the matter. 
The real question for him was how to bring fact as close to oughtness as possible. In the Meiji 
constitutional regime, as far as oughtness and fact were separated, the political system could be all 
the more democratic. On the contrary, the new constitution allowed oughtness to become fact when 
the people tried hard to realize the ideal of  politics of  the people for the people.209 There was no 
difference between tenno sovereignty and popular sovereignty in seeking nomos sovereignty. But they 
were decisively different because while the former saw nomos in obeying the tenno’s order, the latter 
expressed a mental attitude for obtaining nomos by the responsibility and cooperation of  all the 
people. It seemed to him much more important to grasp the distinction between tenno sovereignty 
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and popular sovereignty in this respect than to point out the difference between the two in principle 
clearly understood from the provisions of  the two constitutions.210    
This controversy between Miyasawa and Odaka has had an impact. First, it made clear the 
discontinuity between the two constitutions. Most Japanese constitutional scholars have basically 
favored Miyasawa’s position over Odaka’s nomos sovereignty thesis.211 As Odaka himself  admitted 
in the course of  the debate, the new constitution had altered the fundamental principle of  
government in Japan. While tenno sovereignty had been no longer a guiding principle for state affairs, 
the people now had the ultimate power to make a decision in the state. The Miyasawa-Odaka 
controversy has revealed the alternation of  the location of  sovereignty, which was obscured by the 
efforts of  the government to retain the kokutai from the immediate aftermath of  the war to the 
process of  making the new constitution.212 From this controversy onward, secondly, sovereignty had 
been conceptualized along Miyasawa’s formulation: the ultimate power to decide the way the state 
should be.213 When he also described the concept of  sovereignty as a principle, however, he failed to 
clarify the dynamic nature of  sovereignty. Sovereignty possesses dual elements: to show the location 
of  political legitimacy in the state and to mean the actual power to create a fundamental political 
order in the state. Further theorization of  popular sovereignty would be reserved for the future.214  
Thirdly, even though his thesis was disfavored, the fact that Odaka had written apologia for 
the tenno institution in one of  the most prestigious academic journals in Japan vividly showed that 
there was a considerable part of  intellectuals including legal scholars who wished to see continuity 
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between the old and new constitutions.215 Odaka targeted his theory not on the political reality of  the 
tenno institution, but on its moral aspect. In fact, Miyasawa as a member of  the House of  Peers, 
agreed with the Minister of  State, Kanamori Tokujiro, that the idea of  the kokutai as the moral and 
ethical nature of  the state had never changed even with the new constitution.216 This aspect of  the 
idea of  the kokutai was powerful enough to capture most intellectuals of  the day. As Watsuji’s 
argument for the tenno as the symbol of  the cultural unity of  the nation, thus, Odaka’s nomos 
sovereignty thesis had passionately played a distracting role in searching for a new meaning of  
constitutional life. Thus, a lesson to learn was that an appropriate constitutional theory should be 
flexible enough to cope with this moral aspect of  the tenno system.217  
It was definitely true that Odaka’s thesis had served a conservative purpose in avoiding self-
conscious confrontation with a serious inconsistency between popular sovereignty and the symbolic 
tenno institution. It was also true, however, that Odaka asked a necessary question whether 
sovereignty should be interpreted as almighty, whatever he might intend. What he raised became all 
the more serious for the development of  democratic politics. It was deeply related to the problem of  
how a minority should be protected against a tyrannical majority under popular sovereignty. 
However, prewar Japan had never yet experienced the tyranny of  majority that democracy inevitably 
involves. Prevention of  abuse of  political power on the part of  a minority had an urgent relevancy to 
the problems of  the day. 218  Miyasawa rather set a well-timed framework of  discussing the 
organization of  political power. Thus Odaka and Miyasawa argued with each other on considerably 
different planes.219 Odaka might ask the right question but it was at the wrong time.       
Miyasawa’s theory of  the August Revolution has gained basic support as an exquisite 
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explanation of  the constitutional change in Japanese constitutional scholarship.220 The theory is 
based upon three indispensable premises. First, there should be limits of  constitutional amendment. 
Second, the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes reply should be interpreted as the requirement of  
popular sovereignty in Japan. Finally, international agreements should be understood as influencing 
a domestic legal system directly. Thus the criticisms the August Revolution theory has received are 
over these three premises.  
Kawamura Matasuke, a professor of  constitutional law at the Kyushu Imperial University, 
disagreed with Miyasawa that the process of  establishing the Constitution of  Japan was not 
necessarily regarded as revolutionary. 221  Kawamura, a colleague of  Miyasawa as a disciple of  
Minobe Tatsukichi and a member of  the Matsumoto Committee222 and a future associate justice of  
the newly created Supreme Court, simply argued that the new constitution was a legal product of  the 
amendment process of  the Meiji Constitution. Kawamura attacked the premises upon which the 
August Revolution theory relied. First of  all, Kawamura did not understand that the Potsdam 
Declaration and the Byrnes reply required the Japanese government to adopt a new constitution of  
popular sovereignty.223 He paid attention to the term of  the Byrnes reply that “The ultimate form of  
government in Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely 
expressed will of  the Japanese people.” He rejected on the one hand a loose interpretation that Japan 
could decide a form of  government by herself  and on the other a strict interpretation that a form of  
government should be decided by a referendum of  the Japanese people. Thus he did not believe that 
the term had required amending the amendment procedure of  the Meiji Constitution,224 either. 
Rather, he read it more politically. Namely, “the freely expressed will of  the Japanese people” meant 
to him a will not suppressed and distorted by military clique, bureaucrats, and dictators, that is, a 
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free and frank will of  the many people.225 Therefore, the formal steps such as the tenno’s project, 
deliberation and decision of  the House of  Peers, and the tenno’s sanction were not regarded as 
contradictory to the term of  surrender. In fact, he contended, MacArthur and GHQ approved the 
process the Japanese government followed by relying upon Article 73 of  the Meiji Constitution.226 In 
sum, Kawamura understood that the Japanese government had promised the Allied powers to 
democratically implement the provision of  the amendment process and it did implement 
constitutional revision as democratically as possible.227  
The second point Kawamura disagreed with Miyasawa on concerned the limits of  
constitutional amendment. Kawamura refused to see constitutional limitations on the amendment 
process. To him, the kokutai meant a classification of  a government system by a location of  
sovereignty and thus the distinction between tenno sovereignty and popular sovereignty formed a 
mere problem of  the organization of  government. The kokutai understood thus was of  a legal nature 
and subject to change even if  its ethical understanding ordered otherwise.228 It was true that the Meiji 
Constitution presupposed only partial, not total, amendment. However, Kawamura asserted that a 
distinction between partial amendment and total amendment came down to a matter of  degree 
because if  a half  of  the provisions of  a constitution were amended twice, then all the provisions of  
the constitution could be constitutionally amended. Thus there was no use saying a constitution 
could be constitutionally amended only partially.229 As a result, Kawamura rejected the idea of  
revolution to explain the legal basis of  the new constitution. He concluded that it legally derived 
from the process of  amending the Meiji Constitution.230             
Miyasawa responded to Kawamura’s criticism by defending his basic points. Even if  “the 
freely expressed will of  the Japanese people” meant a political condition, it should not be missed 
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that such a condition would bring a legal meaning. To Miyasawa, it was critically important to 
recognize that a popularly authorized tenno institution was completely different from a tenno system 
based upon the divine will of  the imperial founder and other imperial ancestors.231 When the freely 
expressed will of  the people had decisive power over the ultimate form of  government, even their 
choice of  supervision of  sovereign power on the part of  the tenno would deny the hitherto central 
constitutional principle of  the tenno institution. Miyasawa argued that the Byrnes reply, in 
comparison with Article 12 of  the Potsdam Declaration and along with the understanding of  the 
Japanese government on retaining the kokutai, clearly meant both the denial of  tenno sovereignty 
with divine right and the establishment of  popular sovereignty.232 Further, Miyasawa contended that 
when the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration, popular sovereignty was 
principled at the same time. He denied the argument that the Japanese government only had an 
obligation to establish a constitution of  popular sovereignty and that thus the principle started to 
exist with the new constitution. Miyasawa believed that constitutional change in sovereignty had 
already occurred before the new constitution was established because the very promise to abolish the 
tenno system with divine right and to establish a constitution based upon popular sovereignty was 
absolutely impermissible under the tenno institution of  divine rule in a line unbroken for ages 
eternal.233  
Miyasawa criticized Kawamura for inconsistency in his attitude toward constitutional 
limitations on amendment. Kawamura rejected the idea of  limits on constitutional amendment and 
distinguished legal amendment from illegal amendment according to a provision of  constitutional 
amendment. However, he could make such a distinction as if  he had set forth a premise that a 
provision concerning constitutional amendment was not freely amended. 234  In Miyasawa’s 
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understanding, the power to amend a constitution derived from the power to make the constitution. 
If  fundamental principles upon which the power to make a constitution was based could be 
amended by its derivative power to amend, that would be seriously self-contradictory as a matter of  
law, although as a matter of  fact that could happen even desirably.235  
As discussed above,236 the kokutai, the principle of  tenno sovereignty, was mostly understood 
as eternal and thus unchangeable in the constitutional scholarship of  prewar Japan. Even Minobe, 
the liberal champion, interpreted “a line unbroken for ages eternal” as showing the tenno’s 
sovereignty would last forever.237 The Meiji constitutional regime had been supported by an idea 
beyond mere legality. Most people, whether liberals or conservatives, had shared a conviction of  
perpetuity of  the tenno’s rule. Thus, the transformation of  governmental principle from the Meiji 
Constitution to the postwar constitution should be understood as something extraordinary. This 
extraordinariness cannot be explained by legality. If  making a constitution means preservation of  the 
political achievements of  a time, to allow it to deny the fundamental achievements is logically self-
contradictory. It is quite true that such self-contradiction often occurs in the real world of  politics. 
However, if  we want to see such extraordinariness as it is, it cannot be explained from a legalistic 
point of  view. Indeed, the Constitution of  Japan is a product of  what is politically extraordinary. 
Recognition of  the limits of  constitutional amendment helps to realize that something extraordinary 
happens, though it might be useless in actual politics. Thus Miyasawa’s position on limits on 
constitutional amendment is well sustainable theoretically as well as historically.  
Another problem Miyasawa’s August Revolution theory has to face is why Article 73 of  the 
Meiji Constitution was utilized to establish the Constitution of  Japan if  the August Revolution had 
already overthrown tenno sovereignty. He argued that the Revolution had not abolished the Meiji 
Constitution but changed the meanings of  its provisions as far as they conflicted with the new 
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principle of  popular sovereignty. Thus state affairs were executed by following the provisions of  the 
Meiji Constitution so long as they were in harmony with popular sovereignty. In this interpretation, 
constitutional amendment formally followed the procedure of  Article 73 but it was also subject to 
the principle of  popular sovereignty. Miyasawa concluded that sanction of  the tenno and decisions in 
the House of  Peers, which were understood as contradictory to the new principle, formally existed 
but substantially lost their constitutional effect.238 In sum, he saw Article 73 was partially valid and 
partially invalid from the standpoint of  popular sovereignty when the constitutional amendment was 
actually implemented. Appearance of  legal continuity was added, in his logic, for the mere policy 
reason to prevent disorder invoked by a drastic transformation of  values.  
According to Miyasawa’s account, however, the deliberation in the House of  Peers, in 
which he himself  actively participated to make a marked contribution to clarifying the change in the 
kokutai,239 would have been void. Then, his thesis is far removed from the actual process of  making 
the Constitution of  Japan.  
In this respect, his theory of  the August Revolution should be understood not as an 
explanatory theory of  what actually happened in August 1945 but as a legal theory for exploring the 
creation of  the new constitution.240 That is why it does not matter how Miyasawa actually behaved 
to the reality caused by the defeat in the war. Judging from the behavior of  Miyasawa, in fact, his life 
seems to have had nothing to do with his thesis. He was not an exception among most intellectuals 
when he argued in October 1945 that constitutional amendment was not necessarily required to 
realize the liberal democratization of  Japanese politics and that because of  its simplicity and 
flexibility, appropriate interpretations and operations of  the Meiji Constitution would accomplish 
the purpose. In his understanding, the Meiji Constitution was essentially based upon liberalism and 
democracy and the first task of  democratization was to recover its potential of  liberal democracy 
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distorted for the last decade.241 In this line of  thinking, Miyasawa played an important role in the 
Matsumoto Committee.242 Even after he published the first essay of  the August Revolution thesis in 
May 1946, Miyasawa jointly in the House of  Peers attempted to propose to modify the governmental 
draft concerning the status of  the tenno from the symbol to the head of  the state.243 At the time of  
deliberating on the new constitution, he still believed that it was better to use a vague expression on 
the principle of  popular sovereignty. 244  Because of  his opportunism, Miyasawa failed to fully 
celebrate a new meaning of  constitutional law. There is, thus, a serious inconsistency between his 
less commitment to the new value of  government in an actual life and his recognition of  revolution 
in theory.245 However, it does not necessarily cause damage to the merits of  the August Revolution 
thesis as a constitutional theory.246 This thesis along with the debate between Odaka and Miyasawa 
has clarified the fundamental change of  sovereignty. The clarification was desperately needed for the 
Japanese people at the beginning of  their own new constitutional life.   
What is the most serious problem Miyasawa’s August Revolution theory has to be 
confronted with is, however, the fact that the Japanese people did not mobilize themselves for 
freedom. 247  Unlike the Americans in the American Revolution or the French in the French 
Revolution, direct participation of  the Japanese people in destroying the old regime and creating a 
new political order was extremely limited immediately after the war. Rather, we cannot ignore the 
defeat and the succeeding Allied occupation as indispensable factors in making the Constitution of  
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Japan. In the first place, most people, particularly the governing elite, did not believe that the 
Potsdam Declaration and Byrnes reply required the Japanese government to adopt a government 
system based upon the radically different principle of  popular sovereignty.248 Constitutional scholars 
were no different. After all, they were prevalently infatuated with the idea of  the kokutai and 
obsessed with defending the tenno institution. The enchantment of  the kokutai had so profoundly 
penetrated to most people that the acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration did not cause a radical 
change in their mental attitude in postwar Japan. Miyasawa’s opportunistic behavior well expressed 
that the Japanese elite had experienced no real revolution at all in the aftermath of  World War II. 
Miyasawa’s revolution is nothing other than a retrospective elitist reaction to what happened with 
the fundamental law after the defeat.249 
 In fact, it is very difficult to understand the mere acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration as a 
revolution in terms of  the actual life of  the Japanese people of  the day. If  any kind of  constitutional 
revolution occurred, furthermore, it was under the sovereignty of  General MacArthur.250 With the 
Allied occupation, Japan had lost independence.  
Miyasawa’s thesis retrospectively advocates a legal theory of  constitutional revolution based 
upon internationalism.251 As a legal theory, surely, it has consistency. However, if  sovereignty means 
something important in politics, it indicates not only a source of  political legitimacy but also 
attribution of  active political power to someone. Thus popular sovereignty requires the people to 
exercise at least potentially the ultimate power as well as to be the only legitimate source of  political 
authority. We should think of  the process of  constitutional making as more political than 
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Miyasawa’s August Revolution thesis.  
The constitutional revolution in the wake of  the wartime defeat can be understood as a two-
step process. First, the acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration by the Japanese government had 
abolished the governmental system based upon the tenno sovereignty derived from divine right. No 
matter what the statement “The ultimate form of  government in Japan shall, in accordance with the 
Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of  the Japanese people” might have 
meant, there had never existed such a thing as a free discussion on the foundation of  the tenno’s 
authority in prewar Japan. The concept of  a line unbroken for ages eternal was well beyond rational 
justification. Even the loosest interpretation that the Japanese government could decide its own form 
of  government freely from the Allied occupation at the end of  the occupational period required the 
Japanese government to choose a form of  government, which was completely inconsistent with the 
principle the Meiji constitutional system had relied upon.252 The tenno’s sovereignty could not be an 
object of  choice. The Meiji Constitution only confirmed the sovereignty of  the tenno which had been 
naturally assumed since the foundation of  the nation. Thus, the acceptance of  the Potsdam 
Declaration had overthrown the basis of  the Meiji constitutional regime. As Hannah Arendt has 
pointed out, there has been no government or state powerful enough to survive defeat in war since 
World War I.253 Arendt’s observation was also the case with Japan after World War II. International 
relations had come to influence inevitably and sometimes directly domestic political and legal 
systems. 
Unlike the assumption of  the August Revolution thesis, however, the mere acceptance of  
the Potsdam Declaration did not bring popular sovereignty to Japan. The second step of  
constitutional revolution was related to the actual power aspect of  popular sovereignty. The 
constitutional debates had gradually revealed the necessity of  a fundamental change in the 
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governmental system in postwar Japan.254 Whatever form the institution of  the tenno might have 
taken, a large number of  Japanese people heard that forms and foundations of  the tenno system were 
widely and heatedly discussed. Unlike the case of  the Meiji Constitution,255 the discussion was not 
limited to the governing elite. In the constitutional debates, the Japanese people had been self-
consciously confronted with what should be an appropriate source political legitimacy of  their 
country for the first time in their history.256  
In the constitutional discussion, furthermore, the Japanese people had experienced freedom 
both negative and positive. As discussed in Chapter 1, the idea of  the kokutai as the tenno system in a 
line unbroken for ages eternal was incompatible with internal freedom because standards of  value 
had been monopolized by the imperial founder and ancestors and thus common citizens could not 
confine themselves to an inner fortress to cope with political power, which a modern liberal 
democratic constitution generally guarantees.257 Now the principle of  tenno sovereignty by divine 
right was abolished, a condition was met that common citizens could enjoy civil liberties. The 
Japanese people had also experienced positive freedom when they themselves discussed the creation 
of  a fundamental political order. The people at the periphery of  the power structure of  the Meiji 
constitutional system such as Takano Iwasaburo and the members of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai 
(Constitutional Research Group) actively campaigned for the principle of  popular sovereignty.258 The 
Japanese people participated in the general election of  the Imperial Diet as a quasi-constitutional 
convention and their representatives argued for and against the constitutional draft in the public 
arena.259 Popular participation in constituting a fundamental political order was the first thing in 
their history. The principle of  popular sovereignty became clear when the Japanese people exercised 
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their positive freedom. They eventually established the new constitution by themselves.260  
In sum, the Potsdam Declaration had abolished tenno sovereignty based upon the concept 
of  the kokutai and then the idea of  popular sovereignty had gradually emerged through constitutional 
debates among the Japanese people including the governing elite and has been finally established as 
the fundamental principle of  the new constitution. In the process of  making the Constitution of  
Japan, therefore, it can be fairly said that the Japanese people simultaneously experienced a sense of  
freedom and of  a new beginning.261 This was really a revolution politically understood.  
It is true that liberation came from GHQ as gift. It is also true that popular sovereignty was 
claimed under the Allied occupational power. This constitutional revolution without doubt had 
serious limitations. Whatever the limits might have been, however, the Japanese people as a whole 
first confronted the problem of  constituting a political order by themselves after the wartime defeat. 
The whole process of  making the postwar constitution should be taken as a revolutionary idea. The 
Constitution of  Japan has required the Japanese people to change their way of  thinking and 
behaving. Popular sovereignty was a fundamentally innovative idea for them. Since the 
establishment of  the Constitution of  Japan, the method of  government has changed dramatically. 
Politics has become an art of  human relationships founded upon mutual persuasion by speech. This 
was what the Meiji constitutional system lacked. The government can no longer disregard liberty 
and equality and the will of  the people. Of course, these ideas are elusive and manipulative, and yet 
we have to acknowledge frankly the radical transformation at least at the level of  ideas. People with 
either a clear idea of  popular sovereignty or force of  habit for defending the kokutai participated in 
the process of  making the Constitution of  Japan. By coping with the claim of  popular sovereignty, 
defenders of  the kokutai had come to be forced to justify the tenno institution by some means. What 
was taken for granted under the Meiji Constitution has lost its basis without rationalization. The 
Constitution of  Japan has been also a revolution of  ideas. 
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The inspiration from the Odaka-Miyasawa debate has now given us a distinct theory of  the 
Constitution of  Japan as an unfinished constitutional revolution. The next question is how the 
Japanese people have tried to complete this unfinished constitutional revolution. How have the 
Japanese people as sovereign made relative the newly introduced symbolic tenno system, the previous 
model of  which was regarded as having absolute authority? How have they accepted the new 
constitutional principles? How has discontinuity in the two constitutions that became gradually basic 
recognition been discussed concretely? Let us focus our attention on how the symbolic tenno 
institution was understood in relation to the principle of  popular sovereignty in the early postwar 
period.  
 
8. The Tenno Institution in the New Constitution 
 The new constitution has transformed the status of  the tenno from sovereign to symbol.262 
Because the term of  symbol was unfamiliar to the legal circle, its understanding was not 
undisputable. We have already seen what the eminent scholars in the field of  history, ethics and 
jurisprudence tried to mean by the symbol.263 They tended to argue that the tenno had traditionally 
been the symbol of  the unity of  the nation and the tenno institution has essentially carried only a 
tenuous political meaning and thus nothing new with the new constitution. These arguments, 
however, seem disharmonious with a core idea of  the new constitution because as a matter of  
principle, the status of  the tenno derives from the will of  the sovereign people, which was never 
recognized before the new constitution.   
 Minobe Tatsukichi, once foremost liberal but now seemingly behind the times, 
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acknowledged the great change of  the status of  the tenno.264  However, he interpreted the new 
constitution as though he had never appreciated its newness. For example, he understood that the 
tenno was supposed to be situated above the diet, cabinet and courts to unify them and thus granted 
the powers to perform authoritative acts such as to convoke the Diet, dissolve the House of  
Representatives, appoint the prime minister and the chief  justice of  the Supreme Court, promulgate 
amendments to the constitution, laws, cabinet orders, and treaties, and attest important state 
actions.265 The tenno’s involvement was believed to enhance the authority of  these state actions. The 
purpose of  these provisions is, in Minobe’s interpretation, respect for the authority of  the tenno.266  
 Minobe understood that the symbolic tenno should be respected as a figure expressing the 
state and all the people integrated as a whole. Although the tenno was not granted the power to 
represent the will of  the people, he was interpreted to be a representative in form, not will. While the 
people were no longer subjects under the tenno’s rule but now sovereign, Minobe believed, they were 
still under an obligation to respect the tenno as their representative in form.267 Minobe’s constitutional 
revolution stopped half-way when he contended that Japan was still a monarchy under the 
Constitution of  Japan because the tenno was understood to be the source and embodiment of  honors, 
which the concept of  a monarch centrally depended upon in his opinion.268 Thus, the image of  the 
symbolic tenno Minobe presented was not much different from that of  the Meiji constitutional 
system because he argued that the tenno, who was legally sovereign, should have been beyond real 
politics. 
 Sasaki Soichi, another liberal champion but a dissenter of  the symbolic tenno institution in 
the House of  Peers, showed a little more discontinuous interpretation of  the new constitution. The 
symbolic tenno meant to him realization of  the nature and situation of  Japan as a state by the figure 
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of  the tenno.269 Unlike Minobe,270 Sasaki distinguished the meanings of  the tenno’s status as the 
symbol of  the state and the symbol of  the unity of  the people. The former meant that when people 
saw the figure of  the tenno, they realized Japan as one distinct body of  life. The latter symbolized the 
nature that people who had their own lives shared a common life unified in Japan.271 Sasaki pointed 
out, further, that Article 1 of  the new constitution should be interpreted as not descriptive but 
normative. Namely, the tenno should play a role as the symbol of  the state and of  the unity of  the 
people. This role had nothing to do with governmental functions. The tenno should situate himself  
outside politics. Sasaki once again confirmed the change of  the kokutai.272 
 Kawamura Matasuke, a prominent constitutional scholar and a near future associate justice 
of  the Supreme Court, presented an interpretation mixed between continuity and discontinuity. He 
understood that Article 1 of  the new constitution showed the national consciousness that when they 
look up to the tenno, people vividly and profoundly realize the existence of  the state of  Japan and an 
integrated body of the united Japanese people. In Kawamura’s interpretation, the article expressed 
nothing but such national psychology and had no legal effect. Thus, the status of  the head of  the 
state might not be derived from the provision.273 Kawamura clearly denied that the tenno had any 
kind of  sovereign powers, not to mention supervision of  sovereignty. Although Articles 6 and 7 of  
the new constitution provide for the tenno’s performance of  matters of  state, Kawamura argued, they 
could not be regarded as parts of  sovereign power because the acts of  the tenno on these matters were 
not dependent upon his discretionary decision but substantial decision-making of  other organs. The 
Diet designates the prime minister274 and the cabinet designates the chief  justice of  the Supreme 
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Court.275 The matters of  state provided for in Article 7 are performed only with the advice and 
approval of  the cabinet. Thus, Kawamura continued, all matters of  state the tenno is supposed to 
perform were predetermined by institutions other than the tenno and the tenno’s acts were planned to 
arrange forms for what had been already decided. 276  Unlike the Meiji constitutional system, 
Kawamura concluded, the tenno had no power to appoint minister of  state and therefore he could do 
nothing but agree on decisions made by the cabinet. Kawamura clarified the break of  the old tenno 
institution in the postwar constitution. 
 Kawamura believed that the principle of  no monarchical responsibility in a constitutional 
monarchy was inconsistent with the modern ethical and legal fundamental principle of  free 
personality with responsibility. Particularly in Japan, the “sacred and inviolable” clause277 had been 
misunderstood as a basis of  the mysterious deification of  the tenno. Kawamura stated that abolition 
of  the sacred and inviolable clause had a good reason. Further, he added, although it retained the 
hereditary line of  tennos, the symbolic tenno system could not be considered a monarchy traditionally 
understood because the tenno had no political power whatsoever. The tenno in the new constitution 
was much weaker than kings in Britain and Belgium. Kawamura thus wondered whether the 
symbolic tenno system could be classified as a monarchy. He refused to categorize the tenno as a 
monarch defined in constitutional scholarship because not only executive powers and the power to 
give consent to constitutional amendment but also any governmental powers were removed from the 
tenno.278  
However, Kawamura showed a compromising attitude when he realistically admitted that 
there was the prevalent popular sentiment that the people had the tenno govern the state or had the 
tenno as the head of  the state, although he frankly recognized that democracy and monarchy 
essentially were incompatible. If  the opinion a majority of  people enjoyed should prevail, he 
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contended, a harmony between the two institutions was supported by a current majority of  the 
Japanese people. If  the tenno’s promulgation of  law gave authority to decisions by the will of  a 
majority of  the people and it helped to cultivate a law-abiding spirit, then it was unexpectedly good 
for developing democracy in Japan.279  
Thus, Kawamura relied upon the authority the tenno traditionally possessed in order to cope 
with a minority’s failure to obey the will of  a majority which he thought of  as defects of  democratic 
politics in prewar Japan. It was quite dubious, however, that such a compromising attitude actually 
made a great contribution to developing democratic politics in postwar Japan because democracy 
with popular sovereignty required the people to have an independent and self-governing spirit and 
assume responsibility for their political decisions. Although he pointed out that the human tenno was 
in principle equal to the people and thus special legal protections such as lese majesty were abolished, 
Kawamura also set reservations on free speech that criticized the tenno system. Because the tenno was 
the symbol of  the state and the object of  admiration of  an overwhelming majority of  the people, he 
asserted, a speech act that insulted the tenno meant to dishonor the popular sentiment that respected 
the tenno. Although he emphasized that free speech was indispensable for democracy,280 Kawamura 
did not apply his acute analysis to this case. In his view, those who criticized the tenno naturally 
needed to show courtesy.281 Here a constitutional principle of  free speech turned into a matter of  
morality. 282  Kawamura’s interpretation well showed continuity in discontinuity in constitutional 
understanding.   
 A well-balanced thought on the new constitution was made public by a legal philosopher as 
early as October 1946, immediately after the House of  Representatives voted for the government 
draft of  constitutional revision with slightly modifications. 283  The essay of  Tsuneto Kyo was 
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regarded as influential with respect to understanding characteristics of  the symbolic tenno institution 
in the new constitution. 284  Tsuneto clearly pointed out the forthcoming new constitution as 
revolutionarily innovative because it would deprive the tenno of  almost all political powers granted 
by the Meiji Constitution and thus it would try to abolish the traditional tenno system. 285  He 
understood that the Meiji Constitution had adopted an imperfect constitutional monarchy because 
elements of  a despotic monarchy had still remained in it. Thus, he did not support the argument that 
simplicity and flexibility in the Meiji Constitution meant that no fundamental alternation of  
constitutional text was required to democratize the political system after the wartime defeat. In his 
view, small constitutional amendments would not be effective enough for the government to 
administer properly a political regime and to build a democratic peace state as steadily and soon as 
possible.286 The Meiji Constitution, he believed, had become an obstacle for constructing a new 
Japan fundamentally characterized by democracy. Thus a new constitution was necessary.287 
 Rejecting both the conservative criticism that the symbolic tenno institution was 
fundamentally different from the traditional tenno system and the radical criticism that article 1 of  
the new constitution showed a not thoroughgoing democratization, Tsuneto saw the new 
constitution that was to be established by the freely expressed will of  the people through the Imperial 
Diet as expressing a position that the tenno institution should be retained with sweeping reform.288 
He also refused to follow the strict originalist idea because the framers’ intentions served only as a 
reference to interpret law. The established text itself  should be objectively interpreted.289 
 Tsuneto contended that in a monarchy, monarch was essentially the symbol of  the state. 
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That was because the characteristics and structure of  monarchy as a body sociologically made the 
monarch a symbol. In his view, this was also true of  the tenno system in Japan. Thus the tenno had 
been the symbol of  the state since Japan was built as a monarchy.290 To Tsuneto, what was significant 
for Article 1 of  the new constitution was first that a sociological fact that the tenno held the status of  
the symbol of  the state would be expressed as a legal declaration. Secondly, it radically transformed 
the tenno system that had hitherto existed. Thus the nature of  the state of  Japan the tenno would 
symbolize would become fundamentally different from what the old tenno system had symbolized. 
Thirdly and fourthly, the tenno would hold the status of  the symbol of  the unity of  the Japanese 
people as well as of  the state of  Japan, depending upon the sovereign will of  the people.291 Further, it 
was important for him to distinguish symbol from representation. While the relationship between 
symbol and what it symbolizes is a mutual relationship between things different in nature, the 
relationship between representative and what it represents is a mutual relationship between things 
similar in essence.292 This meant that his theory made clear the fact that the tenno and the people as a 
unity were regarded as different in nature.293 
 Unlike the Meiji Constitution, Tsuneto correctly pointed out, the new constitution would 
vest the tenno with no political powers. The tenno could perform only formal and ceremonial acts 
provided for in the constitution. Thus, the symbolic tenno would neither be the superintendent of  
sovereign power nor the head of  the administrative department in a normal sense and thus, Tsuneto 
argued, it was difficult to say that the tenno was the head of  the state in the common usage of  the 
term. However, he admitted that the symbolic tenno could be called the head of  the state only in an 
insufficient sense of  the term because it would perform the highest formal and ceremonial activities 
in national politics and would represent the state in international relations.294 In this respect, Tsuneto 
was wrong when he understood that the tenno would represent the state in international relations 
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because the tenno should attest the full powers and credentials of  ambassadors and ministers, attest 
instruments of  ratification and other diplomatic documents, and receive foreign ambassadors and 
ministers.295 Because he understood that the tenno’s actions provided for in the new constitution 
made important state actions legally effective by giving them the requisite forms, 296  Tsuneto 
mistakenly interpreted the tenno’s performance on state matters relating to international relations as 
representing the state. 297  Rather, the cabinet would make substantial decisions on international 
matters and thus it would represent the state of  Japan. The tenno’s performance on state matters are 
commonly understood as adding formality to what has already been determined by other institutions 
with the advice and approval of  the cabinet.298 
 However, the misreading the new constitution did not diminish the values of  Tsuneto’s 
theory on the symbolic tenno institution. He coolly recognized that the political regime provided for 
in the new constitution would not be purely democratic but include monarchical elements in its 
central part. He expected that there was a good possibility that politics under the revised constitution 
would be self-government by the people but at the same time acknowledged that because the tenno 
institution would be outwardly retained, it could not be denied that it would possibly have a 
considerable influence on political practices.299 Tsuneto warned that further democratization might 
be confronted with a serious problem from inside the new constitution. 
 In Tsuneto’s view, the reason why the general will of  the people required the drastic 
alternation of  the tenno system was that it judged that the old tenno system would become a serious 
obstacle to creating a new Japan. At the same time, the general will of  the people also retained the 
tenno system even fundamentally changed because most people were aware that they had respected 
the historical tradition that Japan, with the tenno at the center, could retain national unification and 
                                                 
295 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 7 (v), (viii), & (ix). See also, Tsuneto, “Shochoteki chii,” Shinkenpo to 
minshushugi, 46.  
296 Tsuneto, “Shochoteki chii,” Shinkenpo to minshushugi, 67. 
297 See Yokota Koichi, “Seiken zengono tennozo,” 56. 
298 Sato Koji, Kenpo, 253-254; Takahashi Kazuyuki, “Kokumishuken to shocho tennosei,” Nonaka et al., Kenpo, 
1: 114-117. 
299 Tsuneto, “Shochoteki chii,” Shinkenpo to minshushugi, 50-51. 
 417 
independence as the state.300 
As Sasaki, Tsuneto interpreted that the symbol of  the state and that of  the unity of  the 
people would have different meanings. The provision that the tenno would be the symbol of  the state 
would legally mean that Japan would still maintain the fundamentally transformed tenno system only 
with formal and ritualistic functions as a part of  important political organizations.301 Tsuneto argued 
for the tenno as a symbol of  the state that would have considerably changed in political structure 
from a sovereign tenno founded upon mysterious characteristics to a symbolic tenno as a human 
being.302 On the other hand, the tenno as the symbol of  the unity of  the people meant that the tenno 
symbolized the relationship that the people as a whole except the tenno formed one group commonly 
under the government. Above all, Tsuneto offered a critically important interpretation about the 
symbol when he stated that the tenno as the performer on state matters delegated by the people 
would symbolize the state of  Japan and at the same time symbolize the unity of  the Japanese people 
as a delegate of  the people who “desire peace for all time are deeply conscious of  the high ideals 
controlling human relationships” and who “have determined to preserve our security and existence, 
trusting in the justices and faith of  the peace-loving peoples of  the world.”303 Thus Tsuneto provided 
a systematic view on the symbolic tenno institution in the new constitution. By following his style, 
then, we can add that the tenno symbolizes a state that is operated on the universal principle that 
“Government is a sacred trust of  the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the 
powers of  which are exercised by the representatives of  the people, and the benefits of  which are 
enjoyed by the people.”304 This well clarifies an inherent tension involved in the new constitution that 
the universalistic values are planned to be symbolized by the most particularistic institution. In any 
event, however, Tsuneto’s effort to interpret the new symbolic tenno system from the perspective of  
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the new constitution as a whole was precious because most commentators of  the time tended to pay 
a great deal of  attention to the tenno system itself.305  
It is noteworthy that Tsuneto denied the tenno as akogare no mato (the center of  national 
adoration). He rejected as a moral or religious reading the government explanation on the symbolic 
tenno institution that the state of  Japan was established based upon the unification of  the whole 
people in relation situating the tenno at the center of  national adoration and thus images of  the state 
and the unity of  the people were realized in the figure of  the tenno. Because he believed that legal 
norms provided for things that should be realized in real social life, Article 1 of  the postwar 
constitution should be understood as a provision on the real status of  the tenno to offer guidance for 
political practice. The center of  adoration as what the tenno should be would give the people only a 
standard for moral practice.306 For him, it was wrong to understand that the tenno would symbolize 
the unity as a whole formed by people who respected the tenno with a special feeling indicated by the 
word of  adoration because Article 1 of  the revised constitution would mean that the tenno would 
symbolize the unity as a whole of  the people formed by all Japanese individuals.307 Further, Tsuneto 
rejected the interpretation that the Japanese people and the Japanese race were interchangeable in 
this context.308 His point is crucial because the internal continuity theory seems to confuse, whether 
intentionally or carelessly, nation and race, which are essentially different concepts. Nation is more 
artificial than race. 
Tsuneto’s argument on the symbolic tenno institution is considered an excellent 
constitutional interpretation of  the time because it recognized a serious internal tension between the 
principle of  popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno system and tried to reconcile them in a most 
rational way. He self-consciously confronted the problems raised by discontinuity and continuity in 
the two constitutions. The new constitution, on the one hand, shows a significant democratization 
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of governmental institutions from the Meiji Constitution but, on the other, maintains the tenno 
system, although fundamentally altered. He offered a perspective on this considerably contradictory 
new constitution by placing emphasis upon parts of  discontinuity.309 He properly pointed out that 
there had been no occasion since the foundation of  the state when the people not only publicly 
discuss the question of  abolishing the tenno system or not but also the fate of  the tenno institution 
was decided by a Diet that reflects the general will of  the people.310 In his understanding, the 
principle of  popular sovereignty would emerge from that debate and under the new principle the 
tenno institution should be totally reshaped to symbolize the values the new constitution would 
solemnly declare. Indeed, Tsuneto regarded the transformation as an unprecedented revolution.311  
By developing the gist of  Tsuneto’s argument, a more radical contention was made in July 
1949. Yokota Kisaburo, a professor of  international law at the University of  Tokyo and future Chief  
Justice of  the Supreme Court, presented a plainly discontinuous image of  the tenno in the new 
constitution.312 During the prewar period, he was critical about the Japanese government’s policy on 
China. He did not accept the legitimacy of  the state of  Manchuria. Thus the military exercised 
surveillance over what he would say.313     
Yokota not only simply admitted that the symbolic tenno institution had been completely 
different from the tenno system the Meiji Constitution provided for but also claimed that people 
should face up to a truth that the tenno system had changed in matters of  his status, foundation and 
powers. Whereas the tenno under the Meiji constitutional regime was sovereign, based upon the 
divine right to govern, and vested with a wide range of  powerful prerogatives,314 Yokota stated in 
comparison, the tenno in the new constitution was the symbol of  the state and the unity of  the people, 
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based upon the sovereign will of  the people, and invested with no real political powers but the 
enumerated formal and ceremonial functions for the people.315 He rejected the contention that the 
sovereign people included the tenno in the Japanese traditional form of  government because 
togetherness, not confrontation, of  the tenno and the people that was allegedly unique to Japan was 
merely a false idea deriving from the lack of  consciousness of  freedom, equality and above all 
dignity as an individual.316 
Yokota emphatically pointed out the change of  the tenno system in nature. He believed that 
different institutions should be called by different names thus the symbolic tenno institution should 
not have been named the tenno institution because the tenno system in the authentic meaning of  the 
word had been abolished under the new constitution.317 The facts he laid stress upon were that the 
principle of  popular sovereignty had been clearly established and that the tenno’s status had 
depended upon the general will of  the sovereign people.318 Unlike the tenno who was entitled to 
govern by the will of  the imperial founder and ancestors, he even argued, the new symbolic tenno 
institution could be abolished if  the sovereign people wished because its foundation was upon 
nothing other than their general will.319 When we consider the political context immediately after the 
establishment of  the new constitution, Yokota’s frank recognition of  a possibility of  legal abrogation 
of  the tenno institution was without doubt outstandingly liberal.  
Like Tsuneto, Yokota declared that the idea of  the kokutai both in the political meaning and 
in the spiritual sense had changed with the new constitution. The kokutai in a political sense as a 
general understanding, namely that the tenno in a line unbroken for ages eternal held the prerogatives 
to govern as sovereign, had obviously changed because the symbolic tenno was no longer sovereign 
and vested with any political powers. For Yokota, the tenno’s status of  the symbol carried no positive 
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legal meaning unlike representation.320 However, it negatively meant important things because the 
status as the symbol denied the status as sovereign and the head of  state. Although it is questionable 
whether the head of  state does not have the function of  symbol,321 Yokota’s main point rather lied in 
criticism of  the argument of  the akogare (adored) tenno.322 He stated that the kokutai in a spiritual 
sense derived from the political idea of  the kokutai. The people admired the tenno because the tenno in 
one line unbroken for ages eternal actually reigned and ruled.323 As the political idea changed, it was 
thus at least said, the ethical idea of  the kokutai would gradually change.324 He expressed a doubt that 
a derivative concept that lacks or changes a central element was not the same as an original concept 
and believed that a derivative depended upon an original. He criticized the government for misusing 
the term kokutai in common usage for the idea of  the akogare (adored) tenno.325 The government 
adopted a circular argument, as Yokota claimed, when it presupposed the concept of  the kokutai that 
had never changed and then it said that the kokutai had never changed.326 In the first place, he 
criticized, the argument of  the akogare (adored) tenno should not have necessarily been discussed in 
the constitutional deliberations of  the Imperial Diet because a constitution that concerns political 
organization of  the state was not essentially related to the concept of  the kokutai in a spiritual and 
ethical sense. Because the government and many members of  the Diet wanted to declare the kokutai 
never changed with the new constitution, in his opinion, an unnecessary issue was on the agenda.327                 
Yokota’s criticism did not stop here. He continued to analyze the symbol tenno system itself  
to show that it was inconsistent with democracy by nature. Yokota understood that equality in 
dignity for the individual was the fundamental idea that supports democracy. Human development, 
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in his belief, brought people to recognition of  this equality sooner or later.328 Democracy based upon 
a universalistic value of  equality conflicted with the tenno system based upon lineage that is beyond 
the efforts of  individuals. The making of  the new constitution formed a far delayed reflection of  the 
ideal of  democracy.329 In his view, the symbolic tenno institution greatly ameliorated defects deriving 
from a traditional tenno system harshly contradictory to democracy.330 However, he still saw two 
problems with the new institution: lineage and mysticism. Because the symbolic tenno institution is 
hereditary,331 he argued, it was not deniable that there was always a danger that a person who is not 
sufficiently qualified for the position might succeed to the throne. The tenno system might be also 
possibly utilized for illegitimate purposes because it had been surrounded with mysticism. Yokota 
sharply rejected the argument that the disastrous failure of  the Meiji constitutional regime was 
attributed not to the tenno but to the people who supported him. Yokota straightforwardly admitted 
that the tenno was more responsible for the collapse than his aides because if  he as sovereign had 
been strong enough to control the supporting institutions, such a result could have been avoided.332 
The principle of  no responsibility on the part of  the monarch was an irrational system, he added, 
because, on the one hand, the monarch enjoyed a wide range of  political powers but, on the other 
hand, he escaped from responsibility for the results of  the exercise of  them.333 The argument for no 
fault of  the tenno vividly showed mysticism made even rational people unable to face up to the truth. 
Yokota warned of  the effect of  irrationalization the mysticism surrounding the tenno system had 
had.334 In his view, conservative and feudalistic forces tended to appeal to this mysticism for their 
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political causes.335 
Therefore, Yokota concluded that there was no logical reason to retain the tenno system. In 
consideration of  the feeling of  a majority of  people, however, he did not deny its maintenance. 
Rather, he pointed out the necessity of  eliminating the thorough evils of  the tenno system. In his 
proposal for constitutional revision, the tenno would absolutely stay away from political matters. 
Although Yokota understood that the new constitution was in this direction, some provisions such as 
appointments of  the prime minister and the chief  justice and dissolution of  the House of  
Representatives raised a question of  the non-politicalness of  the tenno due to their political nature. 
Even the slightest doubts of  its relation to politics should be removed from the constitutional text. 
His twice new tenno system would perform only matters of  state on the awarding of  honors, 
receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers, and performance of  ceremonial functions. 336  In 
conclusion, Yokota remind his readers of  the essential incompatibility between the tenno system and 
democracy. 
This frank analysis of  the tenno institution well presented the arrival of  a new age. People 
could not imagine themselves hearing such a harsh criticism of  the tenno system only four years 
before. On the one hand, eternality of  one line of  tennos was seriously believed to be beyond all kinds 
of  criticism and, on the other hand, that idea was preserved with severe punishment. It is true that 
Yokota belonged to an absolute minority on the issue in light of  the atmosphere of  the time for 
retaining the kokutai. Many intellectuals including legal scholars wanted to see continuity in the two 
constitutions. However, it is important to realize that one of  a few such arguments was actually 
made. Yokota’s status in orthodox academism made the thing more significant. The discontinuity 
Yokota tried to show in a convincing way does exist, whether people were willing or reluctant to 
recognize it. 
In this section, we have seen that there were various discussions over the symbolic tenno 
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institution immediately before and after the establishment of  the Constitution of  Japan. This new 
constitution seemed to guarantee rich public discourse on the issue at least for the time being. As a 
matter of  principle, in fact, the tenno institution has, with popular sovereignty, been incorporated into 
the constitutional system itself, which was the most essential task for constitutional design in light of  
the collapse of  the Meiji constitutional regime.337 The next problem was how the Japanese people 
would strike a balance between the principle of  popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno 
institution, which are, as Yokota showed, essentially incompatible.                        
 
9. The Interpreted Symbol  
 So far, we have seen several discussions on the relationship between popular sovereignty and 
the symbolic tenno system from the viewpoint of  discontinuity and continuity. Although there were 
wide attempts to recognize some kind of  continuity between the two constitutions, their 
discontinuity was defended by clear and frank, though few, comments. No matter how important the 
discussions might be, however, there was another issue to discuss as well: the very status of  symbol 
in the constitution. Problems over sovereignty and symbol are categorically different in nature.338 
Because the symbolic tenno institution has been constitutionalized, whether people like it or not, the 
meaning of  the symbol should be examined in a way that interpretation would be most consistent 
with the spirit of  the new constitution. 
 From the beginning, the symbol has been generally understood as the embodiment of  what is 
invisible and abstract by a concrete thing.339 It is a way to acquire sensuously a clear image of  a 
vague ideal through its expressive function. For example, it is common to symbolize a country by a 
crown or a national flag. However, what is unique to the symbolic tenno system is that what 
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symbolizes the state is the tenno, a living person. Unlike a lifeless thing, the tenno has his own life and 
personality. He, who acts with his will, is the symbol of  the state and the unity of  the people. 
Furthermore, the institution of  the symbolic tenno was occupied by the same person who had been 
believed to be a living god until only a few years before. These circumstances around the new 
constitution have made the symbolization even more complicated than usual. 
 Something symbolized and something symbolizing have also been understood as different in 
nature. This is in sharp comparison with representation that presupposes sameness in nature 
between the representing and the represented.340 Since the tenno declared himself  to be a human 
being, the relationship between the people and the tenno has become characterized as one of  
sameness. Thus one could say that a symbolic relation between the two could not be valid and then 
the tenno could not be a symbol in the authentic meaning of  the word.341 Even though the tenno is 
now human, however, he has a special qualification based upon lineage. Further, a popularly elected 
president can be at once the representative of  a people and symbol of  their unification. Therefore, 
the tenno’s symbolization should be examined carefully. 
 Commentators agreed that a symbol had the function of  integrating the people.342 But there 
was no consensus on how the symbolic tenno did and should perform an integrating function. The 
provision of  the symbolic tenno institution in the postwar constitution, most commentators agreed, 
has no legal meaning but a socio-psychological meaning.343 An interesting controversy occurred over 
this function of  integration when Kuroda Kaku, a former professor of  constitutional law at Kyoto 
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University, wrote an essay on the oversimplification of  problems over the tenno institution in August 
1952. He pointed out there was a great discrepancy between the constitutional principle of  the 
symbolic tenno institution and the sociological function of  integration the tenno had actually played 
because he believed that while the Constitution of  Japan had not offered appropriate forums for the 
tenno’s function of  integration, people heatedly welcomed the tenno when he toured all over Japan.344 
Kuroda examined the integrating function in monarchy and drew conclusions that this function had 
nothing to do with his or her political powers and abilities, that this function was well performed in 
ceremonies, that his or her qualities and historical tradition as background were closely related but 
that monarch had to hold at least the status of  monarch to perform this function well.345 In Kuroda’s 
view, a monarch played a symbolic role in integrating the people, like a national flag or historical 
monuments. Unlike them, however, the monarch appeared as not a thing but a personality before the 
people. The great personality of  a monarch could lead to integrating the people well and this was 
called charismatic rule. Kuroda saw the symbolic and the charismatic as conflicting with each other 
because charismatic rule came down to the rule of  man, not law.346 The Tenno Showa in the Meiji 
constitutional system was typical of  charisma. In his understanding, reflection of  that system had 
come to remove all political powers vested in the tenno.347 In the new constitutional system, however, 
he argued, the tenno was neither a monarch nor the head of  the state nor the source of  legitimacy of  
political power. Because the tenno had neither reigned nor governed, he continued, the matters of  
state listed in the new constitution that the tenno plays were merely formal and ceremonial.348 Thus 
Kuroda concluded that while the whole constitutional structure had placed emphasis upon denial of  
the tenno’s power, it did not increase the symbolic function of  the tenno.349 In this understanding, as a 
                                                 
344 Kuroda, “Kajyo”; Kuroda, “Kenpojyo no chii.”  
    For the strategy of the tenno’s visit on all over Japan in order to settle the newly established symbolic 
institution, see Sakamoto Kojiro, Shocho tennosei heno pafomansu. 
345 Kuroda, “Kajyo,” 12-13. 
346 Kuroda, “Kajyo,” 13-14; Kuroda, “Kenpojyo no chii,” 7-13. 
347 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 4. 
348 Kuroda, “Kajyo,” 14.  
349 Kuroda, “Kenpojyo no chii,” 16. 
 427 
matter of  constitutional logic, whereas the tenno is supposed to be the symbol of  the state and the 
unity of  the people, there is no substantial room for him to play a symbolic function for integrating 
the people. But as a matter of  fact, the tenno plays an important role in social and political processes. 
 Sato Isao raised a question about the premise Kuroda had set.350 Kuroda assumed that a 
symbolic function of  monarch was well performed only when the monarch was even nominally 
vested with the power to reign. Sato first disagreed with Kuroda that the integrating function of  the 
symbol involved the status of  monarch. 351  Sato believed that the symbolic function was well 
performed all the more because a symbol was unable, powerless and passive. In this respect, Sato 
argued, the current tenno was more appropriately symbolic than a tenno with absolute authority and 
the wide political powers of  the Meiji constitutional system.352  
While he admitted the positive side of  a symbol Kuroda argued for, Sato contended that 
when what a symbol symbolizes had an undisputable and unequivocal meaning, it was worth a real 
symbol. On the other hand, when what a symbol symbolized was unstable and contestable, various 
people expected the symbol to have a positive effect in different ways and thus the symbol could not 
integrate the people as it was supposed to do.353 In this respect, Sato argued, the tenno as the symbol 
of  the unity of  the people was considered unstable and understood as carrying many different 
meanings divided by people who saw the symbol. Furthermore, although the tenno in the new 
constitution had been deprived of  all political powers and vested with formal and ceremonial roles, 
he continued, there were ample dangers that the authority of  the tenno from the prevalent image of  
the old tenno might be abused in the political process. Because of  the failure of  the Meiji 
constitutional system, Sato inferred, the new constitution rejected integration through the tenno’s 
personality as a dangerous phenomenon.354 In conclusion, the matters of  state enumerated in the 
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postwar constitution offered no small room for performing the symbolic function of  the tenno well.355 
This controversy has again clarified the socio-psychological nature of  the symbolic tenno 
institution.356 The constitutional provision itself  does not guarantee the institution to function well.357 
To be sure, it is always the case with constitutional law, which is inevitable as the fundamental law of  
the state. However, it is truer of  the clauses on the symbolic tenno institution because a lot of  
attention had been paid to its very existence since acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration. Whatever 
position one might take toward the newly introduced symbolic tenno institution, its emotional cost 
was extremely high because the idea of  the tenno in one line unbroken for ages eternal had controlled 
every aspect of  the values of  an individual’s life.358 The controversy has well shown the necessity of  
exploration of  a question of  under which conditions what has provided for the symbol in the new 
constitution can display adequately its function.  
The twist the debate has indicated has also revealed a complicated feature of  the problem. 
Whereas Kuroda understood that the symbolic tenno could play a positive role in integrating the 
people under certain conditions, Sato was pessimistic about its positive function due to the division 
of  images the symbol brought. While Kuroda did not understand that the new constitution expected 
the symbolic tenno to perform a function of  integration on a socio-psychological level, moreover, 
Sato recognized that the constitution expected the symbolic tenno institution to play an integrating 
function. Kuroda believed that the integrating function of  the symbol could work only upon the 
minimum premise that the tenno even nominally held the status of  monarch and the head of  state 
and thus pointed out that the constitution had provided the symbolic tenno with no room for playing 
the integrating function. Believing so, he placed emphasis upon socio-psychological conditions 
around the symbol. He argued that constitutional provisions on the symbol would produce no 
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integrating function by themselves.359 Meanwhile, Sato stated that the matters of  state the new 
constitution has vested with the symbolic tenno were the ultimate forms of  nominal powers a 
monarch usually enjoys.360  
Both Kuroda and Sato agreed that it had to be avoided that the symbolic tenno institution 
would become charismatic in the postwar constitutional system. They disagreed with each other on 
the conditions under which the tenno institution could play a healthy function of  integration as the 
symbol. The written constitution was not believed to help much in exploring such conditions. The 
political circumstances of  the time inevitably influenced the conditions under which the symbol 
actually functioned. Although there were a few efforts to minimize the charismatic influences of  the 
symbolic tenno, 361  the predominant nostalgic conservative forces attempted to interpret to the 
maximum the matters of  state the symbolic tenno was supposed to perform so as to emasculate the 
spirits of  the new constitution. For example, the government tried to treat the tenno in the diplomatic 
context as if  he were the head of  the state. As discussed above,362 the tenno has no powers related to 
government and can perform only the matters of  state enlisted in the constitution with the advice 
and approve of  the cabinet.363 Thus the tenno can play a formal and ceremonial role. In the area of  
foreign affairs, the cabinet assumes responsibility for substantial decision-making.364 After decisions 
made by the cabinet and with its advice and approval, the tenno attests the full powers and 
credentials of  ambassadors and ministers.365 As a matter of  constitutional logic, it is the cabinet that 
issues the full powers and credentials of  diplomats. As a practice, however, it looks like the tenno 
creates the documents. 366  Indeed, there has always been great temptation for the conservative 
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government to utilize the symbolic tenno institution for political causes. 
In the next section, we will examine an interesting legal case that is understood as a good 
example of  how great an influence even the symbolic tenno institution had upon the exercise of  the 
precious right of  free expression. The case reflects the complicated mixed components of  the 
presumably democratic political process in postwar Japan: the reasons and passions of  the people.  
  
10. The Placard Case: The Symbolic Tenno, Free Speech, and the Emergence of  New Politics 
 The case was about old lese majesty in the new constitutional system. On May 19, 1946, a 
popular mass meeting to gain rice (so-called the Food May Day) was held. In the demonstration, a 
communist worker at a machine factory carried a placard that mocked the tenno.367 The placard read:  
Imperial Edict (Hirohito says)  
 The kokutai has been maintained.  
    I stuff   
      myself.  
 You people,  
    starve to death.  
  Imperial sign and seal (in katakana)  
The Japan Communist Party  Tanaka Precision Machine Cell368 
 
 
He was indicted for lese majesty.369 In a sense, the very indictment was astonishing because the 
liberation that GHQ had pushed seemed to face severe limitations.370 People were curious to know 
whether courteous freedom alone deserved celebration or people themselves could define the 
meaning of  freedom in the new era.  
On November 2, 1946, just one day before the promulgation of  the Constitution of  Japan, 
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the Tokyo district court found him guilty of  defamation of  the tenno, not lese majesty, and sentenced 
him to imprisonment with labor for eight months.371 On October 9, after the indictment and before 
the judgment, in fact, MacArthur made a comment on the decision of  the prosecutor’s office not to 
prosecute other cases of  lese majesty. 
The decision of  the Japanese procurators to drop accusations against men 
charged with lese majeste is a noteworthy application of  the fundamental concept, 
embodied in the new constitution just adopted by the National Diet, that all men 
are equal before the law, that no individual in Japan---not even the Emperor---shall 
be clothed in legal protection denied the common man. It marks the beginning of  a 
true understanding of  the lofty spirit of  the new national charter, which affirms the 
dignity of  all men, and secures to all the right freely to discuss all issues, political, 
social, and economic, of  concern to the people of  a democratic nation. For, the free 
interchange of  ideas, the free expression of  opinions, the free criticism of  officials 
and institutions is essential to the continued life and growth of  popular government. 
Democracy is vital and dynamic but cannot survive unless all citizens are free thus 
to speak their minds. 
In his new role the Emperor will symbolize the repository of  state 
authority---the citizen. The dignity of  the state will become the dignity of  the 
individual citizen, and the protection accorded him as the symbol of  the state ought 
to be no more and no less than the protection accorded the citizen. To hold the 
contrary would constitute a direct negation of  one of  the basic principles of  
democratic government. It would but serve to perpetuate the pattern of  feudalism 
and autocracy and do violence to those basic freedoms acknowledged by Japan and 
to which the Emperor himself  has given most hearty accord.372 
 
 
MacArthur emphasized the value of  equality in the new political order and denounced lese majesty 
as special protection for the tenno. However, he did not forget to add that “all public officials be 
protected against unwarranted defamation or vilifications in licentious disregard of  the respect to 
which they as free individuals in a free society and as the public representatives of  a free people are 
fully entitled.”373 MacArthur did not pay due attention to the values of  free speech in a liberal 
democracy.374  
The judgment of  the Tokyo district court seemed to have followed this guidance of  
MacArthur. It recognized the fundamental change in the status of  the tenno after Japan accepted the 
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Potsdam Declaration. Special legal protection for the tenno had been abolished because the tenno had 
been regarded as an individual. Thus, the judgment said, the reputation of  the tenno as an individual 
should be legally protected like everyone else’s.375 As a result, it saw, defamation instead of  lese 
majesty should be the legal issue there.376 Another problem was that while lese majesty was not, 
defamation was a crime indictable upon a complaint.377 The judgment ruled that prosecutors as a 
representative of  the public interests could indict defamation cases unless it was against the tenno’s 
especially expressed will.378 On the other hand, the judgment did not attach importance to freedom 
of  expression. Rights should not be abused and had to be exercised to enhance the public welfare. 
The judgment turned the legal issue into a moral problem when it said that free expression should 
have been exerted with moderation and courtesy.379 Whatever it might intend, anyway, the fact was 
important that the Tokyo district court denied lese majesty in postwar Japan.380 Both the defendant 
and prosecutor appealed to the upper court. 
 The very next day of  the district court’s decision, the Constitution of  Japan was promulgated. 
And along with it, an imperial order of  general pardon or amnesty was issued.381 Those who were 
accused of  lese majesty were amnestied. When amnesty was ordered, the power of  public 
prosecution on pending cases would cease to exist and thus a court should grant a menso-
adjudication (a kind of  dismissal).382  
 On June 28, 1947, the Tokyo appellate court rendered a menso-adjudication.383 But the ruling 
challenged MacArthur and GHQ. Even after the amnesty was ordered, the appellate court continued 
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a substantial trial. The ruling surprisingly found the conduct of  the defendant constituted lese 
majesty. The ruling believed that lese majesty had two functions. One was to protect respect for the 
sacred and inviolable tenno as the head of  the state. This function was related to the protection of  the 
tenno as sovereign. In this sense, it said, the people had entertained a deep conviction that to 
maintain respect for the tenno was equivalent to protection of  the state itself. The second function of  
lese majesty was understood as protecting the tenno as a person. In this sense, lese majesty was 
interpreted as a special type of  defamation concerning the tenno. Although acceptance of  the 
Potsdam Declaration and the establishment of  the new constitution had significantly changed the 
status of  the tenno and thus abolished the first function of  lese majesty, the ruling contended, its 
second function had not changed because the new constitution had given the tenno special status as 
the symbol of  the state and the unity of  the people and thus deserved special legal protection. Even 
under the new constitution, the ruling mistakenly pointed out, the tenno as the head of  the state 
occupied a special diplomatic position and granted honors and held ceremonies.384 Guarantee of  the 
tenno’s social status made its legal protection different from common citizens, which was tolerated by 
the new constitution because of  its establishment of  the symbolic tenno institution. As a result, lese 
majesty as a special crime of  defamation of  the tenno still existed. The Potsdam Declaration and 
GHQ directive did not affect the power of  lese majesty, the ruling continued, because it had not 
officially been abolished or suspended yet.385   
Like the district court, furthermore, the appellate court also despised free expression. It 
placed emphasis upon a moderate and courteous manner of  exercising the right.386 The principle of  
popular sovereignty was not mentioned with freedom of  expression. In conclusion, the appellate 
court dismissed the case after recognizing lese majesty. While the district court denied lese majesty 
in the new constitutional system, the appellate court refused to recognize the paradigmatic shift of  
sovereignty. 
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The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court to seek a judgment of  not guilty. On May 26, 
1948, a fractionalized Court dismissed the appeal.387 The majority by nine of  fifteen justices relied 
upon a technical reason. They understood that menso-adjudication as formal, not substantial, namely 
if  there was a decision of  amnesty, which then removed the power of  public prosecution, the court 
had to dismiss the case without examining substantially whether an accused act constituted a crime. 
The majority thus denied an appeal based upon claims that there were no accused facts or that the 
fact did not constitute a crime. The majority admitted that the judgment of  the appellate court was 
illegal because it reviewed the substantial contents of  the case. Because it eventually dismissed the 
case as formal adjudication, however, the Supreme Court should not reverse the judgment below.388 
One justice maintained that the appeal should be dismissed because he believed that an appeal of  
menso-adjudication was impermissible. Moreover, he contended that it was a substantial judgment 
and that lese majesty as a special crime of  defamation on the tenno was still effective until it was 
clearly repealed.389 Two justices interpreted the appeal as legal but substantially argued that the 
defendant was guilty of  lese majesty.390 These three justices took the same position on merits of  the 
case as the original judgment. 
Two other justices agreed with the defendant that the appeal was legal. Like the majority, 
they understood the original judgment was illegal because it reviewed the case substantially despite 
the amnesty. Unlike the majority, however, they believed that the illegality of  the original judgment 
was so serious that the Supreme Court should reverse it and render a formal menso-adjudication by 
itself. 391  One justice explicitly pointed out that acceptance of  the Potsdam Declaration had 
fundamentally transformed the status of  the tenno and thus he argued that since then lese majesty 
had been void regardless of  a formal procedure of  repealing the crime. In his view, this 
understanding was conformable to the democratic thought that all people are equal before the law. 
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The new constitution declared the principle of  popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno system 
based upon the principle. He believed that a feudalistic idea was so obsolete that the dignity of  the 
tenno could not be protected without the threat of  criminal punishment. Thus he insisted that the 
Court should reverse the original judgment and declared the defendant’s innocence.392 
Resorting to legal technicality, 393  the majority of  the Supreme Court avoided the 
controversial issue on relation of  the symbolic tenno system to lese majesty. By doing so, as a result, 
the majority did not reverse the construction of  lese majesty as the special defamation of  the tenno 
the Tokyo appellate court affirmed. Thus twelve of  fifteen justices did not disagree that even the 
symbolic tenno should deserve special legal protection. They did not care about the most profound 
relationship between the principle of  popular sovereignty and freedom of  expression. A special legal 
protection such as lese majesty seriously conflicts with the idea of  the precise examination of  all 
kinds of  political authority by the people themselves, which must be the basic principle for popular 
sovereignty. The very idea of  lese majesty should have become obsolete under the principle of  
popular sovereignty. However, the inferior courts and the Supreme Court in this case failed to 
appreciate fully what free expression means in a liberal democracy. Therefore, this case well shows 
how powerful the old way of  thinking was even in the new era. 
At the same time, however, this case also indicates that a new era had come. Thanks to a 
new system of  disclosing the opinions of  justices,394 the fractionalized Supreme Court itself  became 
evidence that justices could not reach an agreement. In a sense, the majority might feel 
uncomfortable about expressing their opinion of  punishability of  lese majesty in the new 
constitutional idea and thus might restrain themselves from doing so. Moreover, there were 
dissenting opinions in the case. An ideological monolith became merely a fading myth. One justice 
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clearly declared the accused innocent because lese majesty had already lost its legal power to protect 
the tenno. The Japanese people now lived in a world where people disagree with one anther over 
important political matters. Thus politics has to be based upon public discussion. This is 
fundamentally different from the prewar system in which the idea of  the kokutai, the sovereign tenno 
in one line unbroken for ages eternal, had deeply restricted people’s way of  thinking. However 
influentially the outdated ideas might have lingered, it was also true that public discourse on 
important political issues had been fundamentally transformed. The very tenno institution had 
become an object of  public discussion. Postwar Japan had finally come into a regime of  legitimating 
political power endlessly through making efforts to persuade others by speech. 
 
11. Conclusion           
The public discourse on constituting a political order during the early postwar period is best 
described as a self-conscious confrontation between continuity and discontinuity between the prewar 
and postwar constitutional systems. Whatever its origins might have been, the Constitution of  Japan 
is really innovative in respect of  sovereignty. The people who once were only subjects of  divine rule 
of  the tenno are now sovereign.395 The status of  the symbolic tenno institution depends upon the 
general will of  the sovereign people. 396  Conservatives could not receive straightforwardly the 
alternation the new constitution had brought because they were all charmed with the kokutai 
ideology for a long time. This was true with old liberals such as Minobe and Tsuda. Most of  the 
intellectuals of  the time were prisoners of  the kokutai. Thus arguments for continuity between the 
two constitutions were influential in public discourse. No matter how limited and weak it might have 
been, however, frank recognition of  discontinuity was also steadily advocated. 
In the last section, we discussed the Placard Case, which, among other things, indicated 
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that a new age had come.397 The case arose from the Food May Day activities on May 19, 1946, in 
which about 250,000 people gathered to participate in a demonstration to get rice.398 They went to 
the imperial palace to ask the tenno for delivery of  rice. Such a direct action of  people showed the 
arrival of  a new era. This episode also indicated that people had a feeling that the merciful tenno 
might help people in trouble. Although politicians sounding the tenno might be self-interested, people 
somehow believed that the tenno as their father would listen to their distress. This feeling was a 
reflection of  prewar ideology of  chu (loyalty) and ko (filial piety). On May 24, the Tenno Showa 
(Hirohito) delivered a speech on the food crisis. The food speech was much less influential than his 
speech on ending the war on August 15 one year before. Social disorder immediately after the defeat 
in the war caused many people to concentrate on a private life that was very difficult to sustain. The 
old style of  relation of  order and subject did not necessarily work well in the new and confusing 
situation.  
In the speech, the tenno expressed his desire: “I sincerely desire and expect that on this 
occasion the people will live in the beautiful tradition as the family state, overcome difficulties of  
today beyond individual interests, and make their way toward reconstruction of  the homeland.”399 
However, people who were starving to death could not reverently listen to what the tenno said. They 
wanted not a spiritual speech but something to eat.400 They expected the tenno as sovereign to present 
concrete measures to solve the food crisis. Their expectation was betrayed.401 After the speech, there 
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disappeared popular appeals and petitions to the tenno for actual claims.402 Many people had come to 
realize that the family view of  the state was fictitious. This showed that something important was 
happening in the political system. The Meiji constitutional system was supported by the ideology of  
loyalty and filial piety. However, they were fading virtues in the new era and had no longer 
functioned well as reigning ideology. A new idea for a governmental system was desperately needed 
in the new era. 
A new trend also emerged about the role of  the tenno in an educational context. The Kyoiku 
Chokugo (Imperial Rescript on Education) was issued for the purpose of  offering a moral foundation 
for the Meiji constitutional regime.403 Chu (loyalty) and ko (filial piety) were regarded as the most 
important virtues for propping the empire of  Japan. “Our subjects ever united in loyalty (chu) and 
filial piety (ko) have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of  
the fundamental character of  Our Empire (kokutai no seika), and herein also lies the source of  Our 
education (kyoiku no engen).”404 The new constitution clearly conflicts with the basic idea of  the 
Rescript. After many twists and turns, on June 19 and 20, 1948, the House of  Representatives and 
House of  Councilors voted for resolutions on rescinding and confirming the lapse of  the Imperial 
Rescript on Education, respectively. 405  On September 22, 1951, in its place, Amano Sadahiro, 
Minister of  Education in the third Yoshida Shigeru cabinet, announced his private plan of  an outline 
of  national practices.406 He contended that the spirit of  morality as an independent state would 
require individuals to realize the dignity of  personality of  both themselves and others and that the 
individual mind, knowing what was fair and square, would require the state to be fair and square, 
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which would lead to the spirit of  harmony. He enumerated various virtues regarding individuals, ie 
(household), society, and state. As expected, Amano emphasized the role of  the tenno in rebuilding 
national morality. The outline enlisted the tenno and the ethics of  the state, among other things. It 
read: “Japan has the tenno as the symbol of  the state. The existence of  the tenno in the long tradition 
is distinctively characteristic of  Japan. The status of  the tenno holds a character of  the center of  
morality as the symbol of  the state.” “The soul of  the state resides in moral principles. The essence 
of the state is deeply based upon its ethical character rather than political and economic character. 
The tenno has unselfish moral character and thus the status of  the tenno symbolizes the fundamental 
character of  the state.”407 
Amano’s plan was an attempt to moralize postwar Japan by utilizing the symbolic tenno. 
His argument seemed similar to the thesis of  the tenno as akogare no chushin (the center of  adoration) 
a former minister of  state Kanamori Tokujiro had developed in the ninetieth Imperial Diet as a 
quasi-constitutional convention. However, they were different from each other. While Kanamori as a 
matter of  fact argued that the tenno was the center of  morality of  the people, Amano attempted to 
introduce guidance that the tenno ought to be the center of  national morality. The idea that the tenno 
has a moral and ethical character easily led to deification of  the tenno.408 That was why many people 
were worried about Amano’s outline of  national practices. Faced with broad criticisms, Amano 
eventually withdrew his private plan.  
This episode vividly indicates, on the one hand, that the symbolic tenno system is different 
from the sacred and inviolable tenno institution and, on the other hand, that there are always 
temptations for political power to utilize the tenno to mobilize the people for certain purposes. 
Because the cabinet is responsible for matters of  state the symbolic tenno is supposed to perform,409 it 
depends upon the character of  cabinets whether the role of  the symbolic tenno institution will 
expand or shrink. Mysterious connotations the word of  symbol carries make it much easier for the 
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cabinet to manipulate the institution.410 
In such situation, the Constitution of  Japan started to regulate political processes. Its basic 
principle is simple and clear: “Government is a sacred trust of  the people, the authority for which is 
derived from the people, the powers of  which are exercised by the representatives of  the people, and 
the benefits of  which are enjoyed by the people.”411 Required liberal democratization of  politics was 
only realized through its transformation to mutual persuasion by speech. The postwar constitution 
has established a base line for it. 
Ukai Nobushige once articulated the essence of  the tenno system provided for in the 
Constitution of  Japan. “The status of  the tenno as the symbol of  the state and of  the unity of  the 
Japanese people the Constitution of  Japan has provided for depends upon the political will and 
psychology of  the people that decide a role the symbol should play. A problem cannot be determined 
by the letters of  the constitution whether the status of  the tenno is merely formal or also substantial. 
If  the political will and psychology of  the people and the government that now has the status of  their 
representative wanted to give an important role to the symbolic tenno, the tenno could be substantial 
in such a way, despite its formal and ceremonial functional provisions of  the postwar 
constitution.”412 
The constitutional principle of  popular sovereignty with the symbolic tenno institution is a 
product of  political compromise among complicated internal and external elements after World War 
II. No matter how similar the new symbolic tenno institution might seem to the old one, they are 
fundamentally different from each other. With the principle of  popular sovereignty, the political will 
of  the people, not the tenno must prevail. The postwar constitution anyway overcomes the most 
serious difficulty the Meiji constitutional regime had suffered from.413 The new constitution has 
taken the tenno system into a constitutional frame. The substance of  the symbolic tenno institution 
                                                 
410 For the mysterious character of  a symbol, see Ukai, “Shocho to daihyo,” 12.   
411 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble, par. 1. 
412 Ukai Nobushige, “Kenpo niokeru tenno no chii,” Shiso, no. 336, 1952, reprinted in Shocho to daihyo, 14-25, 
25. 
413 See Chapter 1 section 9. 
 441 
thus all depends upon the political will of  the people. The external imposition theory and the 
internal continuity theory are unable to offer persuasive arguments on these ongoing struggles over 
the internalization of  liberal democratic values in postwar Japan. Rather, the Japanese constitutional 
experience here is best understood as more dynamic. In fact, making the postwar constitution has 




An Unfinished Constitutional Revolution 
 
As of  November 2003, the Constitution of  Japan has been effective for fifty-six and a half  
years. The Meiji Constitution was good for the same period. Thus, the postwar constitution has 
enjoyed a longer life than its predecessor by the end of  2003. This longevity is somewhat amazing 
when we recall its bizarre origins.  
While the Japanese government, enchanted with the kokutai ideology, failed to create a new 
constitutional order that was appropriate for the era after the defeat in war, the intellectuals on the 
periphery of  the established regime presented an innovative idea of  popular sovereignty with a 
ritualistic tenno institution. Then, GHQ intervened in the process of  constitutional making to protect 
the tenno system from international harsh public opinions and to execute its occupational policy 
smoothly. The Japanese government had no clear vision without retention of  the kokutai and thus 
could not help accepting GHQ’s draft, which turned out to serve the government’s basic cause. 
However, the government did not obediently follow it but attempted to japanize it as much as 
possible, and in fact succeeded in part.1  
The government failure did not necessarily mean that there were no innovative experiences 
at all for the Japanese people. The Japanese people as a whole were compelled to be confronted with 
the crucial problem of  constituting freedom for the first time in their history, even though GHQ 
carefully controlled the flow of  information by censorship. In the ninetieth Imperial Diet, women 
and leftists along with traditional conservative men participated in deliberating the fundamental 
organization of  the political order, although GHQ also intervened in clarifying the principle of  
popular sovereignty because the Japanese government intentionally used ambiguous phrases. The 
process of  making the postwar constitution followed the procedure the Meiji Constitution provided 
for. The American and Japanese conspiracy deprived the Japanese people of  a valuable opportunity 
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to participate directly in creating the fundamental order. As a result, the Constitution of  Japan was 
established as a total revision of  the Meiji Constitution, even though the two constitutions 
fundamentally differ in their basic political philosophy. Then the Japanese government tried to 
pretend that constitutional discourse had continued despite the change of  the name of  the 
constitution. Although it was given an opportunity to review the new constitution between May 3, 
1948, and May 3, 1949, as a policy of  the Far Eastern Commission, further, the Japanese 
government did not take any substantial actions for review and revise the newly established 
constitution.2 
Conservatives have severely criticized the postwar constitution since Japan recovered her 
independence. Its bizarre origin definitely makes a considerable contribution to conservative attacks. 
Conservatives argue that the postwar constitution is made in the USA and that Japan needs a 
constitution that expresses more indigenous values.3 They insist that the tenno should be the head of  
state and that the guarantee of  rights in the postwar constitution is too individualistic to destroy 
traditional communal virtues. Obligations or the public welfare rather than rights should be 
emphasized in their opinion. Article 9, with its denunciation of  war and armed forces has been 
always a target of  vigorous criticism. For the conservatives, Article 9 is the symbol of  the limited 
sovereignty of  postwar Japan.4 Wars of  self-defense and of  international sanctions as the natural 
right of  an independent state should have not been denounced. 
The conservative campaigns for constitutional amendments from 1950s have never gained 
enough momentum to initiate an amending bill in the Diet.5 In 1955, conservatives united to form 
the Liberal Democratic Party. One of  main reasons for this realignment was to establish an 
autonomous and indigenous constitution.6 The next year, the LDP took the leadership in creating 
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the Kenpo Chosakai (the Commission on the Constitution) in the cabinet.7 The Socialist Party decided 
not to participate in the Commission because it believed that the Commission was nothing other 
than a plausible excuse for a conclusion already determined. On August 13, 1957, at length, the 
Commission on the Constitution started its activities. About seven years later, on July 3, 1964, the 
Commission finished its work and submitted its final report to Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato. From a 
revisionist point of  view, the final report was disappointing. The report did not recommend the 
creation of  an independent and indigenous constitution but juxtaposed both revisionist and 
preservationist opinions in the process of  enactment and current problems with the postwar 
constitution. The political intention to revise the constitution at its establishment had disappeared. 
The Commission had instead become a more academic study institution. The leadership of  
Chairman Takayanagi Kenzo greatly contributed to this transformation. Takayanagi, a professor of  
Anglo-American law at the University of  Tokyo, in fact participated in deliberation on the postwar 
constitution in the House of  Peers. Interestingly enough, he himself  not only strongly opposed the 
external imposition theory but also proposed a Japanese-American collaboration thesis. His position 
is well expressed in the following quotation. Though long, it is worth rereading: 
  If  we make a generalized judgment on the basis of  the circumstances which have 
become clear as a result of  the investigation of  the facts carried out by this 
commission, then, it is unfair to characterize the present Constitution as having 
been imposed by an army occupation.  
  The question of  whether or not the Constitution was “imposed” must be discussed 
from a number of  different aspects. The first is that of  the acceptance of  the 
Potsdam Declaration. Because there can be no doubt that it can be regarded as the 
fountainhead of  the present Constitution and that it was accepted by the 
government of  Japan as a result of  a lost war, it can be said that the declaration was 
forced on Japan by the Allies. Also it was enforced by the Japanese government 
under the supervision and direction of  SCAP [Supreme Commander for Allied 
Powers]. Accordingly, because the power to decide whether the draft constitution 
prepared by the Japanese government was in accord with the provisions of  the 
Potsdam Declaration resided in SCAP and ultimately in the Far Eastern 
Commission, the fact that the Japanese government was not completely free will be 
contested by no one. Regarded from this aspect, it can be said that the enactment of  
the present Constitution was forced on Japan. 
  The second aspect is that of  the so-called transmission of  the MacArthur draft. 
                                                 
7 For the Kenpo Chosakai, see John M. Maki, Japan’s Commission on the Constitution: The Final Report (Seattle: 
University of  Washington Press, 1980); Watanabe, Nihonkoku kenpo ‘kaisei’shi, 305-306, 314-321, 364-440. 
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The emphasis of  the “imposed constitution” argument is on whether that draft was 
imposed, ordered, or recommended. But it is impossible to conclude directly that 
there was force in this second aspect from a recognition that there were elements of  
force in the first aspect above. 
  Thus, the problem here concerns the power of  General MacArthur but in this case 
also a distinction must be made between the legal dimensions of  his authority and 
its actual exercise. Thus, it is a fact that General MacArthur possessed the legal 
authority to impose orders and force on the Japanese government. But this is a 
problem of  two different dimensions, namely, the fact of  legal authority itself  and 
his actual exercise of  it. 
  If  we look at the aspect of  the actual utilization referred to above, General 
MacArthur’s actions at the time of  the enactment of  the Constitution assumed the 
following form: the presentation to the Japanese government of  the MacArthur 
draft as the first draft, the request for the opinions of  the Japanese side in respect to 
it, and the acceptance and inclusion of  the items in house opinions which could be 
endorsed. This differs from a one-sided imposition of  orders; moreover, the fact that 
GHQ acted in accordance with this strict differentiation between these two forms 
can be recognized because at the time of  the transmission of  the MacArthur draft it 
was very definitely stated that it was not an “order,” but “advice.” Considering the 
matter thus, it is erroneous to view the MacArthur draft as having been forced on 
the Japanese side by SCAP. The present Constitution must be termed a result of  the 
collaborative efforts of  Japan and America.  
  Even when we turn our attention to the content of  the Constitution, it must be 
considered a Japanese-American collaborative Constitution. For example, at the 
same time that politically, a considerable effort on General MacArthur’s part went 
into the maintenance of  the emperor system and on the technical legal side the 
efforts of  the GHQ legal experts were worked in to the present Constitution, also 
on the Japanese side the efforts of  Prime Minister Shidehara must be highly valued 
both in regard to his expounding to General MacArthur of  the principle of  the 
renunciation of  war, but also in regard to his decision to follow the line of  the 
MacArthur draft to defend the emperor system. Also on the technical legal side the 
wishes of  the Japanese side were realized. As a reflection of  facts like these, the 
Constitution was not something forced on us by an army of  occupation. It was also 
not something created by the Japanese alone. In this sense, it must be considered as 
a constitution resulting from Japanese-American collaboration.8  
 
In November 1963, Prime Minister Ikeda, a pragmatic conservative, publicly announced that he had 
no intention to amend the constitution during his term.9  In fact, the Socialist Party and other 
opposition parties occupied one-third of  the seats in the House of  Representatives,10 which meant 
that it was impossible for the LDP to amend the constitution without the consent of  the Socialists. 
                                                 
8 Maki, Japan’s Commission on the Constitution, 224-225 ([…] added). 
9 See Watanabe, Nihonkoku kenpo ‘kaisei’shi, 432-433.  
10 After the general election on November 20, 1960, the LDP gained 300 seats (64.2%), while the Socialist 
Party the Democratic Social Party, and the Communist Party occupied 144 (30.8%), 17(16.2%), and 3 seats 
(2.5%), respectively. The opposition parties held 164 seats (35.1%). After the next general election three years 
later, the situation did not change. While the LDP shared 63% of  the seats, the opposition parties occupied 
36.8%. See Ishikawa, Sengo seijishi, 122-123. 
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Ikeda realized the postwar constitution had been assimilated by the people. Although the 
Commission consisted of  those who supported constitutional revision more than those who were 
negative about it, the failure of  revisionists might indicate that they were not a majority among the 
people. Constitutional revision no longer had a high priority over other important political and 
economic matters in policy selection. This conservative campaign ended in an anticlimax. In any 
event, the consent of  two-thirds of  the members of  each house in the Diet is a burdensome 
requirement for partisan movements of  constitutional amendment. 
If  we calmly consider the matter, we reach the conclusion that, in a sense, conservatives 
have mistakenly attacked the postwar constitution. In light of  unavoidable intervention, it is they 
who gained maximum benefits from the new fundamental law for the time being.11 They could 
maintain their beloved tenno institution anyway. Other scenarios all might have been much more 
devastating toward the traditional tenno system than the current constitution. 
In any event, the assertion of  the “imposed” constitution could not gain much support. It is 
important to ask why the conservative campaigns for an autonomous and indigenous constitution 
have failed so far. Indeed, some member of  GHQ who participated in preparing the draft expected in 
1946 that Japan would amend the postwar constitution soon after the occupation ended.12 The 
expectation remains unfulfilled.13 The Japanese people have never amended the postwar constitution. 
We might say that they have never even taken any serious action for amendment because a law of  
popular referendum necessary for the amendment process has not been enacted yet for over fifty 
years.14 This is in sharp contrast to the experience of  postwar Germany. The Bonn Basic Law has 
been amended more than forty-five times, although its amendment process significantly differs from 
                                                 
11 See Tanaka Hideo, Kenpo seitei katei obegaki (Notes on the Process of  Making the Constitution of  Japan) (Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, 1979), 175-178. 
12 For example, Milton J. Esman, who was a member of  the executive committee in the Government Section 
for preparing GHQ’s draft, believed that “the new constitution would not outlast the military Occupation of 
Japan.” See Theodore McNelly, “Epilogue,” The Origins of  Japan’s Democratic Constitution (Lanham, Md.: 
University Press of  America, 2000), 173.  
13 See Theodore H. McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’: The Policy and Process of  Constitutional Reform in 
Occupied Japan,” Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 103. 
14 See Chapter 4 section 8. 
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the Japanese one in respect of  popular referendum.15    
The conservative campaign for an autonomous and indigenous constitution has failed 
partly because the external imposition theory does not necessarily correspond with what really 
happened in the process of  making the postwar constitution. As I have argued in this dissertation, 
the process consists of  rather complicated interactions. We should not forget that the Kenpo 
Kenkyukai (the Constitutional Research Group) and the Kokumin No Kokugo Undo (the People’s 
National Language Movement) played a critically important role in framing the postwar constitution 
either indirectly or directly.16 In the thirty-hour marathon drafting meeting of  March 4-5, 1946, Sato 
Tatsuo, a ranking legal bureaucrat, bravely challenged the Government Section to draft a Japanese 
text modeled upon the GHQ’s plan for the conservative cause.17 The Japanese people with their first 
authentic universal suffrage elected their representatives for a quasi-constitutional convention. The 
representatives included, along with traditional conservative men, women who garnered seats in the 
lower house for the first time, socialists who were moderate but solid reformists, and communists 
who argued for a republican form of  government. In the ninetieth Imperial Diet, representatives 
argued for and against organization of  the fundamental political order. The Japanese people had 
never had such public deliberation ever before. They experienced freedom in creating a constitution 
of  their own government. Thus, all in all, the Japanese side did important work for either progressive 
or conservative purposes. In sum, the external imposition theory oversimplifies what Japanese 
people actually did in the process of  establishment of  the new constitution during the occupied 
period.18 
                                                 
15 The Bonn Basic Law requires no popular referendum for constitutional amendment. See Chapter 4 section 8. 
16 See Chapter 3 sections 2 & 3 and Chapter 4 section 2. 
17 See Chapter 3 Section 4. See also, Koseki Shoichi “Japanizing the Constitution,” Japan Quarterly 35: 3 (1988), 
234-240. 
18 Theodore McNelly, pioneer of  the study of  the postwar Japanese constitution in the United States, has 
expressed the same opinion: “While it cannot be denied that MacArthur’s role was decisive in the formulation 
and ultimate enactment of  the constitution, it is an oversimplification to assert that he arbitrarily “imposed” it 
to Japan. (1) First we note that he was acting on orders from the U.S. government and the Allied Powers to 
bring about the democratization of the Japanese government system. (2) Second, we note that the timing of 
his efforts was intended to protect the monarchy, which the overwhelming majority of  the Japanese people 
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In relation to this, the failure of  the conservative campaign for constitutional revision is also 
partly because basic political values embodied in the new constitution have taken deeper root in 
postwar Japan. The constitutional values are not entirely exogenous. For instance, the Kenpo 
Kenkyukai proposed a constitutional regime not only in which the people would have sovereign 
power and the tenno would be a ceremonial institution with no real governing powers but also in 
which the Japanese people would enjoy civil rights and civil liberties without reservation of  laws. 
Kato Kanjyu conceived the ceremonial tenno as the symbol of  harmony of  the nation.19 Further, the 
Kenpo Kondankai (the Constitution Discussion Group) planned to introduce judicial review in its new 
constitutional system. Even denunciation of  armed forces was once provided for in its first draft.20 
Three basic principles of  the postwar constitution---due respect for fundamental human rights, 
popular sovereignty, and thorough pacifism---are all indigenous ideas among the Japanese people, 
although most of  them were germinal and needed to be polished with help from outside. Thus the 
postwar constitution was not a bolt out of  the blue but more or less not unfamiliar to the Japanese 
people. Its basic ideas had a solid ground for developing in postwar Japan. Therefore, many Japanese 
people are not sympathetic with the conservative accusation that the postwar constitution is foreign 
in essence.  
We can point out another reason for constitutional stability. Immediately after the wartime 
                                                                                                                                                             
desired, from its abolition as demanded by some of the Allies. MacArthur, then was advising the Japanese 
government about the best way to achieve its primary objective in constitutional reform and warning them 
about the dangers to the monarchy if  appropriate action was not taken. 
  (3) The Japanese cabinet’s original proposals were vetoed by MacArthur because they did not meet the Allied 
criteria for democratic reform. (4) SCAP’s Government Section, consulting Allied criteria and progressive 
Japanese thought, drafted a model constitution which would meet Allied criteria, and it became both by the 
basis of  the new constitution. (5) This draft was modified both by the Japanese cabinet and then by the 
Japanese Diet. (6) MacArthur resisted efforts of  the Allied Powers represented in the Far Eastern Commission 
to amend the proposed constitution and to make the final determination about whether it should be put into 
effect. Thus at this stage MacArthur sought to prevent imposition by the Allied Powers of  their views.” 
McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’: The Policy and Process of  Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan,” The 
Origins of  Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 28 
19 See Chapter 5 section 3. 
20  When Inada Masatsugu and Unno Shinkichi, a lawyer and important member of  the Socialist Party, 
prepared a draft of  the Constitution Discussion Group, Unno proposed an article that “Japan shall be a 
cultural state possessing no armament.” However, because of  further discussion, Inada proposed to omit this 
article and to write pacifism in the preamble. See Koseki, Tanjyo, 76-78. 
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defeat the Japanese people tended to understand the postwar constitution as something that would 
bring a bright future to them. The small booklet of  the Kenpo Fukukai for popularizing the 
Constitution of  Japan was called Atarashi Kenpo Akarui Seikatsu (The New Constitution, A Bright Life), 
twenty million copies of  which were distributed to households throughout the land.21 The school 
textbooks edited by the Ministry of  Education also emphasized that the Japanese people who now 
had a hard time because of  their devastating defeat would be led to prosperity by the practice of  
democracy in every aspect of  their life the new constitution tried to expand and strengthen. 22 
Although conservatives attempted to appeal in public discourse after the war to a nostalgic sense in 
the people, the Meiji Constitution came to be recognized in relation to war, despotism, and austerity. 
Although a life under the previous constitution might be described as too dark to correspond 
objectively to what actually occurred, the Japanese people clearly welcomed the postwar constitution 
as a prescription for a bright future.23 It was believed to be connected to breaking off  a past most 
people could not happily identify themselves with.  
Charles Kades, deputy chief  of  the Government Section and one of  key persons in making 
the constitution, expressed the same view on its durability.  
[T]he constitution accurately caught the spirit and aspirations of  the Japanese 
people. The people were heartsick and weary with war; they were resentful of  
military adventures abroad and police repression and thought control at home; they 
longed for peace and liberty and governmental recognition of  the sanctity of  life 
and the dignity of  the individual. The constitution struck a responsive chord and 
answered those yearnings with its renunciation of  war, with its declaration of  both 
political and economic rights of  both men and women, with its establishment of  an 
independent judiciary to safeguard those rights, and with its proclamation that the 
people are sovereign. Although the people continued to respect the emperor, their 
respect ceased to rigid subservience to a sacred sovereign.24 
 
 
In this context, it is obvious that mere reverting discourse could not convince the people to mobilize 
                                                 
21 See Chapter 5 section 2. 
22 See Chapter 4 section 3. 
23 See Tanaka Hideo, “The Conflict between Two Legal Tradition in Making the Constitution of  Japan,” Ward 
& Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 125-126. 
24 Charles L. Kades, “The American Role in Revising Japan’s Imperial Constitution,” 104 Political Science 
Quarterly 215-247, 243-244 (1989). 
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themselves for constitutional amendment. 
 Meanwhile, however, the claim that the postwar constitution well presents indigenous 
elements of  political culture also has to be confronted by another trap with an easy answer: the 
internal continuity theory. Another kind of  conservative argues that the postwar constitution is the 
best presentation of  the true tradition of  the Japanese people. For them, the Meiji Constitution is not 
a point to which the Japanese people should revert because it was deviant from authentic tradition. 
Rather, the pre-modern period is their favorite. The tenno had nothing to do with governmental 
power but continuously existed as a spiritual authority among the Japanese people. In their view, the 
postwar constitution is characterized as a restoration of  this good old image of  the tenno. If  the 
concept of  the people includes the tenno in the Japanese tradition, they argue, the tenno would share 
sovereignty with the people in the postwar constitutional regime. For them, Japan has been 
invariably a country of  popular sovereignty. In any event, for conservative traditionalists, the 
symbolic tenno institution the postwar constitution has framed perfectly matches the traditional 
image of  the tenno. Thus they contend that there is nothing new in the postwar constitution.  
However, the formulation of  the new constitution was essentially irrelevant to the 
restoration of  a pre-modern system. When it accepted the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese 
government agreed that a reconstruction of  the political order in the postwar era had to be carried 
out based upon the ideas and terms of  modern constitutionalism. Whether one likes it or not, thus, 
an analytical tool had to be modern, too. Establishment of  a liberal democratic government, then, 
was an international pledge the Japanese government agreed to realize.25 The postwar constitution is 
thus evaluated from the viewpoint of  liberal democracy in a modern sense. The new constitution is 
founded upon a profound principle of  due respect for human dignity as individuals. This principle is 
revolutionarily new in Japanese history. Although the Meiji Constitution partially introduced the 
Western concept of  rights, the concept of  the kokutai, that is, the government by the tenno in one line 
unbroken for ages eternal strictly limited rights because the inner freedom of  individuals could not 
                                                 
25 See McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’,” The Origins of  Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 28. 
 451 
be protected under such a governmental system.26 Respect for the human dignity of  individuals did 
not make sense until the postwar constitution took the tenno into the constitutional framework. 
Furthermore, popular sovereignty is inconsistent with the traditional tenno institution. The latter did 
not need justification for its authority. The very notion of  continuity to exist for a long time made it 
legitimate. As far as the symbolic tenno institution is based upon the sovereign will of  the people,27 
this tenno institution unlike the old one has to be justified though public discussion. Because the 
people are plural, the sovereign power of  the people must be exercised though the free exchange of  
ideas. Popular sovereignty and free speech are inseparably connected.28  Thus in the process of  
creating a postwar constitution that is based upon the principle of  popular sovereignty, the tenno 
system was seriously discussed and considered from different angles among the people. There had 
been no such discussion in Japanese history. Public deliberation on reasons and manners of  the tenno 
institution was indeed unprecedented.29 While conservative traditionalists contend that the sovereign 
people included the tenno in the Japanese traditional form of  government, moreover, the contention 
has no solid base because togetherness, not confrontation, of  the tenno and the people, allegedly 
unique to Japan might be merely a false idea deriving from the lack of  consciousness of  freedom, 
equality and above all dignity as an individual.30 In sum, the internal continuity theory also did not 
pay due attention to a fundamental gap between the pre-modern tenno system and the symbolic tenno 
institution the postwar constitution has adopted and, further, oversimplifies complicated theoretical 
foundations of  the latter. The internal continuity theorists trivialize the precious experience of  the 
first republican moment for the Japanese people. 
Therefore, both the external imposition theory and the internal continuity theory fail to 
                                                 
26 See Chapter 1 section 5. 
27 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 1. 
28 See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1948). See also, Chapter 4 sections 4 & 5. 
29  See Tsuneto Kyo, “Kaisei kenpo no kakumeiteki seikaku (Revolutionary Characters of  the Revised 
Constitution),” Shinkenpo to minshushugi (The New Constitution and Democracy) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1947), 
80. 
30 Yokota Kisaburo, Tennosei (The Tenno System) (Tokyo: Rodo Junposha, 1949), 51-57. 
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appreciate the distinctive features of  forming the new constitution in postwar Japan. The governing 
elite might feel MacArthur and GHQ imposed the postwar constitution upon them. If  important 
constitutional writing occurs after extraordinary political achievements,31 a new constitution is a 
document for confirming the achievements that are more or less the break in political values with the 
old regime. Thus, leaders in the previous regime always tend to feel the imposition of  a new 
constitution upon them. In this respect, the case of  the Constitution of  Japan is no exception. And, 
thus, the story about the formulation of  the postwar constitution from the people’s side could be very 
different from the official narrative. No matter how weak it might be, the creation of  the constitution 
was an undeniable republican moment in history of  the Japanese people. They as a whole were 
confronted with the fundamental problem in a political community of  constituting freedom for the 
first time. They publicly discussed the organization of  political power. They argued for and against 
the tenno institution, even its abolition. The publicly deliberated tenno institution is completely 
different from the traditional form of  the institution. Through public deliberation among themselves, 
the Japanese people faced up to a difficult task of  making the traditional authority relative. They had 
to turn something they had unconsciously accepted for a long time into an object of  choice. Self-
conscious confrontation with the object was necessary to achieve this. Here rationalization of  
politics has just begun. That is why I understand the process of  making the postwar constitution as 
an unfinished constitutional revolution in Japan.    
It was fair to say that the Constitution of  Japan was framed in extraordinary circumstances. 
Undeniably, the postwar constitution was born under the enormous influence of  MacArthur and 
GHQ. In fact, Japan was militarily occupied by the Allied Powers, especially the United States.32 
That was the rough situation for the Japanese people, particularly the governing elite who had to 
negotiate with GHQ. However, Japan was defeated in a war she started. She accepted the Potsdam 
                                                 
31 See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); Bruce 
Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
32 Even West Germany, which unlike the Japanese case, was directly occupied, had a more autonomous 
process of  making the basic law. 
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Declaration, which meant that she imposed on herself  the international obligation to liberally 
democratize the governmental process. Unfortunately, the Japanese government failed to come up 
with a reform plan that lived up to international expectations. For the government, the retention of  
the kokutai was identical to the fate of  the state.33 The particularistic value of  the kokutai could not 
prevail over universalistic liberal democratization in the context of  international pledges. 
Perhaps a thought experiment may be suggestive here. What would have happened if  
MacArthur and GHQ had not directly intervened the process of  framing the postwar constitution 
but only kept giving guidance to the Japanese government? Could the Japanese people have 
successfully created a liberal democratic constitution anyway? Initial reform for liberal democracy, 
which also came from GHQ’s occupation policy for executing the Potsdam Declaration, was 
definitely important. Although the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party made the first Yoshida 
Shigeru coalition cabinet, they together held only 239 of  464 seats (51.3%) in the House of  
Representatives when the ninetieth Imperial Diet was convoked on May 16, 1946.34 A majority of  
more than two-thirds of  all the members had to agree on a successful amendment of  the Meiji 
Constitution.35 Decisive power belonged to the Socialist Party, which held 93 seats (20%).36 Thus to 
achieve constitutional amendment, the conservatives would had to compromise with the Socialists. 
At that time, the Socialists covered a wide range of  the political spectrum. Its constitutional plan 
expressed an eclectic attitude among different positions in the party. On February 23, 1946, it 
published the outline of  a new constitution, which provided that “Sovereignty shall reside in the 
State (a cooperative body of  the people, including the tenno). Governing power shall be divided, the 
more important part shall be assigned to the parliament and one part shall be assigned to the tenno 
                                                 
33 See Chapter 2 sections 4 & 5. 
34 See Ishikawa Masumi, Deta Sengo seijishi (Data Postwar Political History) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1984), 115. 
35 See the Constitution of  the Empire of  Japan, art. 73. 
36 The Kyodoto (the Cooperation Party), another conservative party, occupied only 14 (later 45) seats. Before 
the session ended, yet another conservative party, the Kokuminto (the Nation Party) was formed and consisted 
of  45 representatives. See Ishikawa, Sengo seijishi, 115. These two parties merged to form the Kokumin Kyodoto 
(the National Cooperation Party) for the next general election. For the reformation of  conservative parties in 
postwar Japan, see Uchida Kenzo, “Japan’s Postwar Conservative Parties,” Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing 
Japan, 306-338.  
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(largely reducing the tenno’s prerogatives). The tenno shall be retained.”37 Takano Iwasaburo and 
Morito Tatsuo, both important members of  the Constitutional Research Group joined the party’s 
drafting committee.38 On one point in the deliberation, the drafting committee discussed something 
like a symbolic tenno institution as the draft of  the Constitutional Research Group.39 The final 
outline of  a new constitution was more regressive than the conception on one point of  the symbolic 
tenno system but much more progressive than the drafts of  the Liberal Party and Progressive Party, 
both of  which claimed to maintain the kokutai.40 If  the Socialists had been realistically influential, 
the somewhat conservative draft of  the Socialist Party might have been a plan of  the government. If  
so, the most serious problem in the Meiji constitutional system would have been anyway, though not 
completely, solved in a way that the tenno would have been taken into a constitutional framework. 
Further, we must not ignore the fact that the Socialist Party was growing as a party at that time. In 
the second general election in the postwar period, the Socialists became the leading party and the 
center of  the Katayama coalition cabinet. As we have discussed, Katayama Tetsu took the impact 
from the Constitution of  Japan seriously and cultivated his constitutional thoughts based upon the 
impact.41 He and his Socialists might become more progressive in the process of  making the postwar 
constitution.  
It is true that the difference between the theory of  state sovereignty and the concept of  
popular sovereignty with the symbolic tenno system is not a matter of  degree but of  quality. This 
hypothesis may paint a rosy picture of  the Socialists. The conservative parties might have not made 
an easy compromise in respect of  the status and power of  the tenno. Besides, we should not forget 
that the political party balance in the early postwar period was crucially influenced by GHQ’s policy 
                                                 
37 See Chapter 3 section 2. For the Socialist draft, see also, Sato Tatsuo, Seiritsushi, 2: 778-783.  
38 Katayama Tetsu, Hara Hyo, Suzuki Yoshio, Unno Shinkichi, Matsuoka Komakichi were also members of  
the drafting committee. 
39 Minpo, February 16, 1946 in Koseki, Tanjyo, 68. 
40 For the constitutional plans of  the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party, see Sato, Seiritsushi, 2: 736-771, 
773-778. 
41 For Katayam Testu, see Chapter 4 section 10. 
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of a purge of  nationalists and militants.42 Then, however, the work of  constitutional revision would 
have come to a deadlock. The two-thirds majority requirement was a troublesome burden. 
MacArthur’s and GHQ’s intervention might have been necessary.43 The harsh reality of  international 
politics might have also made intervention at an early stage inevitable.44  
The Japanese power elite did not have any idea that they, profoundly infatuated with the 
kokutai ideology, would willingly amend their beloved Meiji Constitution to a substantial extent. 
Surely, MacArthur’s suggestion on constitutional reform stimulated intellectuals on the periphery of  
the power center to engage themselves in framing a new political order in the new era. But the 
overwhelming majority of  common citizens were passive because they suffered serious damage in 
the wartime defeat. First of  all, they were starving. At that time, they desperately wanted rice far 
more than a constitution. Therefore, there is no doubt that the Japanese people did not carry out 
constitutional reform by themselves.  
In the first part of  this conclusion, we have discussed Takayanagi Shinzo’s theory of  
Japanese-American collaboration. By following Alfred Oppler’s terminology,45 further, McNelly has 
understood constitutional reform in postwar Japan as an induced revolution.46 Koseki Shoichi has 
emphasized seeking a new perspective “that goes beyond the nation-state” and “that stresses the 
                                                 
42  Interestingly, however, the situation quickly changed. After removal of  the purge, purged former 
representatives returned to the political world as candidates. 95 such candidates were elected in October 1952. 
They shared only 20.4% of the total 466 seats. See Ishikawa, Sengo seijishi, 30. Postwar politics did not revert to 
type but started an autonomous movement.  
43 Sato Tatsuo, who carried out activities of  constitutional revision as a ranking legal bureaucrat, pointed out 
that unless GHQ’s plan had been presented to the Japanese government, a constitutional revision would have 
been realized upon the plan of the Matsumoto Committee, the Liberal Party, or the Progressive Party which 
would have taken the Socialist plan into account. He stated that the general tendency of  the day was formed 
along opinions in the Matsumoto Committee, the Liberal Party, and the Progressive Party. See Sato Tatsuo, 
“Kenpo shiko no jittai (The Constitution as Applied in Practice),” Koho Kenkyu, no. 19 (1958), 23-42, 40. 
44 McNelly has pointed out that the Far Eastern Commission could have not reached its conclusion because 
the USSR strongly opposed the retention of  the tenno system and veto power. He has speculated that if  the 
FEC had had a unanimous policy toward Japanese constitutional revision, it might have supervised the 
process of  drafting a constitution and text more or less similar to the actual one might have been submitted to 
national referendum. But he has doubted such a would-be constitution could avoid the stigma of  “imposition”. 
See McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’,” Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 100-101. Indeed, Allied forces 
were in Japan.  
45 See Political Reorientation of  Japan, 2: 662-666. 
46 McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’,” The Origins of  Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 29. 
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clash of  legal ideas”.47 Recently, John Dower also has pointed to constitutional writing as a hybrid 
Japanese-American legacy full of  contradictions and mixed messages. “[N]othing better exemplified 
these tensions and complexities than the debates that continued to swirl around the remarkable new 
constitution.”48 Moreover, Ray Moore and Donald Robinson have argued that constitutional making 
was profoundly a joint achievement of  Japan and the United States. They have estimated that 
“Neither side could have produced this constitutional revolution alone.”49 The simple imposition 
theory has been rejected and a view of  postwar constitutional writing as a joint enterprise has 
become popular. In relying upon recent developments, my argument focuses more upon a republican 
moment of  the Japanese people. Without any doubt, this precious opportunity was granted to them. 
Most of  them were passive observers. In the first public debate on constitutional making, however, 
they did listen to what was said about a new fundamental political order. A tradition became an 
object of  discussion, consideration, and choice. The Japanese people as a whole experienced what 
they had never experienced before. Even after the establishment of  the postwar constitution, they 
were forced to face up to the ambiguity deriving from the political compromise over the relationship 
between the principle of  popular sovereignty and the symbolic tenno institution, to try to clear it and 
to manage to strike a delicate balance between the two. The Japanese people, whether conservatives 
or progressives, whether royalists or republicans, shared in the creation of  a new political order with 
one another for the first time in their history. This experience should not be underestimated. 
                                                 
47 Koseki, Tanjyo, 13; Birth, 3. Koseki has pointed out complicated features of  the provisions of  the postwar 
constitution. “In the Japanese Constitution there are provisions, for example, that were merely products of  
compromise, inserted without sufficient discussion; other provisions that are vestiges of  the Meiji Constitution 
that Japanese legal bureaucrats, unnoticed by the Americans, succeeded in retaining; completely new 
provisions, not in the American draft, that Japanese officials or Diet members inserted; and provisions that, 
even though they were important in retrospect, ran counter to the trend of the times and disappeared at the 
early drafting stage. In short, the Japanese Constitution has the appearance of  a mosaic.” Ibid, 3-4. 
48 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 561. In a broader context, Dower has also argued that American occupation 
intensified Japanese bureaucratic capitalism. “[M]uch of what has been characterized as a postwar ‘Japanese 
model’ proves to be a hybrid Japanese-American model: forged in war, intensified through defeat and 
occupation, and maintained over the ensuing decades out of  an abiding fear of  national vulnerability and a 
widespread belief  that Japan needed top-level planning and protection to achieve optimum economic growth. 
This bureaucratic capitalism is incomprehensible without understanding how victor and vanquished embraced 
Japan’s defeat together.” Ibid., 558. 
49 See Moore & Robinson, Partners for Democracy, 337.  
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On the other hand, the extraordinary process of  framing has also caused serious problems. 
First, as we discussed earlier in this conclusion, the Japanese people overwhelmingly welcomed the 
postwar constitution because they felt that the constitution would bring a bright and prosperous life 
to them. Among other things, the ideal of  peace the new constitution has adopted infatuated them. 
The value of  peace, which is understood in relation to the concept of  a culture state, indeed has 
characterized postwar Japan. At some point in history, obviously, the Japanese people regarded 
peace, freedom, and democracy as all directly related to prosperity and a bright future. However, 
identification of  the constitution with prosperity and a bright future easily obscures serious reflection 
on the past. The bad life of  the old days tends to fall into oblivion. What is obscured includes war 
responsibility, particularly to Asian peoples.50 The commitment of  the Japanese people to peace 
unfortunately does not lead to mostly needed reconciliation with the peoples of  the areas Japan 
invaded. The “desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the 
preservation of  peace, and the banishment of  tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all 
time from the earth” must remain as mere desire with such an attitude.51     
Second, the lack of  mobilization of  the people has diluted the liberal democratic values of  
the constitution. The Japanese-American joint enterprise deprived the Japanese people of  
opportunities to express themselves decisively.52 The Japanese government wanted to avoid a direct 
appeal to the people because thorough discussion of  the tenno system and popular ratification were 
essentially inconsistent with its image of  the constitution as an instrument of  the elite for ruling the 
people. MacArthur and GHQ wanted to have a new constitution as a fait accompli as soon as 
possible to avoid the intervention of  the FEC. Both of  them shared a common interest in not having 
popular ratification. Therefore, the rights and liberties guaranteed in the postwar constitution were 
characterized as something rationed from above at the beginning. Their internalization has been a 
                                                 
50 See Koseki Shoichi, ‘Heiwa koka’ nihon no saikento (Reconsideration of 'Peace State' Japan) (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 2002) (hereinafter cited as Koseki, ‘Heiwa Kokka’). 
51 The Constitution of  Japan, preamble, par. 2. 
52 See Chapter 4 section 9. 
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pressing problem for the Japanese people.  
Third, because the Japanese-American hybrid of  constitutional writing soft-landed on the 
planned destination, the postwar constitution inheres a serious essential contradiction. While it has 
declared that respect for human dignity as individuals is the underlying principle, 53  it has also 
provided for a hereditary tenno as the symbol of  the state and of  the unity of  the people.54 A political 
community based upon the principle of  respect for human dignity as individuals is characterized as 
having a horizontal relation of  its members as equals. Rule of  the community should be built upon a 
fundamental value of  mutual respect as individuals. Thus it should not be naturally symbolized by a 
person who holds a special status different from common citizens. A hereditary institution respects 
lineage and conflicts with recognition of  equal value among individuals.55 However, the Japanese-
American joint enterprise has approved two institutions in essential tension. Although this tension 
was well understood at the beginning of  the postwar constitutional system,56 it has been a difficult 
task for the Japanese people to strike a balance between universalism and particularism. To face up 
self-consciously to the tension is necessary to strike a critical balance. The debate over the symbolic 
tenno institution in the early postwar period indicated that once the tension is lost, there is a danger 
that the particularistic value might erode even the underlying principle. The tenno institution that was 
deified and mystified under the Meiji regime is apt to easily be an object of  manipulation for political 
causes. Although the postwar constitution has adopted a system in which there is a guarantee of  
fundamental human rights, popular sovereignty, and thorough pacifism to secure respect for human 
dignity as individuals, nonetheless, it is undeniable that its introduction of  the tenno institution with 
the same tenno has given a misleading impression of  continuity between the two constitutional 
regimes. The lack of  popular mobilization here again works negatively. 
These problems deriving from the Japanese-American collaboration have to be solved for 
                                                 
53 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 13. See also ibid. art. 97. 
54 The Constitution of  Japan, art. 1. 
55  See Takahashi Kazuyuki, Rikkenshugi to nihonkoku kenpo (Constitutionalism and the Constitution of  Japan) 
(Tokyo: Hoso Daigaku Kyoiku Shinkokai, 2001), 302-303. 
56 See Chapter 5. 
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furthering constitutional values. Because now the GHQ’s intervention ended long time ago, the 
Japanese people can decide how to respond to these problems by themselves with the principle of  
popular sovereignty.   
 
Meanwhile, both domestic and international environments have significantly changed from 
those surrounding Japan at the establishment of  the postwar constitution. Starvation is a relic of  the 
past. An affluent society has emerged. The self-recognition of  a fourth class country has become an 
old story. Defeat in the war is now far away. When the postwar constitution was established, the 
Cold War was in the germ. Now it has ended. As time has passed, memories of  defeat and 
occupation are fading. There is no doubt that a constitution is an outcome of  a time. As 
environments change, thus, cry for change is in a sense necessary. 
Among other things, Article 9 has been a central target of  harsh criticism. Denunciation of  
war and of  armed forces has been criticized ever since its establishment. However, attacks on Article 
9 have been more severe than ever since the Japanese felt internationally ridiculed when Japan 
decided to offer money, not troops, for the Gulf  War by following the spirit of  the postwar 
constitution.57  
The challenge to the constitutional principle itself  should be welcomed because criticisms 
usually contribute to an expansion of  the legitimacy of  the system. Especially, comparison with the 
Meiji Constitution indicates their importance. In fact, the very criticisms on the postwar constitution 
prove its superiority over its predecessor because the Meiji constitutional system had never tolerated 
critics accusing the constitution itself. Criticisms were excluded from the process of  framing the 
Meiji Constitution.58 With the Chian Iji Ho (the Peace Preservation Law), further, the concept of  the 
kokutai suppressed any criticism of  the constitutional regime in public discourse. The notion of  kintei 
kenpo (a constitution created by the tenno) deterred criticism. The Meiji constitutional regime was 
                                                 
57 See Glenn D. Hook & Gavan McCormack, Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2001). 
58 See Chapter 1 section 1. 
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essentially a closed circle for the established elite. On the other hand, the postwar constitution was 
committed to an open system. Unlike the Bonn Basic Law, which adopts the idea of  fighting 
democracy, 59  even a challenge to the liberal democratic fundamental order is constitutionally 
protected as far as it remains an advocate of  critical thought. Freedom of  expression is guaranteed 
without any reservation on the face of  a constitutional text.60 The postwar constitutional system tries 
to protect the public space for rich debate and robust exchange of  ideas among the people. 
In the case of  Article 9, the problem is complicated. The Japanese government first stated 
that Japan could not wage even a war of  self-defense. Although paragraph 1 of  Article 9 does not 
necessarily deny the right of  self-defense as a state, the government explained, its second paragraph 
prohibits her from having armed forces and the right of  belligerency and thus she cannot fight a self-
defense war as a matter of  fact. Since then, the government has come to interpret the armed forces 
the second paragraph prohibits Japan from maintaining as forces by which modern warfare can be 
executed. Under this interpretation, the Self-Defense Forces have been organized and steadily 
upgraded with weapons and equipments. Many people doubt that the government’s interpretation is 
constitutional but the Supreme Court of  Japan has avoided this controversial issue by resorting to 
interpretive technicalities.61 Nonetheless, the government still claims that the right of  collective self-
defense cannot be exercised without conflicting with Article 9.62  
This expansive but still somewhat restrictive interpretation of  Article 9 by the government, 
on the one hand, has eroded the normative power of  Article 9 but, on the other, clearly succeeded in 
                                                 
59 See Bonn Basic Law, art.21 par. 2. 
60 See the Constitution of Japan, art. 21. In this respect, the postwar Japanese constitution is more similar to 
the U.S. Constitution than to the postwar German Constitution. See the U.S. Constitution, first amendment. 
61  The Supreme Court has said nothing about the constitutionality of  the Self-Defense Forces. See the 
Naganuma Nike Missile Site Case, Supreme Court Judgment, September 9, 1982, Minshu 36: 2, 1679 in 
Lawrence W. Beer & Hiroshi Itoh, The Constitutional Case Law of  Japan, 1970 through 1990 (Seattle, University of  
Washington Press, 1996), 122-130; the Hyakuri Air Base Case, Supreme Court Judgment, June 20, 1989, 
Minshu 43: 6, 385, ibid., 130-141. See also the Sunagawa Case (a case of  constitutionality over Article 9 of  the 
United States bases in Japan), Supreme Court Judgment, December 16, 1959, Keishu 13: 2, 3225  in John M. 
Maki, Court and Constitution in Japan: Selected Supreme Court Decisions, 1948-60 (Seattle, University of  
Washington Press, 1964), 298-361. 
62 For the government’s interpretation of Article 9, see Nakamura Akira, Sengo seiji ni yureta kenpo kyujyo (Article 
9 of the Constitution that Has Been Swayed by Postwar Politics), 2nd ed., (Tokyo: Chuo Keizaisha, 2001). 
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evading excessive military costs in the intense Cold War situation, which enabled Japan to pursue 
economic growth in the postwar era. However, the government’s position has been criticized not 
only by progressives who stick to the constitutional principle of  thorough pacifism but also by 
conservatives who want Japan to be a “normal” country with full armed forces. The concept of  
peace without armed forces is now on trial. 
However, the problem of  Article 9 is more intricate than the conservatives argue. Article 9 
was created principally to protect the tenno himself  from his war criminalization and its institution 
from abolition.63 Thus it related to not just the provision of  denouncing war and armed forces, but 
also the whole structure of  the postwar constitution. A real question the Japanese people have to 
answer now is whether Japan has been successful in the liberal democratization of  politics 
independently of  the influence of  the tenno and, even more importantly, whether the liberal 
democratization of  politics in the postwar era has won trust from foreign countries, especially the 
Asian countries Japan invaded and colonized in her imperialist era.  
Unfortunately, the postwar government has failed to fully assume war responsibility. 
Political utilization of  the tenno has never ceased. This is not only the case with traditional 
conservatives. In the summer of  1993, the LDP lost power for the first time in thirty-eight years and 
Hosokawa Morihiro was designated as prime minister in the Diet and formed his non-LDP and-
communist seven-party coalition cabinet. The members of  this new cabinet wanted to authorize 
itself  through the tenno. According to the postwar constitution, the tenno formally appoints the prime 
minister,64 but he was abroad at that time. In such cases, the kotaishi (the crown prince) is delegated 
to perform matters of  state. 65  As a matter of  constitutional principle, the kotaishi should have 
appointed Hosokawa as the prime minister. As a matter of  fact, they waited for the tenno’s return 
because they believed that an epoch-making new start in government after the long reign of  the LDP 
                                                 
63 See McNelly, “‘Induced Revolution’,” Ward & Sakamoto, Democratizing Japan, 102; Koseki, ‘Heiwa Kokka’, 
47-48.  
64 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 6 par. 1. 
65 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 4 par. 2. 
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should be celebrated by the direct appointment of  the tenno himself. 
Thus we cannot say that the goal the Japanese people set after the defeat has been achieved. 
The liberal democratization of  politics is developing, not developed. In such a situation, Article 9 is 
still a reminder of  what Japan did in the pre- and mid-war period and the symbol of  how the 
Japanese people can gain trust from other peoples. 
One question that should be asked now is how the Japanese people can achieve a 
constitutional promise, the liberal democratization of  politics, which is still needed after fifty-seven 
years. Recently, Kato Norihiro, a literary critic, argued for the choice of  the same constitution.66 His 
argument basically relies upon criticism on the imposed constitution as a starting point of  postwar 
democracy. He praises the opposition of  Minobe Tatsukichi to the proposed constitutional revision 
by the government in the Privy Council.67 Kato mentions the meeting of  February 13, 1946, between 
Japanese government representatives and officials in the Government Section as a symbolic episode 
of  the imposition.68 Unlike conservatives, however, Kato contends for a progressive cause that the 
Japanese people should look squarely at the fact that the peace constitution they now highly approve 
of  was established by an occupying force and had lacked their subjective commitment. Thus Kato 
proposes to choose the postwar constitution again to promote its progressive values.69 
As this dissertation has showed, Kato’s foundation of  argument is not persuasive. Minobe 
later argued for constitutional revolution and seemed to deny his own academic achievement for the 
liberal democratization of  the Meiji Constitution in his postwar writings.70 Kato does not understand 
why the postwar constitution was written in such an extraordinary way.71 Even more importantly, he 
                                                 
66 Kato Norihiro, Haisengo ron (An Essay on the Post Defeat in War) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1997). 
67 Kato, Hisengo ron, 25-31. 
68 Kato, Hisengo ron, 19. Kato quotes the following: “At 10:10 o’clock General Whitney and the undersigned 
left the porch and went out into the sunshine of  the garden as an American plane passed over the house. After 
about fifteen minutes Mr. Shirasu joined us, whereupon General Whitney quietly observed to him: ‘We are out 
here enjoying the warmth of atomic energy.’” Takayanagi, Seitei Katei, 1: 324.  
69 Kato, Haisengo ron, 22-23.  
70 See Chapter 2 section 6. 
71 See Chapter 2 sections 4 & 5. 
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does not appreciate Japanese initiatives for creating a new political order.72 He fails to understand 
that the Japanese-American conspiracy deprived the Japanese people of  a precious opportunity to 
express themselves decisively, which has without doubt diluted the liberal democratic values of  the 
postwar constitution.73 In addition, Kato also fails to pay attention to the fact that denunciation of  
war and of  armed forces was closely related to the retention of  the tenno institution. 
This dissertation has indicated that even within the granted political space of  the 
extraordinary circumstances of  occupation, the Japanese people experienced a republican moment 
for the first time in their history. They self-consciously faced up to the fundamental question of  
political legitimacy. No matter how limited the choice might have been, the Japanese people did 
choose the postwar constitution.  
Thus, the real question is rather whether to reinforce the choice of  the past or to discard it, 
not to choose the same postwar constitution. What is questioned is, then, the meaning of  defeat and 
the ensuing creation of  a fundamental political order for the Japanese people. The message of  the 
original choice is clear: the principles of  popular sovereignty and thorough pacifism have been 
adopted to realize due respect for human dignity as individuals. Have freedom, democracy, and 
peace been fully realized in the last fifty-seven years? Rather, the making of  the postwar constitution 
around the limitations has marked a mere starting point of  internalizing the liberal democratization 
of  politics. It was indeed an unfinished constitutional revolution. If  the liberal democratization of  
politics has not been completed yet, then the original choice is still relevant fifty-seven years later. To 
reinforce constitutional values and promote their internalization further, commitment to politics by 
the people should be on trial. That is because whether they are active or passive, enlightened or 
ignorant, positive or cynical, the very people play a central role in a postwar constitutional system 
where popular sovereignty has been solemnly declared.    
We should recall what Morito Tatsuo, an important member of  the Kenpo Kenkyukai (the 
                                                 
72 See Chapter 3 sections 2, 4, & 5 and Chapter 4 section 2. 
73 See Chapter 4 section 9. 
 464 
Constitutional Research Group) and the Socialist Party, and the Minster of  Education of  the 
Katayama and Ashida cabinets, pointed out in the process of  making the postwar constitution.74 The 
most important thing about a new constitution was, Morito argued, not making a consistent system 
of  legal doctrines but reforming old power relations. Morito clearly understood the necessity that the 
Japanese people themselves should further the political and social reforms GHQ’s occupational 
policy originated. To reform power relations in society, he thought, it was necessary to enhance the 
political and social consciousness of  the people. The new constitution should be characterized as 
principles for guiding the people to promoting the political and social reforms that had started. 
Morito thus appealed to the priority of  politics as a source of  reform for peace, freedom, and 
democracy.75 What Morito stated in January 1946 is still significantly stimulating. In the liberal 
democratization of  politics, the Japanese people continue to undergo a constitutional revolution. 
The priority of  politics is desperately needed to realize the constitutional promises. 
In a sense, however, the poverty of  politics might be prepared in the postwar constitution. It 
entails the essential contradiction that while the constitution places human dignity as individuals as 
the most fundamental value, the state and the people the constitution plans to regulate are 
symbolized by the tenno, the institution of  which reflects a dynastic virtue conflicting with 
fundamental values. A static view of  the constitutional order might misunderstand that it is the tenno 
who integrates the people.76 Then political integration tends to be downplayed because it might be 
understood as being already embodied by the tenno. However, we should be cautious not to get 
caught up in the continuity thesis. When the Meiji Constitution was established, its founders sought 
the center of  a new governmental system for the tenno. It was partly because religion had no 
influence upon integrating the people in Japan. It was also because, unlike Western peoples, the 
                                                 
74 See Chapter 3 section 2. 
75 Morito Tatsuo, “Kenpo kaise no kadai (Problems over Constitutional Revision),” Tokyo Shinbun, January 9-
13, 1946, in Kizokuin Jimukyoku Chosabu, ed., Kenpo kaisei ni kansuru shoron shuroku (A Collection of  Articles 
and Essays on the Constitutional Revision) (1946), 122-127. 
76 See Chapter 5 section 9. 
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Japanese people were unfamiliar with constitutional politics.77 But the ultimate reason why the 
founders resorted to the tenno lay in the elitist distrust, or fear, of  politics by the people. It was 
convenient for the hanbatsu leaders to utilize the tenno for national integration because morality 
attached to the tenno could be directly connected to the political legitimacy all governmental systems 
need. For them, after all, the constitution was nothing other than an efficient instrument for ruling 
the people.  
In the postwar constitution, however, the status of  the symbol of  the state and the unity of  
the people the tenno holds derives from the sovereign will of  the people. 78  Unlike the Meiji 
constitutional regime, the postwar system has made the authority of  the tenno relative and rational. 
The morality which used to be attached to the tenno has become irrelevant to political legitimacy in 
the postwar constitutional system. If  national integration by the tenno reflects the elitist distrust of  
popular politics, such a way of  securing political integration should not be applicable to the postwar 
political regime. The postwar constitution relies upon the people the hanbatsu leaders were afraid of. 
As a matter of  constitutional principle, the people are integrated through politics before the tenno 
system performs its function. In short, political integration of  the people comes first and then it is 
symbolized by the tenno.  
In this constitutional structure, therefore, a picture of  political integration is more dynamic 
because the people are essentially plural and thus always tend to be diversified. Thus, popular 
sovereignty is also a dynamic idea. Unlike the solo sovereign in monarchy, popular sovereignty with 
the presupposition of  plurality has to ask how to create a sovereign will. As we have repeatedly 
discussed, the principle of  popular sovereignty is profoundly connected to free expression.79 The 
human dignity, popular sovereignty, and thorough pacifism the postwar constitution has tried to 
                                                 
77 The idea of  the tenno as the center of  the state is found in the opening speech for deliberation in the Privy 
Council by Ito Hirobumi as its president. See Inada Masatsugu, Meiji kenpo seiritsushi (A History of  Making the 
Meiji Constitution) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1962), 2: 567-568. See also, Chapter 1. 
78 See the Constitution of  Japan, art. 1. 
79 See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1948). 
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realize as the crucial political values should be the center of  the political integration of  the Japanese 
people. However, even with the full protection of  free expression, we cannot secure agreement on 
important matters among the sovereign people. There basic constitutional values are all controversial 
political concepts. Disagreement rather than agreement is perhaps normal in popular engagement in 
politics. Thus agreement is always tentative. The idea of  popular sovereignty invokes challenges to 
the status quo partly because political decisions in a community are inevitably provisionary and 
partly because a minority is as a general trend apt to govern a majority even in a democracy. But it is 
mostly because the concept of  popular sovereignty inspires the people to bring reality close to the  
ideal. Because of  this inherent dynamism of  popular sovereignty, robust public debate makes it really 
workable. Political integration can be achieved only through popular commitment to such open 
discussion.  
Then we realize that the postwar constitution has transformed politics from an old system 
based upon a vertical order-subject relation to a more horizontal relation of  mutual persuasion 
among equals by speech. As a result, the Japanese people have been invited to “replace the notion of  
a regime governed by laws, of  a legitimate power, by the notion of  a regime founded upon the 
legitimacy of  a debate as to what is legitimate and what is illegitimate---a debate which is necessarily 
without any guarantor and without any end.”80 In such a regime, the priority of  politics is essentially 
inevitable. Politics based upon “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” 81  public debate alone can 
realize the constitutional promises by integrating the people. Thus, the postwar constitution gains 
more brilliance in vigorous discussion.82 The constitutional revolution does indeed continue for the 
Japanese people. 
                                                 
80 Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. by David Macey (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 39. 
81 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
82 The commissions of  investigation of  the constitution have been established in both houses of  the Diet since 
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